Judgement JAHAGIRDAR, J. :- This is a reference made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Greater Bombay under S.395(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The reference arises out of proceedings initiated by the Muslim wife under S.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also out of an application made by the husband under S.127(3)(b) of the Code. 2. Few facts ought to be necessarily stated in order to understand the circumstances under which the learned Additional Sessions Judge has made the reference. On 16th of July, 1979, there was a divorce between the wife and the husband who had been married several years earlier. The wife made an application which was treated as Criminal Case No. 915/MN/1979 under S.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter referred to as "the Code", for maintenance. On 14th of October, 1980, the Metropolitan Magistrate of Vikhroli passed an order giving maintenance to the wife of Rs. 150/- per month. 3. As is well known, the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, hereinafter referred to as the Muslim Women Act of 1986, came into force on 19th of May, 1986. The wife made an application for recovering the arrears of maintenance for the period after this Act came into force. This application has been treated as Criminal Case No. 636/N/1986. In these proceedings, the husband made an application under S.127(3)(b) of the Code for dismissing the wife's application on the ground that after 19th of May, 1986, the divorced Muslim wife was not entitled to recover any amount by way of maintenance pursuant to any order that might have been passed under S.125 of the Code. 4. The learned trial Magistrate, by his order dated 12th October, 1988, dismissed the husband's application and directed him, allowing the wife's application, to make the payment. This order was challenged by the husband in revision, being Criminal Revision Application No. 357 of 1958, which came up for hearing before Mr. H.S. Ghare, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay (Court No. 37). The learned Additional Sessions Judge noticed two judgements of this Court. which were in the field and which were directly on the point that arose in the revision application. The first of these judgements is Mahaboobkhan v. Parveenbanul, 1988 Mah LJ 751. Then there was another judgement of Loney, J. in Zahid Ali v. Fahmida. (1988) 2 DMC 387. The learned Additional Sessions Judge noticed two judgements of this Court. which were in the field and which were directly on the point that arose in the revision application. The first of these judgements is Mahaboobkhan v. Parveenbanul, 1988 Mah LJ 751. Then there was another judgement of Loney, J. in Zahid Ali v. Fahmida. (1988) 2 DMC 387. From the way the learned Additional Sessions Judge has noticed these two judgements, we gathered an impression that he thought that there was some inconsistency between these two judgements. The learned Additional Sessions judge also noticed some other judgements of the other High Courts touching upon this point, and thereafter formed an opinion which he has expressed in paragraph 8 of his judgement and order dated 21st of February, 1989. The said opinion is as follows : "I also heard the learned Counsel for the State Shri Raje who submitted that since this question of law involved is likely to affect number of such proceedings and since the judgement of his Lordship Mr. Justice Mohta and the Judgements of Calcutta and Kerala High Courts are at variance, coupled with the observations of His Lordship Mr. Justice Loney, it would, be a fit case to refer to Hon'ble High Court under S.395(2) of Criminal Procedure Code so that the law is well settled by a larger Bench of this High Court." Hence the reference has been placed before this Bench. 5. We have heard Mr. Miranda and Mr. Shaikh, the learned Advocates appearing for the wife and husband respectively. Mrs. Rao, the learned Public Prosecutor, has also assisted us. After having heard the learned Advocates and after having gone through the judgements referred to by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, we are of the opinion that the reference under S.395(2) of the Code made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is wholly unwarranted. There is no conflict at all between the two views expressed by Mohta, J. and Loney, J. in the judgements referred to above. In order to demonstrate this, we will notice briefly the facts in both the cases. 6. In Mahaboobkhan's case (1988 Mah LJ 781), the divorce had taken place between the parties on 8th of January, 1985. An application for maintenance had been made by the divorced wife thereafter and on 31st January 1985, the order for maintenance had been passed. In order to demonstrate this, we will notice briefly the facts in both the cases. 