P. M. CHAUHAN J. ( 1 ) IN this third round of litigation first having lost upto the Supreme Court and second unberion relief not granted by the Court and subsequently having been withdrawn the petitioner The Gujarat Rajya Hawkers Lari-Stand Patharanwala Sangh (to be referred as The Union) is asserting practically the same contentions and also asserts for interim relief pending the hearing of the writ petition. ( 2 ) THE petition came up before the learned single Judge of this High Court and pending the admission status quo was directed to be maintained. There after the learned single Judge issued rule and at the same time directed to place this matter before the Division Bench as in the view of the learned Judge having regard to the facts and circumstances of the matter it would be proper to refer the matter to the Division Bench and continued the ad interim relief. Even before the learned single Judge affidavit-in-reply was filed on behalf of the respondents and copies of the previous judgments were produced but it appears that considering the importance of the matter and the previous litigation between the parties and that the previous judgment was delivered by the Division Bench of this High Court the learned single Judge directed to place this matter before the Division Bench. At the request of the learned Advocates for the parties we proceeded on to hear the ad interim relief granted by the learned single Judge as it is seriously challenged by the respondents that the learned single Judge should not have granted ad interim relief in view of the previous litigation between the parties and the judgment of this Court confirmed by the Supreme Court. ( 3 ) ADMITTEDLY the petitioner was the party in previous proceedings in the High Court and the Supreme Court. In spite of that the petitioner has sought relief restraining the respondents from removing their larry-gallas patharnas etc. from the places which the members of the Union occupy. Even though the grounds urged by the petitioner are practically the same it is contended that some grounds other than those decided by the High Court and the Supreme Court are involved in this petition and therefore till this matter is heard and finally decided by this Court the respondents should be restrained from taking any further action of removal of larri-gallas etc. ( 4 ) IN the facts and circumstances of this matter it is desirable to narrate in short the history of the litigation between the parties. Unauthorised obstruction was caused by certain hawkers within the limits of the Municipal Corporation at Ahmedabad and also with in the limits of Vadodara City and Surat City; the Corporation authorities tried to remove them from the public places and therefore several Special Civil Applications were filed in this High Court from 1980 to 1984 the numbers of which are specified in the judgment copy of which is produced on the record. The Division Bench of this High Court by judgment dated December 23 1985 disposed of the writ petitions. Various legal contentions about the right of the parties to occupy the public street were turned down by the High Court. We shall consider in short the rival contentions which were raised before the High Court and the Supreme Court and in the present petition at a later stage. After rejecting the cententions the penultimate direction given by the Division Bench was that the Corporation should prepare a Scheme with such modifications as may be necessary having regard to the overall legal contentions in the areas under the jurisdiction of the Corporation on the lines of the Scheme as modified and approved by the Supreme Court in Bombay Hawkers Union v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985 SCC 525 ). The direction was to prepere the Scheme within a period of three months. Accordingly the Municipal Commissioner Ahmedabad framed the final Scheme a copy of which is produced on the record. But it is not necessary in the present litigation to consider the details of the Scheme as the particulars of the Scheme are not challenged. The judgment by the Division Bench of this Court was challenged by several parties by filing petitions for special leave to appeal in the Supreme Court and some of the parties who did not file petitions for special leave to appeal in the Supreme Court preferred writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court by order dated July 28 1986 directed this Court to examine the Scheme and after hearing the petitioners if any to suggest such modification as may be appropriate and desirable and forward the report to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court by order dated July 28 1986 directed this Court to examine the Scheme and after hearing the petitioners if any to suggest such modification as may be appropriate and desirable and forward the report to the Supreme Court. After that the Division Bench of this High Court examined the Scheme and heard objections of the parties and submitted the report to the effect that the Scheme prepared by the respondent-Corporation deserves to be accepted subject to the modifications specified in the report. When they objections were listed for hearing in the Supreme Court some of the petitioners contended that because of the disturbed condition in the Ahmedabad City at the relevant time they could not point out their difficulties and therefore the Supreme Court by order dated October 8 1987 again directed the High Court to consider as to whether the Scheme as modifed by it required further modification. The Division Bench of this High Court again considered the report