Judgment S.B.Sanyal and R.N.Lal JJ. 1. This petition is being disposed of at the stage of admission after notice to the respondents having been duly served. The official respondents and respondent No. 3 have appeared. Counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 3 only. 2. In this application the petitioner seeks quashing of his order dated 12.1.1988 (Annexure-5) renewing the permanent Stage Carriage Permit (Arrah to Surajpura) of respondent No. 4; the order dated 2.3.1988 (Annexure-10) confirming the change in the time schedule: and the order dated 22.7.1988 (Annexure-12) rejecting the revision preferred against the order confirming the change in the time schedule. 3. The petitioner pressed only three points: Point No. 1: The publication of the renewal application in Nav-Bharat Times is not in confirmity with Rule 46 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, as that is not a prescribed Newspaper as envisaged under Sec. 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. In support of the said point the petitioner relies on a Division Bench decision of this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 5322 of 1987, disposed of on 8.1.1988 : Uma Shankar Jha V/s. The State of Bihar and Ors. vide Annexure-3. 4. So far as this point is concerned, Sec. 57(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) contemplates that on receipt of an application for a stage carriage permit the Regional Transport Authority shall make the application available for inspection at the office of the Authority and shall publish the application of the substance thereof in the prescribed (emphasis supplied) manner together with a notice of the date before which representations in connection therewith may be submitteed and the said date shall not be less than 30 days from such publication. Sec. 2(21) of the Act defines the word prescribed as prescribed by rules made under the Act. Rule 46 of the Bihar Motor Vehicles Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) prescribes the publication (a) on a suitable notice board situated on the premises of the Authority (b) in the Important Newspapers and (c) forward a copy to the District Magistrate of the District in which the route lies who shall publish the copy on a suitable notice board in his office. 5. No particular Newspaper or Newspapers have been prescribed by the rules but important Newspaper. 5. No particular Newspaper or Newspapers have been prescribed by the rules but important Newspaper. Admittedly the application has been displayed on the notice board of the Authority as also that of the notice board in the office of the District Magistrate as also in the Nav-Bharat Times, a Hindi publication of Times of India group. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relies on a letter dated 4.6.1979 sent by the Special Secretary to the Government in the Department of Transport to the State Transport Authority and all the Regional Transport Authorities to the effect that important newspapers in the State of Bihar in the opinion of the Government are the Indian Nation, the Searchlight, the Aryabarta and the Pradeep. It is, therefore, submitted that since the renewal application was not published in one of these papers, there has been a violation of Sec. 57(3) of the Act read with Rule 46 of the rules and as such the renewal application ought not have been entertained. It may be stated that out of the four newspapers mentioned in the letter, the Searchlight and the Pradeep have stopped publication long before. Our attention has also been drawn by the respondents to a policy decision of the State Government dated 13th July, 1981, for approving the list of newspapers for Government advertisement in supersession of all previous notifications stating therein that approved newspapers will be of three categories (a) the names of big newspapers whose circulation will be more than 20,000 (b) the names of medium newspapers whose circulation will be between 8,000 and 20,000 and (c) the names of small newspapers whose circulation will be 8,000 or below. It has further been stated that publication should not be confined to previously notified newspapers only, but to include such newspapers which fall within the present guideline. This policy decision of 1981 has been reiterated in January, 1989 (vide Annexure-2 of the counter-affidavit of respondent No. 3) in the letter issued by the Transport Department stating therein that important newspapers as contemplated under Rule 46 of the Rules read with Sec. 57(3) of the Act will be in accordance with the notification of 13th July, 1981. 7. The argument of the learned Counsel that the publication in Nav-Bharat Times is improper publication is fallacious. 