JUDGMENT - DESHMUKH B.N., J.:---The appellant-accused, who was tried for offences punishable under section 66(1)(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act and 18 and 20(b) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, was convicted by the learned trial Judge and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months with a fine of Rs. 1,000 under section 66(1)(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, and to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years with fine of Rs. 5,000 for offence under section 18 and to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years with fine of Rs. 5,000 for offence under section 20(b) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, which is hereinafter referred to as the "said Act". The order of conviction and sentence is challenged by the accused in Criminal Appeal No. 201 of 1987, while the State has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 219 of 1987 challenging the order of fine imposed by the learned trial Judge for offences both under sections 18 and 20(b) of the said Act. 2. We have heard both the appeals simultaneously as the same were directed against the common order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Judge. 3. Shri A.B. Naik, appearing for the accused, contended that the conviction on all counts cannot be sustained. His argument is that the mandatory procedure prescribed in Chapter V of the said Act has not been complied with. The identity of the property is not properly established. The Chemical Analyser's report is produced in this case, which does not consist of the competent authority, as per the Rules. His further contention is that the evidence on record produced by the prosecution does not justify the conviction at all. 4. The prosecution has relied upon the evidence of the panch witness Gangadhar Wavre (P.W. 1), Police Constable Sukhdeo Rakh (P.W. 2) and P.S.I. Nagorao Gore (P.W. 3), as also the report of the Chemical Analyser at Exhibit No. 13. 5. From the evidence of P.W. 1 Gangadhar, which is corroborated by P.W. 2 Sukhdeo and P.W. 3 Nagorao in all material particulars, it is clear that the search of the house of the accused at Kaziwada, Bhadgal Gate area of Aurangabad, was taken on 8-3-1986 at 8 p.m. to 8.30 p.m. The evidence is to the effect that the raiding party stopped in front of the house of the accused. P.S.I. Nagorao got down and finding the door of the house closed, he gave a call for the accused. Responding to the call, the accused came out of the door. Inquired by the P.S.I., the accused gave his name as Abdul Karim s/o Abdul Razzak. The accused was further told that a raid is being carried out in his house, because of his indulgence in illegal trade of ganja and opium,. The entire raiding party had entered the house of the accused and in the front hall, a cot was placed and a bed was spread over it. Beneath the cot, small kothi meant for the grain was found. Near the kothi, there were two other iron tins. All the above three articles were taken out at the instance of the P.S.I. and opened by P.W. 2 Sukhdeo. In the kothi, ganja was found. In one iron tin, white cloth packet (bag) was found containing charas and in the same tin, in another plastic bag, opium was found; while in the third tin, again ganja was found. P.S.I. Gore mixed up the ganja found in the tin and kothi gathered sample in a white paper packet. The samples of charas and opium were also separately collected in the paper packets. These packets were sealed with wax and official seal was applied. The panchas put their signatures on these three paper sealed packets. The remaining charas, opium and ganja were placed in original containers and the containers were sealed. The panchnama, Exhibit 7, was accordingly drawn. 6. This, in short, is the story of the prosecution. The panchnama is proved by P.W. 1 Gangadhar and his evidence is supported by P.W. 2 Sukhdeo and Gore, P.W. 3. They have given consistent story and practically unshaken in the cross-examination. 7. The challenge to this evidence of the prosecution is based on the provisions of the said Act and the Rules framed by the Government of Maharashtra under the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 71 of the said Act. 8. According to Shri Naik, the prosecution has not established that the procedure prescribed by the said Act is strictly followed. He contended that the information admittedly given by the informant was not reduced to writing, nor the same was communicated to the superior officer. He also contended that the grounds of arrest were also not communicated to the accused any time. He contended that the information admittedly given by the informant was not reduced to writing, nor the same was communicated to the superior officer. He also contended that the grounds of arrest were also not communicated to the accused any time. The search and seizure had proceeded in violation of the procedure prescribed by the said Act. His other main contention is that the possession of the illicit material by the accused is not established, inasmuch as the prosecution has failed to lead evidence show that the house, where raid was carried out, belonged to or possessed by the accused. In the absence of evidence regarding possession, the link required by law between the illicit articles and the accused is not at all proceed by the prosecution. 9. Another contention of Shri Naik, which is required to be considered, is based on the provision of section 51 of the said Act, read with sub-sections (6) and (7) of section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to him, though under the said provisions, the accused should have been handed over the list prepared under sub-sections (6) and (7) of section 100 of the Code, as this part of the Code applies by virtue of the provisions of section 51 of the said Act, the same was not done. His further contention is that the defence of the accused was reasonable and should have been accepted by the learned trial Judge. 