heard the learned Advocates for the parties and expressed the view that no modification was necessary except one suggested by the Advocates for the parties which is specified in the order. That was with regard to the distance from the road from which larry-gallas should be removed. The Supreme Court heard some of the matters on January 6 1988 and remaining on February 3 1988 and disposed of the matters observing that. "on consideration of all aspects of the case we feel that the scheme approved by the High Court on April 22 1987 as modified any the supplementary report dated December 7 1987 submitted to this Court should be affirmed and accepted by us and the said scheme as modified by the supplementary report dated December 7 1987 submitted to this High Court should be treated as sufficient for purposes of meeting the requirements of the situation. There shall be an order in all these petitions in the above terms in modification of the judgment of the High Court". After that the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation intended to implement the scheme and therefore several suits were filed in the City Civil Court Ahmedabad and notices of motion were taken out for restraining the respondents from removing the cabins largy-gallas and patharanas from the places occupied by them but were unsuccessful in getting interim orders and therefore preferred several appeals against the interim orders. The learned Single Judge of this Court by judgment dated April 29 1988 dimissed the appeals but issued certain directions laying down the procedure to be followed before the removal of the larry-gallas etc. Even though the directions are not much relevant for the purpose of the present litigation it should be stated that the learned single Judge directed the respondents to issue public notice in one of the local Gujarati newspapers at least 15 days before the date fixed for the removal and for public announcement by loud speakers four days prior to the date fixed for the removal. After that the respondent Municipal Corporation proceeded to implement the Scheme and remove the encroachments and issued public notice dated May 7 1988 The present petitioner then filed Special Civil Application No. 2577 of 1988 in the High Court and other petitioners also filed Special Civil Application No. 2510 of 1988 and prayed for the Interim relief. In Special Civil Application No. 2577 of 1988 copy of which is produced by the petitioner on the record the contentions mostly were that by implementing the Scheme and by removing the larry-gallas the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 14 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India are offended and the property right and the right to live of the petitioners are seriously jeopardised. Prayer for interim relief was also made but this Court considering the rival contentions rejected the prayer for interm relief Special Civil Application No. 2577 of 1988 was then withdrawn on December 22 1988 Before that the present petition was filed by the petitioner and the learned single Judge by order dated December 22 1988 granted ad interim relief and directed to maintain the status quo. The present petition is therefore the third petition in the High Court Challenging the action of the respondent-Corporation removing the unauthorised occupation of the public streets by keeping lorry-gallas patharanas etc. ( 5 ) THE petitioner raises practically the same contentions as raised in the previous litigations but Shri Memon learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner submits that several other points which were required to be contended by the parties and considered by the Court in the previous litigation were not raised or considered and therefore the present petition is legally tenable. In view of the contention it would be considered in short the contentions in the present petition by the petitioner. In view of the contention it would be considered in short the contentions in the present petition by the petitioner. ( 6 ) THE main contentions by the petitioner in the present petition are that the Standing Committee of the Municipal Corporation passed a Resolution No. 1350 dated January 21 1986 by which the the Municipal Corporation has decided to install about 10000 Mini Stall at such places by which obstruction may not be caused to the public in general and to allot the Mini Stall to recognised larrygallawalas unemployed Mill Workers educated encroachment persons and to remove encroachment made by them and accommodate them at such places. The text of the Resolution is extracted in the petition and it is contended that before removing the encroachment alternative arrangement is to be made to accommodate the socalled encroachers. The petitioner has asserted its right to occupy the open place side of the road etc. as many of them are in possession for more than 15 to 20 years and according to the petitioners when the trespassers can become owners of the land in their possession with the passage of time the members of the petitionerunion also should get such right. It is also asserted that the person in possession has good title against all other persons in the world but the rightful owner and acquire an absolute title if the rightful owner does not assert his title within the prescribed period of limitation. It is also contended that the Municipal Corporation has decided to confer the ownership rights of the shops cabins and the plots to 48 displaced persons from Pakistan some of whom are occupying authorisedly and some unauthorisedly and therefore the petitioner also