JUDGMENT 1. - This is a special second appeal under section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance 1949 filed by Jankidass and Mohanlal who were defendants Nos. 3 and 4 respectively before the learned trial Judge (District Judge Bikaner). Then there are cross-objections dated 24.10.75 filed by Mahant Dhangir and Idol of Shiv Bhagwan who were plaintiffs in the suit. These are directed against the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court rendered in Civil 1st Appeal No. 172 of 1973 on 14.7.75. Both of these were initially heard by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Hon'ble S.K.M. Lodha (as he then was) and Hon'ble Kanta Bhatnagar J. This Division Bench dismissed the appeal on merits by a Judgment dated 3.1.85. By the same judgment the cross-objections were also dismissed not on merits but on the ground of maintainability. Cross-objectors challenged this judgment before the Supreme Court of India by filing Civil Appeal No. 1018 of 1987. The Supreme Court accepted this appeal vide its judgment dated 28.10.87. By the said judgment the Supreme Court not only directed hearing of the cross-objections on merits but also further directed that the appeal itself be restored. This is how both the appeal and the cross-objections have come before us for decision. 2. Learned counsel for the cross objectors has raised a preliminary objection regarding the re-hearing of appeal. He submits that the Division Bench of this Court dismissed the appeal on merits vide its judgment dated 3.1.85. No appeal was taken by the appellants to the Supreme Court against dismissal of their appeal and hence points raised in appeal cannot be re- agitated before this Court and so far as the appeal is concerned it cannot be re-heard and only cross-objections can be heard. Learned counsel for the appellants urges that the Supreme Court explicitly reversed the judgment of the Division Bench in its entirety and directed restoration and re-hearing of the appeal as well as the cross-objections. This Court is bound by the said judgment and as such this Court is bound to re-hear the appeal as also the cross-objections on their merits. 3. We have given our earnest consideration to the rival contentions. True that the Division Bench of this Court by its judgment dated 3.1.85 dismissed that appeal on merits. This Court is bound by the said judgment and as such this Court is bound to re-hear the appeal as also the cross-objections on their merits. 3. We have given our earnest consideration to the rival contentions. True that the Division Bench of this Court by its judgment dated 3.1.85 dismissed that appeal on merits. It is also not denied that appellants did not prefer any appeal against dismissal of their appeal. Ordinarily in such circumstances the appeal could not have been re-heard on merits. But we have to be guided by what the Apex Court has ordained in the appeal of the cross-objectors. It has inter alia stated as under:- "In the result we allow the appeal and reverse the judgment and decree of Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench shall now restore the appeal and cross-objections of the parties and dispose of the same in accordance with law and in the light of observations made . The appellants shall get the cost of this appeal." 4. A bare reading of the aforesaid dictum goes to show that the Apex Court set aside and reversed the judgment of this Court in its entirety. It specifically directed this Court to 'restore the appeal' and cross-objections of the parties. It further directed this Court 'to dispose of the same in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made'. This clearly shows that this Court is required not only to re-hear the cross objections but also to re-hear the appeal. Hence the preliminary objection has no merit and is over-ruled. 5. Now the controversy and its genesis. In the historic town of Bikaner is an old Math known as Juna Math. Math is said to be older than the town itself lending significance to the appellation Tuna' i.e. old. The Math is one of the chain of Maths belonging to the Dashnami sect of Hindu Sanyasis. It is said to have been founded some four hundred years back. One Sanjagir is said to have constructed a temple in the Math premises with Lord Shiva as its presiding deity. Mahant Lal Gir defendant No. 2 in the suit is fourth Mahant in the line of succession from Sanjagir. 6. The Math is said to have owned certain urban land situated in the town of Bikaner. One Sanjagir is said to have constructed a temple in the Math premises with Lord Shiva as its presiding deity. Mahant Lal Gir defendant No. 2 in the suit is fourth Mahant in the line of succession from Sanjagir. 6. The Math is said to have owned certain urban land situated in the town of Bikaner. There is some controversy between the parties on this aspect of the matter. According to the plaintiffs and defendant Lal Gir the land really belonged to the Math or at any rate to the presiding deity of Lord Shiva though the patta stood in the name of Sanjagir who was the Mahant or head of the Math at the relevant period. According to contesting defendants including the present appellants the land belonged to Mahant Sanjagir and eventually came to belong to defendant Lal Gir by succession. 7. The plaint (sic) allegation is that the non-contesting defendant Lalgir started living a life of depravity. He was an opium addict. He fell under influence of one Jagnnath Sunar whom he appointed his 'Mukhtiar aam'. Under the evil spell of said Jagannath Lalgir started frittering away the property of the Math. 8. The case of the plaintiffs-cross objectors was that on August 19, 1963 Lalgir gave on lease the land measuring 2211 sq. yards in favour of Madan Mohan (defendant No. 1) a real nephew of Jagannath Sunar. The lease was for 99 years with monthly rent of Rs. 30/-. It was a sham transaction without consideration and not for any legal necessity of the Math or the deity. Being uneducated and being under influence of opium Lalgir was not in a fit condition to understand the true nature of the transaction. Again on March 22 1968 Lalgir sold 446 sq. yards of land to Madan Mohan. It was out of the land which was already leased to Madan Mohan. The sale was for Rs. 4,000/-. This transaction also suffered from like infirmities. 9. It is alleged that Madan Mohan constructed some shops on a portion of the land so purchased. He rented the shops to Jankidass & Mohanlal appellants before us. Later on he sold the shops to them for a sum of Rs. 15,000/-. Later on he sold 124 sq. yards of suit land to these very persons on 8.4.69 for a sum of Rs. 1,500/-. 10. He rented the shops to Jankidass & Mohanlal appellants before us. Later on he sold the shops to them for a sum of Rs. 15,000/-. Later on he sold 124 sq. yards of suit land to these very persons on 8.4.69 for a sum of Rs. 1,500/-. 10. The plaintiff cross-objectors challenged these alienations made by Lalgir inter alia on the ground that Lalgir had abdicated his Mahantship in favour of Dhangir on 14.6.67 and Lalgir had ceased to be the Mahant of the Math. 11. The suit was filed on 27.1.70 by Dhangir conjointly with Lord Shiv the presiding deity of the temple of the Math. The gist of their case was that the disputed alienations were without authority without consideration and for no legal necessity and as such were not binding on them. They also claimed possession of the suit properties. 12. Lalgir admitted the claim of the plaintiff-cross-objectors in its entirety. The suit was resisted by Madan Mohan and his alieness Jankidass and Mohanlal on diverse grounds. They inter alia pleaded that the suit land belonged to Sanjagir and was inherited by Lalgir who was competent to sell the same. The land did not belong to the Math or to then deity of Lord Shiv. The alienation were wholly legal and proper. The plaintiffs were not entitled to bring the suit. It was denied that Lalgir had abdicated Mahantship and Dhangir had been appointed Mahant. It was asserted that within life time of Lalgir Dhangir could not have become a Mahant. It was pleaded that Dhangir was privy to the transactions and documents had been executed in his presence and he had attested them and as such he was estopped from challenging them. A plea regarding limitation was also raised and it was pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation. 13. The learned trial Judge framed as many as nine issues. After due trial it recorded the following findings : (i) The disputed land belonged to the Math though originally the patta was issued in the name of the then Mahant Sanjagir. (ii) Deity of Lord Shiv is the owner of the Math. (iii) Lalgir had limited rights in the disputed land and he was not absolute owner thereof. (iv) Lalgir was an addict and used to remain under influence of intoxicaion and had rendered himself incompetent to manage the affairs of the Math. (ii) Deity of Lord Shiv is the owner of the Math. (iii) Lalgir had limited rights in the disputed land and he was not absolute owner thereof. (iv) Lalgir was an addict and used to remain under influence of intoxicaion and had rendered himself incompetent to manage the affairs of the Math. (v) Mahant Lalgir did nominate Dhangir as Mahant. (vi) The lease deed in question was executed without receiving any consideration. (vii) The sale in respect of 446 sq. yards of land was valid and proper and for consideration. Ex. Al was attested by Dhangir. (viii) Shops were built on the land so sold to Madan Mohan. Dhangir did not object to it. (ix) Plaintiffs are estopped from challenging the validity of sale deeds Ex. Al and Ex. A2. (x) The suit was within limitation. Upon such findings the learned trial Judge partly decreed the suit and declared the lease deed Ex. 2 as not binding on the plaintiffs. The rest of the suit was dismissed. This was done by judgment dated 9.5.73. 14. Aggrieved by this judgment the plaintiffs filed S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 172 of 1973 while Madan Mohan filed S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 182/1973. Both the appeals were heard together and disposed of by a common judgment dated 14.7.75. During the course of hearing of this appeal it was urged that the suit in respect of the lease was barred by time. This plea prevailed with the learned single Judge who heard the appeal. It was also urged before him that the Math was a public registered trust. A certificate dated 6.4.63 was filed before him in support of the contention. It was admitted without demur from the other side. Hence on the basis of such document it was' held that the Math was a public trust. 15. He held that the property which belonged to the Math must have been held by the person who was managing the Math as trustee and could have alienated the property only for the benefit of the trust. Learned single Judge further held that Madan Mohan had failed to discharge his duty to enquire into the fact that whether there was any legal necessity for Lalgir to dispose of Math properties by way of sale. He further held that the signatures on the sale deed Ex. Learned single Judge further held that Madan Mohan had failed to discharge his duty to enquire into the fact that whether there was any legal necessity for Lalgir to dispose of Math properties by way of sale. He further held that the signatures on the sale deed Ex. A/I were not that of Dhangir this transaction was not for the necessity of the Math and as such the ownership of the lands belonging to the Math could not validly be transferred to Madan Mohan and so no title passed to Madan Mohan. He went to this extent of holding that Ex. Al was not genuine. He further held that defendants no. 3 and 4 could not claim a better title than that of defendant Madan Mohan. On the basis of the aforesaid findings the appeal of the plaintiffs as well as cross appeal of the defendant Madan Mohan were partly allowed. It was held that the lease deed executed by Lalgir on 19.8.63 could not be challenged by the plaintiffs after a lapse of three years from the date of execution of the deed the suit being time barred in respect of the prayer relating to the lease deed. The declaration given by the trial court that lease deed was null and void was set aside. However in respect of the sale deed Ex. A/1 effected by Lalgir in favour of Madan Mohan on 22.3.68 a declaration was granted that the same was void and as such no property belonging to the Math passed to Madan Mohan by this deed and the sale was not binding on Lord Shiv and Dhangir. Aggrieved the alienees of Madan Mohan have filed this appeal while plaintiffs in the suit viz. Deity of Lord Shiv and Mahant Dhangir have filed cross-objections. 16. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants as also learned counsel for the cross objectors. We have also heard learned counsel for respondent no. 3 who has generally supported the appellants. Some written arguments have also been filed. We have given our earnest consideration to the arguments made and have carefully perused the record. On the contentions raised before us by the parties following questions require determination at our hands: (1) Whether the land in dispute belonged to the Math or to the deity of Lord Shiv or to Sanjagir as his personal property? We have given our earnest consideration to the arguments made and have carefully perused the record. On the contentions raised before us by the parties following questions require determination at our hands: (1) Whether the land in dispute belonged to the Math or to the deity of Lord Shiv or to Sanjagir as his personal property? (2) What was the character of the land in the hands of Lalgir - whether he held it as his absolute property or he was only a limited owner thereof? (3) Whether the sale made by Lalgir was for legal necessity? (4) Whether the said alienation was for consideration? (5) Whether the said sale was not genuine? (6) What is the effect of the registration of the Math as a Public Trust under the provisions of the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act 1959 (Act No. 42 of 1959)? (7) Whether the suit by the deity or for that matter by Mahant Dhangir was incompetent? (8) Whether Dhangir had signed Ex. A/1 and hence was estopped from challenging the same? (9) Whether the apellants were purchasers for value from an ostensible owner and hence sales made in their favour could not be challenged? (10) Whether the suit of the plaintiffs in respect of the lease was within limitation? (11) Whether plaintiffs were entitled to recover possession of the suit properties? (12) Whether plaintiffs were entitled to recover mesne profits? We shall take up these questions seriatim. Hence first question first. 17. At the fore-front of his argumets learned counsel for the appellants had contended that the learned trial Judge erred in holding that the Math belonged to the deity of Lord Shiv and that the disputed land belonged to the Math and not to Lalgir. He contends that the learned trial Judge as well as learned single Judge have failed to appreciate the true character of the disputed land qua the Mahant and this has vitiated their findings. He submits that the two courts have failed to interpret the Patta in its correct prospective and it should have been held that the land belonged to Sandhyagir or Sanjagir as Mahant of the Math and consequently Lalgir being in line of succession acquired the same rights in the land which Sanjagir possessed. He submits that the two courts have failed to interpret the Patta in its correct prospective and it should have been held that the land belonged to Sandhyagir or Sanjagir as Mahant of the Math and consequently Lalgir being in line of succession acquired the same rights in the land which Sanjagir possessed. Learned counsel for the plaintiff cross objectors contends that the trial court was right in holding that the land belonged to the Math and the Math belonged to Lord Shiv which was the presiding deity of the Math. Likewise learned single Judge was right in holding that the disputed land belonged to the Math and the Mahant held it only as a trustee and consequently he was not competent to alienate it except for legal necessity or for benefit of the estate. 18. Now these contentions raise mixed questions of law and fact and hence it shall be proper for us to look to the factual and legal aspects of the controversy raised before us. 19. Admittedly the Math is a very old one and even on plaint averments it was older than the town of Bikaner. According to the plaintiffs cross-objectors the Math was 400 years old. This Math belongs to the Dasnami sect of Shaiva sanyasis as deposed to by plaintiffs' witnesses. This aspect of the matter has not been disputed before us and hence we accept this position. 20. There is evidence of plaintiffs' witnesses on record to show that Sanjagir had constructed a temple in the Math and the presiding deity of this temple was Lord Shiv. This must have been done it the life time of Sanjagir himself and not earlier. 21. Now this is an admitted fact before us that a patta had been issued by the erstwhile State of Bikaner in respect of the disputed land. This patta was granted in Samvat 1810 we are now in Samvat 2045. It means Sanjagir lived some 235 years ago. Hence the temple of Lord Shiv was decidedly of a later origin than the Math itself. Admittedly this patta was not in the name of the deity. It was in the name of Sanjagir. This patta was granted in Samvat 1810 we are now in Samvat 2045. It means Sanjagir lived some 235 years ago. Hence the temple of Lord Shiv was decidedly of a later origin than the Math itself. Admittedly this patta was not in the name of the deity. It was in the name of Sanjagir. The relevant part of this patta reads as follows : HINDI MATTER 367042A This patta specifically refers to HINDI MATTER 367042B This intrinsic evidence goes to show that the land originally belonged to the Math though the patta was granted in the name of Sanjagir. Admittedly Sanjagir was the Mahant of the Math at the relevant time. Hence we do not find any good material to hold that the Math or the land in dispute belonged to Lord Shiv. Nowhere from the recitals of patta we do find good reasons to uphold the findings of the learned single Judge that the disputed land belonged to the Math and its patta was granted to the then Mahant and it was in this capacity that successive chelas right upto Lalgir got the land on becoming Mahants in their turn. Whether Dhangir inherited this land or not shall be dealt with elsewhere. 22. In this connection learned counsel for the appellants submitted that rulers of erstwhile States were absolute monarchs and they used to revoke grants at their sweet-will and used to give away property of one person to another. Hence the Patta should be construed to mean that even if the land in dispute belonged to the Math the ruler had revoked the grant made to the Math and had settled the land on the Mahant Sanjagir to make the same his personal property. We are afraid that we cannot persuade ourselves to put such a construction on the Patta the relevant portion whereof we have already reproduced. There is no material before us to show that the then ruler intended to resume the land of the Math and settle it on the Mahant in his personal capacity. We may add that this argument deserves to be stated only for the sake of rejection and we unhesitatingly reject the same same being conjectural and being devoid of any foundation. 23. We may add that this argument deserves to be stated only for the sake of rejection and we unhesitatingly reject the same same being conjectural and being devoid of any foundation. 23. A very important controversy raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is about the nature of the property in the disputed land in the hands of Lalgir. He seriously challenges the correctness of the view expressed by the learned single Judge in this regard. We may here profitably reproduce what the learned single Judge had to say in this connection. He observed as under : "Mulla in his Treatise on Hindu Law has discussed in Article 424 the position of Shebait or a Mahant and has described a mahant as regards the property of the temple as a mere trustee. According to this treatise a mahant performs the duty of rendering service to the temple and he is a person holding an office of dignity. The property of a math is held by a mahant as spiritual head of the institution but the property may by the usage and custom of the institution vest in trustees other than the spiritual head. In any case the property is held 'solely in trust for the purposes of the institution. PW 4 Someshwaranant and PW 3 Haripuri and PW 5 Satyanand who hold respectable position in the sect have proved the custom of this sect as to how the property is held by a mahant and they have stated that Lalgir being the mahant held the property of the math in trust for the institution. They also proved that in their presence Lalgir had made Dhangir as the mahant of the Tuna math' by performing the custom of putting a Chadar on the Chela and then arranged a feast to celebrate this occasion. In Ghansham Das Vs. Anant Singh and others, AIR 1927 Lahore 757 (1) it has been held that if a sadhu acquires property and does not devote it to religious purposes he remains absolute arbiter of the disposal of the property but if the property has once passed-to a chela by virtue of his being a chela it is only reasonable to hold that the chela must treat the property as religious. It is not disputed by the parties that Lalgir was the fourth chela in order of succession from mahant Sanjagir who was the original grantee of the land and the mahant who intervened between Sanjagir and Lalgir held the property to be that of the math. Even the document of the grant made in favour of Sanjagir describes the land granted as math property and therefore it will not be out of tune to hold that Lalgir did not inherit the office of mahant to treat this property as his private property. The property came in the hands of Lalgir as the property belonging to the math and as such he was to manage this property in the interest of the math. The plea of the defendant that the land belonged to Lalgir as his personal property therefore cannot be accepted by us." A reading of the above observations does go to suggest that temple and math were treated as synonymous terms by the learned single Judge. To that extent there may be some inaccuracy in the aforesaid observations. But by and large the observations appear to be correct. This is true that Math and temple are distinct entities under Hindu Law. Mulla in his famous treatise on Hindu law in its 15th Edition has made following observations at page 526 in this respect : "Distinction between temples and maths - The religious foundations known as Devasthanams or temples are the most numerous in India and have the largest endowments especially in the shape of lands assignment of public revenue and jewellery. These institutions have been established for the spiritual benefit of the Hindu community in general or for that of particular sects or sections thereof. Next to the temples the most important religious foundations in this country are the ancient maths or monasteries- presided over almost invariably by sanyasis or monks. The object of these maths (or mutts) is generally the promotion of religious knowledge and the imparting of spiritual instruction to the disciples and followers of the math. In the case of maths though there are idols connected therewith the wOrship of them is a secondary matter. The object of these maths (or mutts) is generally the promotion of religious knowledge and the imparting of spiritual instruction to the disciples and followers of the math. In the case of maths though there are idols connected therewith the wOrship of them is a secondary matter. The two classes of institutions namely temples and maths are thus supplementary to each other in the Hindu Ecclesiastical system both conducive to spiritual welfare the one by affording opportunities for prayer and wOrship the other by facilitating spiritual instruction and the acquisition of religious knowledge. In the case of temples the endowed property vests in the idol; in the case of maths it vests in the math itself as a juristic person (1). The mohunt like the she bait is the manager or custodian of the institution. The view taken on Vidyapurna V. Vidyanidhi (m) that in case of maths the ideal person is the office of the spiritual teacher which as it were is incarnate in the person of each successive mohunt who for the time is a real owner is not tenable after the pronouncement of the judicial Committee in Vidya Varathi V. G.L. Sami (n)." Hence distinction between a math and a temple is real and vital. 