Judgment P. S. Mishra, J. 1. Courts, last bullwark of a State, act to administer justice. Art of governance except that of a despot, is judged by dispensation of justice recognising the dignity and majesty of law. Every authority, including the executive or Legislature, have to function judicially in mattess such as rights and interests recognised by law, legal injuries, etc. Judiciary, however, is the organ which functions independent of the Executive and the Legislature to command, if necessary, to obey the law and repair the injuries caused by men in power as well as those who function without or beyond the limits of law. Any disrespect to the seat of justice, any affront to its dignity, any disobedience of its commands, decrees or orders, is aifront or disobenience to the dignity and majesty of law, because obedience of law alone ensures peace, order and progress, such had been the zeal and demand of the people who desired to live in freedom that even monarchies in the west could not but convey to them that even the sovereign would obey the law and so commands, decrees and orders of the court. This concept of majesty of law has persisted in the democratic Governments and special respect to seat of justice has remained unimpaired. Any contumacious behaviour towards court has been treated as disrespect to the majesty of law. Since British brought their courts to India and pretended to deliver to theit subjects in the colonies a democratic administration, the concept of the independent judiciary and of special respect to seats of justice also came with it. Independent aad democratic India extended constitutional recognition to the independence of the court of justice and recognised their right to punish for contempt, a necessary incident to every court of justice, whose independence alone guarantees obedience to law, which has since become, for courts of record, the plenary power. 2. Freedom of speech is the core of all freedoms that men may desire. One may live without food for a day or two, without a roof over head for days and months, and for years with little or no clothes to cover the naked body, but to live without speech as a dumb who is not allowed to express himself even by signs or gestures, is living a life without the soul. One may live without food for a day or two, without a roof over head for days and months, and for years with little or no clothes to cover the naked body, but to live without speech as a dumb who is not allowed to express himself even by signs or gestures, is living a life without the soul. Those who were put in prison, chained and put in confinements, could live for years as prisoners only because speech remained with them. As so long soul remains ia the body, it functions ; without the soul, a body has no meaning, so without feeedom of speech freedom has got no meaning. That India has leant in its relentless struggle for freedom and the Constitution of India has incorporated it as a fundamental right. 3. Reasonable rertrictions on all freedoms developed not because a law imposed them. They developed as a rule of self respect because to preserve the self respect it is necessary to respect others. It is said that words cause the gravest injury because body injuries heal up but injuries caused by words remain for ever. Can one belong to a society which he abuses Answer is no. Legislatures in a democracy represent the people. Can one get privilege to abuse them Answer is no. Legislatures must get the privilege of the people to punish one who abuses them. Lest one may not abuse the society, one must not abuse a legislature. Punishments for contempt of a sovereign alone can ensure that those who devite are made to realise that they cannot attack the dignity of the people of India or the State which represents them. 4. The last bullwark of a State, the court of justice, apart from being the sentinel of the aspirations of the people, is the home of helpless. One who does not find any body listening to his cries finds in the courts the saviour, the preceptor, who lends ears to his grievances and exercises its authority as a shield to protect the sufferer and as a sword to combat the invador of law. Abuses hurled upon the courts are nothing but abuses to those who stand by and for the people and who represent nothing but the public interest. No one can have the privilege to abuse the courts, for by abusing them he abuses the guardians of law. Abuses hurled upon the courts are nothing but abuses to those who stand by and for the people and who represent nothing but the public interest. No one can have the privilege to abuse the courts, for by abusing them he abuses the guardians of law. On the other hand, the courts must have the privilege to punish any contumacious behaviour as unless such privilege is recognised, freedom shall be as peril. 5. Freedom of speech, apart from other confines, must, therefore, stand limited by the privileges and the courts. 6. I have stated, in short, the circumference of my consideration of the question whether the impugned news item concerning judicial functions of the court and the Judges of the court is tendicious and contumacious or not. 7. In Re : Tarit Kanti Biswas and others, AIR 1918 Cal 988 a Special bench of the Calcutta High Court was confronted with two articles published in May, 1917, in Amrit Bazar Patrika, a news paper published at Calcutta. The first read : "there is a mischievous afloat, which should be contradicted. It is stated that a vigorous attempt is being made to get up a Bench to consider the appeal on the judgment of Greaves, J. , in connexion with the acquisition of surplus land by the Calcutta Improvement trust according to somebodys choice. We do not believe that it is possible for any one, far less the Chairman of the Trust, to secure a bench after his own heart as a counterpoise to the Mookerjee and cuming Bench. We are sure the interest of every ratepayer is safe in the hands of the Hon ble Judges, and we do not think that any official of the Trust can go so far. " The other article was a bit longer : "something like consternation prevails on account of the proposed new constitution of the appellate Bench of the Calcutta High Court before which appeals against the awards of the Improvement. Trust are to be heard. . . . " A proceeding for contempt of court was initiated and the court said just after stating the facts : "with regard to the first article I have no doubt it constitutes a contempt of court. Trust are to be heard. . . . " A proceeding for contempt of court was initiated and the court said just after stating the facts : "with regard to the first article I have no doubt it constitutes a contempt of court. " mookerjee, J. , in his concurring judgment considered, whether any imputation as to the constitution of a Bench shall constitute contempt or not and said : "the fourth proposition refers to the rumour that the Appellate Bench presided over by the Chief Justice and Woodroffe, J. , was about to be strengthened by the appointment of Chitty, J. , and that something like consternation prevailed on account of the proposed new constitution of the Bench. As I read the Article, the consternation was due, not so much to the fact that the Chief Justice and woodroffe, J. , composed the Bench, as to the fact that the Bench was about to be strengthened by the appointment of Chitty, J. This implies most unmistakably that a just decision that is, a decision just in the estimate of this impartial writer, could not be expected from a Bench so constituted. If language has meaning, this was clearly a libel on chitty, J. , if not also upon the other two members of the Bench. " having so said Mookerjee, J. , has said "it is needless to multiply early instances of the application of this doctrine, which will be found collected in 3 Howell State trials, 1074-1080 and a Howell State Trials 50. Amongst modern instances, reference may be made to the observations. In the matter of a Special Reference from the Bahama Islands reg. V/s. Staffordshire Country Court Judge ; Reg. V/s. Gray ; rex V/s. Danes ; Surendra Nath Banerjee V/s. Chief Justice of Bengal ; sashi Bhushan Sarbadhicary, in the matter of Taylefs case, and Banks aad Fenwick, In the matter of (9) The principle deducible from these cases is that punishment is inflicted for attacks of this character upon Judges, not with a view to protect either the court as a whole or individual Judges of the court from a repetition of the attack, but with a view to protect the public, and specially those who, either voluntarily or by compulsion, are subject to the jurisdiction of the court, from the mischief they will incur, if the authority of Tribunal be undermined or impaired. " Speaking further with respect to the publishers of newspaper, Mookerjee, J. , has said "in my opinion this Court has undoubted jurisdiction to deal summarily with persons who have committed contempt by scandalous attack upon the Judges, and such power should be exercised in the present instance. When I hold this I do not overlook the assertion of the printer and publisher that the articles before us were published by him in good faith and in the public interest. The sincerity of this plea appears to me to be open to the gravest doubt. But, even on the assumption that this allegation is literally true, I desire to add that, while I do not underrate in the least degree the importance of the liberty of the press, I cannot hold it expedient that any class of the community should be privileged to attack the Courts so as to interfere with the rights of litigants or to embarras the administration of justice. The publishers of newspapers have the right, but no higher right than others, to bring to public notice the conduct of courts, and provided the publications are true and fair in spirit ; there is no law to restrain the freest expression of the disapprobation that any person may entertain of what is done in or by the courts. But liberty of the press must not be confounded with licence or abuse of that liberty, and though it may be true that where the liberty of press and freedom of public comments end, there tyranny begins, it is at least equally true that where vituperation begins, there the liberty of the press ends ; and the inherent power of the Superior courts of the Record to punish any publication calculated to interfere with the administration of justice cannot be deemed in any way restricted by considerations of the kind urged by the printer and publisher. " 8. It is not necessary, in my view, to discuss every case law on the subject, as by going through every judgment made available to us by learned counsel for the parties and within our knowledge. " 8. It is not necessary, in my view, to discuss every case law on the subject, as by going through every judgment made available to us by learned counsel for the parties and within our knowledge. I have found that the statement of law by mookerjee, J. , in the case of Tarit Kanti Biswas and others case (supra) has stood the test of the time and the Courts of India, including the Supreme Court, have even after taking notice of the changes in the time and clime have retained the basis of the rule that any publication scandalising or intending to scandalise or lowering the authority or tending to lower the authority of the court will constitute a contempt and that the publication of a news item like the one in Amrit bazar Patrika, quoted above, shall constitute an act of scandalising the court. 