10. We have considered the evidence of all the prosecution witnesses. They are all consistent regarding the presence of the accused at the time of the search and seizure. Their testimony remains unshaken in the cross-examination in each of these witnesses. From the evidence on record, it is clear that the accused was the only person present in the house at the material time. From the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the presence of the accused cannot be doubted and is, in fact, established. The manner in which the cross-examination has proceeded also leaves no scope regarding the presence of the accused in the house at the material time. There is absolutely no cross-examination on the question of ownership and possession of the house. On the contrary, the manner in which the cross-examination has proceeded indicates that the house was in possession of the accused at that material time. There is absolutely no cross-examination on the question of ownership and possession of the house. On the contrary, the manner in which the cross-examination has proceeded indicates that the house was in possession of the accused at that material time. The fact that the accused alone was present in the house at the material time also that he must be in possession of the said articles. The possession will have to be deemed in the present circumstances to be exclusive. 11. Shri Naik has relied upon certain statements made by P.W. 3 P.S.I. Gore in his cross-examination, wherein he has admitted that he did not collect evidence, oral or documentary, during investigation to show that house No. 5-3-45 was owned, possessed and occupied by the accused. Relying on these admissions, Shri Naik, contended that the prosecution has failed to establish the ownership, possession or occupation of the accused over the house, where the raid was carried out. 12. The provisions of section 54 of the said Act provide for presumption on the basis of possession of illicit articles. What is material in the present case is not then possession of the house, but the possession of the illicit articles. It is true that it would have been better if the prosecution had led evidence to show the possession, ownership or occupation of the house also. But, as already stated, the only inference, which is possible from the evidence led by the prosecution, is that the accused was present at the time of the raid in the house, when the illicit articles were seized from a room, and the accused has failed to account for his presence in the house at that relevant time satisfactorily. In view of the presumption raised under section 54 of the said Act, it was for the accused to explain satisfactorily as to how he was alone present in the house at that time. There is nothing suggested in the cross-examination, which would amount to satisfactory explanation given by the accused. Without indicating anything more by way of cross-examination, the accused has merely stated in his statement under section 313 of the Code that he is not the owner nor in possession or occupation of the said house. There is nothing suggested in the cross-examination, which would amount to satisfactory explanation given by the accused. Without indicating anything more by way of cross-examination, the accused has merely stated in his statement under section 313 of the Code that he is not the owner nor in possession or occupation of the said house. We are unable to appreciate as to how the accused is entitled for any benefit out of admissions given by P.W. 3 Gore regarding collection of material showing ownership, possession and occupation of the house at the relevant time. 13. Shri Naik has further contended, on the basis of the prosecution evidence, that the evidence does not show that the procedure prescribed by law is strictly followed. According to him, it was for the prosecution to establish by positive evidence that the steps are taken by the prosecution by following the procedure prescribed in Chapter V of the said Act. In the absence of any evidence by the prosecution, Shri Naik stated, it must be held that the prosecution has failed to comply with the mandatory provisions laid down in Chapter V of the said Act. He has contended that admittedly the raid has taken place between 8 to 8.30 p.m., though as per the procedure prescribed, the raid should have been carried out during day time. Further, the information given by the informant is not reduced in writing, nor forwarded to the superior officer. So also, the list is no supplied to the accused at the time of raid as provided in sub-sections (6) and (7) of section 100. Criminal Procedure Code, nor the copy of the panchnama is supplied to the accused any time. His pointed emphasis is on the fact that the prosecution has not led evidence to show that the grounds of arrest were ever supplied to the accused. On the basis of all these contentions, Shri Naik's argument is that the mandatory procedure prescribed by the provisions in Chapter V of the said Act, namely, from section 41 onwards, are not at all complied with, nor the prosecution has led any evidence to establish that such a procedure was followed before the accused was arrested or before any presumption can be raised under section 54 of the said Act against him. 14. 