JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) FROM the averments made in the petition, it appears that one Lachhoo Prasad and Chainlal held about 3 acres of land, comprised in Plot No. 94, Gora Bazar, Cantonment, Jabalpur, They continued in its occupation till their death. Lachhoo Prasad and Chainlal are both dead. Lachhoo Prasad died on 6-11-1979, while Chainlal died in 1969. On their death, their heirs, including Gulab Chand and Shivnath came in occupation. Gulab Chand is also dead and his sons are said to be in occupation. The petitioners, who are the heirs of the original holders, Lachhoo Prasad and Chainlal, allege that their ancestors were in occuption as owners of this land much before the British rule in India. However, on a misapprehension, lease deeds were executed by the Cantonment Board in respect of this land, the last being the lease deed dated 7-6-1969, executed in favour of Lachhoo Ram alias Lachhoo Prasad, Gulabchand and Shivnath. This lease expired in 1975, whereafter it was never renewed although the petitioners were ever willing to get the lease renewed. The petitioners allege that the lease aforesaid is renewable and heritable. Although no formal lease deed was executed, rent was being accepted by the Estate Officer upto the year 1981. One of such receipts, evidencing payment of the alleged amount of rent is Annexure P-3. No amount on account of occupation was thereafter accepted by the Estate Officer, although tendered. ( 2. ) ON 25-11-1981, the Military Estate Officer, M. P. Circle, Cantt. Jabalpur, served a notice upon Lachhoo Prasad, Gulabchand and Shivnath, demanding a sum of Rs. 774. 40 as damages for occupation of that land and also required them to furnish certain affidavits. An opportunity was given to the noticees to comply with that demand by 9-12-1981, failing which, it was made clear that eviction proceedings shall be taken against them under the provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, and they shall further be liable to pay damages. On 9-12-1981, vide Annexure P-3, a sum of Rs. 774. 40 was paid by the petitioners and was accepted as damages for occupation from 1-6-1979 to 31-10-1981. It appears from Annuxure P-5 that the occupants raised certain unauthorised structure on the land in question and also permitted some unauthorised persons to reside therein. This was held to be contrary to the terms of the lease. 774. 40 was paid by the petitioners and was accepted as damages for occupation from 1-6-1979 to 31-10-1981. It appears from Annuxure P-5 that the occupants raised certain unauthorised structure on the land in question and also permitted some unauthorised persons to reside therein. This was held to be contrary to the terms of the lease. They were, therefore, asked to vacate the premises within 15 days of that notice, which is dated 10-10-1985. The petitioners filed a reply to that notice which is Annexure P-4 and alleged that they have paid all the amount due from them, vide receipt, Annexure P-6, dated 31-10-1985, and requested for withdrawal of the notice. It is significant that even in this reply, it was not denied that structures were raised on the land and that unauthorised persons were allowed to occupy those structures. At the same time, it also appears that the petitioners filed an appeal under section 9 of the Act, before the District Judge, Jabalpur, against that order of eviction (Annexure P-5 ). That appeal was also dismissed vide order dated 26-8-1986 (Annexure P-7 ). By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners challenge the order of their eviction, Annexure P-5, dated 10-10-1985 and the appellate order. ( 3. ) BEFORE the learned District Judge, the only question agitated was that no opportunity was given to the petitioners and no enquiry was held before the order of eviction was passed. The District Judge, for reasons recorded in para 4 of his order, appears to be right in negativing that contention. It appears from that order that notice under section 4 (1) of the Act was served on the holders and the petitioner No. 1, Jagdish Prasad, appeared. He did not submit any reply. He also informed that Lachhoo Prasad and Gulabchand were dead. He, however, applied for time to file a reply. Time was granted. On 28-11-1984, Lachhoo Prasads son Gangaram appeared for all the heirs of Lachhoo Prasad and made oral submissions, which were reduced by the Estate Officer into writing. Affidavits were filed on 18-12-1984, whereafter a detailed order was passed on 1-10-1985 and then pursuant to that order, notice dated 10-10-1985 was issued. Time was granted. On 28-11-1984, Lachhoo Prasads son Gangaram appeared for all the heirs of Lachhoo Prasad and made oral submissions, which were reduced by the Estate Officer into writing. Affidavits were filed on 18-12-1984, whereafter a detailed order was passed on 1-10-1985 and then pursuant to that order, notice dated 10-10-1985 was issued. The narration of the facts in this order of the District Judge is sufficient to negative the petitioners contention, which was reiterated before this Court as well, that due opportunity was not given to the petitioners to represent their case. The petitioners, therefore, cannot he heard to make any complaint and challenge their eviction from the land in question on that count. ( 4. ) SHRI R. K. Pandev, learned counsel for the petitioners, vehemently argued that since the petitioners ancestors were in occupation of the land in question prior to