9. In Shri Wasudeoraoji Sheorey V/s. Shri A. D. Mani, AIR 1951 Nag 26 several decisions of different Courts in India and Britain were considered. The law has been stated in the following words : "it is implicit in all these decisions that the publication in newspapers of reports of proceedings before a court of law must be true and accurate and that it must be without malice. . . . . . . . " 10. In State V/s. Radha Krishna, AIR 1961 Pun 113 a booklet titled "economics of Prosperity" contained a story about a case popularly called "punjab National Bank case". The author of the booklet had alleged that there had been flagrant denial of justice, which denial he had attributed to the influence of the Bank officers with the presiding officer of the Courts. The law has been stated in the following words : "a reflection on the Court imputing unfairness or ignorance is regarded as a contempt. The acts constituting contempt no doubt cover a wide range. Some are usually committed in the course of adjudication of a cause or the execution of the courts order. Such acts are calculated to hinder, delay and obstruct the administration of justice. Anotner class of acts are those, which bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend its dignity, affront its majesty or challenge its authority. Some are usually committed in the course of adjudication of a cause or the execution of the courts order. Such acts are calculated to hinder, delay and obstruct the administration of justice. Anotner class of acts are those, which bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend its dignity, affront its majesty or challenge its authority. The law in this "country punishes as contempt of Court any conduct that tends to bring the administration of justice into disrespect or to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice. Any act done or writing published calculated to bring the court into contempt or to lower its authority is a contempt of Court, whether corruption is imputed, or misconduct or incapacity in the discharge of the judicial duties is suggested. Allegation of extraneous considerations weighing with a Judge in deciding a case amounts to contempt of Court. " 11. In a judgment of the Orissa High Court in P. S. V. Iyer V/s. Commissioner of Sale Tax, AIR 1960 Orissa 221 a Bench of the said court has said that the main object of a newspaper is to give information about recent events and which is not a record, but is in its nature ephemeral, even though many persons do file their copies for reference, and that the essential pre-requisite of a periodical in order to make it a newspaper is that it must contain mainly public news or comments on public news. Post Constitution view of the supreme Court found its first expression in a Consti tution Bench judgment in the case of Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy V/s. State of Madras, AIR 1952 SC 149 : ". . . . A libellous reflection upon the conduct of a Judge in respect of his judicial duties may certainly come under Sec.499, Penal Code, and it may be open to the Judge to take steps against the libeller in the ordinary way for vindication of his character and personal dignity as a Judge ; but such libel may or may not amount to contempt of court. As the Privy Council observed in Surendra nath V/s. Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court, ILR 10 Cal 109 : although contempt may include defamation, yet an offence of contempt is something more than mere defamation and is of a different character. As the Privy Council observed in Surendra nath V/s. Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court, ILR 10 Cal 109 : although contempt may include defamation, yet an offence of contempt is something more than mere defamation and is of a different character. When the act of defaming a Judge is calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law, it would certainly amount to contempt. The offence of contempt ic really a wrong done to the public by weakening the authority and influence of courts of law which exist for their good. As was said by Sillmot, C. J. , Willmots Opinion p.256 ; Rex V/s. Davies, 30 at p.40-41. attacks upon the Judges excite in the minds of the people a general dissatisfaction with all judicial determination and whenever man s allegiance to the laws is so fundamentally shaken it is the most fatal and dangerous obstruction of justice and in my opinion calls out for a more rapid and immediate redress than any other obstruction whatsoever ; not for the sake of the Judges as private individuals but because they are the channels by which the kings justice is conveyed to the people. " what is made punishable in the Indian Penal Code is the offence of defamation as defamation and not as contempt of Court. If the defamation of a subordinate Court amounts to contempt of Court proceedings can certainly be taken under Sec.2, Contempt of courts Act, quite apart from the fact that other remedy may be open to the aggrieved officer under Sec.499, Penal Code. But a libel attacking the integrity of a Judge may not in the circumstances of a particular case amount to a contempt at all, although it may be the subject-matter of a libel proceeding. This is clear from the observation of the Judicial Committee in the case of the Matter of a Special Reference from the Bahama Islands, 1893 AC 138. . . . . " The Supreme Court considered the effect of a specific article published in a newspaper and observed : ". . . . The article in question is a scurrilous attack on the integrity and honesty of a judicial officer. . . . . " The Supreme Court considered the effect of a specific article published in a newspaper and observed : ". . . . The article in question is a scurrilous attack on the integrity and honesty of a judicial officer. Specific instances have been given where the officer is alleged to have taken bribes or behaved with impropriety to the litigants who did not satisfy his dishonest demands. If the allegations were true, obviously it would be to the benefit of the public to bring these matters into light. But it they were false, they cannot but undermine the confidence of the public in the administration of justice and brine judiciary into disrepute. The appellant, though he took sole responsibility regarding the publication of the article, was not in a position to substantiate by evidence any of the allegations made therein. He admitted that the statement was based on hearsay. Rumours may have reached him from various sources, but before he published the article it was incumbent upon him as a reasonable man to attempt to verify the informations he received and ascertain, as far as he could, whether the facts were true or mere concocted lies. He does not appear to have made any endeavour in this direction. As the appellant did not act with reasonable care and caution, he cannot be said to have acted bona fide even if good faith can be held to be a defence at all in a proceeding for contempt. What is more, he did Dot express any regret for what he had done either in the High Court or before us and his behaviour does not show the least trace of contrition. In these circumstances we think that the appeal cannot succeed and must be dismissed. " 12. In Aswini Kumar Ghose and another V/s. Arabinda Bose and another, air 1953 SC 75 an article appearing in the Times of India, a daily newspaper, was held to constitute a criminal contempt. The Supreme Court said : "no objection could have been taken to the article had it merely preached to the Courts of law the sermon of divine detachment. But when it proceeded to attribute improper motives to the Judges, it not only transgressed the limits of fair and bona fide criticism but had a clear tendency to aifect the dignity and prestige of this Court. But when it proceeded to attribute improper motives to the Judges, it not only transgressed the limits of fair and bona fide criticism but had a clear tendency to aifect the dignity and prestige of this Court. The article in question was thus a gross contempt of Court. It is obvious that if an impression is created in the minds of the public that the judges in the highest Court in the land act on extraneous considerations in deciding cases, the confidence of the whole community in the administration of justice is bound to be undermined and no greater mischief than that can possibly be imagined. It was for this reason that the rule was issued against the respondents. " the Supreme Court quoted with approval observations by the Privy Council in Andre Paul V/s. Attorney General of Trinidad, AIR 1936 PC 141 : "the path of criticism is a public way ; the wrong headed are permitted to err therein : provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered virtue ; she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken comments of ordinary men. " 13. The aforementioned two cases decided by the Supreme Court thus emphasise that a fair and bona fide criticism of a Judge in Court will not constitute contempt. An attack upon a Judge bringing him personally in disrepute shall fall within the ambit of libel and like any person defaming the Judge may vindicate himself by initiating a proceeding for defamation, but, when the criticism or an attack goes beyond the limits of fair and bona fide criticism and attributes improper motives to the Judges having a clear tendency to affect the dignity and prestige of the Court, it is a contempt. 14. In course of time when consensus citizens started asserting and press became more vigilant quite independent of the agency of the State thoroughly investigated facts started pouring in the shape of reports of such consensus groups, newspaper men too became activist and some sort of investigating journalism started. 14. In course of time when consensus citizens started asserting and press became more vigilant quite independent of the agency of the State thoroughly investigated facts started pouring in the shape of reports of such consensus groups, newspaper men too became activist and some sort of investigating journalism started. This happened more or less simultaneously in almost every part of the free world, more particularly in the democracy in Britain U. S. A. and India. During the pendency of the criminal proceedings in a Magistrates court as well as in the High Court against the Commissioner of the Calcutta Corporation, the corporation set up a special committee to enquire into the conduct of certain servants including the Commissioner alleged to have been taking advantage of their offices in carrying their business in their own names. In the course of the enquiry the Committee sent a questionunaire to the Commissioner seeking to enquire whether he had made certain appointments of persons who were either related to the prosecution witnesses in a criminal case or were helping him in conducting his defence in that case. A question arose, whether the Commissioner had suborned the prosecution in the criminal case or not. Holding on the facts of the said case that the circumstances did not establish that the Special Committee had constituted itself as a Court of parallel enquiry to look into the matter in issue in the criminal case pending in the High Court, therefore, the conduct of the Committee did not tend to interfere with the course of justice. The Supreme court in Saibal Kumar Gupta and others V/s. B. K. Sen and another, AIR 1961 SC 633 said : ". . . . . . . . . No doubt it would be mischievous for a newspaper to systematically conduct an independent investigation into a crime for which a man has been arrested and to publish the results of that investigation. This is because trial by newspapers, when a trial by one of the regular tribunals of the country is going on, must be prevented. The basis for this view is that such action on the part of a newspaper tends to interfere with the course of justice whether the investigation tends to prejudice the accused or the prosecution. . . . " 15. The basis for this view is that such action on the part of a newspaper tends to interfere with the course of justice whether the investigation tends to prejudice the accused or the prosecution. . . . " 15. In a case in which the Chief Minister of West Bengal, P. C. Sen was found guilty of contempt, the Supreme Court has said In Re : P. C. Sen, AIR 1970 SC 1821 - "the law relating to contempt of the Court is well settled. Any act done or writing published, which is calculated to bring a Court or a Judge into contempt, or to lower his authority, or to interfere wit the due course of justice or the lawful process of the Court is a contempt of Court. R. V/s. Grey, (1900)2 QB 36 at p.40. Contempt by speech or writing may be by scandalising the Court itself, or by abusing parties to actions, or by prejudicing mankind in favour or against a party before the cause is heard. It is incumbent upon Courts of justice to preserve their proceedings from being misrepresented, from prejudicing the minds of the public against persons concerned as parties in causes before the cause is finally heard has pernicious consequences. Speeches or writings misrepresenting the proceedings of the Court or