7. The argument of the learned Counsel that the publication in Nav-Bharat Times is improper publication is fallacious. The publication in prescribed manner as contemplated under Sec. 57(3) of the Act will mean as provided by the rules and not by Circular or Notification. The rules prescribe three modes including one for publication in important newspapers without specifying the name of the newspapers. The letter of 1979 cannot be a substitute for the rules. An executive instruction is not a rule. In the case of Madheshwar Mandal V/s. The State 1975 BBCJ 452, a Division Bench of this Court while dealing with the prescribed authority under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act held that an authority to be local authority must be prescribed by the rules and not to be prescribed by mere notification. The word prescribed as defined has a distinct meaning and the statue of the rules made under the Act is much higher than that of letters, Circulars, Notifications etc. But, when the law requires the act to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in that manner and not in any other manner. The infraction of letter of 1979 is, therefore, of no consequence. Further, 1981-Notification reiterated in the year 1989 also leads to the same conclusion. So far as the decision of this Court in Uma Shankar Jha (supra) is concerned, the attention of their Lordships was not drawn to this aspect because the private respondents did not appear, and the Court was given an impression that the newspaper in which the publication was made was not the prescribed newspaper. The attention of the Court was also not drawn to the definition of the word prescribed nor the attention was drawn to the subsequent Notification of the State Government of the year 1981. Further, in the said case there was no publication of the application in the notice board of the Regional Transport Authority nor in the notice board of the District Magistrate. Thus, the case of Uma Shankar Jha (supra) is clearly distinguishable. 8. We are, therefore, of the view that non-publication of the renewal application in the paper the Indian Nation, the Searchlight the Aryabarta and the Pradeep is of no consequence. The question of publication in the Search-light and the Pradeep did not arise at all as they ceased to exist. 8. We are, therefore, of the view that non-publication of the renewal application in the paper the Indian Nation, the Searchlight the Aryabarta and the Pradeep is of no consequence. The question of publication in the Search-light and the Pradeep did not arise at all as they ceased to exist. It may be stated here that it is not the case of the petitioner that Nav-Bharat Times is not an important newspaper with circulation less than twenty thousand. One cannot ignore that it is an important Hindi newspaper of Eastern India. Point No. 2: The next submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the renewal application was not filed within 120 days is required under Sec. 58 of the Act, but there has been a delay of 10 days and the Chairman had no authority to condone the delay of 10 days. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the application was filed within the grade period as envisaged under Sec. 58(3) of the Act inasmuch as it was so done within 15 days after the last date. It has further been contended that even assuming that there was delay, the Chairman under Rule 43A of the rules was empowered to condone the delay. Admittedly, the application for renewal was filed before 135 days including the grace period of 15 days. Even though Sec. 58(2)(a) of the Act provides the filing of the renewal application within 120 days before the date of the expiry of the permit. Sec. 68(3) of the Act confers power upon the Regional Transport Authority to entertain an application beyond the last date, if it is filed within 15 days of the said date on Payment of prescribed fee. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the application having been filed within the grace period, it was not barred by time. 9. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner the grace could have been only allowed by the Regional Transport Authority and not the Chairman of the Authority, as has been done in this case, does not appear to be convincing. The Chairman has been delegated with certain powers as envisaged under Rule 43-A of the rules. Rule 43-A(g) of the rules confers power upon the Chairman to renew a permit under Sec. 58 of the Act. The Chairman has been delegated with certain powers as envisaged under Rule 43-A of the rules. Rule 43-A(g) of the rules confers power upon the Chairman to renew a permit under Sec. 58 of the Act. The Chairman, therefore, is conferred with all powers as contemplated under Sec. 58 of the Act. The only exception to the exercise of the said power is in relation to those cases where objections and representations are filed. In the instant case no representation or objection was tiled to the renewal of the permit of the petitioner. The decision in the case of Mohd. Ashfaq V/s. State Transport Appellate Tribunal U.P. -- , relied upon by the petitioners Counsel does not have any application, because in the said case the renewal application was filed beyond 135 days and in that context the Supreme Court observed that there was no power of condonation of delay. In the instant cage the renewal petition was filed within 135 days. Point No. 3: So far as the change in the time schedule is concerned, it is manifest from Paragraph No. 4 of the impugned judgment that the prayer for change of the time schedule was made prior to the renewal of the permit, namely, the prayer was made on 31.12.1987 and the permit was renewed on 124-1988. There is no substance in the argument of the learned Counsel that the time schedule was changed not in accordance with law. Further, the impugned judgment (Annexure-12) it appears that the Chairman approved the time schedule keeping in view the existing circumstances and in public interest. We arc in agreement with the judgment rendered by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in this regard and we do not find any reason to interfere with the said judgment. 10. For all these, reasons we do not find any substance in the writ petition and is, accordingly dismissed at the stage of admission.