should be conferred such ownership right and for that purpose they have already submitted the application to the Municipality. The petitioners have also asserted the fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (g) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India and during the course of the arguments Shri Memon learned Advocate of the petitioner referred the same authorities which were considered by this Court in previous judgment. The petitioners have also asserted the fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (g) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India and during the course of the arguments Shri Memon learned Advocate of the petitioner referred the same authorities which were considered by this Court in previous judgment. The petitioners have accordingly prayed for a declaration that the impugned act of the Municipal Corporation infringes the fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 14 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India is against the law laid down by the Supreme Court of India is mala fide high-handed and that the respondent No. 1 Municipal Corporation has no right to remove the larry-gallas of the members of the petitioner-Union unless the land on which they stand is required for public purpose and without holding proper enquiry about the possessory right of the members of the petitioner-Union and also without providing alternative sites or accommodation to the members of the Union who occupy the particular place for 20 years or more. ( 7 ) THE contentions of the petitioners are controverted by the respondents in the affidavit-in-reply of Estate Officer Shri K. J. Shah. The main contentions are that the present petition is not tenable as the same contentions decided by this High Court and approved by the Supreme Court and the Scheme as directed by this Court is finally approved by the Supreme Court and the petitioner had raised all the contended which are asserted in this petition in the High Court as well as in the Supreme Court. I is also contended that the Special Civil Application No. 2577 of 1988 having been withdrawn the present petition is barred. Various other contentions are raised by the respondents which shall be considered at the relevant place. Copy of the affidavitin-reply filed by the Deputy Estate Officer Shri P. K. Ruwala in Special Civil Application No. 2577 of 1988 is also produced. The respondents also rely on the judgment in Special Civil Application No. 2584 of 1980 etc. Orders of this High Court dated April 22 1987 and December 7 1987 in the same matters considering the Scheme prepared by the respondent-Corporation and the judgment by the Supreme Court. ( 8 ) AS we are deciding the limited point about the interim relief it is not necessary for us to elaborately consider the rival contentions of the parties. However as Mr. ( 8 ) AS we are deciding the limited point about the interim relief it is not necessary for us to elaborately consider the rival contentions of the parties. However as Mr. Memon learned Advocate for the petitioner has vehemently urged and asserted the contentions of the petitioner for granting interim relief and restraining the respondents from removing the encroachment till the final decision of this petition we would consider in short the rival contentions of the parties. ( 9 ) IN the group of Special Civil Applications including the one by the present petitioner this Court considered the relevant provisions of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act 1949 and Articles 14 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. It was urged that the Municipal Corporation had no right to remove the encroachment and the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (g) and Article 21 of the Constitution were violated. In support of the contention the judgments of the Supreme Court in Bombay Hawkers Union and Others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others ( AIR 1985 SC 1206 and Olga Tellis and Others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others ( AIR 1986 SC 180 ) were referred. After elaborate discussions the Division Bench observed that: In view of these decisions we hold that the hawkers have no fundamental or legal rights to occupy parts of public streets for doing their business and that Section 231 of the B. P. M. C. Act is not ultra vires Articles 14 19 and 21 of the Constitution. Asserting the right to live guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India it was urged before the Division Bench that the petitioners had right to carry on their business at the places occupied by them. That contention was repelled and referring the affidavit filed in that matter it was observed that pursuant to the suggestion made by this Court a Scheme has been framed by the Corporation and number of sites in different parts of the city are set apart where the hawkers can keep their larries and gallas and carry on their business. That contention was repelled and referring the affidavit filed in that matter it was observed that pursuant to the suggestion made by this Court a Scheme has been framed by the Corporation and number of sites in different parts of the city are set apart where the hawkers can keep their larries and gallas and carry on their business. The Contention that the opportunity should be afforded before the removal was also turned down as the parties were given sufficient opportunity of being heard and the Supreme Court in the case of Olga Tellis (supra) also did not consider it necessary to serve the notice before the removal as the