prejudicing the public for or against a party or involving reflections on parties to a proceeding amount to contempt. To make a speech tending to influence the result of a pending trial, whether civil or criminal is a grave contempt. Comments on "pendings, proceedings, if emanating from the parties or their lawyers, are generally a more serious contempt than those coming from independent sources. The question in all cases of comment on pending proceedings is not whether the publication does interfere, but whether it tends to interfere with the due course of justice. The question is not so much of the intention of the contemner as to whether it is calculated to interfere with the administration of justice. As observed by the Judicial Committee in Debi Prasad Sharma V/s. King-Emperor 70 Ind App.216 at p.224 : AIR 1943 PC 202 at p, 204 : ". . . . . . The question is not so much of the intention of the contemner as to whether it is calculated to interfere with the administration of justice. As observed by the Judicial Committee in Debi Prasad Sharma V/s. King-Emperor 70 Ind App.216 at p.224 : AIR 1943 PC 202 at p, 204 : ". . . . . . the test applied by the Board which heard the reference was whether the words complained of were in the circumstances calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice and the due administration of the law. " if, therefore, the speech which was broadcast by the Chief Minister was calculated to interfere with the course of justice, it was liable to be declared a Contempt of the Court even assuming that he had not intended thereby to interfere with the due course of justice " 16. The Supreme Court in P. C. Sens case (supra) has stated in particular about the courts in India "but our Courts are Courts, which administer both law and equity assuming that a Judge holding a trial is not likely to be influenced by comment in newspapers or by other media of mass communication may be ruled outthough it would be difficult to be dogmatic on that matter alsothe Court is entitled and is indeed bound to consider, especially in our country where personal conduct is largly influenced by opinion of the members of the caste community occupation or profession to which he belongs, whether commons holding up a party to public ridicule or which prejudices society agaist him, may not dissuade him from prosecuting his proceeding or compel him to compromise it on terms unfavourable to himself that is a real danger which must be guarded against " 17. Tarkunde, J. of the Bombay High Court was scandalised by the publication of the article in a weekly periodical "mainstream in an ingeniously and cleverly worded article. It was referred to a news item published in a Gujarati paper, architects Khare --Tarkunde Private Limited of Nagpur, got a loan facility of Rs.10 lacs from the Bank of India. The partners of Kharetarkunde Private ltd, include the father, two brothers and some other relatives of Justice Tarkunde who awarded a decree for Rs.3 lacs as damages against Blitz and in favour of Thackersay. The partners of Kharetarkunde Private ltd, include the father, two brothers and some other relatives of Justice Tarkunde who awarded a decree for Rs.3 lacs as damages against Blitz and in favour of Thackersay. The Bank guarantee came at the evc of the marathon judgment delivered by him in Thackersay Blitz libel suit from the New India assurance Company and the two Directors of the Bank of India, who voted in favour of the credit being granted to Kharetarkunde were Thackersay and jaisinh Vithaldas (believed to be a relative of fhackersay ). One of the Directors of the New India Assurance Company, that stood guarantor for the loan facility was a senior partner of the Firm of the Solicitors of Thackersay. In Perspective publication v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 321 , the Supreme Court found that the High Court was fully justified in punishing the contemner. The Supreme court has said that there was a clear imputation of impropriety, lack of integrity and oblique motives to Justice Tarkunde in the matter of deciding the Thackersay blitz suit which undoubtedly constituted Contempt of Court 18. Giving at one place the principles which should govern cause of contempt, the Supreme Court has said : "we may restate the result of the discussion of the above cases on this head of contempt. which is by no means exhaustive. (1) It will not be right to say that committals for contempt scandalising the court have become obsolete. (2) The summary jurisdiction by way of contempt must be exercised with great care and caution and only when its exercise is necessary for the proper administration of law and justice. (3) It is open to any one to express fair, reasonable and legitimate criticism of any act or conduct of a Judge in his judicial capacity or even to make a proper and fair comment on any decision given by him because justice is not a cloistered virtue and she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men. (4) A distinction must be made between a mere libel or defamation of a judge and what amounts to a contempt of the Court. (4) A distinction must be made between a mere libel or defamation of a judge and what amounts to a contempt of the Court. The test in each case would be whether the impugned publication is a mere defamatory attack on the Judge or whether it is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or the proper administration of law by his court. It is only in the latter case that it will be punishable as contempt. (5) Alternatively the test will be whether the wrong is done to the judge personally or it is done to the public. To borrow from the language of Mukherjee, J. (as he then was) Brahma Prakash sharmas case, 1953 SCR 1169 : AIR 1954 SC 10 , the publication of a disparaging statement will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the Judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the courts administration of justice or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the Judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. In Perspective Publications (supra), the Supreme Court also considered whether truthfulness or factual correctness is a good defence for contempt or not. The Supreme Court has said : "as regards the third contention no attempt was made before the High court to substantiate that the facts stated in the article were true or were founded on correct data. It may be that truthfulness or factua correctness is a good defence in an action for libel, but in the lawl of contempt there are hardly any English or Indian cases in which such defence has been recognised. It is true that in the case of bathina Ramakrishua Reddy, 1952 SCR 425 : AIR 1952 SC 149 , there was some discussion about the bona fides of the person responsible for the publication but that was apparently done to dispose of the contention which had been raised on the point. It is quite clear that the submission made was considered on the assumption that good faith can be held to be a defence in a proceeding for contempt. It is quite clear that the submission made was considered on the assumption that good faith can be held to be a defence in a proceeding for contempt. The words even if good faith can be held to be a defence at all in a proceeding for contempt show that this Court did not lay down affirmatively that good faith can be set up as a defence in contempt proceedings. . . . . " 19. In Gobind Ram V/s. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 989 , the supreme Court reiterated the law stated in Perspective Publications (supra ). In n. R. Parashar and others V/s. Dr. Farooq Abdullah and others, AIR 1984 SC 615 , the law was tested by the Supreme Court once again. The Chief Minister was respondent in the said case, who was in Daily Kashmir Times reported to have said that "i will never honour these stay orders even if I am hanged, that justice could be bought with money and that this task could be performed conveniently by any leading lawyer. . . " The Supreme Court has said : "if we were satisfied that the Chief Minister had made the statements attributed to him, it would have been a serious matter. Then, we could not have dismissed the peroration as an ill-tempered outburst of an uninformed person. Considering the high position which chief Ministers occupy in the public life of any country, their words and deeds have to be presumed to be intended. The defence that what was said or done was not intended is not open to persons occupying high public offices. " The Supreme Court in M. R. Parashars case (supra) also took notice of right of free speech and has said : ". . . . . . the right of free speech is an important right of the citizen, in the exercise of which he is entitled to bring to the notice of the public at large the infirmities from which any institution suffers, including institutions which administer justice. Indeed the right to offer healthy and constructive criticism which is fair in spirit must be left unimpaired in the interest of public institutions themselves. Critics are instruments of reforms, not those actuated by malice but those who are inspired by the spirit of public weal. Indeed the right to offer healthy and constructive criticism which is fair in spirit must be left unimpaired in the interest of public institutions themselves. Critics are instruments of reforms, not those actuated by malice but those who are inspired by the spirit of public weal. Bona fide criticism of any system or institution is aimed at inducing the administrators of that system or institution to look inwards and improve its public image. Courts do not like to assume the posture that they are above criticism and that their functioning needs no improvement. But it is necessary to make it clear that though law does not restrain the expression of disapprobation against what is done in or by courts of law, the liberty of free expression not to be confounded with a licence to make unfounded allegations of corruption against the judiciary. The abuse of the liberty of free speech and expression carries the case nearer the law of contempt. " The Supreme Court has also reminded those who criticise the judiciary that it has no forum from which to defend itself, that the Legislature can act in defence of itself from the floor of the House, which enjoys privileges which are beyond the reach of law ; that the Executive is well powerful and has ample resources and media at its command to explain its actions and if need be, to counter attack, but those who attack the judiciary must remember that they are attacking an institution which is indispensible for the survival of the rule of law but which has no means of defending itself. In the very nature of things, it cannot engage itself in an open war nor indulge in releasing contradictions. The sword of justice is in the hands of the Goddess of Justice, not in the hands of mortal Judges. Therefore, Judges must receive the due protection of law from unfounded attacks on their character. 20. In Conscientious Group V/s. Mohammad Yunus and others, AIR 1987 sc 1451 , the Court got a quotation from an order passed by the Supreme Court on December 12, 1986, which order was passed allowing the petitioner to withdraw the petition. The Court has stated ". . . . . . . . . . . 