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1989 DIGILAW 235 (KER)

Vishnu & Co. v. Abdulkhadar Haji

1989-06-21

BALAKRISHNA MENON, RAMAKRISHNAN

body1989
Judgment :- Ramakrishnan, J. 1. The main dispute in the above appeal relates to the ownership of a Mercedez Benz air-conditioned motor car bearing Registration No.ORG 3277, which was later changed to MMD 2901. The deceased 1st respondent in the above appeal who was the plaintiff in the suit and whose legal representatives are respondents 9 to 19 wanted a declaration that he is the owner of the car and prayer for recovery of possession of the same. Defendants 5 and 6, the appellants in the appeal, denied the ownership of the plaintiff and contended that the car belonged to them as bona fide purchasers for value without notice of any defect in title. The trial court held that the plaintiff is the owner of the car and is entitled to recover the same. The contentions of defendants 5 and 6 were specifically found against. The appellants challenge the said findings of the trial court in this appeal. 2. Briefly stated the facts necessary for deciding the appeal as borne out by the pleadings in the case are thus: According to the plaintiff the 1st defendant was the registered owner of the Mercedez Benz car with registration No.ORG 3277 described in the plaint schedule (hereinafter referred to as the car). The plaintiff purchased the car from the 1st defendant entering into a written agreement dated 10-4-1974 with him. As per the agreement the price fixed was Rs.1,25,000/-. An amount of Rs.65,000/- was paid on 10-4-1974 itself. On payment of Rs.65,000/- the first defendant delivered the car with the registration certificate to the plaintiff which he accepted. The plaintiff was in possession of the car thereafter. The balance amount payable was agreed to be paid on or before 10-7-1974. It was further agreed that the transfer of registration will be effected only on payment of the balance amount in full. Ext.XI is said to be a signed true copy of the agreement dated 10-4-1974. The true copy of the agreement was marked as Ext.XI since the original was alleged to be irrecoverably lost. The balance amount was not paid in time. However, an amount of Rs.35,000/- was paid by the plaintiff to the 1st defendant on 30-8-1975 on which date a fresh agreement referring to the earlier agreement and purporting to be a renewal of the earlier one was entered into. Ext.X2 is the said agreement executed in a stamp paper. The balance amount was not paid in time. However, an amount of Rs.35,000/- was paid by the plaintiff to the 1st defendant on 30-8-1975 on which date a fresh agreement referring to the earlier agreement and purporting to be a renewal of the earlier one was entered into. Ext.X2 is the said agreement executed in a stamp paper. The terms of the said agreement were also more or less the same as that of Ext.XI. The receipt of Rs.35,000/- paid on 30-8-1975 was acknowledged by the 1st defendant in Ext.X2 agreement itself and the balance amount of Rs.25,000/- was agreed to be paid on or before 30-3-1976. The plaintiff alleged that the balance amount of Rs.35,000/- was also paid by adjustment of the amount due to the son of the plaintiff from the 1st defendant under Ext.X7, an agreement for sale of a plot of land entered in to between the plaintiffs son and the 1st defendant. Accordingly it was claimed that the plaintiff has become the absolute owner of the car and entitled to quite possession of the same. 3. It was further alleged that while the plaintiff was in prison as a detenu under COFEPOSA, his nephew, the second defendant, was keeping possession of the car and the registration certificate. The plaintiff on release from the jail came to know that the 2nd defendant had wrongfully and illegally removed the car to Bombay without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff and had entrusted it to the 3rd defendant for safe custody in his garage. But the 3rd defendant quite illegally forged necessary documents and got the registration transferred in his name on 17-11-1976/22-11-1976. Ext.B4 is the duplicate registration certificate of the car issued by the R.T.O. Bombay. The Registration No. of the car was also changed to MMD 2901. Later on 6-4-1977/ 7-4-1977 as per one and the same proceedings numbered as 327134/3272/29 two successive transfers of registration were effected, first in the name of the 4th defendant and second in the name of the 5th defendant. The plaintiff contended that the transfer of registration in the name of the 3rd defendant was one obtained on the basis of forged documents and is totally ineffective to convey any title to the 3rd defendant. The plaintiff contended that the transfer of registration in the name of the 3rd defendant was one obtained on the basis of forged documents and is totally ineffective to convey any title to the 3rd defendant. The successive subsequent transfers in the names of the 4th and 5th defendants seen to have been effected on one and the same day are also totally illegal and are part of a conspiracy hatched among the defendants to deprive the plaintiff of the ownership of the car in question. 4. It was further alleged in the plaint that on the basis of a criminal complaint filed by the 2nd defendant cases was registered as Crime No.219 of 1977 D. C. B. (C. I. D.), Bombay against defendants 3 and 4 and the search made by the police in the said case disclosed that the car was dismantled probably to prevent detection and that the main part was secreted in the garage of the 8th defendant. The plaint also refers to the various criminal proceedings initiated by the 1st defendant and the other parties to the suit relating to the car in question and the orders passed in those proceedings by various courts including this Court. The claim of the 1st defendant in the criminal proceedings C.C.209 of 1977 before the Additional First Class Magistrate, Tellicherry to the effect that the balance amount of Rs.25,000/- was not paid and as such he continues to be the owner of the car was totally denied by the plaintiff. It was contended that the plaintiff has become the absolute owner of the car on the basis of the sale in his favour effected by the 1st defendant and that he is entitled to get a decree for the recovery of possession of the car from the defendants. A claim for Rs.10,000/- towards damages for the losses suffered by him on account of the wrongful deprivation of the use of the car and expenses for replacing the damaged parts of the car was also made in the plaint. 