24. This is also true that a Mahant of a Math is not a trustee in the ordinary sense of the term. However the office of the Mahant is in the nature of a trust and the property of math vests in the Mahant in trust for the math and viewed in this light the observations of the learned single Judge cannot be said to be wholly incorrect. In the AIR Commentary on Hindu Law Third Edition Vol. I Chapter IV various Articles appear delineating the legal position of a Math as also rights and powers of Mahant of a Math. According to Article 52 appearing at page 782 of the book a Math is a juridical person. Article 53 at page 783 states that the possession and management of the properties of a Math are vested in the head or superior of the Math for the time being. Article 54 in the same book states that the office of Mahant may be held by more than one person. Article 53 at page 783 states that the possession and management of the properties of a Math are vested in the head or superior of the Math for the time being. Article 54 in the same book states that the office of Mahant may be held by more than one person. It further states that where the founder of a Math has not prescribed any rules to be followed in the appointment of succeeding mahants the devolution of the office depends upon the custom or usage which has prevailed in the Math. The office of Mahant is immovable property which is impartible and non-transferable. the mahant is not a corporation sole. A Mahant ceases to hold office when he (i) ceases to exercise the duties of the office (ii) relinquishes the office (iii) is disqualified or (iv) is removed by Court. Article 55 appearing at page 792 describes the position of a Mahant as follows: "(1) The property of a math vests in the head of the math for the time being but may vest in another person as a matter of usage. (2) The property of a math vests in the mahant in trust for the math but the mahant is not a 'trustee' in the technical sense of the word. (3) The mahant is not a life-tenant of the property of the math." (emphasis supplied by us) The rights of Mahant have been described in Article 56 appearing at page 797. The Art. says - 'he mahant' is entitled to (1) the possession and management of the property of the math. (2) the income or usufruct of the property of the math according to custom and usage of the math and (3) the right to nominate his successor where such right is conferred on him by the deed of endowment if any or by usage. The powers of Mahant have been described in Article 49 appearing at page 802. The Article reads as follows : "The mahant has power to do all acts which are necessary or for the benefit of the math. The powers of Mahant have been described in Article 49 appearing at page 802. The Article reads as follows : "The mahant has power to do all acts which are necessary or for the benefit of the math. In particular he has the power- (i) to sue and defend legal proceedings (ii) to contract debts and (iii) to alienate property where necessary or for the benefit of the math." Then Article 50 appearing at page 808 states the liability of Mahant as follows: "The mahant is liable to account for the property of the math except to the extent that he is personally entitled to any part of it according to usage." 25. We have extracted the aforesaid Articles from the classic commentary to demonstrate that Mahant of a Math though is not a trustee in the legal sense of the term yet holds the property of the Math in trust for the benefit of the math and is not empowered to fritter away the property of the Math in any manner he likes. He is not an absolute owner of the property and he holds the same in trust for the benefit of the math. 26. Now assuming for a moment that Sanjagir got the land in his own name for his own benefit and not for the benefit of the trust it shall have to be seen as to how the rights in the land passed to successive chelas. The position of law has been very correctly summed up in (1) Ghansham Das V. Anant Singh (AIR 1927 Lahore 757) . The gist of the relevant observations from this ruling has already been given by the learned single Judge in the passage already quoted. The proposition appears to be that if a sadhu acquires property and does not devote it to religious purposes he remains absolute arbiter of the disposal of the property but if the property has once passed to a chela in virtue of his being chela it is only reasonable to hold that the chela must treat the property as religious. Hence even if the property in dispute is assumed to be originally personal property of Sanjagir it ceased to remain so in the hands of his chelas and they got it only religious property for the benefit of the math. Hence even if the property in dispute is assumed to be originally personal property of Sanjagir it ceased to remain so in the hands of his chelas and they got it only religious property for the benefit of the math. We answer this question accordingly and uphold that finding of the learned single Judge on this point. 27. We have already shown the difference between the temple and the Math and to our mind Math is a distinct entity from the temple. The land in dispute did not belong to the deity Lord Shiv in any way. Learned counsel for the appellants was at pains to explain to us that Lord Shiv was not a proper person to bring the suit with regard to the disputed land. We have no quarrel with this proposition and hence we need not cite the various rulings and treatises relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants in this regard. 28. This takes us to the consideration of the next question whether the sale made by Lalgir was for legal necessity of the Math. Learned single Judge while relying upon Article 152 of Mulla's treatise on Hindu law observed that the burden lay on purchaser to prove - (a) either that there was legal necessity for the sale; or that he made proper and bona fide inquiry as to the existence of the necessity and did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existence of the necessity. Learned single Judge further observed that this proposition of law is attracted to the sale made by a mahant of a math who is undoubtedly a limited owner being a trustee of the property belonging to a religious institution. Keeping this back-ground in view learned single Judge scrutinised the evidence of the parties and observed that Madan Mohan had nowhere stated that there was any legal necessity for managing the trust to justify the alienation of the land made in his favour. Learned single Judge observed that the evidence did not establish that any inquiry was ever made by Madan Mohan before entering into the transaction of purchase that there was any necessity for such a sale. Learned single Judge observed that the evidence did not establish that any inquiry was ever made by Madan Mohan before entering into the transaction of purchase that there was any necessity for such a sale. In view of the above circumstances he held that the purchaser Madan Mohan had failed to discharge his duty while he was dealing with a mahant who was only a trustee of the 'Juna Math' (limited owner). Learned counsel for the appellants contends that in the present case learned single Judge has not correctly read and appreciated the evidence on record. He submits that Ex. A/1 clearly recited a legal necessity for the sale namely repair of Math and repayment of debt. He submits that when the sale deed itself recited the legal necessity it was not necessary for Madan Mohan to state in so many words that Lalgir needed money for legal necessity of the Math. He submits that the question of legal necessity was not raised at the time of trial and had such a controversy been raised he would have led necessary evidence. Learned single Judge laboured under an impression that no legal necessity had been recited in the sale deed Ex. A/1. We find that this criticism is justifiable. Learned single Judge observed in his judgment : "Document Ex. A/1 sale deed executed by Lalgir in favour of Madan Mohan does not also show the existence of any necessity for entering into the transaction of sale of the land belonging to the math." This observation of the learned single Judge is against the clear recitals made in Ex. A/1. The relevant portion of Ex. A/1 recites HINDI MATTER 367042C Madan Mohan in this case was not required to state regarding the factum of legal necessity when the same had been recited in the sale deed Ex. A/l. It was for the plaintiffs to show that the aforesaid recital was false. Nothing has been brought in the record to show this. On the contrary Mahant Dhangir admitted in his statement HINDI MATTER 367042D 1 This statement shows that in one breath Dhangir wanted to suggest that no money was required by the Math but in the next breath he admitted the fact that the Math and the temple were in disrepair. Nothing has been brought in the record to show this. On the contrary Mahant Dhangir admitted in his statement HINDI MATTER 367042D 1 This statement shows that in one breath Dhangir wanted to suggest that no money was required by the Math but in the next breath he admitted the fact that the Math and the temple were in disrepair. His emphasis on HINDI MATTER 367042E goes to show that later on Lalgir might not have used the amount of repairs or the Math but that does not go to show that there was no legal necessity of the Math. The aforesaid admission is very significant and does go to show that money had been in fact required for carrying out repairs of the math and the temple. It appears that learned single Judge laboured under an erroneous impression that Ex. A/1 did not recite any legal necessity. This erroneous assumption has clearly vitiated his finding. In our opinion in the facts and circumstances of the case and particularly in view of the fact that there was a clear recital in Ex. A/1 of legal necessity it was not necessary for Madan Mohan that he should have stated that there was legal necessity for the sale. In our opinion recital in Ex. A/1 sufficiently discharges the burden of the alienees that in fact there was a legal necessity for the sale. 29. The learned trial Judge had found that the sale deed had been made for consideration and a sum of Rs. 4000/- had been paid in presence of the Sub- registrar who had made a specific endorsement thereupon that a sum of Rs. 4000/- had been paid in his presence. Learned single Judge reversed this finding of the learned trial court on two grounds namely (i) Lalgir had stated that he did not receive a single pie from Madan Mohan as a consideration for sale; no serious cross examination was directed on this aspect of the question when Lalgir came in the witness box (ii) The Sub- Registrar was not produced in the witness box to prove the endorsement. 30. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that learned single Judge fell in error in holding that the appellants ought to have examined the Sub-Registrar to prove the endorsement. 30. