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1989 DIGILAW 232 (MAD)

Kalimuthu and Others v. State

1989-03-30

ARUNACHALAM

body1989
Judgment : The appellants were tried in S.T.C. No.51 of 1984 on the file of the Special District and Sessions Judge (Essential Commodities Act Cases), Madurai for violation of Clauses 4(1) and 5(1) of the Tamil Nadu Paddy and Rice (Regulation of Trade) Order, 1974 punishable under Secs.3 and 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The appellants were found guilty as charged by the trial Court and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months each and to pay a fine of Rs.200 each, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. However, the third accused (A3) was acquitted by the trial Court. Though Arunasalam, the third appellant had been acquitted by the trial Court, obviously by misapprehension the appeal has been filed on his behalf as well and I also find that bail had been ordered in his favour at the time of admission of the appeal. This is apparently a mistake. This has to be set right recording that there could be no appeal by Arunasalam, the third accused to this Court, since he had been already acquitted by the trial Judge. 2. The facts which led to this prosecution can now be narrated P.W.5, Inspector of Police, Civil Supplies, C.I.D. and his party at 3.00 A.M., on 1.10.1983 found the lorry bearing Registration No.TNV 6633 proceeding towards Coimbatore from Madurai loaded with 37 bags of rice without valid documents. The lorry was intercepted at Kodai Road near Ammaya Naickanoor and in the presence of P. W.3 Chellayya 37 bags of rice were seized. However, P.W.3 has not supported the prosecution and has been treated as hostile. P.W.5 obtained sanction to prosecute the accused, which order of sanction is dated 9.5.1984 and has been marked as Ex.P1. Ex.P1 is proved by P.W.1 an Assistant in the Madurai Collectorate. Of the accused, the third accused (A3) who has been acquitted, is the owner of the lorry. The first appellant was the driver and the second appellant was the cleaner of the lorry. The prosecution case was that the acquitted accused loaded the rice bags into the lorry without proper documents. 3. Out of the five witnesses examined by the prosecution, P.Ws.1 and 2 do not advance the prosecution case, since they are witnesses after the event. 4. The prosecution case was that the acquitted accused loaded the rice bags into the lorry without proper documents. 3. Out of the five witnesses examined by the prosecution, P.Ws.1 and 2 do not advance the prosecution case, since they are witnesses after the event. 4. In the trial Court when questioned under Sec.313, Crl.P.C., the appellants and the third accused (A3.) denied their complicity in the crime. The first appellant stated that he had signed in a blank paper. The second appellant stated that he and the first appellant had parked the lorry and gone out for taking coffee and when they returned they found the lorry loaded in the shed, and the tarpaulin having been tied over the loaded articles. On the side of the accused one Ganesan was examined as D.W.1 to substantiate the defence that the appellants had nothing to do with the loading of the articles in the lorry. Exs.D1 and D2 were also marked by the appellants. 5. Mr.A.Packiaraj, learned counsel for the appellants, contends that since the Tamil Nadu Paddy and Rice (Regulation of Trade) Order, 1974 has been repealed by the Tamil Nadu Essential Trade Articles (Regulation of Trade) Order, 1984 the prosecution against the appellants under 1974 Order cannot be maintained, since the proceedings were ab initio void. According to him, the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court will have to be quashed on this short ground. It will be necessary at this stage to refer to certain relevant dates. The occurrence had taken place on 1.10.1983. The charge sheet was filed on 21.9.1984. Sanction to prosecute was obtained on 9.5.1984. The Tamil Nadu Essential Trade Articles (Regulation of Trade) Order, 1984, came into force on 1.4.1984. Clause 31 of this 1984 Order repeals the Tamil Nadu Paddy and Rice (Regulation of Trade) Order, 1974. Clause 31(2) states that notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under this said Order, including any order or direction issued, shall be deemed to have been made or issued under this Order. It is obvious that the chargesheet in this case has been filed on 21.9.1984, approximately live months after the coming into force of the Tamil Nadu Essential Trade Articles (Regulation of Trade), Order, 1984. It is obvious that the chargesheet in this case has been filed on 21.9.1984, approximately live months after the coming into force of the Tamil Nadu Essential Trade Articles (Regulation of Trade), Order, 1984. To substantiate his contention, the learned counsel for the appellants has relied on Devaraja Naicker v. Inspector of Police, Food Cell (C.I.D.), 1978 L.W. (Crl.) 132, wherein Natarajan, J., as he then was, has held that the words “anything done or any action taken” referable to a. similar provision in the 1974 Order, can have reference only to proceedings already instituted before the 1968 Order in that case (1974 Order in this case) was repealed and can have no reference to proceedings instituted or charge sheets laid after that Order has been repealed. In respect of the 1974 Order, the learned Judge observed that it was undoubtedly neither a Central Act nor a Regulation, and it had been framed by virtue of the powers delegated to the State Government by the Central Government under the Essential Commodities Act. It is therefore, by the authority derived by it under Sec.3, and the notified order made by the Central Government under Sec.5, that the Government of Tamil Nadu has passed the relevant orders. Consequently, the General Clauses Act will not apply to the above said order passed by the Tamil Nadu Government. Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act was also considered in the said pronouncement and was concluded that the prosecution cannot rely upon Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act to validate the proceedings instituted against the appellants under the repealed Order. The aforementioned view taken by this Court squarely applies to the facts of the present case. The words “anything done or any action taken” occurring in Subclause (2) of Sec.31 of the 1984 Order can have reference only to proceedings already instituted before the 1974 Order was repealed and can have no reference to proceedings instituted or charge-sheet laid after that order had been repealed. The appellants are bound to succeed on this sole ground since the prosecution itself was not legally maintainable. 6. Thelearned Government Advocate brings to my notice another serious infirmity in this prosecution. The order of sanction marked as Ex.P1 does not indicate the application of mind by the sanctioning authority. It merely states a few facts facts and permits prosecution being initiated against the appellants and the third accused (A3). 6. Thelearned Government Advocate brings to my notice another serious infirmity in this prosecution. The order of sanction marked as Ex.P1 does not indicate the application of mind by the sanctioning authority. It merely states a few facts facts and permits prosecution being initiated against the appellants and the third accused (A3). The sanction must indicate application of the mind of the sanctioning authority who must be fully aware of the facts constituting the offence. The application of mind is so sacrosanct, for according a sanction to prosecute, is not a mere empty formality. Even on this ground of Ex.P1 not indicating application of mind by the sanctioning authority, the appellants will be entitled to an acquittal. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the appellants are acquitted and the fine, if any paid by them shall be refunded.