acquisition of proprietary rights by the British rulers and since there had been no acquisition proceedings relating to their right to occupy and no compensation has been paid in that behalf, they have a right to continue in occupation de hors the leases and, therefore, cannot be evicted. This contention has to be repelled for more reasons than one. To begin with, no such question was agitated either before the Estate Officer of the Cantonment Board or even in appeal before the learned District Judge. It appears that before these authorities, the petitioners did not dispute that they held the lease under the authority, of the Cantonment and claimed only rights as lessees. No right to occupy in their own right, apart from lessees, was claimed. This question, therefore, cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, as apparently it involves questions of facts. ( 5. ) THE again, it is the petitioners own case that their ancestors had executed lease deed in favour of the cantonment authorities and continued to occupy the land as lessees. This is what they had been contending throughout and have even maintained their right to occupy the land as lessees in the present petition itself. They have not yet vacated the premises. They are, therefore, estopped by force of section 116 of the Evidence Act, from questioning title of the Cantonment or Union of India to the land in dispute. This is what they had been contending throughout and have even maintained their right to occupy the land as lessees in the present petition itself. They have not yet vacated the premises. They are, therefore, estopped by force of section 116 of the Evidence Act, from questioning title of the Cantonment or Union of India to the land in dispute. It is true that in this petition, the petitioners allege that their ancestors executed the lease deed under misapprehension of their rights. However, beyond making such averment for the first time in this petition, they have demonstrated nothing else to show that their predecessors laboured under such a misapprehension of their rights. Instead, they had been continuously executing lease deeds, paid rent and even before the Estate Officer and the District Judge they only claimed right as lessees. The petitioners, therefore, cannot be heard to lay a claim to any title adverse to their lessor, i. e. , the Cantonment Board, or Union of India in this petition. ( 6. ) AS a sequel to the above contention, it was also urged that the proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, being of a summary nature, the question of title cannot be decided. Suffice it to say that no such question of title was raised either before the original authority or before the appellate authority. We have held that the petitioners are not entitled to question the title of their lessor, namely, the Cantonment Board or the Union of India. It was next urged that even after the issuance of the notice of eviction, the Cantonment authorities and the Estate Officer demanded and accepted rent for occupation of these premises. The contention, therefore, is that by acceptance of the rent, the petitioners have been accepted as lessees and the notice of eviction must be deemed to be waived. Here again, the petitioners do not seem to be right. A perusal of the receipts (Annexures P-3 and P-8) would indicate that the amounts mentioned in these receipts have been received by the Cantonment Board as damages for use and occupation of the land and not as rent. The mention of the word damages in these receipts only gives a contra-indication that the lease was ever intended to be continued. A perusal of the receipts (Annexures P-3 and P-8) would indicate that the amounts mentioned in these receipts have been received by the Cantonment Board as damages for use and occupation of the land and not as rent. The mention of the word damages in these receipts only gives a contra-indication that the lease was ever intended to be continued. We find it difficult to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioners that by accepting the amount as damages for occupation any lease has corne into being or the old lease has been revived. Learned counsel for the petitioners also argued that the leases are heritable and renewable. Proviso III to the lease deed (Annexure P-1) has been relied upon. That proviso states that the lessees shall be known as temporary tenants. According to this proviso, a lease shall be renewable for a period of five years at a time subject to the condition that the land is not required by the lessor and the decision of the lessor in this respect shall be final. This provision thus authorises renewal of the lease for a period of five years, provided the land is not required by the lessor. The petitioners contention is that at no time before the respondents filed their reply in this Court, they ever said that the land was required by them. This contention appears to be factually correct. The cause of eviction as is evident from the facts stated above is that the petitioners used the land otherwise than for agricultural purpose and thereby contravened clause (3) of the lease agreement (Annexure P-1 ). The lessor had thus a right to determine the lease and to resume possession. ( 7. ) YET another contention urged is that the lease is heritable and for that reliance has been placed on proviso IV of the lease agreement (Annexure P-1 ). The lessor had thus a right to determine the lease and to resume possession. ( 