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that learned single Judge fell in error in holding that the appellants ought to have examined the Sub-Registrar to prove the endorsement. It is contended that there was a presumption of the correctness of the endorsement made by the Sub-Registrar by virtue of section 60 of the Indian Registration Act. Hence appellants were not required to produce the Sub- Registrar. It is urged that Lalgir could not have been expected to own in cross examination that he had received a consideration of Rs. 4,000/- and hence cross examination on this aspect would not have yielded any result. It is submitted that Madan Mohan had categorically deposed that he had paid a sum of Rs. 4,000/- to Lalgir in presence of the Sub-Registrar. This statement was corroborated by the aforesaid endorsement and as such the statement of Madan Mohan was reliable and worthy of credence. Learned single Judge was not right in rejecting this testimony on the grounds mentioned above. 31. We have considered this contention carefully. In this case there is a clear endorsement by the registering officer on Ex. A/1 that a sum of Rs. 4,000/- had been paid in presence of the registering authority. This endorsement to be proved did not require examination of the Sub-registrar. Judicial note has to be taken of such an endorsement by virtue of section 60 of the Indian Registration Act read with sections 56 and 79 of the Indian Evidence Act. In our opinion non-cross examination of Lalgir was not very material because he could not be expected to own that a sum of Rs. 4,000/- had been paid to him in presence of the Sub- Registrar. The statement of Madan Mohan coupled with the endorsement by the Sub-Registrar on Ex. A/1 goes to prove that a sum of Rs. 4,000/- had been paid by Madan Mohan to Lalgir. In our opinion denial of Lalgir on this aspect of the matter does not sufficiently rebut the sworn testimony of Madan Mohan duly corroborated by the endorsement of the registering authority on Ex. A/1 regarding the passing of the consideration. We are in agreement with the learned counsel for the appellants that such an endorsement did not require examination of the registering authority to be proved. Reference in this connection may be made to (2) Radha Mohun Vs. Nipendra Nath (AIR 1928 Cal. A/1 regarding the passing of the consideration. We are in agreement with the learned counsel for the appellants that such an endorsement did not require examination of the registering authority to be proved. Reference in this connection may be made to (2) Radha Mohun Vs. Nipendra Nath (AIR 1928 Cal. 154) wherein it has been held that judicial notice should be taken of the endorsement of the Sub-Registrar and his signature. We may add that there is a presumption as to the genuineness of certificate of registration endorsed by the Sub-Registrar by virtue of section 79 of the Indian Evidence Act. We are fortified in our view by the pronouncement of this High Court in (3) Govind Ram V. Abdul Wahab ( AIR 1963 Raj. 234 ) . In the result we find that the learned single Judge fell in error in holding that the appellants were required to examine the Sub-Registrar to prove the correctness of the endorsement regarding payment of consideration on Ex. A/1. In our opinion the evidence of Madan Mohan supported by the endorsement of the registering authority could not have been discarded merely on the basis of denial of Lalgir regarding receipt of consideration. We therefore reverse the finding of the learned single Judge on this point and restore the finding of the learned trial Judge. 32. Now we may take up the finding of the learned single Judge that the aforesaid sale was not genuine. Learned single Judge in arriving at this finding has considered the circumstance that stamps for the sale were purchased in the name of Madan Mohan on 20.4.67 i.e. almost a year before the sale deed was executed on these stamps. Another circumstance relied upon in this context was that Banshi Lal DW 3 gave the impression that the sale deed had been presented to the Sub-Registrar for registration the very day it had been written even though the sale deed shows that it was written on 20.3.68 and was presented for registration on 5.4.68. The other ground relied upon by the learned single Judge in arriving at the said finding was that Banshi Lai when cross examined refused to identify Dhangir who had signed Ex. A/1 as an attesting witness. This conduct of Banshi Lal was taken as shaking the credibility of the witness. The other ground relied upon by the learned single Judge in arriving at the said finding was that Banshi Lai when cross examined refused to identify Dhangir who had signed Ex. A/1 as an attesting witness. This conduct of Banshi Lal was taken as shaking the credibility of the witness. Another factor taken into consideration was that Madan Mohan had stated that the shops which were standing on the land sold to him belonged to the Mahant though in his earlier statement he had said that the shops had been constructed by him. Learned single Judge was further influenced by the fact that Jagnnath was managing the property of the Math and Madan Mohan was his real nephew. Upon such factor he was of the view that Madan Mohan was only a benami purchaser. 33. Learned counsel for the appellants has seriously challenged the aforesaid finding. It was submitted that the learned trial judge had arrived at a categorical finding that Dhangir had in fact attested Ex. A/1. This finding was based on proper appreciation of evidence and learned single Judge was in error in reversing this finding without cogent grounds. It is submitted that there was direct evidence of DW 1 Bhanwar Lal to prove attestation by Dhangir. As regards non- identification of Dhangir by Bhanwar Lal it is submitted that a deed writer scribes hundreds of deeds every year. Banshi Lal was examined long after the deed Ex. A/1 had been written. Hence it was not possible for him to have identified Dhangir after a lapse of long period. In his examination-in-chief Bhanwar Lal made this position clear but this explanation was not considered by the learned single Judge. It was an admitted case of both the parties that the shops were not constructed by Mahant but had been constructed by Madan Mohan. Hence a stray statement that the shops belonged to the Mahant and he sold them did not falsify Madan Mohan's earlier statement that he had built these shops. Presumably by referring to shops he was referring to the land itself. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-cross-objector has tried to support the finding of the learned single Judge but in para 2 (vii) of his written arguments it was admitted that Madan Mohan had constructed the shops some time in 1964. Presumably by referring to shops he was referring to the land itself. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-cross-objector has tried to support the finding of the learned single Judge but in para 2 (vii) of his written arguments it was admitted that Madan Mohan had constructed the shops some time in 1964. We have considered the evidence on record and we are of the view that the learned single Judge was not right in holding that the sale in question was not a genuine one. Learned trial court had found the sale to be a valid transaction. One of the factors taken into consideration by the learned single Judge were sufficient to arrive at the finding that the sale was not a genuine one. Madan Mohan was not asked to explain how and under what circumstances the stamps for the sale deed had been purchased much before the execution of the sale deed. It has to be remembered that the sale deed was a registered one. So far as the statement of Banshi Lal is concerned he did not say that the parties had gone to present the sale deed for registration the day it had been written. He simply says that after the sale deed had been scribed Lalgir signed the same and Dhangir and Bhanwar Lal attested it in his presence. He handed over the sale deed thereafter to Lalgir. It is significant that Banshi Lal was unable to identify Lalgir also though it is an admitted position that Lalgir in fact signed Ex. All and presented the same for registration; hence non-identification of Dhangir and Banshi Lal was not a good ground to discard his testimony. It may here be reiterated at the cost of repetition that Banshi Lal never suggested that the parties had gone for registration of the document on very day it had been written. What was the use of this conjecture of the learned single Judge is not clear. We therefore find that the learned single Judge was not right in saying that the sale in question was not genuine. Here we may observe that learned single Judge was of the view that Madan Mohan was a benamidar for Jagannath. In this case there is not an iota of evidence to show that consideration for sale had been advanced by Jagannath. Here we may observe that learned single Judge was of the view that Madan Mohan was a benamidar for Jagannath. In this case there is not an iota of evidence to show that consideration for sale had been advanced by Jagannath. Hence it cannot be said that transaction in favour of Madan Mohan was a benami one. 34. Learned single Judge permitted the plaintiffs to produce certificate is- sued to the Juna Math by the Assistant Commissioner Devasthan Rajasthan Jodhpur and Bikaner Division dated 6.4.63 mentioning that Juna Math Bikaner had been declared a public trust and that it has been registered at serial No. 30 in the register of public trusts and a certificate to that effect was issued to Mahant Lalgir under the hand and signature of the Assistant Commissioner. As observed already this document was taken on record without demur and learned single Judge came to the finding that this document settled the controversy about the nature of the Juna Math. According to him Juna Math was a public trust within the provisions of the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act 1959. 35. It may be mentioned here that the learned single Judge allowed the plaintiff to file this document before it to show that the Math was a public trust. However, when the plaintiffs wanted to raise a new ground that the lease deed in question and the sale deed in question were executed in contravention of section 31 of the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act and should be declared ab initio null and void the learned single Judge turned down this prayer on the ground that this objection was never raised before the trial court. In our opinion learned single Judge was right in not allowing the plaintiffs to raise this point when no foundation had been laid for such a plea in the pleadings. Whether any contravention of the provisions of section 31 of Rajasthan Public Trusts Act was made or not was a mixed question of law and fact. In the cross-objections filed on behalf of the plaintiffs the plaintiffs have not challenged the correctness of the refusal of their prayer by the learned single Judge. In view of this fact we need not enter into the controversy whether the lease deed and the sale in question were in contravention of the provisions of section 31 of the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act or not. 36. In view of this fact we need not enter into the controversy whether the lease deed and the sale in question were in contravention of the provisions of section 31 of the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act or not. 36. A question was raised regarding the competence of the District Judge to try the suit by virtue of section 73 of the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act 1959. In our opinion we need not dwell upon this aspect of the matter in detail because in our opinion the trial court did not decide or deal with any question during the course of the trial of the suit which could be decided or dealt with by any officer or authority under the provisions of the Act. It is highly doubtful if a suit of this nature could have been at all filed before any officer or authority appointed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act 1959. Substantially this was a suit to set aside alienation made by an erstwhile Mahant. We do not think that any such suit could have beer. filed before any officer or authority under the provisions of the said Act. Hence we leave the discussion at that. 37. Now we may deal with the question whether the suit by the deity or for that matter by Dhangir was incompetent. Two distinct grounds have been raised in this regard, firstly it has been urged that the deity had no locus standi to file the suit. It was further urged that Mahant Dhangir also could not file the suit. Secondly it was urged that at any rate the suit was collusive and hence was incompetent. We have to see if these submissions have any force. 