JUDGMENT - PATEL H.D., J.:---The respondent Gyarsilal, as a legatee of the deceased landlady Smt. Champabai, filed two applications dated 2-7-1979 and 5-5-1983 under Clauses 13(3)(i), (ii), (iii) and (v) of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rent Control Order") seeking permission to terminate the tenancy of the petitioners. The applications were registered as Revenue Case No. 729/A-71(2)/78-79 and 331/A-71(2)/82-83. The Rent Controller, Nagpur by common order passed on 22-9-1986 granted permission to the respondent to terminate the tenancy of the petitioners under Clauses 13(3)(ii), (iii) and (v) of the Rent Control Order. The claim of the respondent under Clause 13(3)(i) was, however, disallowed. 2. Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Rent Controller, Nagpur the petitioners preferred two appeals which came to be registered as Appeals Nos. 34/A-71(2) of 86-87 and 35/A-71(2) of 86-87 before the Additional District Magistrate, Nagpur. After hearing the parties, the Appellate Authority confirmed the orders passed by the Rent Controller, Nagpur and dismissed both the appeals by its common order dated 23-7-1987. 3. Thereupon, the petitioner filed a Writ Petition bearing No. 1094/88 before this Court raising only one challenge, namely, the provisions of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 were ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, prayed for quashing of the aforesaid orders passed by the Rent Control Authorities. The challenge was based on singular contention that as different laws relating to Rent Control operated in the State of Maharashtra, they were discriminatory and hence, the provisions of Rent Control Order could not be employed against the petitioners. This Court after hearing the parties, summarily dismissed the petition by order dated 17-8-1988. The order passed is reproduced below: "The only ground on which the present writ petition has been filed is that the provisions of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, is ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as different enactments are operating in different parts of the State. This point is concluded against the petitioner by two decisions of this Court (i) (Vidharbha (Rent Control) Bhadekaru Sangha v. State)1, 1986 Mh.L.J. 883 and (ii) (Mukesh v. Vinod)2, A.I.R. 1986 Bom. 247. Under the circumstances the petition is summarily dismissed." 4. This point is concluded against the petitioner by two decisions of this Court (i) (Vidharbha (Rent Control) Bhadekaru Sangha v. State)1, 1986 Mh.L.J. 883 and (ii) (Mukesh v. Vinod)2, A.I.R. 1986 Bom. 247. Under the circumstances the petition is summarily dismissed." 4. After unsuccessful attempt to get the orders passed by the Rent Control Authorities quashed, the petitioners have filed the present petition once again impugning the very same orders passed by the Rent Control Authorities but on different grounds. Actually the merits of the orders are now challenged in this petition. Resisting the petition, the respondent raised the preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition. His contentions were as under : The petitioners are impugning the very same orders passed by the Rent Control Authorities which were the subject matter of earlier Writ Petition No. 1094/88 and that petition came to be dismissed after hearing the parties. The grounds now urged by the petitioners in this petition were within the knowledge of the petitioners when the earlier Writ Petition No. 1094/88 was filed and all these grounds could well have been taken in that petition itself. In these circumstances, it was not permissible now for the petitioners to challenge the very same orders on different grounds in a subsequent petition. Hence, the petition is barred under the principles of res judicata or at any rate, on the grounds of public policy. 5. The aforesaid objection was opposed on behalf of the petitioner. According to them, the principles of res judicata would apply to the grounds that may be available only with reference to the attack made in the petition whether those grounds were raised or not. In other words, the principles of res judicata will not act as a bar to the present petition because the ground or grounds of attack raised in this petition are different and those grounds do not relate to the constitutional validity of the Rent Control Order. It remains to be seen whether the proposition urged on behalf of the petitioners is correct or not. I will first deal with the relevant case law cited at the Bar. 6. It remains to be seen whether the proposition urged on behalf of the petitioners is correct or not. I will first deal with the relevant case law cited at the Bar. 6. The theories behind the application of the principle of res judicata and the principle itself is well illustrated in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the judgment reported in the case of (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Nawab Hussain)3, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1680, the relevant portions of which are extracted below : "3. The principle of estoppel per res judicata is a rule of evidence. As has been stated in (Marginson v. Blackburn Borough Council)4, 1939(2) KB 426 at p. 437, it may be said to be "the broader rule of evidence which prohibits the reassertion of a cause of action." This doctrine is based on two theories : (i) The finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions for the final termination of disputes in the general interest of community as a matter of public policy and (ii) the interest of the individual that he should be protected from multiplication of litigation. It therefore serves not only a public but also a private purpose by obstructing the reopening of matters which have once been adjudicated upon. It is thus not permissible to obtain a second judgment for the same civil relief on the same cause of action, for otherwise the spirit of contentiousness may give rise to conflicting judgments of equal authority, lead to multiplicity of actions and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It is the cause of action which gives rise to an action, and that is why it is necessary for the courts to recognise that a cause of action which results in a judgment must lose its identity and vitality and merge in the judgment when pronounced. It cannot therefore survive the judgment, or give rise to another cause of action on the same facts. This is what is known as the