Judgment :- 1. Plaintiff is the appellant. He was a part-time menial in an aided school from 1-6-1966 to 31-8-1974. Thereafter he was promoted as full-time menial and again promoted as full-time peon from 1-9-1974. As a peon, he had to on superannuation on 6-6-1982 when he was due to complete the age of 55. He was informed from the Department that he had to retire on 6-6-1982 because the benefit of G.O. (P) 202/70/Fin. dated 7-4-1970 fixing the age of retirement at 60 to the Last Grade Servants was not applicable to him on the ground that he was not a full-time employee on or before the date of the G.O. He took the stand that since he exercised the option under R.24-B of the Kerala Education Rules and became a full time employee, he was entitled to continue in service upto the age of 60. To that effect, he filed a petition to the Education Department on 24-8-1981 and a reminder on 22-9-1982. He also applied for stay of termination of his service. Interim stay was granted under Ext. Al. On the basis of the stay, he worked as full-time peon till 11-11-1983. On 1-11-1983 his petition was rejected on the ground that he is entitled to continue only upto the age of 55. That is Ext.A2. The order was communicated on 11-11-1983 on which date he was removed from the service. The suit was filed for realisation of the unpaid salary and emoluments from 6-6-1982 upto 11-11-1983. Contention of the defendant-State was that the stay order did not make him eligible for salary and hence his claim cannot stand. The suit was decreed by the Munsiff. But the decision was reversed by the Subordinate Judge on two grounds namely, (1) The salary and service conditions are governed by the provisions of a special Statute namely, the Kerala Education Act and the Rules made thereunder and that the general provisions contained in a general statute like the Contract Act cannot therefore be applied, and (2) The effect of the stay order is only till the disposal of the main petition and subject to the result of it. When the main petition itself is dismissed and the stay vacated, no benefit can flow out of the interim order. That is how the plaintiff happened to come up in second appeal. 2. When the main petition itself is dismissed and the stay vacated, no benefit can flow out of the interim order. That is how the plaintiff happened to come up in second appeal. 2. There is no dispute regarding the fact that the appellant continued in service and discharged his duties during the relevant period on account of the stay granted by the Government. It is also admitted that Government is the authority responsible for disbursement of the salary and emoluments. That is as per S.9 of the Kerala Education Act. The school and thereby the Government had the benefit of his services. No substitute was appointed during that period. Therefore, there was no necessity or occasion to make any payment to anybody else. Government had the unrestricted option to refuse stay and sent away the appellant from service as soon as he attained the age of 55. In these circumstances, the question is whether the claim of the appellant will come within the ambit of S.70 of the Contract Act or not. That is the substantial question of law involved in this second appeal. 3. I do not think that the two grounds relied on by the appellate judge could stand. There cannot be any dispute regarding the proposition of law that special provisions in a special statute enacted to meet a particular situation will override the general provisions of a general statute. S.70 of the Contract Act is a general provision in a general statute. But the Kerala Education Act and Rules do not contain any provision to meet a contingency contemplated by S.70 of the Contract Act. Therefore, there is no question of any provision in the Kerala Education Act or Rules overriding the provisions of S.70 of the Indian Contract Act. The question is only whether S.70 of the Contract Act is applicable or not. 4. It is also true that in interim order of injunction or stay may have life only till the disposal of the suit and it may be subject to the result of the suit or petition also. But when something is allowed to be done on the basis of the interim injunction or stay, that remains there in spite of the fact that the order was subsequently vacated. But when something is allowed to be done on the basis of the interim injunction or stay, that remains there in spite of the fact that the order was subsequently vacated. There are two Division Bench decisions of this Court in Kochu Kunju & Others v. State of Kerala & Others (1986 KLT 1281) and Annamma v. State of Kerala (1987 (1) KLT 882) holding that employees who continued in service solely on the basis of interim orders of Court are entitled to the salary and emoluments for the said period though the payments cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of working out other retirement benefits. Those decisions did not consider the legal background of the entitlement. An employee who continued in service on the strength of stay orders issued by the employer or the authority responsible for payment of salary and allowances cannot at any rate be in a worse position. 