7. ) YET another contention urged is that the lease is heritable and for that reliance has been placed on proviso IV of the lease agreement (Annexure P-1 ). That proviso is as follows: "provided also that if the lessees or the person (or persons) for the time being entitled to hold the said land shall die before the expiry or determination of the said term the heir or heirs of the person (or persons) so dying shall it so permitted in writing by the Military Estate Officer/cantonment Board become entitled thereupon to hold the said land for the remainder of the said term subject to the covenants and conditions herein expressed and if there shall be no person who shall so become entitled to and shall hold the said land the said terms hereby granted shall be deemed to have determined as from the date of the death of the person so dying as aforesaid. " A perusal of this proviso would show that on the death of the original lessee, before the expiry or determination of the term of the lease, the heir or heirs of the person (or persons) so dying have a right only to occupy the demised land only for the remaining term of the lease and that too if permitted by the Military Estate Officer. The facts of this case indicate that Lachhoo Prasad died before the expiry of the term of the lease. His heirs would, therefore, be entitled to occupy for the remaining term of the lease and that too on permission in writing granted by the Military Estate Officer. The heirs thus seem not entitled to obtain renewal of the lease. Their only entitlement in terms of the lease agreement is to continue in occupation for the unexpired term of the lease and that too not without the permission of the Military Estate Officer in writing. The petitioners have filed no such permission. They have, therefore, no right to continue in occupation or to obtain renewal of the lease after its term expired. ( 8. ) IT was also faintly argued that the Military Estate Officer was not entitled to decide the question of title and consequently could not pass the order of eviction. This contention must also be rejected. They have, therefore, no right to continue in occupation or to obtain renewal of the lease after its term expired. ( 8. ) IT was also faintly argued that the Military Estate Officer was not entitled to decide the question of title and consequently could not pass the order of eviction. This contention must also be rejected. It is apparent from the record that no question of title was raised before either the Military Estate Officer or the District Judge in appeal. We have also held above that being the lessee and claiming as such, the petitioners are not entitled to question their lessors title. We have negatived the petitioners contention that the leases were executed by their predecessors under any misapprehension of their right. This contention is also rejected. ( 9. ) IN the rejoinder filed by the petitioners, it is asserted that the question was raised in the Lok Sabha as to the right of such occupants of the properties belonging to Union of India in Cantonments. According to the petitioners, the consensus had been and an assurance was given that persons, like the petitioners, occupying land within the Cantonment, shall be allowed to continue in occupation and the leases in their favour shall be renewed. The petitioners further allege that leases of certain lands, falling within the Cantonment, Jabalpur, in favour of some other persons have been renewed, but the petitioners have been unlawfully singled out. The act of the respondents in not executing the lease deed in favour of the petitioners is also, therefore, criticised as discriminatory. In our opinion, even this suggestion by the petitioners does not advance their case any further. What transpired in Parliament is of no consequence, unless the discussions precipitated in the form of any definite resolution. The various documents filed along with the rejoinder do not contain any direction either to the Cantonment Board or to the Military Estate Officer to execute leases in favour of the occupants of land in Cantonment as held by the petitioners. instead, Annexure P-12 only contains a direction to expedite pending eviction proceedings. Clause 3 of Annexure P-16 only requires that the occupants of building sites claiming preferential treatment should be informed to apply for 30 years lease (non-renewable ). We fail to see how this document helps the petitioners. It is true that leases in favour of certain persons have been renewed. Clause 3 of Annexure P-16 only requires that the occupants of building sites claiming preferential treatment should be informed to apply for 30 years lease (non-renewable ). We fail to see how this document helps the petitioners. It is true that leases in favour of certain persons have been renewed. The petitioners, however, have not pleaded in what manner the cases of other persons are similar to that of the petitioners. The petitioners can complain of an unequal treatment and levy a charge of hostile discrimination only after placing facts on record, showing that the cases of persons in whose favour leases have been renewed are similar to their case. A number of facts in this regard will have to be pleaded. In our opinion, the petitioners have not placed any material on record to accept their plea of hostile discrimination. This plea also must be rejected. ( 10. ) NO other point was urged. The petition fails and is dismissed, but without costs.