20. In Conscientious Group V/s. Mohammad Yunus and others, AIR 1987 sc 1451 , the Court got a quotation from an order passed by the Supreme Court on December 12, 1986, which order was passed allowing the petitioner to withdraw the petition. The Court has stated ". . . . . . . . . . . While allowing the application to be withdrawn, we must express out view that every one is entitled to criticise the judgment of the Court but no one should attack the Judges who delivered the judgment as that denigrates the judicial institution and in the long term impairs the democratic process. That is something which must be avoided at all costs. " 21. The Supreme Court has dealt with the question of contempt of Court by newspaper articles in several cases, including S. Mulgaokar, AIR 1978 SC 727 ; baradakanta Mishra V/s. Registrar of Orissa High Court, AIR 1974 SC 710 ; Rama dayal Markarha V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1978 SC 921 and E, M. Sankaran Namboodripad V/s. T. Narayanana Nambiar, AIR 1970 SC 2015 in which the Supreme Court dealt with a case in which as Chief Minister the contemner had held a press conference and made various critical remarks relating to the judiciary. The Supreme Court found that the remarks constituted contempt. The Supreme court held that under the existing law oi contempt of court any publication which was calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law would amount to a contempt of court, 22. Two judgments of the Supreme Court, one in S. Mulgaokar, AIR 1978 sc 727 and the other in P. N. Duda V/s. P, Shiv Shankar and others, AIR 1988 SC 1208 ; however, require attention. In S. Mulgaokars case all the three Hon ble Judges constituting the Bench agreed with the conclusion but apparently differed in the approach to the law on the subject Beg, C. J. in his judgment stated "the judiciary cannot be immune from criticism. But, when that criticism is based on obvious distortion or gross mis-statement and made in a manner which seems designed to lower respect for the judiciary and destroy public confidence in it, it cannot be ignored. I am not one of those who think that an action for contempt of Court, which is discretionary, should be frequently or lightly taken. But, when that criticism is based on obvious distortion or gross mis-statement and made in a manner which seems designed to lower respect for the judiciary and destroy public confidence in it, it cannot be ignored. I am not one of those who think that an action for contempt of Court, which is discretionary, should be frequently or lightly taken. But at the same time, I do not think that we should abstaia from using this weapon, even when its use is needed to correct standards of behaviour in a grossly and repeatedly erring quarter. It may be better in many cases for the judiciary to adopt a magnanimously charitable attitude even when utterly uncharitable and unfair criticism of its operations is made ont of bona fide concern for improvement. But, when there appears some scheme and a design to bring about results which must damage confidence in our judicial system and demorallize Judges of the highest court by making malicious attack, any one interested in maintaining high standards of fearless, impartial and unbending justice will fell perturbed. I sincerely hope that my own undisguised perturbation at what has been taking place recently is unnecessary. One may be able to live in a world of Yogic detachment when unjustified abuses are hurled at ones self personally, but when the question is of injuiry to an institution, such as the highest court of justice in the land, one cannot overtook its effects upon national honour and prestige in the comity of nations. Indeed, it becomes a matter deserving consideration of all serious minded people who are interested in seeing that democracy does not flounder or fail in our country. " Stating on his own opinion on the matter discussed in the judgment of krishana Iyer, J. and Beg, C. J. said : "may opinion on matters touched by my learned brother Krishna Iyer is that, although the question whether an attack is malicious or ill intentioned, may be often difficult to determine, yet, the language in which it is made, the fairness, the factual accuracy the logical soundness of it, the cure taken in justly and properly analysing the materials before the maker of it, are. important considerations. important considerations. Moreover, in judging whether it constitutes a contempt of Court or not we are concerned more with the reasonable and probable effects of what is said or written than with the motives lying behind what is done. A decision on the question whether the discretion to take action for contempt of Court should be exercised in one way or the other must depend on the totality of facts and circumstances. " Krishna Iyer, J. in his separate judgment stated ". . . . . . . . . . . . My judgment is more an explanation than an expostulation and certainly not a reflection on the respondents. " He also however, has sounded the same note as has been in the past and recorded the law as "prejudicial publicity, indulged in by a free press owing no institutional responsibility or public accountability, cannot be all that good, especially when Judges are personally vilified assured that the robes traditionally, and for good reasons, do not and should not wrestle with caluminating columnists or yellow journalists. Likewise, a litigant or Judge run down by powerful vested interest wearing the mask of mass media owned by them or hiring the pen of arch spokesmen of political or economic reactionaries, cannot run riot, raising the alarm that free speech is in peril and get away with it. Heroism on the face may often be villainy at heart and the law cannot retreat from its justice function scared by slogans. Balancing of values is difficult, delicate but indispensible. " ". . . . . . . . . . It is a disturbing development in our country that the media and some men in the trade of traducement are escalatingly scandalising Judges with flippant or motivated write-ups wearing a pro bona publico veil and mood of provocative mock challenge. The court shall not mediate nor hesitate but shall do stern juetice to such professional contemners not shrink because they are scurrilous, influential or incorrigible Even so, to be gentle is to be just and the quality of mercy is not strained. The court shall not mediate nor hesitate but shall do stern juetice to such professional contemners not shrink because they are scurrilous, influential or incorrigible Even so, to be gentle is to be just and the quality of mercy is not strained. So, it is that a benign neglect, not judicial genuflexion, is often the prescription, and to inhibit haphazardness or injustice it is necessary that the Bar and the Press evolve a dignified consensus on the canons of ethics in this area, with due regard to the Constitution and the laws, so that the Bench may give it a close look and draw the objective line of action. . . . " Kailasam, J. gave no separate judgment except acknowledging that Krishna iyer, J. has himself characterised his judgment as obiter dicta. 23 In P. N. Duda V/s. P. Shiv Shanker (supra), however, the law stated by the Supreme Court and other courts in the country as well as abroad have been referred to in some details. What is noticeable, however, is the expression of agreement with the ratio of law on the subject of contempt in the previous judgments. Expressing on the ratio of E M. Shankaran Namboodripads case (supra), in P. N. Dudas case (supra), the Supreme Court has said : ". . . . . . While respectfully accepting the ratio and the observations of the learned Chief Justice made in that decision we must recognise that times and clime have changed in the last two decades. There have been tremendous erosions of many values. . . . " The Supreme Court has taken notice of the fact that P. Shiv Shanker was making a study of the attitude of the Supreme Court and that the speech of the minister read in proper perspective did not impair administration of justice, the court disposed of the matter. The Bench deciding the law in Dudas case again examined this aspect of the law. 24. In Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. V/s. Proprietors of Indian Express News papers, Bombay Pvt. Ltd. , (1988) 4 SCC 592 ,, the Supreme Court has considered the contempt laws once again the cases pending in different courts, several disputes related to the public issue of 12.5 per cent secured convertible debentures of 200 each for case per aggregating to Rs.593.40 crores of the petitioner-company were raised. The matter came, however before the Supreme Court with a prayer to transfer the cases in different courts to the Supreme Court itself. The Supreme court issued an order of injunction restraining all the respondents mentioned in the petition from publishing any articles comment, report or editorial in any of the issues of the Indian Express or their related publications questioning the legality or validity of any of the consents, approvals or permissions of which the petitioner in the transfer petition had made reference. 25 Elaborate arguments were advanced and it was contended that there was no contempt of courts involved and that pre-stoppage of newspaper article or publication on matters of public importance was uncalled for and contrary to freedom of press enshrined in our Constitution and in our laws. On the one hand the argument was that the publication was on a public matter, so public debate cannot and should not be stopped, on the other hand, it was submitted that due administration of justice must be unimpaired. In his separate judgment, mukharji, J. has said : "our Constitution is not absolute with respect to freedom of speech and expression, as enshrined by the First amendment to the American constitution. Our attention was drawn to the decision of this Court. In Re P. C. Sen where this Court upheld the order of conviction against the Chief Minister of West Bengal for broadcasting a speech justifying an order, the validity of which was challenged in proceedings pending before the court. The West Bengal Government had issued an order under Rule 125 of the Defence of India Rules, placing certain restrictions upon the right of persons carrying on business in milk products. The validity of this order was challenged by a writ petition. After the rule nisi had been issued on the petition and served on the State Government, the State Chief minister broadcast a speech seeking to justify the propriety of the order. The High Court issued a rule requiring the Chief Minister to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt of court. The High Court found him guilty of contempt and fined him. The matter came up before this Court and the conviction was upheld. It was held that the speech was ex facie calculated to interfere with the administration of justice. " after referring to Indian Express Newspaper (Bombay) Put. The High Court found him guilty of contempt and fined him. The matter came up before this Court and the conviction was upheld. It was held that the speech was ex facie calculated to interfere with the administration of justice. " after referring to Indian Express Newspaper (Bombay) Put. Ltd. , Mukharji, J. has said : ". . . . . . Though the Indian Constitution does not use the expression freedom of press in Article 19 but it is included as one of the guarantees is Article 19 (l) (a ). The freedom of press, as noted by venkataramiah, J. is one of the items around which the greatest and the bitterest of constitutional struggles have been waged in all countries where liberal constitutions prevail. . . . . . " 26. Having considered once again the interest of preserving a citizens right and so the right of the press or freedom of speech and the limitations or responsible limits thereof with the aid of the pronouncements and the authorities ia the United States as well as England, Mukharji, has said : " "the question of contempt must be judged in a particular situation. The process of due course of administration of justice must remain unimpaired. Public interest demands that there should be no interference with judicial process and the effect of the judicial decision should not be pre-empted or circumvented by public agitation or publications. It has to be remembered that even at turbulent times through which the developing countries are passing, contempt of court means interference with the due administration of justice. " Article 19 of the Constitution besides Article 19 (l) (a) of the Constitution states "all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. " clause (2) of Article 19 states -"nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, ia so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign State, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence. " Existing law of the contempt on the day the Constituent Assembly adopted to Constitution received recognition in Article 142 (2) of the Constitution as the power of the Supreme Court, subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament and that of the High Court in Article 215 thereof. Articles 105 and 194 of the Constitution of India took/take care of the privileges of the parliament and the State Legislatures. 