5. The three conditions essential for the applicability of S.70 of the Contract Act which involves the principle of quasi-contract or quantum merit are (1) A person should lawfully do something for another or deliver something to him, (2) In doing the said thing or delivering the article he must not intend to act gratuitously, and (3) The other person for whom something was done or to whom something was delivered must have enjoyed the benefit thereof. When these three essential pre-requisites are satisfied, S.70 imposes upon the latter person the liability to make compensation to the former in respect of or to restore the thing done or delivered. In order to the applicability of the Section, it is necessary that the person against whom the claim is made must have been at liberty to refuse to accept the thing or to return it. In otherwords, he must have always had the option to accept or reject. The section applies only when the person having such an option voluntarily accepts the thing or enjoys the work done. If the option is not there, S.70 is excluded. S.70 occurs in Chapter V which deals with certain relations resembling those created by the contract. The chapter does not deal with rights and liabilities accruing from the contract. It particularly deals with obligations of persons voluntarily enjoying the benefit of gratuitous acts (AIR 1962 SC 779). If the option is not there, S.70 is excluded. S.70 occurs in Chapter V which deals with certain relations resembling those created by the contract. The chapter does not deal with rights and liabilities accruing from the contract. It particularly deals with obligations of persons voluntarily enjoying the benefit of gratuitous acts (AIR 1962 SC 779). Since the liability is not on the basis of any valid contract, there is no scope for a suit for specific performance or for damages for breach of contract. 6. For the application of S.70, there need not be a pre-existing legal obligation. So long as it is not an officious overbearance on the part of the plaintiff to intermeddle and cause the supply or do the thing without giving any option to the opposite side, he can claim compensation provided he did not intend to act gratuitously. A bona fide act with a genuine intention and acceptance of the benefit are essential. So long as the act is not illegal the jurisdiction of the court to grant relief is there. One of the purposes of the relief is to avoid unjust enrichment of a person who voluntarily accepted and enjoyed the benefit. That is on the basis of an implied forging of a quasi-contract between the parties. Pre-existence of a jural relationship is not the necessary sine qua non for action underS.70. (AIR 1977 Madras 147). When once the above conditions are satisfied and the work done or thing delivered is voluntarily accepted and enjoyed, a lawful relationship is born and such a relationship is recognised by S.70. The principle of unjust enrichment wanted to be avoided by the Section presupposes (1) that the defendant was enriched by the voluntary receipt of the benefit, (2) that such an enrichment was at the expenses of the plaintiff, and (3) that it would be unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without making compensation (1985 KLT 169). 7. It is also necessary for the applicability of the Section that what is done or delivered must be lawful. The word "lawful" is not a surplusage and must be treated as an essential part of the requirement of the Section. 7. It is also necessary for the applicability of the Section that what is done or delivered must be lawful. The word "lawful" is not a surplusage and must be treated as an essential part of the requirement of the Section. The word "lawfully" contemplates cases in which a person held such a relation to another as either directly to create or by implication reasonably to justify an inference that by some act done for another person the party doing the act was entitled to look for compensation for it to the person for whom it was done (ILR (2) All. 234). Between the person claiming the compensation and the person against whom it is claimed some lawful relationship must subsist. That is the implication of the word "lawfully". But that relationship arises not because of a contract or the doing of something, but because what was done bona fide was accepted and enjoyed. The acceptance or enjoyment alone creates the relationship which gives right to the cause of action for compensation. It is necessary that the thing delivered or done must not be fraudulently or dishonestly or gratuitously. 8. In this case the appellant was able to continue in service after attaining the age of 55 only on account of the fact that the stay permitted him to continue. There cannot be any dispute regarding the fact that the state had the option to send him away without retaining him in service for a single day: As earlier stated, the benefit of his service was enjoyed by the school and consequently the Government. Nobody else had to be paid for it. Thus there was enrichment. If compensation is not paid, that will undoubtedly become unjust enrichment also. Definitely that will be inequitable also. S.70 of the Contract Act is squarely applicable and there is no justification for denying the financial benefit claimed in the plaint. The second appeal is therefore allowed. In reversal of the decree and judgment of the appellate court those of the trial court are restored as against the defendants with costs throughout.