5. The 1st defendant in his written statement specifically admitted the execution of Exts.X1 and X2 agreements, the payments of Rs.65,000/- and Rs.35,000/- made by the plaintiff towards purchase price of the car and the delivery of the car to the plaintiff with the registration certificate as was done by him in the criminal proceedings earlier in 1977. 5. The 1st defendant in his written statement specifically admitted the execution of Exts.X1 and X2 agreements, the payments of Rs.65,000/- and Rs.35,000/- made by the plaintiff towards purchase price of the car and the delivery of the car to the plaintiff with the registration certificate as was done by him in the criminal proceedings earlier in 1977. However, the payment of Rs.25,000/- by adjustment alleged by the plaintiff was denied and it was contended that the plaintiff committed breach of the agreement and the ownership of the car continued to vest to him. But it was also specifically stated in the written statement itself that he is making a claim only for the recovery of the balance amount since it is doubtful whether he can claim back the car itself invoking the penal clause in the agreement stipulating the return of the car on breach of the terms of the agreement. The allegation in the plaint regarding the fraudulent and illegal transfers effected in the name of defendants 3,4 and 5 were admitted by the 1st defendant also. It was specifically stated that he has not submitted any joint application for transfer of the registration in the name of the 3rd defendant and that his signatures in the application for transfer submitted to the R.T.O., Bombay must have been forged by the 3rd defendant. Subject to his claim for Rs.25,000/- the ownership of the plaintiff was specifically admitted by the 1st defendant. Accordingly the 1st defendant raised a counter claim in the written statement and paid necessary court fee also. 6. The 2nd defendant while denying the allegations in the plaint that he is also a party to the illegal removal of the car and the transfer of registrations effected in respect of the car contended that he has entrusted the car and the certificate of registration with the 3rd defendant only for safe custody and that the transfers of registration effected are all fraudulent and were effected without his knowledge and consent. According to him he was totally unaware of the alleged illegal actions of defendants 3 to 5 when they were perpetrated and when he came to know about such actions he filed a criminal complaint before the Bombay police who had registered a case against defendants 3 and 4 as C.C. 219 of 1977. According to him he was totally unaware of the alleged illegal actions of defendants 3 to 5 when they were perpetrated and when he came to know about such actions he filed a criminal complaint before the Bombay police who had registered a case against defendants 3 and 4 as C.C. 219 of 1977. He pleaded that he is totally innocent of all the illegal acts of defendants 3 onwards. 7. Defendants 4 to 6 filed separate written statements taking more or less the same contentions. First of all it was contended that the 1st defendant was having neither ownership nor possession of the car at any time. The plaintiffs ownership as well as right to possession of the car was also denied by them. The 4th defendant contended that he is a dealer in second hand cars and had purchased the car in question for valuable consideration after duly verifying the registration book and immediately on such purchase had contacted several prospective buyers including the 5th defendant firm M/s. Vishnu and Co. Byculla, Bombay (hereinafter referred to as the firm) of which the 6th defendant is a partner. The date on which the 4th defendant purchased the car was not mentioned in the written statement. The firm agreed to purchase the car in exchange for their car bearing registration No.MRJ 4708 and an additional payment of Rs.15,000/-. Thus the car was sold to the firm and the registration of the car was transferred in the name of the 5th defendant. The 4th defendant contended that the agreements stated to have been entered into between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant for the sale of the car are all collusive agreements created for the purpose of defeating his rights over the car and for harassing him. It was contended that he is a bonafide purchaser for value without notice of the title of the plaintiff. He sold the car to the 5th defendant after receiving full consideration. The 5th and 6th defendants also adopted the same contentions raised by the 4th defendant and contended that they are also bona fide purchasers for value and that they are not parties to any illegal actions as alleged by the plaintiff. They also denied the allegation that the car was dismantled purposely and important parts of the car were secreted in the garage of the 8th defendant. They also denied the allegation that the car was dismantled purposely and important parts of the car were secreted in the garage of the 8th defendant. They stated that the gear box of the car was damaged and the car required major repairs and it was only for the purpose of repairs that the car was entrusted with the 8th defendant. Defendants 8 and 9 filed written statements denying the plaint allegations and contending that they are necessary parties to the suit and that it was as entrusted by the 5th defendant that they came to be in custody of the car for repairs. 8. Defendants 3 and 7 remained ex pane. 9. The plaintiff filed a rejoinder traversing the contentions raised by the defendants. 