6. In Mahaboobkhan's case (1988 Mah LJ 781), the divorce had taken place between the parties on 8th of January, 1985. An application for maintenance had been made by the divorced wife thereafter and on 31st January 1985, the order for maintenance had been passed. Subsequently, an application for distress warrant was made by the wife for the maintenance. In the meantime, the Muslim Women Act of 1986 had come into force. The husband resisted the application for distress warrant by contending that after the Muslim Women Act of 1986 had come into force, the right to maintenance of a divorced Muslim women has to be worked out only under the provisions of the Muslim Women Act of 1986 and not under the provisions of the Code. Even if an order has been earlier passed under S.12 of the Code, that order itself becomes infructuous after 19th of May, 1986. This contention was upheld by Mohta, J., who held that the Muslim Women Act of 1986 was declaratory in character and a Muslim divorced woman can claim maintenance only under the provisions of the Muslim Women Act of 1986 irrespective of the fact that an order had been passed in her favour before the Act came into force under S.125 of the Code. 7. In Zahid Ali's case (1988-2 DMC 387) (Bom), the application for the maintenance had been made by a Muslim wife who was not divorced and an order for maintenance had been passed before the Muslim Women Act of 1986 had come into force. That order for maintenance had been challenged by the husband, but subsequently confirmed by the High Court and the Supreme Court. In February 1984, an execution application was filed by the wife. From the facts mentioned in the judgement in zahid Ali's case, One gathers that the execution application proceedings were going on till 1986. It was only after the Muslim Women Act of 1986 came into force that the husband divorced his wife and thereafter made an application in December 1987 that the order of maintenance passed under Section 125 of the Code can no longer be enforced against him, after the Muslim Women's Act of 1986 came into force in May 1986. It was only after the Muslim Women Act of 1986 came into force that the husband divorced his wife and thereafter made an application in December 1987 that the order of maintenance passed under Section 125 of the Code can no longer be enforced against him, after the Muslim Women's Act of 1986 came into force in May 1986. Loney, J. noticed that, the retrospectivity in Mahaboobkhan's case (1988 Mah LJ 781) was applicable to a divorced wife and not to a wife who had applied earlier; earlier means before the divorce. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case before him, Loney, J. held that S.3 of the Muslim Women Act of 1986 is not available to a Muslim woman who is not divorced for the obvious reason that the Act of 1986 deals with the rights of divorced women, Lonely, J. further noticed that the wife in the case before him could be regarded as a divorced woman after 14th of July, 1986 on which date the divorced had been obtained. He also noticed that if thereafter she made an application claiming maintenance as a divorced Muslim woman, then obviously the provisions of the Act of 1986 would be attracted. Thereafter, Loney, J. proceeded to hold that the respondent before him, namely, the divorced Muslim woman, was entitled to claim maintenance pursuant to an order passed in her favour under S.12 of the Code up to 14th of July, 1986 and for three months thereafter, Loney, J. did not held that the order passed in favour of the divorced woman under S.12 of the Code will operate indefinitely, despite the provisions contained in the Muslim Women Act of 1986. In this respect, Loney, J. has followed and applied the law laid down in Mahaboobkhan's case. Far from there being any inconsistency between the views taken by Mohta, J. and Loney, J., there is in fact total harmony between the two views. We, therefore, see no justification at all for the learned Additional Sessions Judge for making a reference under S.395(2) of the Code. 8. Far from there being any inconsistency between the views taken by Mohta, J. and Loney, J., there is in fact total harmony between the two views. We, therefore, see no justification at all for the learned Additional Sessions Judge for making a reference under S.395(2) of the Code. 8. It should be remembered that despite what view the other High Courts might have taken every Court which is subordinate to the High Court in Maharashtra is bound to and must follow the law laid down by this Court and should not make reference to the High Court on the ground that some other High Court has taken a different view. The subordinate Courts must unquestioningly obey the law laid down by this Court. In this view of the matter, we will have to reject the reference and would ask the learned Additional Sessions Judge to decide the same after following the law laid down by this Court. 9. However, on the facts and circumstances of this case, we notice that even if we send the matter back to the learned Additional Sessions Judge and if he passes an order that will necessarily be challenged in a revision application before this Court. In view of the importance of the point of law involved in this case, we have decided to exercise the powers of this Court under Section 407 of the Code suo motu. We hereby direct that the Criminal Revision Application No. 357 of 1988, pending in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, shall stand transferred to this Court and the same shall be placed before the Bench dealing with criminal revision applications, Order accordingly. The record and proceedings of the case shall be forthwith sent to this Court by the Sessions Court. Order accordingly.