parties were given sufficient opportunity of being heard in the Court. It is therefore apparent that almost all the contentions raised by the petitioner in the present petition were raised in the previous litigation and were rejected by this Court. ( 10 ) SHRI Memon learned Advocate for the petitioner referring to the judgment in Bombay Hawkers Union and Others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others ( AIR 1985 SC 1206 ) submits that even the Supreme Court has observed that the hawkers have right subject to reasonable restrictions to carry on their business and that does not mean that they cannot occupy any portion of the public place. The hawkers can do their business at the proper places where obstruction may not be caused and therefore they have right to occupy the corners of the street and such other places. That submission cannot be accepted as the Supreme Court has clearly turned down the contention that the hawkers had right to carry on the business as it is their fundamental right conferred under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court clearly observed that:"the right conferred by Article 19 (1)g) of the Constitution to carry on any trade or business is subject to the provisions of clause (6) of that Article which provides that nothing in subclause (g) of Article 19 (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes or prevents the State from making any law imposing in the interests of the general public reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said subclause. The affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents show in unmistakable terms that the impugned provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act are in the nature of reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public on the exercise of the right of hawkers to carry on their trade or business. No one has any right to do his or her trade or business so as to cause nuisance annoyance or inconvenience to the other members of the public. Public streets by their very nomenclature and definition are meant for the use of the general public. They are not laid to facilitate the carrying on of private trade or business. If hawkers were to be conceded the right claimed by them they could hold the society to ranson by squatting on the centre of busy thoroughfares thereby paralysing all civil life". The Supreme Court has observed in unambiguous terms that the hawkers cannot be allowed to occupy part of the public street. ( 11 ) THE Supreme Court in the recent judgment in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur ( AIR 1989 SC 38 ) while agreeing with the judgments of the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis and Bombay Hawkers Union (supra) has also expressed the same view. ( 12 ) EVEN though the contention that the hawkers have right to life as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India and therefore they have right to carry on their business at public places was turned down by the Division Bench and which decision was approved by the Supreme Court Shri Memon learned Advocate for the petitioners referring the judgment in Olga Tellis (supra) and specifically the observations in paragraph 32 of the judgment has asserted the same contention. It is true that in Olga Tellis case the observation of the Supreme Court regarding the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution is that the sweep of right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far-reaching that it does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as for example by the imposition and execution of the death sentence except according to procedure established by law. In the view of the Supreme Court that is but one aspect of the right to life. In the view of the Supreme Court that is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of the right is the right to livelihood because no person can live without the means of living that is the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional light to life the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abregation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. These observations are made by the Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In the same judgment the Supreme Court has categorically observed that by Article 21 such deprivation has to be according to the procedure established by law. In the first place the footpaths or the pavements are public properties which are intended to serve the convenience of the general public. They are not laid for private use and indeed their use for a private purpese frustrates the very object for which they are carved out from the portions of public streets. That contention was therefore virtually turned down by the Supreme Court. In Bombay Hawkers Union (supra) similar contentions were raised and it was submitted that the removal of illegal encroachments by the Municipal Corporation constitutes a threat to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and that right to life includes the right to livelihood. Reliance on the judgment in Olga Tellis (supra) was considered as of little avail as the Constitution Bench in the case of Olga Tellis observed that the word life in Article 21 includes livelihood but upheld the validity of Sections 313 (1) and 314 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act which provided that the Commissioner may without notice cause to be removed obstructions such as encroachments on footpaths which could not be regarded as unreasonable unfair and unjust. In view of the observations by the Supreme Court