14. For the proposition regarding non-compliance with the mandatory provisions, Shri Naik has relied upon several decisions of different High Courts. In (Karam Singh v. State of Punjab)1, 1988 Cri.L.J. 1181, while considering the provisions of the said Act, learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the procedure prescribed under the said Act is to be strictly followed. Shri Naik has also relied upon the decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in (State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sudarshan Kumar)2, 1989 Cri.L.J. 1412. This is a Division Bench decision, where that High Court, while considering the relevant provisions of the said Act, has held that the provisions, which stand incorporated in sections 52(1) and 57 to be followed after the search and arrest of the accused or seizure, are mandatory in character, but the remaining provisions are merely directory, It is further held that the reason is that right to be informed about the grounds of arrest contained in section 52(1) and the requirement of section 57 to the effect that any person making arrest or seizure shall make full report to his immediate superior officer within 48 hours, confer valuable rights on the accused and when informed about the grounds of arrest at the earliest opportunity, the accused becomes aware of, at the very outset, what he has to meet in the long run. It is held that failure to do so would certainly prejudice his defence. Similarly, the provision requiring the person making arrest or seizure to make a full report to his immediate superior officer within 48 hours brings into existence a document which can be used for purposes of cross-examination in defence. The making of such a report within 48 hours will also bring to an end the possibility of improving the prosecution version after that time. If these provisions are not strictly complied with, the prosecution must fail, but the same cannot be said with respect to the remaining provisions incorporated in sections 52(2), 52(3) and 55, in that case, the defence will have to show that failure of justice has resulted due to non-compliance thereof. 15. If these provisions are not strictly complied with, the prosecution must fail, but the same cannot be said with respect to the remaining provisions incorporated in sections 52(2), 52(3) and 55, in that case, the defence will have to show that failure of justice has resulted due to non-compliance thereof. 15. The other case, which is required to be referred to for the purposes of this judgment, is (Rattan Lal v. State)3, 1987(II) Crimes 29 , of Delhi High Court, wherein provisions of section 57 of the said Act have been held to be mandatory and non-compliance is held to vitiate the conviction. 16. From these decisions, it is clear that different High Courts, no doubt, have taken a view that, at least, the provisions of sections 52(1) and 57 of the said Act are mandatory and non-compliance of the same is held to vitiate the conviction. 17. However, the provisions of the said Act, regarding the procedure prescribed in Chapter V, were considered by the Division Bench of this Court in (Abdul Sattar s/o Ahamed Sattar v. The State)4, 1989(1) Bom.C.R. 388 , where this Court has held that even if the provisions of section 41 to 58 of the said Act are mandatory and were not complied, the procedural infirmity will not by itself vitiate the conviction of the accused. The only question that thus remains is whether the non-compliance of the said provisions has caused any prejudice to an accused. 18. In Abdul Sattar's case (supra), this Court has considered the scheme of the said Act, especially in regard to the procedure prescribed by Chapter V thereof. The distinction which is tried to be made between the provisions of sections 52(1) and 57 of the said Act in Chapter V and other provisions of the said Chapter has not found favour with the Division Bench of this Court. This Court has considered the entire procedure, right from sections 41 to 58 of the said Act, and held that though mandatory, non-compliance thereof will not result in vitiating the conviction, unless the prejudice is established. In that judgment, if was further found that a presumption indeed arises in favour of the prosecution in view of section 114-E of the Evidence Act. In that judgment, if was further found that a presumption indeed arises in favour of the prosecution in view of section 114-E of the Evidence Act. It is therefore, for the accused to raise the question of non-compliance of the said provisions in the course of cross- examination, so as to enable the prosecution to satisfy the Court that it had complied with the requirements of law. It was further held that the prosecution is indeed merely bound to prove beyond reasonable doubt the charge framed against the accused and once such burden is discharged, even if there is any procedural omission, such omission does not vitiate the conviction. 19. We have considered the provisions of the said Act, and also the view taken by different High Courts. But, we are in agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench of his Court in Abdul Sattar's case (supra), more so because of the presumption raised under section 54 of the said Act. The presumption is based purely on the establishment of possession of illicit articles with the accused. The only way to meet out the presumption is by giving satisfactory account by the accused. Apart from that, if we consider the other provisions of the said Act in this connection , they support the view which we have taken, so also the view already taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Abdul Sattar's case (supra). If we consider the provisions of section 27(b) of the said Act, the accused may be in possession of a small quantity as prescribed and might have purchased the illicit articles from competent seller, even then the burden still lies on the accused to establish that he was in possession of that quantity for his personal consumption and not for sale or otherwise. In view of this stringent requirement to be established by the accused, even regarding small quantities, it is clear that the trial or conviction shall not vitiate on any technical or procedural defect, unless prejudice is shown to have been caused thereby to the accused in his defence. In the facts of the present case, there is nothing indicated in the cross-examination in regard to points raised by Shri Naik. In the facts of the present case, there is nothing indicated in the cross-examination in regard to points raised by Shri Naik. Moreover, so far as supply of grounds of arrest to the accused is concerned, it is in the evidence of the witnesses that as soon as they entered the house for the raid, they has informed the accused that they have come to take search of the house, as, according to them, the accused is involved in the trade of illicit articles. In view of this, it cannot be said that the defence was prejudiced. 