27. Mr. Ghosh has cited several decisions including some of those which have already been referred to above. Mr. Basudev Prasad has also cited a large number of decisions. It is possible to pick one word in the one decision and another in another decision, but the ratio of every case is one and the same that a contempt of court is an affront to the rule of law and a challenge to the authority or majesty of law. 28. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has defined contempt in two parts ; civil contempt to mean wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of the court, or wilful breach of an undertaking; and criminal contempt to mean the publication whether by words spoken or written or otherwise of any matter or doing other acts whatsoever, which scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court ; or prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceeding ; or interferes or tends to interfere with or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any manner. Looking to this scheme of the law and authorities on the subject it is indeed necessary ia a case of criminal contempt to take notice of interference in the administration of justice by scandalising or tending to scandalising or lowering or tending to lower, or prejudicingor tending to or interfering or tending to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceeding ; or interfering or tending to interfere with or obstructing or tending to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner. What constitutes a scandal leading to contempt is a question which has to be answered with reference to act or transaction causing the scandal. What constitutes a scandal leading to contempt is a question which has to be answered with reference to act or transaction causing the scandal. Acts which tend to embarass a Judge in discharge of his judicial duties may amount to contempt if the contumacious matter concerns the Judge as the court and not the Judge as a person otherwise attacked for his deeds. The second type of attack may in a given case be libel and deal with in accordance with panel laws. 29. Cherished as the freedom of speech is and so the freedom of press. Courts cannot always bear with the publications denigrating or maligning it. Yet may not take appropriate action for contempt. Even libel action may not always be possible by any one defamed by publication of scandalous and defamatory matters. A person functioning as a free agent to inform people about happenings, incidents or facts, evidently cannot do so to settle any score of his own against the person scandalised or defamed. Such a person, who speaks not for himself but claims to speak for the fact only and pro bono publico cannot act without taking the responsibility of the publication by him. This shall naturally take such a person to a code of conduct so that if need of defence arises, he may show that he has not violated the said code and in case it is found that he violated the code, a court may take suitable action. 30. Indian Press as well as the press in U. S. and U. K. struggling today to achieve for themselves the position of the spokesman of the people inasmuch as they have been claiming to act pro bono publico. No one can deny the imperatives of clime and time. The emergence of such public information in the shape of newspapers has been welcomed by every public spirited and consensus persons. 31. No one can deny the imperatives of clime and time. The emergence of such public information in the shape of newspapers has been welcomed by every public spirited and consensus persons. 31. Judges, who exist mainly to ensure the cherished freedom of the people, to prevent abuse of power by the men in position, to remove any impediment or cloud created on the 1 gal rights and interests of the people and repair injuries caused by violation of law by any and every person, may take the pride of being amongst those who not only welcome the emergence and existence of the 4th State but extend their protective umbrella to it against attacks by those who do not like an independent voice or so which inform people about their commissions and omissions. It is indeed credible that the constitutional authorities as a body have never taken any stand against free flow of information though the agency of the press, except in the matters in respect of which laws have been made and restrictions have been imposed This includes the Parliament, state Legislatures, Supreme Court, and the High Court etc. Contempt of Courts laws or laws with respect to contempt of their constitutional authorities on the one hand protect them against slander, villification, accusation and scandalisation and on the other hand remind the media that it must keep itself within the limits of the freedom of speech. Since the Courts act in a proceeding for a perpetual memoria I record here what Madison says "a popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy, or, perhaps both ,. . . . . . . and a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives. " Because the ultimate good in a free society can be reached only by discovery of truth, and that can be achieved only by a free trade in Ideagood or bad. It our attempt is to save democracy, it is necessary that we stand against every attempt to make the system of popular Government insultated against any attempt to make it a farce or a tragedy. It our attempt is to save democracy, it is necessary that we stand against every attempt to make the system of popular Government insultated against any attempt to make it a farce or a tragedy. That can be achieved by harmonising public interest of free flow of idea and popular information on the one hand and the public interest of true and fair administration of justice without any favour or ill-will. It is somewhat embarrassing for me as a Judge without there being any attempt to have a consensus of the Judges to speak on behalf of the Judges or the court, yet I venture to reiterate what has been pointed out in almost every case of contempt that before imputing any motive to a Judge or the court, the press should remind itself of the rule that when they are put to oath to administer justice, they say in the name of God or solemnly affirm that they would administer justice without fear or favour. One must attribute highest motive to a Judge. Attack him if he has violated the oath but not otherwise. It is difficult to imagine any constitutional functioneries without a relative or a friend, whose interests are dear to his heart, It is also difficult to find him without a foe including one who is ready to damage the institutions of the State. In this context the Code of journal-stic ethics becomes relevant. In Mulgaokars case (supra) Beg, C. J. has pointed out that Judges may sit to formulate a code of conduct for themselves and krishna Iyer, J. has said that it is necessary that the journalists themselves prepare a code of conduct, particularly in respect of their information and criticism about the courts and make such a code available to the court to examine so that a mutually acceptable code is applied in the matters concerning the free courts and free press in India. Press Commission of India in its report of 1954 has presented a code of journalists. Ethics, stating that the free press is primary instrument in the creation of public opinion, journalists should regard their calling as a trust and be ready and willing to serve and guard the public interest. The report has proceeded to various matters. Press Commission of India in its report of 1954 has presented a code of journalists. Ethics, stating that the free press is primary instrument in the creation of public opinion, journalists should regard their calling as a trust and be ready and willing to serve and guard the public interest. The report has proceeded to various matters. It will be useful to extract such portions of the report in the judgment, as in my view, if journalists observe the said code of ethics, they shall help themselves, the public at large and the democratic institutions, like Legislatures and the court etc. (1) As the press is a primary instrument in the creation of public opinion journalists should regard their calling as a trust and be ready and willing to serve and guard the public interest. (2) In the discharge of their duties, journalists shall attach due value to fundamental human and social rights and shall hold good faith and fair play in news reports and comments as essential professional obligations. (3) Freedom in the honest collection and publication of news and facts and the right of fair comment and criticism are principles which every journalists should always defend. (4) Journalists shall observe due restraint in reports and comments which are likely to aggravate tensions likely to lead to violence. (5) Journalists shall endeavour to ensure that information is factually accurate. No fact shall be distorted and no essential facts shall be suppressed. No information known to be false or not believed to be true shall be published. (6) Responsibility shall be assumed for information and comment published, if responsibility is disclaimed, this shall be explicitly stated before hand. (7) Unconfirmed news shall be identified and treated as such. (8) Confidence shall always be respected and professional secrecy preserved, but it shall not be regarded as a breach of the code if the source of information is declared in matters coming up before the press Council or Courts of Law. (9) Journalist shall not allow personal interest to influence professional conduct. (10) Anv report found to be inaccurate and any comment based on inaccurate reports shall be voluntarily rectified. It shall be obligatory to give fair publicity to a correction or contradiction when a report published is false or inaccurate in material particulars. (9) Journalist shall not allow personal interest to influence professional conduct. (10) Anv report found to be inaccurate and any comment based on inaccurate reports shall be voluntarily rectified. It shall be obligatory to give fair publicity to a correction or contradiction when a report published is false or inaccurate in material particulars. (11) All persons engaged in the gathering, transmission and dissemination of news and comments thereon shall seek to maintain public confidence in the integrity and dignity of their profession. They shall assign and accept only such tasks as are compatible with this integrity and dignity, and they shall guard against exploitation of their status. (12) There is nothing so unworthy as the acceptance or demand of a bribe for inducement for the exercise by a journalist of his power to give or deny publicity news or comment. (13) The carrying on of personal controversies in the press, where no public issue is involved, is unjournalistic and derogatory to the dignity of the profession. If the endeavour to ensure that information is factually accurate, destroy distort nothing, leave no essential tacts and publish only such facts which they believe to be true, they shall do no wrong. If they disclose the source in case they do not take the responsibility of the correctness or otherwise of the information, they serve themselves and also the public interests. Publication of rumours and gossip affecting the private life of individuals, is no news. Even verifiable news affecting individual, unless needed in public interest is bad vox populi. Such is the responsibility of the free press that it can indulge in gossip mongring, character assassination, publication of unverifiable information or true information which has the effect of causing harm to the constitutional institutions only at the cost the public interest and at the peril of its own credibility and future. No one can suggest that professional secrecy should not be preserved. It will be unethical to do it. No one can similarly suggest that a source which makes information available which information would not have otherwise been available or would have been destroved or impaired, had the source not secretly passed it on should always be disclosed. Ordidarily, if other precautions are taken, a journalist should not be compelled to disclose the source. 32. The position, however, is different when a source gives inaccurate, incorrect, distorted, or motivated information. Ordidarily, if other precautions are taken, a journalist should not be compelled to disclose the source. 