38. We-have already observed that the disputed land did not belong to the deity and as such deity was not competent to bring this suit. Hence the only questions which survive for our consideration are whether Mahant Dhangir could have filed this suit and whether the suit was collusive. 39. Learned counsel for the cross objectors submitted that actually the suit was on behalf of the Math and Mahant Dhangir had been erroneously described as the plaintiff and the suit by the Math was very much competent because the alienated properties belonged to the Math. 39. Learned counsel for the cross objectors submitted that actually the suit was on behalf of the Math and Mahant Dhangir had been erroneously described as the plaintiff and the suit by the Math was very much competent because the alienated properties belonged to the Math. Alternatively it is submitted in this respect that Dhangir had been appointed Mahant by Lalgir within his lifetime and as such he was entitled to bring the suit. We have considered the rival contentions on this point. There is a categorical finding of the learned trial court that Mahant Lalgir had appointed Dhangir as a Mahant on 14.6.67. This finding was upheld by the learned single Judge. The finding of the learned trial court as also of the learned single Judge is based on appreciation of evidence of the parties and we do not find any infirmity in this finding. Here we would like to point out that even before the Hon'ble Supreme Court the stand of the parties was that in between the lease deed and the sale in favour of Madan Mohan there was a change of guard in the Math hence this position is no longer open to challenge. However since learned counsel for the appellants has been at pains to urge that the finding of the trial court as also of the learned single Judge that Dhangir had been appointed mahant during the lifetime of Lalgir is not correct we have examined the evidence on record to satisfy ourselves if the finding suffers from any infirmity. In this context learned counsel for the appellants had referred to page 9 of the written arguments of the cross objectors and has extracted the portion of the same. We have read the entire paragraph from which the learned counsel for the appellants has extracted two sentences which read as follows : "Lalgir only retired from Mahantship and handed over the Management of Trust property to Dhangir. He had not abandoned his title as Mahant." To our mind aforesaid statement quoted out of context does not help the appellants in any way. The entire statement contained in the written arguments on this point is as follows : "It is correct statement of Dhangir that Lalgir was also regarded as Mahant and people gave Bhents to him and Lalgir lives in the Math. This at moment cannot benefit. The entire statement contained in the written arguments on this point is as follows : "It is correct statement of Dhangir that Lalgir was also regarded as Mahant and people gave Bhents to him and Lalgir lives in the Math. This at moment cannot benefit. Madan Mohan and Jankidass and other because Lalgir only retired from Mahantship and handed over the Management of Trust property to Dhangir. He had not abandoned his title as Mahant. Retired persons are also called by the same title and receive same respects from peoples. Mahant after abdication is not required to abandon the Math also. Chela is required to serve him in old age and make provisions for his food medicines and residence." To our mind it is not correct to say that Dhangir had not been appointed Mahant as claimed by the plaintiffs. The evidence of the witnesses of the plaintiffs establish beyond any manner of doubt that Lalgir had appointed Dhangir as Mahant within his lifetime and had divested himself of all the authorities of a Mahant with regard to the management of the Juna Math. In this connection we may briefly refer to the evidence of Someshwaranand Dhangir Lalgir and Satyanand. These witnesses depose about the formalities which took place on the occasion of installation of Dhangir as Mahant. We have no reason to doubt their statements which have been relied upon by both the courts below. 40. Learned counsel for the appellants was at pains to explain that installation of Lalgir as Mahant was a collusive one and the present suit has been filed as a result of collusion between Dhangir and Lalgir. Collusion had been defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary Vol. I (A to G) as follows : "Secret agreement; secret cooperation for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose acting in with the enemy as (a) a secret agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his rights often by the terms of law (b) : agreement between parties considered adversaries at the law (as in a divorce proceedings) (c) : a secret agreement considered illegal for any reason." The very idea of collusion implies fraud and deceit. It appears to us that Lalgir was leading a life of dissipation. One Jagannath uncle of Madan Mohan was managing properties on his benefit. It appears to us that Lalgir was leading a life of dissipation. One Jagannath uncle of Madan Mohan was managing properties on his benefit. It appears that Lalgir under some sort of influence alienated the land of the Math by way of lease and sale. On realising that he had committed a folly he abdicated his powers and appointed Dhangir as Mahant at a ceremony held openly in presence of the followers of the denomination so that the properties may be regained. In our opinion the act of installation of Dhangir as Mahant could not be said to be collusive nor the suit by cross objectors can be said to have been filed collusively. Learned counsel for the appellants was at pains to explain that under sections 19 and 19A of the Contract Act only Mahant Lalgir could have brought this suit. Since he could not have brought the suit Dhangir has been made to bring the suit. May be it is so. But that does not make the suit collusive. If Dhangir and Lalgir genuinely believed that Lalgir was guilty of frittering away the properties of the Math and the properties deserved to be recovered and with this and in view Lalgir abdicated his office so as to clear way for Dhangir to recover the properties the action could not be said to be fraudulent or collusive in any manner. In our opinion Dhangir having been appointed Mahant of the Math is competent to bring the suit. Even otherwise it would be at best a case of misdescription of the plaintiffs. The title of the plaint clearly refers to the Juna Math in the array of the plaintiffs though the suit has been brought by Dhangir. Such a miss description should not affect the maintainability of the suit which has proceeded to the stage of this special appeal. Competence of Dhangir to institute the suit does not appear to have been challenged before the learned Supreme Court. Hence we are of the opinion that the suit by Dhangir or at any rate by the Math through Dhangir is competent and maintainable. We accordingly decide this point in favour of the cross objectors. 41. Now we have to consider if Dhangir has signed Ex. A/I and hence he was estopped from challenging the same. Hence we are of the opinion that the suit by Dhangir or at any rate by the Math through Dhangir is competent and maintainable. We accordingly decide this point in favour of the cross objectors. 41. Now we have to consider if Dhangir has signed Ex. A/I and hence he was estopped from challenging the same. Attestation of a document by itself does not estop the attestor from challenging the correctness of the recitals in a deed unless it is shown by other circumstances that the attestor knew of the contents of the document attested by him. This proposition is very well settled and we need not refer to all the various rulings cited by either side. However we may refer to (4) Pandurang Krishanji V. Markendeya Tukaram ( AIR 1922 PC 20 ) in which it has been held as follows : "Before their Lordships consider the circumstances in which that attestation took place they think it is desirable to emphasise once more that attestation of a deed by itself estops a man from denying nothing whatever excepting that he has witnessed the execution of the deed. It conveys neither directly nor by implication any knowledge of the contents of the document and it ought not to be put forward alone for the purpose of establishing that a man consented to the transaction with the document of facts. It is of course possible as was pointed out by their Lordships in the case of Banga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jagat Kishore Acharya Choudhary (1) that an attestation may take place in circumstances which would show that the witness did in fact know of the contents of the document but no such knowledge ought to be inferred from the mere fact of the attestation." Likewise we may refer to (5) Nayakammal V. Manuswamy (AIR 1924 Mad. 819) which lays down the following proposition : "It has no doubt been held that attestation does not prima facie import knowledge. In Lakhpati v. Rambodh Singh, AIR 1927 Lahore 757 (1) it has been held that the question whether attestation should be held to imply assent is a question of fact and must be determined with reference to the circumstances of each case. As pointed out in Gurudayaldas v. Nathu, AIR 1928 Cal. In Lakhpati v. Rambodh Singh, AIR 1927 Lahore 757 (1) it has been held that the question whether attestation should be held to imply assent is a question of fact and must be determined with reference to the circumstances of each case. As pointed out in Gurudayaldas v. Nathu, AIR 1928 Cal. 154 (2) where a person having a tangible interest in the property affected by a deed attests that deed his attestation should be taken as proof of his consent to and knowledge of the correctness of the recitals in the deed." Likewise we may refer to (6) Dhannalal v. Bhaiyalal (AIR 1956 M.B. 16) which lays down the following proposition:- "(6) The doctrine of estoppel is based upon consideration of fraud. If a man by his declaration act or omission has permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and has permitted him to act upon such a belief then the action of such a man is fraudulent and it is a well established rule of the law that where the fraudulent intention has succeeded the court will not assist the person guilty of fraud or misrepresentation. The principle is aptly expressed in an English decision - 'Niven v. Balknap' 2 Johns 673 (A) by being stated that- "where a man has been silent when in conscience he ought to have spoken he shall be debarred from speaking when conscience requires him to be silent." In - Jankiram Sital Ram Vs. Chota Nagpur Banking Association AIR 1937 Pat. 169(B) . Courtney-Terrell Chief Justice of the Patna High Court in a somewhat similar case observed : "If a man either by words or by conduct has intimated that he consents to an act which has been done and that he will offer no opposition to it although it could not have been lawfully done without his consent and he thereby induces others to do that from which they otherwise might have abstained he cannot question the legality of the act he had so sanctioned to the prejudice of those who have so given faith to his words or to the fair inference to be drawn from his conduct." 