Judgment :- 1. This second appeal by the second defendant arose out of a suit for partition of . the assets of one Gulam Mohammed Sahib. Plaintiff and defendants 4 to 6 are his daughters and defendants 2 and 3 are his sons. First defendants is the widow. In the plaint, there are three schedules. A schedule is the land and B schedule is a copra yard attached to it. C schedule is an oil mill which is now finally held to be not a partible item. It is now concluded that A and B schedules are partible items. There was a controversy whether another business is a partible item that belonged to the father or a separate asset of the appellant. Now that is also finally held to be a partible item. Daughters are entitled to 7/64 each and sons 14/64. Balance belongs to the first defendant. Those are also not disputed and concluded by the preliminary decree and subsequent orders. 2. The suit was originally filed before the Sub Court. At that time, appellant was appointed as Receiver for the suit properties. The suit was then returned and represented before the Munsiff's Court. Before the preliminary decree, the appellant purchased the shares of the plaintiff and defendants 1,3 and 4. Fifth defendant was thereafter transposed as additional second plaintiff. Preliminary decree took note of the purchases not opposed by the other contestants and held as if the additional second plaintiff and sixth defendant are entitled to 7/64 each and the entire balance goes to the appellant. By the impugned order passed by the trial court, as directed by this Court in C.R.P. No. 1888 of 1979, it was held that purchases of the shares of the plaintiff and defendants 1, 3 and 4 by the appellant were with funds that came to his hands as Receiver by way of income from the common business and hence those shares will enure to the benefit of additional second plaintiff and sixth defendant as well. This finding confirmed by the appellate court is under challenge in this second appeal. It is not disputed that the purchases of shares made by the appellant were with funds that came to him as Receiver. 3. This finding confirmed by the appellate court is under challenge in this second appeal. It is not disputed that the purchases of shares made by the appellant were with funds that came to him as Receiver. 3. The only dispute to be solved is whether the purchases will enure to the benefit of the appellant alone and he is only liable to account for the income and profits or whether he is also liable to share the proceeds of the purchases with the second plaintiff and sixth defendant. In solving that controversy, the two further questions that crop up are whether the appellant could be treated as a trustee of the other co-owners and even if so construed, is it possible for the Court in the final decree proceedings to go behind what is decided by the preliminary decree. 4. It is true that Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed and another (A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 77) and Vasudevan Pillai v. Malathy Amma (1987 (2) K.L.T. 802), which followed the same, held that a co-owner in possession would be a constructive trustee on behalf of the co-owner who is not in possession. These decisions were rendered while dealing with adverse possession or right of accounting as between co-owners. They cannot be taken as authorities for the position that acquisition by a co-owner in his name even with common funds could be treated as co-ownership properties liable for partition. A co-owner in possession of all the joint properties does not become a trustee by the mere fact of his collection of the full amount of rent from the tenants as held in Vithal Dass v. Rup Chand and Others (AIR. 1967 S.C.188). If he is to be clothed with the status of a trustee, it must be shown that he has gained some advantage in derogation of the other co-owners interested in the property and that he gained such an advantage by availing himself of his position as co-owner. As held in M.N. Aryamurthi and another v. M.B. Subbaraya Setty (A.I.R. 1972 S.C.1279), there is no presumption that acquisition by the member in possession must be regarded as common property even though there is a liability to account. The properties do not become impressed with any trust in favour of the other members. As held in M.N. Aryamurthi and another v. M.B. Subbaraya Setty (A.I.R. 1972 S.C.1279), there is no presumption that acquisition by the member in possession must be regarded as common property even though there is a liability to account. The properties do not become impressed with any trust in favour of the other members. That decision was followed in Parvathi Amma and others v. Mani Amma (1975 K.L.T. 197) which took the view that where acquisition is made by a managing co-owner by making use of the funds of the co-ownership property, it would not enable the remaining co-owners to demand their shares in. the properties thus acquired but would only entitle them to ask for an account of their share of the money invested in the acquisition. 5. In this case, amounts came to the hands of the appellant not as co-owner, but as Receiver appointed by the Court. If he has not accounted for any money that came to him, it is for the Court to enforce liability and not for the other co-owners to claim partition of the acquisitions made by him by misusing the amounts. The position of a constructive trustee, which makes him liable to account for the rents and profits collected by him, cannot enable the other co-owners to claim share in the properties acquired by him in his name with these funds. Further all the acquisitions were before the preliminary decree and were taken note of therein. The co-owners were contesting and they did not want the acquisitions to be treated as co-ownership assets. They suffered a preliminary decree allowing additional plaintiff and sixth defendant only 7/64 share each and giving the entire balance to the appellant. That decree was allowed to become final without challenge. The contention that they came to know of the source of acquisition only subsequent to the preliminary decree when accounts were taken will not help them unless and until the preliminary decree itself is re-opened. Even conceding that the purchases will enure to the common benefit on the ground that common funds were utilised, that benefit cannot be confined to the three shares alone, as held by the courts below. It must go to others also subject to their liability to account for the amount received because what was paid was amount due to them also. 6. It must go to others also subject to their liability to account for the amount received because what was paid was amount due to them also. 6. None of these questions will arise now because the parties are concluded by the preliminary decree which is not sought to be re-opened. S.97 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifically debars any challenge against the preliminary decree unless it is appealed against. A decision is said to be final when, so far as the court rendering it is concerned, it is unalterable except by resort to such provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as permit its reversal, modification or amendment. A final decision is one which would operate as res judicata between the parties if it is not sought to be modified or reversed by appeal, revision or review, as is permitted. A preliminary decree is not tentative, but is conclusive so far as matters dealt with and decided. Final decree could only be subject to the preliminary decree regarding matters directed therein. Finality does not depend upon executability. Certain types of suits, such as mortgage suits, partition suits and suits for accounting, are to be decided at stages. Though such suits could be regarded as fully and finally decided only after a final decision is made, the decision arrived at the earlier stage also has a finality attached to it. The circumstance that further proceedings are required to be taken for procuring the relief to which a party is held entitled by a decision is no test for not regarding that decision as final. When in a partition suit the preliminary decree fixes shares and liability for accounting it is final so far as those matters are concerned. Working out the shares and details of accounting as well as such other matters not in conflict with the preliminary decree alone could be had in the final decree (Venkata Reddy and others v. Pethi Reddy - A.I.R. 1963 S.C.992). Not only preliminary decree, but some orders passed at earlier stages also may operate as res judicata at subsequent stages of the same litigation so far as matters finally decided therein are concerned. 7. Now, according to the preliminary decree, the shares due to the parties are 7/64 each to the additional plaintiff and sixth defendant and the balance to the appellant. 7. Now, according to the preliminary decree, the shares due to the parties are 7/64 each to the additional plaintiff and sixth defendant and the balance to the appellant. If the impugned portion of the decisions of the courts below is allowed to stand, over and above the shares allotted to them by the preliminary decree, additional plaintiff and sixth defendant will be getting 9/36 each and the share of the appellant will get reduced to that extent. This is impermissible in the final decree proceedings without the preliminary decree itself being re-opened and modified. Both the courts below acted without jurisdiction to this extent. Preliminary decree directed the question of profits to be considered in the final decree and accounts to be taken. That alone can be done keeping the shares allotted by the preliminary decree in tact. Appellant can only be made liable for the share of amounts due to others. The second appeal is, therefore, allowed and the order of the trial court, confirmed by the appellate court, is set aside to the extent it provides that the three purchases made by the appellant will enure to the benefit of the additional plaintiff and sixth defendant as well. Parties will bear their respective costs in this court.