32. The position, however, is different when a source gives inaccurate, incorrect, distorted, or motivated information. When such information should not be published, how such source can be be called an honest or genuine source. It is not the journalists who received information from a source of this kind who intended publication of such a news, it is the source which intended to do it. It will bear repetition, yet it has to be emphasised that any damage to a court or a judge representing the institution of the court shall be a damage to the public interst. A writing, casting imputation of impropriety, lack of integrity and oblique motives to a Judge constitute a contempt of court for the reason that such imputation of impropriety, lack of integrity and oblique motive may in the ultimate shake public confidence in the courts and administration of justice and harm public interest. 33. Mr. Ghosh has persuaded us to hold that a contemner under proceeding is in the position of an accused in a criminal case and any disclosure of the source will constitute disclosure of incriminating evidence by him. A contemner cannot be made to make such disclosure, according to Mr. Ghosh, because no accused in a criminal case can be compelled to incriminate himself. He shall be protected by the right preserved in Article 20 (3) of the Constitution. 34. True a criminal contempt has been distinguished from a civil contempt, yet contempt, civil of criminal, is a contempt of court. Contempt of Court Act, 1971 has in certain matters taken notice of a civil contempt and a criminal contempt separately. Sec.12 combines the two for the purpose of punishment. The word accused has been used for the contemner in proviso to Sec.12 of the Act. But, it is obvious, it mean accused of the civil contempt as well as accused of the criminal contempt. 35. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in State V/s. Padma Kant malviya, AIR 1954 Alld.523 considered the question as to whether contempt of court is an offence and a contemner an accused or not. It answered the three questions referred to it, namely " (1) (a) whether contempt of court is an offence within the meaning of section 5 (2), Criminal PC. It answered the three questions referred to it, namely " (1) (a) whether contempt of court is an offence within the meaning of section 5 (2), Criminal PC. (b) If it is whether the procedure prescribed by that Code for the investigation, inquiry and trial of an offence must be followed ; (2) Whether the alleged contemner is an accused person within the meaning of Sec.5, Oaths Act, 1873 ;. (3) Whether the alleged contemner is a person "accused of an offence" within the meaning of Article 20 (3) ot the Constitution, and can he, if he voluntarily makes an affidavit, be cross-examined upon it. " the court has answered the said three questions holding. " (1) (a) Contempt of Court is not an offence within the meaning of section 5 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ; (b) In view of our answer to the previous question this question does not arise. (2) The alleged contemner is not an accused person within the meaning of Sec.5 of the Indian Oaths Act, 1873 ; (3) An alleged contemner is not a person accused of an offence within the meaning of Article 20 (a) of the Constitution and if he has voluntarily filed an affidavit, he can be cross-examined on it. " 36. In Basanta Chandra Ghosh, AIR 1960 Pat 430 a Full Bench of this court has also considered this question an has held that Article 215 of the constitution confers jurisdiction to punish for contempt of court, that the Code of criminal Procedure does not apply in matters of contempt triable by the High court and that the High Court can deal with a contempt proceeding summarily and stop evolve its own procedure All that is necessary is that the procedure is fair and the contemner is made aware of the charge against him and given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself. This Court agreed with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court that a contemner is not an accused person within the meaning of Sec.5 of the Code of Criminal Proceedure to which alone is attracted Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. Since this being the law, I find no reason to investigate, whether an accused in a criminal proceeding will be required to disclose the source or not. Since this being the law, I find no reason to investigate, whether an accused in a criminal proceeding will be required to disclose the source or not. The procedure adopted for the trial of an accused or offender of committing contempt is a procedure well established and recognised by all courts in India. A contemner can deny disclosure of a source only at the risk of being charged for withholding evidence, which witholding of evidence may constitute an offence separately punishable under the Penal Code 37. Courts may not, however, ordinarily ask a contemner to disclose the source of information, as the information gathered by him may not be only from one source but from several sources. Where, however, there is a genuine doubt as to intentions of the person who got a false, fabricated or even true but scandalous news published, a journalist may be asked to disclose the source, because it is the source which is the villain and not the journalist. 38. Mr. Ghosh has endeavoured to convass that the rule as to disclosure of source in any trial, whether contempt or otherwise, applied in other countries, should not be applied in India. 39. In the background of the masterly contentions of learned counsel appearing for both the parties, it seems, rather, discorded that Mr. Ghosh has chosen to advance this argument. Authorities of U. S. A. or U. K. , whether they do not have any binding effect, they only gives us a thought to ponder a course either to adopt or reject. It is difficult to ignore persuasive value of the case laws in U. K. as until independence and even after the Constitution, the law as to the contempt of court has almost remained unchanged with relevant prescription thereof in the Constitution of India and the Contempt of Courts Act. Law in the U. S A. in particular because the provisions of the freedom of speech in U. S. A. Constitution and the Contempt of Courts Act are similar to provisions in India give us indication how courts as an institution and the Fourth state co-exist without collision. 40. In Attorney General V/s. Mulholland, (1968) 1 All ER 767 Lord denning, Court of Appeal of U K dismissed appeal of two journalists who were convicted for six months imprisonment in respect of the offence under the tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921. 40. In Attorney General V/s. Mulholland, (1968) 1 All ER 767 Lord denning, Court of Appeal of U K dismissed appeal of two journalists who were convicted for six months imprisonment in respect of the offence under the tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921. They wore so convicted because they declined to disclose the source of information which they had published. The judgment says "it seems to me, therefore, that the authorities are all one way. There is no privilege known to the law by which a journalist can refuse to answer a question which is relevant to the inquiry, and is one which, in the opinion of the judge, it is proper for him to be asked. I think it plain that, in this particular case, it is in the public interest for the tribunal to inquire as to the sources of information. How is any ons to know that this story was not a pure invention, if the journalist will not tell the tribunal its source Even if it was not invention, how is anyone to know that it was not the gossip of some idler seeking to impress It may be mere rumour unless the journalist shows that he got it from a trustworthy source. And, if he has got it from a trustworthy source (as I take it on his statement he has, which I fully accept), then, however much he may desire to keep it secret, he must remember that he has been directed by the tribunal to disclose it as a matter of public duty, and that is justification enough. I have no doubt that the journalists-ought to have answered the questions put to them. These were questions they were legally required to answer and they have no privilege to refuse. I would dismiss the appeals on the points of principle accordingly. " 41. In Chancery Division judgment in British Steel Corpn. V/s. Granada television Ltd. , (198l) 1 All ER 4177, the said law has been reiterated in the following words "let me suppose that this is wrong, and that there is the recognised public interest and policy for the press and television for which counsel contends, and that I ought to weigh this against the interest involved in requiring a disclosure of sources. One of counsels subsidiary propositions, in its amended form was that there no reported case in England in which the private interest of the plaintiff has been held to override the public interest in protecting the medias sources of information". The words in England were inserted in order to allow for Re Buchanan, to which I have already referred. The proposition, which puts the plaintiffs private interest in opposition to the public interest seems to me to be plainly fallacious in its formulation. The plaintiffs private interest seems to me to be a misdescription for the paramount public interest that in litigation all relevant evidence should be available to the court. However, private the interest that the plaintiff seeks to protect, the real balance it between the public interest in justice being done, and whatever public interest there is in protecting the medias sources of information. I do not think that authority for this need be cited, thought if authority be required, it may be found in the N. S. P. C. C. and the Nasse cases, and elsewhere". The Court has concluded "granada are not protected against having to disclose the identity of their source of information by any privilege against self-crimination, because there is no real peril of Granada incriminating themselves by making the disclosure. (2) Granada have no absolute privilege against disclosing the source of their information, and they are rightly not sought to contend that they have any such absolute privilege. (3) There has long been a practice, which may have ripened into a rule of law, that at the interlocutory stage the press will normally not be required to disclose their sources of information ; but this does not apply at the trial of the action. (4) It is not yet entirely clear whether the court has a discretion after the interlocutory stage to exclude relevant evidence and so to exempt the press from disclosing their sources of information, or whether there is merely a discretion to discourage rather than exclude. The prevailing balance seems to be in favour of the former of these two views, though I can see much force in the latter. The prevailing balance seems to be in favour of the former of these two views, though I can see much force in the latter. (5) If there is a discretion to exclude, it does not exist in the wide form of requiring the court in each case to balance the advantages of exclusion against the disadvantages, regarded from the point of view of the public interest. What is required is that there should be shown to be consideration of a recognised public interest which support exclusion sufficiently strongly to outweigh the recognised public interest that all relevant and proper evidence should be available at the trial. (6) No public interest in the press not being forced to disclose their sources of information at the trial has yet been recognised ; and there are insufficient grounds for holding that such an interest ought to exist. (7) If, contrary to my view, there is or ought to be such an interest, then in this case I do not consider that it outweighs the public interest in enforcing B. SCs legal claim to be given the information that they seek. (8) If B. SCs claim to disclosure is to be treated as a claim to equitable relief lying in the discretion of the court on general grounds, then I think that the balance of those general grounds lies firmly in favour of granting the remedy. (9) Although in form this is a motion and not the trial of the action, i think that the parties were right to treat it as being in substance the trial of the action for the purpose of the relief claimed in the motion. " This establishes that the Court in England were calculating prevailing balance between competing public interests and were inclined to take a liberal view that a court in its discretion after the interlocutory stage of notice and cognizance may decide in the public interest to order ior disclosure of source. If there is no interest of public competing against the administration of justice, there is no reason why a court shall not order for disclosure of the source. If there is no interest of public competing against the administration of justice, there is no reason why a court shall not order for disclosure of the source. If as a plea of defence a public interest is brought against disclosure, the court shall weigh whether it outweighs the interest of justice, and accept another in the interest of administration of justice to order for disclosure of source or the other public interest pleaded by the coutemner to order no disclosure. 