42. Now we have to see if in the present case it has been satisfactorily established that Dhangir had attested Ex. A/1 as claimed by the appellants. Now we have to see if in the present case it has been satisfactorily established that Dhangir had attested Ex. A/1 as claimed by the appellants. Learned trial Judge was of the opinion that in fact Dhangir had appended the signatures on Ex. A/1. We have already dealt with some of the evidence pertaining to the aforesaid attestation. Madan Mohan in his sworn testimony has deposed that Ex. A/1 had been attested by Dhangir. He has deposed that Dhangir had put his signatures on Ex. A/1 in his presence. According to him besides Dhangir Bhanwar Lal had also attested the same. In cross examination he stated that Lalgir was accompanied with Dhangir and Bhanwar Lal had been called by Lalgir. He has further stated that Lalgir Dhangir and Bhanwar Lal were present at the time of registration. During the cross examination he was put a question whether he had informed Dhangir that he was purchasing land from Lalgir. In reply to such a question he stated "HINDI MATTER" A suggestion was put to him that when he paid Rs. 4,000/- to Lalgir at that time Dhangir was not present. He has categorically denied the same. Nothing has come out in his cross examination which may go to demolish his statement that Dhangir had attested Ex. A/1.-PW 3 Banshi Lal is a scribe of Ex. All and as stated already he deposed that Dhangir and Bhanwar Lal had attested Ex. A/1 in his presence. He however declined to identify Dhangir. He explained that since it was an old matter he could not identify Dhangir though in cross examination he stated "HINDI MATTER" In our opinion a positive non-identification by Banshi Lal of Dhangir does not go to discredit the testimony of this witness that a person named Dhangir did attest the document. This testimony lends sufficient support to the testimony of Madan Mohan that it was Dhangir who had attested the same. Bhanwar Lal is another witness on this aspect. He has deposed that he attested Ex. A/1 and besides him it was attested by Dhangir. He has identified the signatures of Dhangir on Ex.A/1. The witness claimed that he knew Dhangir from his childhood and first Dhangir attested the same and thereafter he had attested it. No suggestion was given to this witness that Dhangir attesting Ex. A/7 was not the self same person as plaintiff Dhangir. He has identified the signatures of Dhangir on Ex.A/1. The witness claimed that he knew Dhangir from his childhood and first Dhangir attested the same and thereafter he had attested it. No suggestion was given to this witness that Dhangir attesting Ex. A/7 was not the self same person as plaintiff Dhangir. The aforesaid positive evidence goes to prove that Ex. A/1 had been attested by Dhangir plaintiff himself. Learned trial court discarded the denial of Dhangir on this point. Before the learned trial court plaintiffs sought to examine two experts namely Shir Brij Bhushan Kashyap and Shri Puri in support of the claim that signatures of Dhangir were forged on Ex. A/1. Learned trial court discarded opinion evidence of Shri Brij Bhushan Kashyap to the effect that the signatures had been forged and preferred to rely upon the positive evidence of the plaintiffs witnesses inter alia on the ground that another expert witness Puri was partly examined by the plaintiffs and his statement was not got completed by the plaintiffs presumably because his opinion was not favourable to the plaintiffs. The attempt of the plaintiffs in getting the document examined by the two experts and further discharge of one expert witness K.S. Puri after part examination goes to show that had Puri been examined completely he would not have supported their case that signatures of Dhangir were forged. This is true that Shri Kashyap did try to show that the signatures of Dhangir on Ex. A,11 were forged but that evidence is at best opinion evidence and if learned trial court for the reasons given by him discarded the opinion evidence of Kashyap and preferred to follow the positive evidence of the appellants witnesses it cannot be said that in doing so he had committed any serious error. 43. Learned single Judge reversed the aforesaid finding of the learned trial Judge though learned single Judge himself was not very much sure if Dhangir had not signed Ex. All. He did not consider the positive evidence of the witnesses referred to above vis-a-vis the evidence of Shri Kashyap which was at best opinion evidence. Therefore in agreement with the learned trial Judge and disagreeing with learned single Judge we hold that Ex. A/1 had been attested by Dhangir and his denial is not worth much. 44. All. He did not consider the positive evidence of the witnesses referred to above vis-a-vis the evidence of Shri Kashyap which was at best opinion evidence. Therefore in agreement with the learned trial Judge and disagreeing with learned single Judge we hold that Ex. A/1 had been attested by Dhangir and his denial is not worth much. 44. Now we have to see if on the basis of such attestation it should be said that Dhangir was estopped from challenging Ex. A/1. Learned single Judge relying upon Bhagwan Singh & other v. Ujagar Singh held that the signatures of Dhangir on Ex. A/1 at the most shows that Dhangir had witnessed the execution of the sale but this attestation does not in any manner suggest that Dhangir by putting his signatures on the document persuaded Madan Mohan to believe that Lalgir was a competent person to dispose of the math property. He further held that attestation alone was not sufficient to attract the doctrine of estoppel to apply against Dhangir. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that learned single Judge did not consider this evidence of the appellants that before attestation of Ex. A/1 by Dhangir the same had been read over by the scribe and at that time Dhangir was present. He did not object to the correctness of the recitals in Ex. A/1 in any manner and attested the same. He submits that this material evidence has escaped the notice of the learned single Judge and that vitiates the findings. He further submits that it is not uncommon in this country to obtain attestation of persons who are personally interested in the property. If a person having personal interest in the property attests a document pertaining to such property it should be held that the attestation estops such person from challenging the recitals in the deed. He has placed reliance in this connection upon Nayakammal v. Munuswamy (AIR 1924 Mad. 819) . There is one more important aspect which has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellants namely that while signing Ex. A/1 Lalgir described himself as the Mahant of the Math while Dhangir described himself as chela of Mahant Lalgir. It is submitted that this description must have led Madan Mohan to believe that Lalgir was the Mahant and Dhangir was only a chela and not the Mahant. A/1 Lalgir described himself as the Mahant of the Math while Dhangir described himself as chela of Mahant Lalgir. It is submitted that this description must have led Madan Mohan to believe that Lalgir was the Mahant and Dhangir was only a chela and not the Mahant. It is submitted that now Dhangir cannot come forward and say that he was not the chela at the relevant time but was a Mahant. 45. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-cross-objectors submits that the finding of the learned single Judge on this aspect does not deserve to be interfered with as the same is based on consideration of evidence. We have carefully considered the rival contentions. In our opinion Dhangir was estopped from challenging the recitals in Ex. A/1 particularly when he styled himself as chela of Lalgir while attesting it and Lalgir was described as a Mahant. In our opinion Dhangir cannot be permitted to turn back and say that Lalgir was not the Mahant of the Math on the date he attested the sale deed. We therefore decide this point in favour of the appellants. 46. Now we may consider the position under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act which reads as under- "41. TRANSPER BY OSTENSIBLE OWNER:- Where with the consent express or implied of the persons interested in immovable property a person is the ostensible owner of such property and transfers the same for consideration the transfer shall not be voidable on the ground that the transferor was not authorised to make it: provided that the transferee after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer had acted in good faith." Learned counsel for the appellants contended that firstly Lalgir was the true owner and Dhangir had no right in the property during the lifetime of Lalgir. Alternatively it was submitted that once Lalgir ceased to be Mahant and Dhangir became Mahant Lalgir continued to be ostensible owner of the property and since Madan Mohan was the purchaser for value without notice he was protected by virtue of section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. He submitted that likewise defendants No. 3 and 4 were bonafide purchasers for value without notice from Madan Mohan and they were also likewise protected. 47. He submitted that likewise defendants No. 3 and 4 were bonafide purchasers for value without notice from Madan Mohan and they were also likewise protected. 47. Learned counsel for the cross objectors submits that the property belonged to the Math and once Lalgir ceased to be Mahant he had no right to pass any interest in the property and as such nothing passed to madan Mohan by virtue of the sale in his favour and likewise nothing passed to the present appellants for the same reason. We have considered this contention carefully. This is true that Lalgir had ceased to be the Mahant as held already by us by virtue of Dhangir's installation as Mahant of the Math by Lalgir in the presence of the followers of the denomination but it does not appear that the appellants or Madan Mohan had any notice of this fact. Normally Lalgir could not have passed over interest in property to Madan Mohan when he had ceased to be mahant of the math but section 41. of the Transfer of Property Act carves out an exception to the aforesaid general rule. In (7) Ramocoomar v. Macqueen (52 IA 40) it was observed as under: "It is a principle of natural equity which must be universally applicable that where one man allows another to hold himself out as the owner of an estate and a third person purchases it for value from the apparent owner in the belief that he is the real owner the man who so allows the other to hold himself out shall not be permitted to recover upon his secret title unless he can overthrow that of the purchaser by showing either that he had direct notice or something which amounts to constructive notice of the real title; or that there existed circumstances which ought to have put him upon an inquiry that if prosecuted would have led to discovery of it." The following conditions are necessary for the application of section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act: (i) that the transferor is the ostensible owner; (ii) that he is so by the consent express or implied of the real owner; (iii) that the transfer is for consideration; (iv) that the transferee has acted in good faith taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to transfer. 48. 