20. There is no substance in the contention of Shri Naik regarding non-compliance with the provisions of sub-sections (6) and (7) of section 100 of the Code, in view of the fact that no such ground is even suggested in the cross-examination of the witnesses, either to the P.S.I. or to anyone else. If defence was really interested, then, as per the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Abdul Sattar's case (supra), the accused could have raised these questions by way of cross-examination, so that it was possible for the prosecution to establish that they did comply with the said requirements. Apart from that, we are not able to gather as to how the defence is prejudiced thereby in the facts of this case. 21. The contention of Shri Naik regarding the identity of the property and the lacuna in the report of the Chemical Analyser, regarding the establishment of link between the sending of the articles and the examination of the said articles and ultimate report of the Chemical Analyser, is also without substance. From the evidence of P.S.I. Gore and the report of the Chemical Analyser, Exhibit 13, we have no manner of doubt that the articles, which were seized on 8-3-1986 and sent to Chemical Analyser on 10-3-1986, were forwarded to the Chemical Analyser by letter No. 1000 dated 10-3-1986. The same were received on 11-3-1986 and analysed on 18-3-1986 and from the report of the chemical Analyser, it is cleat that the sample No. 1 was detected to be ganja, sample No. 2 was detected to be charas and sample No. 3 was defected to be opium, containing 2.48% of morphine. In this regard also, there is no challenge to the evidence of the prosecution by way of cross-examination. 22. In this regard also, there is no challenge to the evidence of the prosecution by way of cross-examination. 22. The important challenge in this connection was based on the definition of the term "Chemical Analyser" given in the Maharashtra Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Rules, 1985. "Chemical Analyser" is defined as, "the Director, Forensic Science Laboratory and Chemical Analyser to the Government of Maharashtra or the Director, Haffkine Institute, Bombay, or the Assistant Director, Drugs Control Laboratory of Food and Drug Administration, Grih Nirman Bhavan, Kalanagar, Bandra, Bombay, and includes any officer authorised respectively by them in this behalf." Relying on this definition, Shri Naik contended that the Chemical Analyser, who had analysed the articles in the present case, was not competent, nor authorised to do the work of analysis. Such a report cannot, therefore, be relied upon to hold that the articles seized were either ganja or charas or opium. At the first sight, the argument may seem to be attractive. But, if we consider the preamble of the Maharashtra Rules, it is clear that the rules are framed in exercise of the powers conferred by section 78 read with section 10 and sub-section (2) of section 71 of the said Act. The definition of the Chemical Analyser as given in the Maharashtra Rules, therefore, is not compressive and has no application for all the purposes of the said Act, but, is confined to the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 71 of the said Act only. Section 71 deals with power of the Government to establish centers for identification, treatment, etc., of addicts and for supply of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Sub-section (2) of section 71 of the said Act provides that the Government may make Rules consistent with the Act, providing for the established, appointment, maintenance, management and superintendence of, and for supply of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances from, the centers referred to in sub-section (1) and for the appointment, training, powers duties and persons employed in such centers. The definition given in the Maharashtra Rules, therefore, applied only to the Chemical Analyser required for the purposes of section 71(2) and not otherwise. 23. Such argument, as above, was considered by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Karam Singh's case (supra) and it has negative such a contention, and, in our opinion, rightly so. 24. The definition given in the Maharashtra Rules, therefore, applied only to the Chemical Analyser required for the purposes of section 71(2) and not otherwise. 23. Such argument, as above, was considered by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Karam Singh's case (supra) and it has negative such a contention, and, in our opinion, rightly so. 24. In the result, the appeal filed by the Appellant accused is required to be dismissed. 25. Considering the appeal filed by the State, we have heard Shri Naik on the point of imposition of fine for offences under the provisions of sections 18 and 20(b)(ii) of the said Act. From the provisions of the said sections, it is clear that if the accused is found guilty for said offences, then the minimum fine which can be imposed on each count for offence under section 18 and also for offence under section 20(b)(ii) is not less than Rs. 1 lakh. In the present case, the learned trial judgment has awarded fine of Rs. 5,000 only on each count. In view of the clear mandate of the statute, the learned trial Judge was in error in awarding fine of Rs. 5,000 only on each count for offences under sections 18 and 20(b)(ii), because the minimum fine of Rs. 1 lakh is prescribed for articles, except ganja. As, in the present case, not only ganja were seized, but as per the Chemical Analyser's report, charas and opium was also seized, minimum fine prescribed by the stature will be not less than Rs. 1 lakh on each count. In view of this, we set aside the order of fine imposed to the extent of Rs. 5,000 on each count by the learned trial Judge both under section 18 and section 20(b)(ii) of the said Act, and enhance the amount of fine to the extent of Rs. 1 lakh both under section 18 and section 20(b)(ii) of the said Act. With this modification, the rest of the order of sentence passed by the learned trial Judge is confirmed. The appeal filed by the State is partly allowed. Appeal dismissed. -----