42. I do not propose to multiply and burden this judgment any further. I may, however, refer to a decision in Science Research Council V/s. Nasse (1979)3 All ER 673. Quoting from a judgment in Alfred Crompton Amusement machines V/s. Customs and Excise Comrr. (No.2) by Lord Cross Chelsea " confidentiality is not a separate head of privilege, but it may be a very material consideration to bear in mind when privilege is claimed on the ground of public interest. What the court has to do is to weigh on the one hand the considerations which suggest that it is in the public interest that the documents in question should be disclosed and on the other hand those which suggest that it is in the public interest that they should not be disclosed and to balance one against the other. " and from a passage in the speech of Lord Hailsham "the categories of public interest are not closed, and must alter from time to time whether by restriction or extension as social conditions and social legislation develop". Lord Fraser of Tullybelton has recorded his agreement in these words : "speaking for myself I fully accept that proposition but any extension can only be made by adding new categories analogous to those already existing just as in that case immunity was extended to a new category of informers to the N. S. P. C. C. by analogy with informers to the police who were already entitled to immunity. There is no analogy between the suggested public interest in the present cases and the kinds of public interest that have so far been held to justify immunity from disclosure. Such public interest as there is in withholding the documents from disclosure is not enough to justify the creation of a new head of immunity for a whole class of documents. " 43. Such public interest as there is in withholding the documents from disclosure is not enough to justify the creation of a new head of immunity for a whole class of documents. " 43. I have referred to the above for the reason that the press may genuinely be feeling that if they disclose the source in the proceedings in the court in trials, suits etc. , or even proceedings for contempt of court or legislatures, their sources may dry out and they may be left without sources in due course. There are such public interest and such classes where a court may think disclosure of a source against the public interest. A cause that a source shall dry up cannot as a rule be recognised is a cause of public interest unless some modalities are worked out and sources of information of some types are kept out of the rule of disclosure by evolution of the system of independent press with a code of ethics and journalists adhering to the norms laid down for the said purpose. Possibly a day will come when courts will with some definiteness say in what type of cases source be not disclosed and in what type of cases disclosure will be necessary. 44. The above law has almost crystalised in the U. K. and in one of its latest decisions the Court of Appeal in Maxwell V/s. Pressaram Limited, 1987-1 the Weekly Law Reports 298, it has reiterated the law saying that it will be necessary to see whether the public interest that protected the source outweighed the interest of justice or not and pointed out that in a case in which there is likelihood of its recurrence or repetition the interest of justice would outweigh the interest of public otherwise. 45. In Paul M. Branzburg V/s. John P. Hayes, 408 US 665 : 33 L Ed 2d 626, the United States Supreme Court has answered the issue, whether requiring newsmen to appear and testify before the State or Federal Grand Juries abridged the freedom of press guaranteed by the first amendment, saying that it did not. 45. In Paul M. Branzburg V/s. John P. Hayes, 408 US 665 : 33 L Ed 2d 626, the United States Supreme Court has answered the issue, whether requiring newsmen to appear and testify before the State or Federal Grand Juries abridged the freedom of press guaranteed by the first amendment, saying that it did not. The judgment is a study or the competing principles beginning from the first amendment to the fifth amendment relating to the freedom of press, need to protect the said freedom, and diclosure of source It has recorded its conclusion in the following words : "it is thus not surprising that the great weigh of authority is that newsmen are not exempt from the normal duty of appearing before a grand jury and answering questions relevant to a criminal investigation. At common law, courts consistently refused to recognise the existence of any privilege authorising a newsman to refuse to reveal confidential information to a grand jury. See, e. g. Ex-parte lawrence, 116 Cal 298, 48 P 124 (1897); Plunkett V/s. Hamilton.136 ga 27, 70 SE 781 (1911) ; Clein V/s. State, 52 So, 2d 117 (Fla 1950) ; in re. Grunow, 84 NJL 235, 85-A 1011 (1913) ; People ex rel mooney V/s. Sheriff, 269 NY 291, 199 NE 415 (1936) ; Joslyn V/s. People, 67 Colo 297, 184 P.375 (1919) ; Adams V/s. Associated Press ; 46 FRD 439 (SD) Tex 1969 ; Brewster V/s. Boston Herald-Traveler corp. , 20 FRD 416 (Mass 1957), See generally Annot, 7 AIR 3d 591 (1966 ). In 1958, a news gatherer asserted for the first time that the first Amendment exempted confidential information from public disclosure pursuant to a subpoena issued in a civil suit, Garland V/s. Torre, 259 F 2d 545 (CA-2) cert denied, 358 US 910, 3 L Ed 2d 331, 793 ct 237 (1958), but the claim was denied, and this argument has been almost uniformly rejected since then, although there are occasional dicta that, in circumstances not presented here, a newsman might be excused. In re : Goodfadar, 45 Haw 317, 367 P 3d 472 (1961) ; In re : Taplor, 412 Pa 32, 193 A 2d 181 (1963) ; State V/s. Buchanan, 250 Ore 244, 436, P 2d 729, cert denied, 392 US 905, 20 L Ed 2d 1363, 88 S CT 2055 (1968) ; Murphy V/s. Colorado. In re : Goodfadar, 45 Haw 317, 367 P 3d 472 (1961) ; In re : Taplor, 412 Pa 32, 193 A 2d 181 (1963) ; State V/s. Buchanan, 250 Ore 244, 436, P 2d 729, cert denied, 392 US 905, 20 L Ed 2d 1363, 88 S CT 2055 (1968) ; Murphy V/s. Colorado. No 19t"04 Sup ct Colo ; cert denied, 365 US 842, 5 L Ed 2d 810, 81 Ct 802 (1961) (unreported, discussed in In re : Goodfader case (supra) at 366, 367 P 2d, at 498 (Fizuha, J. , dissenting ). These courts have applied the presumption against the existence of an asserted testimonial privilege, United States V/s. Bryan, 339 US 323, 33i, 94 L Ed 884, 890, 70 S CT 724 (1950), and have concluded that the First amendment interest asserted by the newsman was outweighed by the general obligation of a citizen to appear before a grand jury or at trial, pursuant to a subpoena, and give what information he possesses. The opinions of the state courts in Branzburg and Pappas are typical of the prevailing view, although a few recent cases, such as caldwell, have recognised and given effect to some form of constitutional newsmans privilege. See State V/s. Khops, 49 Wis 2d 547, 183 NW 2d 93 (1971) (dictum) ; Alioto V/s. Cowles Communications, inc. , CA No.52150 ND Cal (1969) ; In re Grand Jury Witnesses.322 F Supp 573 (ND Cal 1970) ; People v Dohrn, Crim No.69-3808 (Cook County, III Cir Ct 1970 ). " 46. The prevailing constitutional view of the newsmans privilege is very much rooted in the ancient role of the gran J jury that has the dual function of determining if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and of protecting citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions. The Fifth amendment provides that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand jury". The adoption of the grand jury. in our Constitution as the sole method for preferring charges in serious criminal case shows the high place it held as an instrument of justice, A number of States have provided newsmen a statutory privilege of varying breadth, but the majority have not done so, and none has been provided by federal statute. The adoption of the grand jury. in our Constitution as the sole method for preferring charges in serious criminal case shows the high place it held as an instrument of justice, A number of States have provided newsmen a statutory privilege of varying breadth, but the majority have not done so, and none has been provided by federal statute. Until now the only testimonial privilege for unofficial witnesses that is rooted in the Federal Constitution is the Fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. We are asked to create another by interpreting the First Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy. This we decline to do. Fair and effective law enforcement aimed at providing security for the person and property of the individual is a fundamental function of government, and the grand jury plays an important, constitutionally mandated role in this process. On the records now before us, we perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial. 47. This conclusion itself involves no restraint on what newspapers may publish or on the type or quality of information reporters may seek to acquire, nor does it threaten the vast bulk of confidential relationship between reporters and their sources. Grand juries address themselves to the issues of whether crimes have been : "committed and who committed them. Only where news sources themselves are implicated in crime or posses information relevant to the grand jurys task need they or the reporter be concerned about grand jury subpoenas. Grand juries address themselves to the issues of whether crimes have been : "committed and who committed them. Only where news sources themselves are implicated in crime or posses information relevant to the grand jurys task need they or the reporter be concerned about grand jury subpoenas. Nothing before us indicates that a large number or percentage of all confidential news sources fall into either category and would in any way be deterred by our holding that the Constitution does not, as it never has, exempt the newsmen from performing the citizens normal duty of appearing and furnishing information relevant to the grand jurys task " this judgment has also taken notice of the preference for unanimity of those confidential informants involved in actual criminal conduct, a product of their desire to escape criminal prosecution and the fear of newsmen that disclosure will threaten their job security or personal safety or result in dishonour or embarrassment. Concluding, the judgment has said "we are unwilling to embark the judiciary oa a long and difficult journey to such an uncertain destination. The administration of a constitutional newsmans privilege would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order. Sooner or later, it would be necessary to define those categories of newsmen who qualified for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large metro-politan publisher who utilises the latest photocomposition methods. Cf. In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F Supp 573, 574 (ND Cal 1970 ). Freedom of the press is a fundamental personal right which is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion. Lovell V/s. Griffin, 303, US 444, 450, 452, 82 L Ed 949, 953, 954, 58 S Ct 666 (1938 ). See also Mills