JUDGMENT : S.N. Phukan, J. 1. On 15.8.1976 in the morning deceased Hik Bahadur Chetri and his two grandsons, Rajbir Chetri and Jhana Bahadur Chetri, were going by the left side of the road, deceased Hik Bahadur on horseback and two grandsons on bicycles. At the relevant time deceased was aged 70 years and his two grandsons 14 years and 25 years respectively. The Bazar bus No. ASU 1621, it was alleged, was driven rashly and negligently and knocked down all the three persons. Hik Bahadur Chetri died on the spot and so also his horse and two grandsons were seriously injured and the bicycles were damaged due to the accident. Three claim petitions were filed before the learned Tribunal and by the common judgment and order the learned Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 12,000/- to the legal heirs of deceased Hik Bahadur as compensation and in addition also awarded a sum of Rs. 6,000/- for mental suffering. The learned Tribunal further awarded a sum of Rs. 8,500/- for the injuries sustained by Rajbir and Rs. 10,500/- for injuries sustained by Jhana Bahadur. A sum of Rs. 3,000/- was awarded for the death of the horse out of which a sum of Rs. 2,000/- was awarded against the insurance company. It may be stated that Rs. 8,500/- and Rs. 10,500/- awarded to the injured persons include the value of the bicycles damaged. Being aggrieved insurance company has filed the present three appeals and I propose to dispose of all the appeals by this common judgment and order. The claimants have also filed cross-objections under Order 41, Rule 22, CPC and this judgment would also cover the cross-objections. 2. I have heard Mr. Banerjee, learned counsel for the appellant and also Mr. Deka, learned counsel for the respondents. 3. Mr. Deka, learned counsel for the respondents, has urged that in view of Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short 'the Act'), the present appeal is not maintainable as the insurance company, the sole appellant, has challenged only the amount of compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal. On the other hand, Mr. 3. Mr. Deka, learned counsel for the respondents, has urged that in view of Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short 'the Act'), the present appeal is not maintainable as the insurance company, the sole appellant, has challenged only the amount of compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal. On the other hand, Mr. Banerjee has urged that as the owner of the vehicle after filing the written statement and after examination of four witnesses for the claimants did not participate further in the proceeding, the insurance company can challenge the award keeping in view the provisions of Sub-section (2-A) of Section 110-C of the Act. The said Sub-section runs as follows: (2-A) Where in the course of any inquiry, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that- (i) there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made, or (ii) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, it may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, direct that the insurer, who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made. 4. Mr. Deka has urged that for invoking Sub-section (2-A) of the said Section 110-C, the learned Tribunal must be satisfied that there is a collusion between the claimant and the owner and this fact must be recorded by the learned Tribunal and only then the insurance company can claim benefit of this Sub-section. There are two separate clauses in the said Sub-section (2-A) and such satisfaction of collusion arises only in respect of Clause (i). Clause (ii) provides for cases where the owner fails to contest the claim. Mr. Deka has read both the clauses together which is not acceptable. Considering the facts of the case Clause (ii) is applicable to the case in hand as the owner did not participate in the proceeding fully. I accept the contention of Mr. Banerjee that contest means actual contest and in other words the owner must contest the claim to the end. Considering the facts of the case Clause (ii) is applicable to the case in hand as the owner did not participate in the proceeding fully. I accept the contention of Mr. Banerjee that contest means actual contest and in other words the owner must contest the claim to the end. It is true that there is a failure on the part of the Tribunal to record its satisfaction and also allow the insurer to contest the suit. In my opinion this action of the learned Tribunal is clearly against the law and for that insurance company cannot be allowed to suffer. I further hold that even if there is a failure on the part of the learned Tribunal to record its satisfaction and allow the insurer to contest the proceeding this court in appeal can allow the insurer to take the benefit of the said Sub-section (2-A) if this court is satisfied that the requirements of the said Sub-section have been fulfilled. In this connection Mr. Banerjee has drawn my attention to the decision of the Kerala High Court in S. James Vincent Vs. K.A. George and Another, . I am in respectful agreement with the ratio laid down in the above case that non-recording of satisfaction by the Tribunal will not be a bar for the appellate court to give benefit of Sub-section (2-A) of Section 110-C if the appellate court is satisfied that the provisions of the said Sub-section are attracted to a case. Mr. Deka has also placed reliance on two decisions but these decisions are in respect of Clause (i) of Sub-section (2-A) and as such these are not relevant for the present purpose. Mr. Deka has also placed reliance on British India General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Capt. Itbar Singh 1958 65 ACJ but this decision is not relevant as Sub-section (2-A) was inserted in the year 1969. Situated thus, I am of the opinion that in the present appeal the insurance company can challenge the quantum of compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal and as such the appeal is maintainable. 5. According to Mr. Banerjee compensation awarded is not only excessive but not based on the evidence. Mr. Banerjee has urged that in respect of claims arising out of the Act expectancy of life is taken as 65 years and in some cases 70 years. 5. According to Mr. Banerjee compensation awarded is not only excessive but not based on the evidence. Mr. Banerjee has urged that in respect of claims arising out of the Act expectancy of life is taken as 65 years and in some cases 70 years. And as Hik Bahadur was aged 70 years claimant is not entitled to get any compensation. I find from the evidence that Hik Bahadur was a healthy person who was going on horseback and he was also an earning member of the family and used to contribute to the family at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month. The learned Tribunal awarded Rs. 12,000/- for his death, holding that he would have lived upto 75 years. Only because the person was aged 70 years, I am unable to accept submission of Mr. Banerjee that no compensation can be awarded for his death. Section 92-A of the Act which was inserted in the Act in 1982 provides that for the death of any person irrespective of his age an amount of Rs. 15,000/- as compensation is payable. Though this provision was inserted after the present accident, I am of the opinion that the principle laid down in the said section may be made applicable to the case in hand because this is a welfare legislation. As there is a cross-objection, I increase this amount of Rs. 12,000/- to Rs. 15,000/-. For the death of Hik Bahadur the learned Tribunal has awarded Rs. 6,000/- for mental suffering and I find nothing on record to substantiate this claim. I, therefore, hold that the claimant is not entitled to the sum of Rs. 6,000/-. For the death of the horse the Tribunal has awarded a total sum of Rs. 3,000/- of which Rs. 2,000/- is payable by the present appellant. In my opinion this compensation is just and fair. Mr. Banerjee has rightly pointed out that in absence of medical evidence the compensation awarded for the injuries of Rajbir and Jhana is excessive. From oral evidence I find that the above two persons sustained injuries and as such they are entitled to get some compensation. In awarding this amount I have to do some guesswork and in my opinion a sum of Rs. 5,000/- to Rajbir and Rs. 6,000/- to Jhana would meet ends of justice. 6. From oral evidence I find that the above two persons sustained injuries and as such they are entitled to get some compensation. In awarding this amount I have to do some guesswork and in my opinion a sum of Rs. 5,000/- to Rajbir and Rs. 6,000/- to Jhana would meet ends of justice. 6. In the result, I hold that for the death of Hik Bahadur the appellant is liable to pay a compensation of Rs. 15,000/- only, for injuries caused to Rajbir Rs. 5,000/- and to Jhana Rs. 6,000/-. These amounts would include the cost of two bicycles. Appellant shall also be liable to pay Rs. 2,000/- for the death of the horse. With the above modification of the awards the appeal is partly allowed. Cross-objection is also disposed of. No costs.