the submissions of Shri Memon deserve to be rejected. In view of the observations by the Supreme Court the submissions of Shri Memon deserve to be rejected. ( 13 ) THE petitioner asserts the right of purchasing the property as the Municipal Corporation has conferred such title for about 48 displaced persons from Pakistan who are holding the cabins shops or plots in Revdi Bazaar. According to the petitioners some of them are holding such cabins shops or plots unauthorisedly and even then the respondent-Municipal Corporation is inclined to confer valid title to them. That submission cannot be accepted as it is not clear as to whether title of the part of the public street is sought to be conferred on those persons. Even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that some persons unauthorisedly occupying the plots are conferred the rights that does not necessarily mean that the petitioner can assert their right to occupy the part of the public street. ( 14 ) THE contention that the petitieners can assert their tittle except against the original owner is also devoid of any merits. The public streets vest in the local body and the Municipal Corporation asserts the title and the right to remove the encroachment. ( 15 ) MR. Memon learned Advocate for the petitioner asserts that some of the members of the petitioner-Union are occupying part of the public street or public place for 15 to 20 years and they cannot be removed without holding an enquiry. In Support of this submission Shri Memon refers to Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao and Another (AIR 1912 SC 1081 ). The observations by the Supreme Court in that case were regarding the summary remedy for eviction as provided in Section 6 of the A. P. Land Encroachment Act. In the view of the Supreme Court the provisions of Section 6 of the Act can be resorted to by the Government only against persons who are in unauthorised occupation of the land which is the property of the Government but cannot be invoked if there is a bona fide dispute regarding the title of the Government to the property. Ill fact situation of the present litigation that observation of the Supreme Court is not relevant. The submission of Mr. Ill fact situation of the present litigation that observation of the Supreme Court is not relevant. The submission of Mr. Memon is that enquiry should be held as to whether the places occupied by the members of the petitioner-Union are required for public purpose and only after that encroachment should be removed. The very purpose of laying footpaths or pavements on public streets is a public purpose and the streets are meant for general public for use. The observatious of the Supreme Court in the case of Bombay Hawkers Union and in the case of Olga Tellis (supra) on the point are clear. It is therefore not necessary to enquire as to whether the places occupied by the members of the petitioner-Union are required for public purpose. Shri Memon lastly submits that if the interim relief is vacated the purpose of filing the petition will he frustrated and the petition will become infructous. It is true that if the interim relief is not granted the petitioners will not be in a position to assert their right to would the same place. In case ultimately the petition is allowed and the action of the respondent-Municipal Corporation is set aside the members of the petitioner Union can assert their right to occupy the same place. In view of the settled legal position as discussed above and the fact that the petitioners has failed even to prima facie establish the right of its members to occupy unauthorisedly parts of the public streets or such other public places and in view of the fact that petitioner was a party to the judgments of the Division Bench of this Court and of the Supreme Court status quo cannot be allowed to be continued and the members of the petitioner-Union cannot be allowed to continue the public places unauthorisedly occupied by them during the pendency of this third petition. If the ad interim relief is allowed to be continued it would virtually amount to ignoring the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court and therefore status quo order granted earlier should be vacated. We therefore vacate the order passed by the learned single Judge dated 22nd December 1988 directing to maintain the status quo. We therefore vacate the order passed by the learned single Judge dated 22nd December 1988 directing to maintain the status quo. Mr Memon learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Union prayed to continue the interim relief to approach Supreme Court This is the third round of litigation by the parties in the matter. The Supreme Court has already applied its mind and has stated that persons like the members of the petitioner-Union have no right to unauthorisedly occupy public places. Following all these decision we have vacated the ad interim relief already granted. We do not find any ground made out for continuing the interim relief any further Accordingly the reguest to continue the interim relief in order to enable the petitioner to spproach the Supreme Court is refused. Mr. Memon next prayed for grant of certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court. On the facts and circumstances of the present case which we hat discussed in detail in our opinion no substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be interpreted by the Supreme Court arises in this case and as such the prayer for grant of certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court is also refused order accordingly. .