48. If any one of the elements is wanting the transferee is not entitled to the benefit of the section. In (8) Gurbaksh Singh V. Nikka Singh ( AIR 1963 SC 1917 ) it was observed as follows:- "Section 41 is an exception to the general rule that a person cannot confer a better title than he has. Being an exception the onus certainly is on the transferee to show that the transferor was the ostensible owner of the property and that he had after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer acted in good faith. Where the facts establish beyond doubt that the purchaser had the knowledge that the title of his transferor was in dispute and he had taken a risk in purchasing the same it is not possible to hold that he had purchased the property in good faith." True that Lalgir was only a limited owner of Juna Math. He was not competent to transfer or alienate it without any legal necessity. We have already held that in this case legal necessity has been established. We have also held that the sale in favour of Madan Mohan was for consideration. Now we have to examine whether Lalgir was allowed to act as an ostensible owner by the consent express or implied of Dhangir who had become the Mahant and whether Madan Mohan had acted in good faith having taken reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to transfer. 49. In the present case firstly Dhangir allowed Lalgir to style himself as Mahant and himself signed Ex. A/1 describing himself as chela. Secondly he allowed Lalgir to hand over patta of the property to Madan Mohan. Once Dhangir had become the Mahant of the Math he was under an obligation to secure the title deeds of the Math and he should not have allowed the patta to remain with Lalgir. It does not appear that he took care to take over the possession of the Patta. When Lalgir was styling himself as Mahant and he had also the patta of the Math with him and he passed over the patta to Madan Mohan it has to be held that Dhangir had given implied consent for the transfer of the property in favour of Madan Mohan. When Lalgir was styling himself as Mahant and he had also the patta of the Math with him and he passed over the patta to Madan Mohan it has to be held that Dhangir had given implied consent for the transfer of the property in favour of Madan Mohan. It was this inaction of Dhangir which has led Madan Mohan to act to his detriment. In this case when Lalgir passed over the patta to Madan Mohan Madan Mohan must have been led to believe that Lalgir had power to transfer the land. In these circumstances it can be predicated with certainty that Madan Mohan had acted in good faith taking reasonable care to ascertain that Lalgir had power to transfer. Thus if after installation of Dhangir as Mahant Lalgir acted as ostensible owner by the implied consent of Dhangier there is nothing to show bad faith on the part of Madan Mohan. The transfer was for consideration and therefore in disagreement with the learned single Judge we are of the opinion that the ownership in this disputed property passed to Madan Mohan by virtue of the sale deed Ex. A/1. On a parity of reasoning the present appellants acquired the same rights in the property which Madan Mohan possessed. We are therefore of the opinion that the provisions of section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act were clearly attracted to the facts of the present case and learned single Judge fell in serious error in holding that nothing passed to Madan Mohan by virtue of Ex. A/1. We find that learned single Judge failed to take into consideration the aforesaid important facts which vitiate his finding. 50. One more important fact deserves to be taken into consideration. After construction of the shops by Madan Mohan he went on realising the rent of the shops from the appellants. Appellants had before them the sale deed already executed by Lalgir in favour of Madan Mohan and had also been made to know that patta had been delivered to Madan Mohan by Lalgir. This must have definitely persuaded them to believe that Madan Mohan was competent to transfer the property. Hence the principle which applied to the sale in favour of Madan Mohan applies with greater force in case of sales made in favour of the appellants. 51. This must have definitely persuaded them to believe that Madan Mohan was competent to transfer the property. Hence the principle which applied to the sale in favour of Madan Mohan applies with greater force in case of sales made in favour of the appellants. 51. Here we may mention that we have examined the findings of the learned single Judge on points of facts as well as on points of law. The reason is that the powers under section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance are different from the powers of the second appellate court under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as follows: "18. Appeal to the High Court from Judges of the Court. - (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the judgment (not being judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisions) jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of the Judge of the High Court. (2) Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal." This section came to be interpreted by the Division Bench of this High Court as back as in 1960 in (9) Kedarnath v. Sitaram (1960 RLW 328) . In that judgment it was held that in an appeal under section 18 it would be open to the court of appeal to consider all the points necessary to be investigated for the determination of the contention of the correctness of the decree under appeal and that such consideration could not be limited to any particular question of fact or law although on a question of fact they would be extremely slow to interfere where there had been concurrent decision of courts below on such a question. A similar view was expressed in a subsequent Division Bench ruling of this court reported in (10) Suraj Narain v. Gordhan (1968 RLW 423) . In that judgment another Division Bench ruling of this High Court was followed and the following proposition was quoted with approval : "In the absence of any such limitation in section 18(1) of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance it cannot be argued on the antalogy of section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code that the High Court would not be entitled to examine in appeal the findings of fact arrived at by the Judge against whose judgment the appeal in directed. It would not be inappropriate if in an appeal against the judgment of a single Judge the High Court goes into facts and where necessary even interferes with findings based on them. Of course in doing so the Court will always keep in view the salutary principle that ordinarily it should not interfere with findings of fact unless the findings are manifestly erroneous and against the weight of evidence on record." In our opinion in view of the aforesaid legal position we were justified to go into, the various questions of fact. We have interfered with findings of fact only very reluctantly and only where we found that material evidence had escaped the attention of the learned single Judge vitiating the findings. 52. Now we may consider the question whether the suit for cancellation of lease was within limitation and the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for possession of the land demised in the lease and for mesne profits. Learned trial court arrived at a firm finding that the lease was without consideration and even though possession had been passed to the lessee no rent had been paid in pursuance of the lease deed. Learned trial court arrived at a firm finding that the lease was without consideration and even though possession had been passed to the lessee no rent had been paid in pursuance of the lease deed. It was also held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a declaration that the lease deed in respect of 1865/1 sq. yards of land excluding the land comprised in the sale deed was ineffective against the plaintiffs. However no decree of possession was passed in respect of the above land. 53. Learned single Judge was of the view that the suit in respect of cancellation of the lease deed was beyond limitation. He therefore did not consider the further question whether the lease was ineffective against the plaintiffs and whether they were entitled to possession of the land comprised under the same. In their cross objections the plaintiffs submitted that the learned single Judge erred in holding that the suit of the plaintiffs for declaration of the lease deed as void was time barred. It was contended that as soon as Lalgir resigned Mahantship and Dhangir became the Mahant he got a right to challenge the lease. Alternatively it was submitted that Mahant Lalgir died during the pendency of the litigation and notice of this fact could have been taken. Because of death of Mahant Lalgir the lease automatically came to an end. It was further submitted that plea of limitation regarding the suit being barred was given up by the counsel for the defendants and this plea should not have been allowed to be taken in the appeal. On the above premises it was urged that this Court should allow the cross objections and restore the decree of the learned trial Judge so far as lease is concerned with further modification that decree for possession and mesne profits may also be passed. 54. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the suit in respect of the lease was definitely time barred and there is no reason to interfere with the findings of the learned single Judge on this point. It is submitted that admission of a counsel to a question of law is not binding and hence learned single Judge was right in considering the plea of limitation. It is submitted that admission of a counsel to a question of law is not binding and hence learned single Judge was right in considering the plea of limitation. It was submitted that no claim of mesne profits had been made in the plaint or in the cross-objections and as such mesne profits could not be awarded. 55. In reply learned counsel for the cross objectors submits that claim of mesne profits is included to the claim for possession and even though specific prayer for mesne profits has not been made mesne profits should be allowed. 56. We have considered the rival contentions carefully. We may state at the outset that it has not been proved that the lease made by Lalgir was for any legal necessity or was for any consideration. Madan Mohan in his statement in examination-in- chief has not said a single word about the passing of the consideration or legal necessity in respect of the lease. It does not appear that any rent was ever paid in pursuance of the lease deed by Madan Mohan to the lessor. Learned trial court was therefore right in holding that the lease deed was ineffective and void. Learned trial court did not pass a decree for possession. We fail to see why a decree for possession in respect of the lease premises excluding the land covered by the sale deeds was not passed. We therefore hold that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the possession of the leased land excluding that which had been sold by Lalgir to Madan Mohan. 