V/s. Alabama, 384, US 214, 219, 16 Ed 484, 488, 86 S Ct 1434 (1966) ; Murdock V/s. Pennsylvania, 319 US 105 111, 87 L Ed 1292, 1297, 63 S Ct 870, 146 AIR 81 (1943 ). The information function asserted by representatives of the organized press in the present cases is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists. The information function asserted by representatives of the organized press in the present cases is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists. Almost any author may quite accurately assert that he is contributing to the flow of information to the public, that he relies on confidential sources of information, and that these sources will be silenced if he is forced to make disclosures before a grand jury. . ,. " And thereafter has concluded "finally, as we have earlier indicated, news gathering is not without its first Amendment protection, and grand jury investigations if instituted or conducted other than in good faith, would pose wholly different issues for resolution under the First Amendment. Official harassment of the press undertaken not for purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a reporters relationship with his news sources would have no jurisdiction. Grand juries are suoject to judicial control and subpoenas to motions to quash. Wo do not expect courts will forget that grand juries must operate within the limits of the First Amendment as well as the Fifth. " 48. This judgment, thus, has said that freedom of press is indistinguishable from the freedom of a citizen who is subject to the laws that make him responsible to the courts to answer all questions relevant for proper administration of justice including disclosure of a source, whether such disclosure endangers the free flow of news or not. 49. I have not referred to many other cases cited before us because with little variation in the approach to the problem, the answer given is the same, that (1) administration of justice is such a public interest that it shall outweigh any other interest and that (2) a Newsmans privilege is not a special privilege or exclusive privilege. It is the same as that of any citizen as to the freedom of speech. A newsmans source, even if true, is not protected by any special law and if diclosure is necessary in the ends of justice, by withholding it a newsman shall commit serious wrong and damage to the public interest. A newsman shall always be under obligation to answer all the questions put to him like any other witnesses in a proceeding, provided his evidence is necessary. A newsman shall always be under obligation to answer all the questions put to him like any other witnesses in a proceeding, provided his evidence is necessary. A court of law shall, however, not call upon a newsman to be a witness in a proceeding to disclose a source just for the reason of the newsman reporting a fact. If the fact reported has no relation to the proceeding in the court, whether existing from before or coming to exist after the proceeding started, a court of law shall ordinarily decline to order for the disclosure. 50. The position of the press freedom to publish news, information or views in India is, thus, no better than the position of newsman either in united Kingdom or United States. They may be called upon in a Court of law to depose and answer all questions, including disclosure of the source, if the source is involved in committing any offence or its knowledge is relevant to any issue involved in the proceeding in the court. A court, however, shall not ordinarily compel a newsman to disclose its source because a free flow of information also is a cause of the public and it is always in public interest to protect it by extending immunity to press-men to preserve the confidentiality of the source. It will, however, be only in the cases where the interest of justice would demand disclosure of the source, the court shall be within its right to command a newsman to be a witness in a proceeding before it and answer all the questions including the question as to the indentity of the source, and the newsman in such a case shall be obliged to answer all such questions. His refusal to answer any such question shall at a cause of action against him for violating the rule of law. 51. The court shall, however, always take notice of the aforementioned public interest of the free flow of information and any other public interest that may be pleaded by the newsman before it, but if there is no public interest outweighing the interest of administration of justice or there is no public interest at all to be pleaded to maintain the confidentiality of the disclosure of the source, the newsmen will disclose the source. 52. 52. I am not required to go into the details of the proceeding before us, as we have already noticed that the contemners have fully purged themselves of contempt. The correspondent was called to depose before us and his deposition is on the record. He has declined to disclose the source. I need not however, go any further into the matter for the reason that once I hold that unqualified apology has to be accepted, my examining the conduct of any of the contemners will not be in the interest of justice. 53. Mr. Ghosh has submitted that the Hindustan Ti mes is a news paper of repute. It has on many occasions reported matters which invoked response from the constitutional authorities and served the public interest. Quite a few news items published by it have many times moved this Court to initiate proceedings to set a person illegally imprisoned to liberty, remove fetters put to innocent victims and issue orders and directions to undo the legal wrongs. They, it is not only a hope, but a desire, are capable of coming forward as leaders to frame a code of conduct or code of ethics of journalists and bring such code of conduct or ethics to the notice of the courts in India for acceptance as a rule to maintain, as observed by the Supreme Court, a mutually agreed code of behaviour between the press men on the one hand and the courts on the other hand. 54. I have endeavoured to record my opinion on the issues as to what may constitute a criminal contempt, whether a contemner is an accused or not, what is the extent of the freedom of speech under Article 19 (1) of the Constitution of india, whether a contemner can invoke Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India and refuse to appear as a witness or to answer any question as to the disclosure of the source or not, as in the event of contest I would have been called to answer them. 55. This Court has always exercised restraint and softended sharp edges of justice by human compassion and shown deference to the rights and privileges of the people at large. 56. Contemners tendered unqualified apologies at the first instance. They also tendered unqualified apologies in the petitions showing cause. 55. This Court has always exercised restraint and softended sharp edges of justice by human compassion and shown deference to the rights and privileges of the people at large. 56. Contemners tendered unqualified apologies at the first instance. They also tendered unqualified apologies in the petitions showing cause. After arguments were concluded yet another affidavit tendering unqualified apology was filed by them. Learned counsel for the contemners stated before us on 3-7-1989 that the letest affidavit of unqualified apology by the contemners is consistent with the first affidavit showing cause. They, thus, have stood by the unqualified apology ignoring the supplementary petition showing cause, in which one of them had tried to justify the news I believe, as Mr. Ghosh has submitted, that the contemuers who are responsible newsmen never intended to publish any. news amounting to contempt of this Court and that they genuinely felt that it was in the mutual interest of the the freedom of press and the dignity of this Court that unqualified apology should also be published by them and they accordingly published such unqualified apology. Men associated with a newspaper of the reputation of Hindustan Times were expected to respect the law and the court. They nave fully purged themselves of the contempt. The rule is accordingly, discharged. Binod Kumar Roy, J. I wholly agree. However, I wish to add few words. 57. The entire law of contempt concerns administration of justice which relies for its strength on the strength of public confidence and it must raise supreme and fearless justice is the prominent creed of our Constitution.58. In Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. V/s. Proprietors of Indian Express newspapers Bombay Pvt. Ltd. and others, AIR 1989 SC 190 , the Supreme Court in its recent judgment while discontinuing an order of injunction restraining publication of article in the Indian Expressa newspaperafter holding that continuation of injunction would amout to interference with the freedum of Press in form of preventive injunction and it must, therefore, be based on reasonable grounds for the sole purpose of keeping the administration of justice unimpaired, observed as follows : "the law of contempt must be judged in a particular situation. The process of due course of administration of justice must remain unimpaired. The process of due course of administration of justice must remain unimpaired. Public interest demands that there should be no interference with judicial process and effect of the judicial decision should not be pre-empted or circumvented by public agitation or publications. It has to be remembered that even at turbulent times through which the developing countries are passing contempt of court means interference with the due administration of justice. " "publications, if any, however would be subject to the decision of the court on the question of Contempt of Court namely prejudging the issue and thereby interfering with the due administration of justice. " in Attorney General V/s. News Group Newspapers, (1988) 3 WLR 163, the Queens bench Division while dealing with a question of contempt committed by a news paper by publishing an article in regard to a pending proceeding after holding that newspaper as guilty of Contempt of Court observed as follows : "the need for a free press is axiomatic, but the press canuot be allowed to charge about like a wild unbridled horse. It has, to a necessary degree, in the public interest, to be curbed. The curb is in no circumstance more necessary than when the principle that every man accused of crime shall have a fair trial is at stake. It is a principle which, in my experience, news paper, proprietors and editors are usually as alert as anyone to avoid violating. " the then Hyderabad High Court in the State V/s. Vikar Ahmad, AIR 1954 Hyd.175 (which has also been quoted in C. K, Daphtary and others V/s. O. P, Guptas case (supra) reported in AIR 1971 SC 1132 , rightly observed thus : ". . . . . The freedom of press under our Constitution is not higher than that of citizen, and that there is no privilege attaching to the procession of the press as distinguished from the members of the public. To whatever height the subject in general may go, so also may the journalist, and if an ordinary citizen may not transgress the law so must not the press That the exercise of expression is subject to the reasonable restriction of the law of contempt, is borne out by clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution. To whatever height the subject in general may go, so also may the journalist, and if an ordinary citizen may not transgress the law so must not the press That the exercise of expression is subject to the reasonable restriction of the law of contempt, is borne out by clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution. It should be well to remember that the Judges by reason of their office are precluded from entering into any controversy in the column of the public press, nor can enter the area and do battle upon equal terms in newspapers, as can be done by ordinary citizens. " Scurrilous attack on a Judge in respect of his conduct for his judgment has advene effect on the administration of justice and in a country like ours has the inevitable effect of undermining the confidence in the judiciary is shattered the due administration of justice definitely suffers. Contempt notic e discharged.