Judgment :- BHASKARAN, J. The Plaintiff, who is engaged in Seeval business from 5.11.1984 in Tamil Nadu, has been buying new aricanut from growers and merchants, sort, grade and clean them, slice them, mix them with several ingredients and packet them is different sizes for ready consumption in the market. This product has been marked throughout with the trade mark "Appu Seeval'. The trade mark consists of a dancing elephant on a globe with the word Appu printed on the left and Seeval printed on the right. The packets are sold in different quantities. The plaintiff has also registered his business as a small Scale Industrial Unit with the Department of Industries and Commerce. The plaintiff has developed his business and his turnover is in the region of Rs. 60, 00/- per month. The plaintiff has also availed bank loan for his business. 2. While so, the plaintiff came to know that the defendant has also started Seeval business with the trade mark 'Appu Seeval'. The defendant has also been circulating the news that the he has secured the registration of 'Appy Seeval' as a trade mark under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) but on verification it was found that the statement is not correct. The defendant's trade mark is also identically similar to that of the plaintiff. The defendant has not registered his trade mark but has only filed an application for registration with the Registrar of Trade Marks on 13.1.1988 of the trade mark consisting of words ' Appy Seeval, and pictorial representation identical to that of the plaintiff's trade mark. The defendant's application in Class 31 has been assigned the number 484155 by the Registrar of Trade Marks. In that application the defendant claimed the user of the above mark since 1987. Whereas the plaintiff is the continuous user of the mark from 1984. As such, the plaintiff has become the owner of the trade mark consisting of the words 'Appu Seeval' and the pictorial representation of the dancing elephant on the globe. Even according to the representation made by the defendant before the Registrar of Trade Marks, he has been using the trade mark since November, 1987. 3. As such, the plaintiff has become the owner of the trade mark consisting of the words 'Appu Seeval' and the pictorial representation of the dancing elephant on the globe. Even according to the representation made by the defendant before the Registrar of Trade Marks, he has been using the trade mark since November, 1987. 3. With the above allegations, the plaintiff has filed the suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant by himself, his servants, agents or anyone claiming through him from passing off aricanut products/seeval/supari or any other similar goods with the labels/wrappers similar to that of the plaintiff or any manner passing off his goods as the goods of the plaintiff and for other reliefs. Pending the suit, the plaintiff has also filed application No. 1143 of 1988 for grant of interim injunction. The defendant took notice in the injunction application Therefore, no interim order was passed. 4. The suit itself was filed by the plaintiff after obtaining leave to institute the suit in application No. 863 of 1988. The defendant has filed Application No. 1283 of 1988 to revoke the leave granted stating this Court has no jurisdiction since the defendant is carrying on business only in the area of Kumbakonam in Thanjavur District and his products are manufactured and marketed only in that area, He has not expanded his business to any other area, according to the defendant, no part of the cause of action arises in Madras. His application to the Registrar of Trade Marks will not give any cause of action to the plaintiff. The plaintiff should have filed the suit only in the Court of the District where the goods manufactured and marketed. Therefore, the leave already granted has to be vacated. 5. The plaintiff has filed the suit on the basis that the defendants is passing off his goods viz., Seeval as that of the plaintiff by using the identical trade mark consisting of the words 'Appu Seeval' and pictorial representation of a dancing elephant on a globe. On a look of both the labels of the plaintiff and the defendant, there is no difficulty to conclude that both are identically similar. Learned counsel for the defendant raises defense only on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, that the plaintiff has obtained leave on misrepresentation and that therefore, the leave has to be cancelled. Learned counsel for the defendant raises defense only on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, that the plaintiff has obtained leave on misrepresentation and that therefore, the leave has to be cancelled. Therefore, the main issue to be considered in these applications is , whether the suit is maintainable. 6. Learned counsel for the defendant submitted that it is not the case of the plaintiff that the defendant is marketing his products in Madras and, therefore, the cause of action will arise only in Kumbakonam within the jurisdiction of the Court where the alleged spurious goods were manufactured, marketed and sent for sale on commercial scale and this Court has no jurisdiction. He also referred to the decision reported in Himachal Pradesh Horticulture Produce Marketing and Processing Corporation Limited, Shimla v. Mohan Meakin Breweries Limited, Salem, 1981 AIR(P&H) 117 wherein it has been held as follows:" * In a suit for passing off or injunction on account of infringement of trade mark the cause of action partly or wholly can arise in a given jurisdiction only if it is the defendant who is proved to have directly made sale of goods under the impugned trade mark, within that jurisdiction, not to an individual consumer but to a distributor , wholesaler or retailer and that such a sale is on a commercial scale. In the instant case there was no evidence to show any transaction of sale of goods under the impugned trade mark, made by the defendant at the place where the suit for passing off and injunction was instituted and so the court at that place has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 7. Learned counsel for the defendant also referred to the