general principles of res judicata." "4. But it may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If in such a case a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. But it may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If in such a case a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. Courts have therefore treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process ......... This is therefore another and an equally necessary and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for its helps in raising the bar of res judicata by suitably construing the general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. That is why this other rule has sometimes been referred to as constructive res judicata which in reality, in an aspect of amplification of the general principle." Based on the principle enunciated above, the Supreme Court dealt with the merits of the case. It observed that the respondent did not raise the plea in the writ petition which had been filed in the High Court challenging his dismissal from service that by virtue of Clause (1) of Article 311 of the Constitution, he could not have been dismissed by Deputy Inspector General of Police as he had been appointed by Inspector General of Police. It also observed that it was an important plea which was within the knowledge of the respondent and could well have been taken in the writ petition, but he contended himself by raising other pleas that he was not afforded adequate opportunity to meet the case against him in the Departmental Enquiry and the action taken against him was mala fide. The said writ petition was, however, dismissed. It, therefore, held that it was not permissible for the respondent to challenge that very dismissal in subsequent suit on the other ground that he had been dismissed by the authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed because the suit was clearly barred by the principles of res judicata. 7. The next case is (Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam others)5, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1150. In that case, the assessee challenged the validity of Sales Tax imposed upon him for a particular year by petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition was rejected on merits. 7. The next case is (Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam others)5, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1150. In that case, the assessee challenged the validity of Sales Tax imposed upon him for a particular year by petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition was rejected on merits. The assessee approached the Supreme Court by Special Leave Petition and tried to raise two more additional grounds but he was not allowed to do so because those additional grounds were not raised in the writ petition before the High Court. Subsequently, the assessee filed another writ petition under Article 226 before the High Court challenging once again the same assessment order but on grounds the Supreme Court had not permitted to be raised in appeal before it. The High Court rejected the petition and on an appeal, the Supreme Court held that the second writ petition was barred by constructive res judicata. The following observations in paragraphs 11 and 12 are relevant: "11. The result of the decision of this Court in the earlier appeal brought by the appellant before it is clear and unambiguous, and that is that the appellant had failed to challenge the validity of the impugned order which had been passed by the Assistant Commissioner against him. In other words, the effect of the earlier decision of this Court is that the appellant is liable to pay the tax and penalty imposed on him by the impugned order. It would, we think, be unreasonable to suggest that after this judgment was pronounced by this Court, it should still be open to the appellant to file a subsequent writ petition before the Madhya Pradesh High Court and urge that the said impugned order was invalid for some additional grounds. In case the Madhya Pradesh High Court had upheld these contentions and had given effect to its decision, its order would have been plainly inconsistent with the earlier decision of this Court, and that would be inconsistent with the finality which must attach to the decisions of this Court as between the parties before it in respect of the subject matter directly covered by the said decision. Considerations of public policy and the principle of the finality of judgments are important constituents of the rule of law and they cannot be allowed to be violated just because a citizen contends that his fundamental rights have been contravened by an impugned order and wants liberty to agitate the question about its validity by filing one writ petition after another." "12. ........................ At the hearing of this appeal, he has filed another petition asking for leave from this Court to take some more additional points and that shows that if constructive res judicata is not applied to such proceedings a party can file as many writ petitions as he likes and take one or two points every time. That clearly is opposed to considerations of public policy on which res judicata is based and would mean harassment and hardship to the opponent. Besides, if such a course is allowed to be adopted, the doctrine of finality of judgments pronounced by this Court would also be materially affected................." 8. A point for consideration arose before the Supreme Court in (Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior and others)6, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 88 whether a petitioner after withdrawing the petition filed by him under Article 226 of the Constitution of India without permission to institute a fresh petition, can file a second petition under that Article. The view expressed in given below : "9. ............. But we are of the view that the principle underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code should be extended in the interests of administration of justice to cases of withdrawal of writ petition also, not on the ground of res judicata but on the ground of public policy as explained above. It would also discourage the litigant from indulging in bench hunting tactics. In any event there is no justifiable reason in such a case to permit a petitioner to invoke the extra ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution once again. It would also discourage the litigant from