57. Now the question is whether the suit in respect of the lease deed was barred by limitation. Learned single Judge has discussed this aspect of the matter as follows: 'The first question that was urged before me by learned counsel for Madan Mohan while arguing his cross-appeal is that the declaration sought by the plaintiff in respect of the lease deed was time barred and therefore no relief could be given to the plaintiff by the trial court in respect of the validity of the lease-deed. The lease-deed was executed for 99 years on 19.8.63 and the suit was filed on 27.1.70. The lease-deed was executed for 99 years on 19.8.63 and the suit was filed on 27.1.70. According to learned counsel for the plaintiff the suit for getting the lease-deed cancelled and declared as void fell within the purview of Article 59 of the Limitation Act which prescribes a period of limitation of 3 years from the date when the plaintiff was entitled to have the instrument cancelled or set aside. According to the learned counsel for the respondents the period of 3 years shall run from the date of the execution of the lease deed because Mahant Dhangir used to reside in the same Math and therefore it must be within his knowledge that the land belonging to 'Juna Math' was leased out for a period of 99 years by Mahant Lalgir who was undoubtedly a Mahant of the Math and as such he could alienate the land belonging to Math. Learned counsel fo; the appellant after hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent in the cross-appeal filed by Madan Mohan changed his position and urged that the suit is governed by Article 113 which also prescribes a period of limitation of 3 years. According to learned counsel for Dhangir the right accrued to the plaintiff from the date when he came to know of the impugned transaction but Mr. Khatri could not point out any point of time or date when Mahant Dhangir came to know of the execution of the lease-deed. Even before this Court he was not in a position to give any fixed date when Mahant Dhangir came to know of the transaction of lease in favour of Madan Mohan. In these circumstances even if the suit is governed by Article 113 which is the residuary article the right to sue acrrued to the plaintiff on the date when the land was leased out to Madan Mohan by defendant Mahant Lalgir. It may be observed that in paragraph 9 of the plaint it has been averred that defendant Madan Mohan started construction of the shop on the land leased out to him. It may be observed that in paragraph 9 of the plaint it has been averred that defendant Madan Mohan started construction of the shop on the land leased out to him. This averment definitely suggested that the construction that was started on the land by Madan Mohan must have made it clear to every one concerned that Madan Mohan was doing in his own rights as the land was leased out to him for 99 years and as such the fact of making Madan Mohan a lessee must have come within the knowledge of plaintiff Dhangir soon after the construction was started on the land leased out to Madan Mohan by Mahant Lalgir. In the light of these circumstances it is not open for the plaintiff now to say that plaintiff Dhangir came to know of the lease after the sale of the land was effected in 1968 because this argument does not stand to scrutiny specially when I find an averment in the plaint itself in paragraph No. 9 of the plaint that Madan Mohan started constructing shops on the land after the lease deed was executed in his favour. It is admitted that Madan Mohan started the construction of the shops soon after the land was leased out to him. In this view of the matter the suit of the plaintiff for the cancellation of the lease-deed or for seeking a declaration that the lease was ineffective as against the plaintiff appears to be time barred. The trial court has granted the relief to the plaintiff and has declared that the lease was ineffective against the plaintiff but in view of the fact that the suit in respect of such a declaration was barred by time the finding of the court below cannot be sustained." 58. Before us learned counsel for the plaintiffs has submitted that the suit was really covered by Article 96 of the Limitation Act and the plaintiffs could have filed the suit within the period of 12 years from the date of the lease deed. Alternatively the suit was governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act and as such was within time. Learned counsel for the alienees submits that the learned single Judge was right in holding that the suit was barred by limitation. Alternatively the suit was governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act and as such was within time. Learned counsel for the alienees submits that the learned single Judge was right in holding that the suit was barred by limitation. It was alternatively submitted that if it was considered that the lease came to an end on the death of Lalgir the suit was premature. We have considered the above contentions. Article 69 of the Limitation Act clearly does not apply to the present case. This Article applies when the suit is in respect of a transfer made by a previous manager for a valuable consideration. In this case the plaintiffs have come on the specific footing that the lease was without consideration. Reference may be made in this connection to para 7 of the plaint wherein it was specifically said that no consideration had passed for the lease. Suit relating to cancellation of setting aside of an instrument is governed by Article 59 of the Limitation Act and under this Art. the limitation starts running from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiffs to have the instrument cancelled or set aside first become known to him. In this case learned single Judge has referred to the various circumstances and has held that the plaintiffs must have known about the lease from its very inception particularly because Dhangir was residing in the Math itself and the land leased out to Madan Mohan adjoin the Math itself. To our mind this finding is unassailable and clearly the suit was barred under Article 59 of the Limitation Act. We may consider whether the suit could have been filed under Article 65 of he Limitation Act. This Art. reads as follows: "For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title Twelve years When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Explanation. We may consider whether the suit could have been filed under Article 65 of he Limitation Act. This Art. reads as follows: "For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title Twelve years When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Explanation. - For the purposes of this Article - (a) where the suit is by a remainder-man reversioner (other than a landlord) or a devisee the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the estate of the remainder man reversioner or devisee as the case may be falls into possession; (b) where the suit is by a Hindu or Muslim entitled to the possession of immovable property on the death of a Hindu or Muslim female the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the female dies; c. where the suit is by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree when the judgment debtor was out of possession at the date of the sale the purchaser shall be deemed to be a representative of the judment debtor who was out of possession" A bare reading of this Art. goes to show that this Art. applies only when the possession of the defendant is adverse to the plaintiff. In this case Madan Mohan was a lessee of Lalgir and his possession was permissive so far as Lalgir was concerned. Since the transaction was void against the Math it became adverse against the Math from the date of the lease. At any rate it became adverse when Dhangir was installed as Mahant.Hence the Math and Dhangir were entitled to bring this suit within a period of 12 years from the date of lease so far as the leased land was concerned. This appears to be true that on death of Lalgir the lease could not survive at all and even if valid would lapse as has been submitted by Shri Khatri in his written note of the arguments. This appears to be true that on death of Lalgir the lease could not survive at all and even if valid would lapse as has been submitted by Shri Khatri in his written note of the arguments. At page 19 he has stated "Also the Mahant had died on 20.7.1974 thereafter the sale and lease suo motu came to an end so there remains no money to be recovered by Madan Mohan and the lease and sale have come to an end after the death of Mahant and therefore the possession of the appellants and Madan Mohan is as that of trespassers." Considered in this light the suit by the plaintiffs in respect of possession of the land comprised in the lease would be premature only if it is founded on the cause of action accrued on the death of Lalgir. Since the suit was not based on such a cause of action it cannot be said that the suit was premature in any way. Consequently we are of the view that suit for possession of leased land excepting that covered by valid sales was void as against the Math and Dhangir and the suit for possession of such land was within time. 59. Now we may consider the question of mesne profits. The plaintiffs did not sue at all for mesne profits. A bare reading of the relief clauses in the plaint goes to show that no relief was asked for in respect of mesne profits pertaining to the leased land. The learned trial Judge did not pass any decree in respect of mesne profits. The trial court contented itself by declaring lease deed void and ineffective in respect of land measuring 1865/1 sq. yards. The plaintiffs filed the first appeal in question aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree of the learned trial Judge. Therein also they did not make any prayer for grant of mesne profits. Even in their cross objections against the judgment of the learned single Judge they did not claim any mesne profits. 60. This is true that the claim of mesne profits is incidental to and arises out of a claim for possession against a person in wrongful occupation of the property. Notwithstanding this fact a claim of mesne profits is a distinct claim altogether. A claim for mesne profits has to be made as any other claim. 60. This is true that the claim of mesne profits is incidental to and arises out of a claim for possession against a person in wrongful occupation of the property. Notwithstanding this fact a claim of mesne profits is a distinct claim altogether. A claim for mesne profits has to be made as any other claim. It is required to be valued and court fee has to be paid thereupon. When no decree for mesne profits was passed by the trial court the plaintiffs were required to file an appeal against non- allowance of mesne profits. Such an appeal was again required to be valued for the purposes of mesne profits. Under the law of limitation there is a different limitation for the purpose of mesne profits than for purposes of possession. We are therefore not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that they should be allowed mesne profits in this special appeal even though they did not raise a claim before the learned trial Court or for that matter before the learned single Judge. There is one more angle from which this matter may be examined. A claim for mesne profits is really a claim for compensation for wrongful use and occupation. We have already held that so far as the sale in favour of appellants was concerned it was binding against the plaintiffs as also the previous Mahant Lalgir. After exclusion of the property demised in the sale what compensation should be computed for the possession of the land in respect of which trial court passed a decree is purely a question of fact. What would have been compensation for such use and occupation cannot be predicated without a proper foundation of facts. No such foundation has been laid either in the pleadings or in the evidence. We therefore find that this claim in respect of mesne profits cannot be sustained. 61. In view of the above discussion we find that the appeal and the cross objections are liable to be accepted in part to the extent that the plaintiffs' suit fails in respect of the property sold by Lalgir to Madan Mohan and later on sold by Madan Mohan to Janki Das and Mohan Lal. 61. In view of the above discussion we find that the appeal and the cross objections are liable to be accepted in part to the extent that the plaintiffs' suit fails in respect of the property sold by Lalgir to Madan Mohan and later on sold by Madan Mohan to Janki Das and Mohan Lal. The decree of the trial court in respect of the lease declaring the same void (excluding the land sold by Lalgir to Madan Mohan and by Madan Mohan to Janki Das and Mohan Lal) is modified and restored in favour of Juna Math through Dhangir. The Juna Math shall also be entitled to recover possession of the leased land excluding that already sold to the alienees. The suit of idol Shiv Bhagwan being not maintainable is liable to be dismissed in its entirety. Looking to all the circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs.Appeal and Cross Objections Party accepted. *******