decision reported in S. B. S. Jayam & Co. v. Krishnamoorthi, Proprietor, Gopi Chemical Industries, India, 1977 (1) MLJ 286 . In that case, the contention of the defendant is that unless the plaintiff has registered its trade mark at Madras, he cannot maintain a suit at Madras against a possible infringement. v. Krishnamoorthi, Proprietor, Gopi Chemical Industries, India, 1977 (1) MLJ 286 . In that case, the contention of the defendant is that unless the plaintiff has registered its trade mark at Madras, he cannot maintain a suit at Madras against a possible infringement. It was held that in respect of a trade mark registered at the Madras Office, the suit of the property in the mark is at Madras and even though the plaintiff's mark had been registered under the Act at Bombay, by virtue of Section 136(2) of the Act, is should be deemed to have been registered only at Madras and, therefore, the plaintiff can maintain a suit against the defendant at Madras for any infringement of the trade mark. The learned counsel for the defendant further referred to the decision reported in Harold Charles Pinto v. Hilda Menezes in O. S. A. Nos. 78 to 80 of 1976 : 1977 T. L. N. J. 214. Which has not accepted the principal laid down in the above cited Madras decision, wherein it has been held that registration of a trade mark by the plaintiff will give jurisdiction to file a suit against the defendant who disputes the registration, but, once the defendant admits the registration the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot have jurisdiction to maintain a suit against the defendant, who is not carrying on business in the place of registration of the plaintiff's trade mark. Those decisions are not applicable to the to the facts of the present case. 8. Learned counsel for the plaintiff cited a direct decision reported in Jawahar Engineering Co. v. Javahar Engineers Pvt. Ltd. of Delhi High Court in F. A. C. O. (O.S) No. 117 of 1979 : 1979 I. P. L. R. 199 wherein a Bench of the Delhi High Court has held as follows:" * There is another ground for holding that the Court has jurisdiction. Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure shows that a suit like the present can be filled wherever the cause of action wholly or party arises. The plaintiff has prayed for an injunction regarding a threatened breach of a registered trade mark. The learned single Judge held that the Delhi Court does not have jurisdiction on the ground of any sale having been made in Delhi, but does have jurisdiction on account of the advertisement having appeared in the trade mark Journal. The plaintiff has prayed for an injunction regarding a threatened breach of a registered trade mark. The learned single Judge held that the Delhi Court does not have jurisdiction on the ground of any sale having been made in Delhi, but does have jurisdiction on account of the advertisement having appeared in the trade mark Journal. The real point which gives the Court jurisdiction is not the place where the advertisement has appeared, but the fact that the trade mark is sought for sale in Delhi amongst other places Furthermore, when an injunction is sought, it is not necessary that the threat should have become a reality before the injunction and it can even be sought for a threat that is still to materialise. As injunction being prohibitive in nature is intended to prevent something that is likely to happen. Once the plaintiffs have learnt that the defendants have applied for registration of trade mark in Delhi, they can claim an injunction to prevent any sale of the infringing produce in Delhi. In this sense, the Court will have jurisdiction whether any sale in Delhi has taken place or not. In any case, as already stated, the decision is of preliminary; nature once the exact scope of what the defendants intend to do is known, it is open to the Court to return the plaint. In that sense, it is not a final decision and is not open to appeal at the preliminary stage being not a final adjudication". 9. In the instant case, admittedly, the defendant has applied for registration of the trade mark in Madras before the Trade Marks Registry. The trade mark of the defendant is similar to that of plaintiff, and that the same has also been taken up for registration. As has been held in the above cited decision , once the defendant applied for registration of his trade mark in Madras, that will give jurisdiction for the plaintiff to file the suit Madras ant it is not necessary that the defendant must actually carry on business at Madras. Once the defendant has applied for registration, it implies that he is likely to expend his business to Madras. As held in the above cited decision, injunction being prohibitory in nature is intended to prevent something that is likely to happen. Once the defendant has applied for registration, it implies that he is likely to expend his business to Madras. As held in the above cited decision, injunction being prohibitory in nature is intended to prevent something that is likely to happen. Therefore, it can be said that the cause of action also arises at Madras on the basis of the fact that the defendant has applied for registration before the Registrar of Trade Marks, Madras. It cannot therefore said that the leave granted is wrong. 10. So far as the similarity of the trade marks is concerned, as already stated, there is no difficulty in holding that the defendant's trade mark is identical and deceptively similar to that of the plaintiff's trade mark, visually and phonetically Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to injunction. 11. In the result Application No. 1143 of 1988 is ordered and there will be injunction as prayed for pending disposal of the suit. Application No. 1283 of 1988 to revoke the leave granted in application No. 863 of 1988 is dismissed. Held that the defendants having applied for the registration of the mark at the Trade Marks Registry at Madras, that will given jurisdiction for the plaintiff to file the suit in Madras. The defendant's trade mark being deceptively similar to that of the plaintiff's trade mark visually and phonetically, the plaintiff is entitled to injunction as prayed for pending disposal of the suit.