indulging in bench hunting tactics. In any event there is no justifiable reason in such a case to permit a petitioner to invoke the extra ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution once again. While the withdrawal of a writ petition filed in the High Court without permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other remedies like a suit or a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution since such withdrawal does not amount to res judicata, the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution should be deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner in respect of the cause of action relied on in the writ petition when he withdraws it without such permission. In the instant case the High Court was right in holding that a fresh writ petition was not maintainable before it in respect of the same subject matter since the earlier writ petition had been withdrawn without permission to file a fresh petition..........." Though in the abovesaid case, the principles of res judicata were not applied because the petitions were withdrawn before decision could be given, the principles underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure were extended in the interest of administration of justice. This was solely with a view to prevent the litigant from abusing the process of the Court by instituting petitions after petitions on the same cause of action. 9. Even in the case of (Forward Construction Co. others v. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.), Andheri others)7, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 391, the Supreme Court reiterated the principle of res judicata in the following words : "20. So far as the first reason is concerned, the High Court in our opinion was not right in holding that the earlier judgment would not operate as res judicata as one of the grounds taken in the present petition was conspicuous by its absence in the earlier petition. Explanation IV to section 11, Civil Procedure Code provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. Explanation IV to section 11, Civil Procedure Code provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim or defence. The principle underlying Explanation IV is that where the parties have had an opportunity of controverting a matter that should be taken to be the same thing as if the matter had been actually controverted and decided. It is true that where a matter has been constructively in issue it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been heard and decided. The first reason, therefore, has absolutely no force." 10. In the case of (Jaswant Singh and another v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, New Delhi)8, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1096, a ground was urged in support of the appeal by the appellant Jaswant Singh that the order passed by sub-Judge, Delhi having become final, it would operate as a bar to enquiry into an application which had been made by the Custodian after promulgation of the relevant ordinances. The ground was based on the principle underlying section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. While answering the question, the Supreme Court specified the requirements necessary for establishing the principle of res judicata, the relevant portion of which is narrated below : "14. .............. That section provides that no Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. Explanation IV to that section provides that any matter which might or ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue in such suit. It is well settled that in order to decide the question whether a subsequent proceeding is barred by res judicata it is necessary to examine the question with reference to the (i) forum or the competent of the Court, (ii) parties and their representatives, (iii) matters in issue, (iv) matters which ought to have been made ground for defence or attack in the former suit and (v) the final decision......" Placing reliance on the observations made in Forward Construction Company's case and also upon the Jaswant Singh's case (both cited supra) and particularly on the requirements quoted therein for applying the principles of res judicata and they being (i) matters in issue (ii) matters which ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack and (iii) the final decision, it was sought to be contended on behalf of the petitioners that the matters in issue in earlier writ petition filed by the petitioners were restricted to grounds relating to constitutional validity of the Rent Control Order and if any of the ground or grounds pertaining to that challenge were not taken, any subsequent petition raising those grounds again would be barred under the principles of res judicata. It is not possible to spell out such a distinction from any of the above referred cases. If such distinguishing features are accepted, the purpose behind application of the principles of res judicata would be totally frustrated. It must prohibit reassertion of the same cause of action. To put it differently, there must be finality or conclusiveness in a judicial decision in the general interest of the community as a matter of public policy and also to avoid multiplicity of the litigations. In order to show the defence or res judicata, it is necessary to show that not only the cause of action is the same but also that a party agitating had an opportunity of getting the relief which he is now seeking in a former proceeding. It is not in controversy that the petitioners did not raise the grounds in the former petition filed before this Court challenging the impugned orders on merits. It is not in controversy that the petitioners did not raise the grounds in the former petition filed before this Court challenging the impugned orders on merits. It is also not in controversy that challenging of the orders on merits was within the knowledge of the respondents and all the grounds could well have been taken in that petition, but the petitioners contented themselves by challenging the impugned orders only on the grounds of constitutional validity of the Rent Control Order. It is hence not now permissible for the petitioners to challenge the impugned orders on merits once again by filing the present petition. It is clearly barred by res judicata. 11. In the result, the petition is without any merit and is accordingly dismissed with a direction to the parties to bear their respective costs. Petition dismissed. -----