10. The plaintiff produced certain documents and got Exts.X1 to X14 produced through third parties. Apart from producing documentary evidence the plaintiff examined ten witnesses including himself. P.Ws. 9 and 10 were examined to prove Exts.X9 to X13 which according to the plaintiff would show that the transfer of registration of the car in favour of the 3rd defendant was got effected on the basis of forged documents wherein the signature of the 1st defendant was forged. The other witnesses were examined to prove the identity of the 1st defendant as the original owner, the execution of the agreement, payment of the sale price, delivery of the car and the adjustment pleaded by the plaintiff. In defence the contesting defendants produced documentary evidence to prove payment of consideration for the purchase of the car by them and that they are bona fide purchasers. One of the partners of the 5th defendant-firm was also examined as the solitary witness D.W.1 on the side of the defendant. 11. The trial court on a detailed consideration of the entire oral and documentary evidence and the probabilities of the case found that L. T. Mohammed Kunhi shown in the registration certificate of the car is the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant was the registered owner of the car on 10-4-1974 the date of Ext.X1 agreement. 11. The trial court on a detailed consideration of the entire oral and documentary evidence and the probabilities of the case found that L. T. Mohammed Kunhi shown in the registration certificate of the car is the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant was the registered owner of the car on 10-4-1974 the date of Ext.X1 agreement. It also found that Ext.X1 and X2 are genuine agreements executed by the plaintiff and the 1st defendant and that the car in question was delivered by the 1st defendant to the plaintiff with the registration certificate on the date of execution of Ext.X1 itself and the ownership of the car had passed on to the plaintiff from the date of Ext. X1 agreement. The court found that the entire sale consideration was paid as pleaded by the plaintiff. The counter claim put forward by the 1st defendant was found to be not true and sustainable and as such liable to be dismissed. The transfer in the name of the 3rd defendant as seen from Ext.B4 was found to be not genuine. The 5th and 6th defendants were found to be not bona fide purchasers for value without notice. The claim for damages was also found against and disallowed. 12. On the basis of the above findings the suit was decreed declaring that the plaintiff is the rightful owner of the car MMD-2901 and that he is entitled to get possession of the said car from the defendants or any of them having custody of the car. 13. Defendants 5 and 6 have alone appealed against the decree passed by the trial court. They have challenged the decree in its entirety in the appeal. No appeal has been filed by the 1st defendant against the decree dismissing the counter claim for Rs.25,000/-. Thus between the 1st defendant and the plaintiff the finding that the entire sale price of the car stipulated in Exts. X1 and X2 agreements has been paid has become final. 14. The learned counsel for the appellants Shri. T. S. Venkiteswara Iyer has strenuously contended that the finding by the learned Sub Judge that the plaintiff has become the rightful owner of the car, entitled to its possession, is unsustainable in law. He has also strongly challenged the correctness of the finding that Exts. X1 and X2 are genuine agreements whereby the title to the car passed to the plaintiff. He has also strongly challenged the correctness of the finding that Exts. X1 and X2 are genuine agreements whereby the title to the car passed to the plaintiff. The finding that the plaintiff has paid the entire sale price agreed to be paid under Exts.X1 and X2 has also been strongly disputed by the learned counsel as totally unsustainable. The learned counsel has argued further that there is absolutely no justification to hold that the appellants are not bona fide purchasers for value without notice of any defect in title and that they are liable to surrender possession of the car in favour of the plaintiff. According to counsel the suit ought to have been dismissed finding that the plaintiff has failed to establish both title to and right to possession of the car in question. However, it has to be pointed out that the learned counsel for the appellants has not canvassed the correctness of the finding of the trial court that L. T. Mohammed Kunhi whose name is shown in Ext.B4 is the 1st defendant himself. We think quite rightly too. Adverting to a number of facts and circumstances brought out in evidence the lower court has come to a positive finding that L.T. Mohammed Kunhi whose name is shown in Ext.B4 is the 1st defendant himself. We do not find that there is any justification to challenge the correctness of the said finding and we hereby confirm the same. The effect of the said finding is that the 1st defendant was the true registered owner of the car atleast from 15-2-1974 onwards and both the plaintiff and defendants 3 onwards could, if at all, claim only a derivative title from him. (Paras 15 to 23 omitted being discussion of evidence) 24. It may be useful at this stage to refer briefly to the relevant provisions of the law and legal principles with reference to which the main point arising in the appeal, namely, the sustainability of the claim for a superior title put forward by a bona fide purchaser for value without notice as against the true owner; may have to be decided. Since the main dispute relates to the title to a car claimed by an alleged true owner against an alleged bona fide purchaser for value without notice, the provisions in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (Act III of 1930) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) should largely govern the matter. S.27 of the Act incorporates partially the general rule of English law that no one can transfer a better title to goods than he himself possesses. This rule is often expressed in terms of the latin maxim "Nemo dat quod non babet". S.27 is in the following terms: "Sale by person not the owner.- Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any other law for the time being in force, where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof and who does not sell them under the authority or with the consent of the owner the buyer, acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell; Provided that where a mercantile agent is, with the consent of the owner, in possession of the goods or of a document of title to the goods, any sale made by him, when acting in the ordinary course of business of a mercantile agent, shall be as valid as if he were expressly authorised by the owner of the goods to make the same. Provided that the buyer acts in the good faith and has not at the time of the contract of sale notice that the seller has no authority to sell." The principle underlying the Section is that prima facie the right of the legal owner should be protected unless he has done something to induce innocent purchasers or pledgees to believe that the immediate possessor of the goods is the true owner. Two exceptions to the strict general rule are provided in the above Section itself. Some others are contained in S.28 to 30 and 54 of the Act itself. S.27 itself makes the rule subject to other exceptions provided by other laws. By providing exceptions to the general rule which protects the true owner absolutely, the law had tried to make provision to protect cases where goods are sold by persons who are not really entitled to sell them. S.27 itself makes the rule subject to other exceptions provided by other laws. By providing exceptions to the general rule which protects the true owner absolutely, the law had tried to make provision to protect cases where goods are sold by persons who are not really entitled to sell them. This is an attempt to strike a balance between competing claims put forward by the true owners on the one hand and the bona fide purchaser on the other hand. This is required in the interest of trade and commerce. Thus, under the Indian Law, a purchaser from a seller who has no title or authority to sell the goods can get a valid title to goods only in case he establishes that he comes under one or the other exceptions provided by law as indicated above. The exception relevant for the purpose of this case is the first exception provided in S.27 itself. To bring the case within the first exception to S.27 a person has to establish that he is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of any defect in title and for that he has to prove that he had purchased the goods after proper enquiry into the right of the person in possession to make the sale. So, an honest purchase made carelessly without making proper enquiries cannot be said to have been made in good faith to convey good title capable of defeating the title of the true owner. Again a bona fide purchaser for value without notice should further show that the true owner is in the circumstances of the case "precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell". This exception is based on the principle of estoppel. Such an estoppel may arise either (I) by reason of a representation made by the true owner that the seller is the owner of the goods or (II) by negligence on the part of the true owner which enables the seller to create an appearance of ownership. Where negligence is relied upon as raising estoppel, it is necessary to show that the true owner owed the buyer a duty to be careful, that in breach of that duty the true owner was negligent and that this negligence was the proximate or real cause of the buyer being induced to part with the purchase price of the goods to the seller. Mere carelessness on the part of the owner to guard his goods does not however create an estoppel. Mere delivery by the true owner to another person of the possession of the goods or documents of title to goods does not estop him from asserting his title as against one who has purchased the goods from that person. A reference to a few passages from Benjamin's Sale of Goods, Second Edn. at pages 465 and 470 would show that these principles are well settled principles governing acquisition of title by estoppel: "Where the true owner of goods, by words or conduct, represents or permits it to be represented that another person is the owner of the goods, any sale of the goods by that person is as valid against the true owner as if the seller were actually the owner thereof, with respect to any one buying the goods in reliance on the representation. Although the representation may be by words or conduct, it must be clear and unequivocal. It is therefore well established that the mere parting with possession of goods is not conduct which estops the true owner from setting up his title. Parting with possession alone is not a representation of ownership, even if the person receiving the goods has the authority of the true owner to deliver them to third parties. If the rule were otherwise, any bailor would be estopped from denying his bailee's right to sell the goods, and there would be no necessity at all for the Factors Acts. There must be something more. The true owner must have so acted as to mislead the buyer into the belief that the seller was entitled to sell the goods" "The circumstances in which negligence on the part of the true owner can raise such an estoppel are narrowly circumscribed. There must be something more. The true owner must have so acted as to mislead the buyer into the belief that the seller was entitled to sell the goods" "The circumstances in which negligence on the part of the true owner can raise such an estoppel are narrowly circumscribed. It is necessary for the buyer to show, first that the true owner owed him a duty to be careful; secondly, that in breach of that duty the true owner was negligent; and, thirdly that this negligence was the proximate or real cause of the buyer being induced to part with the purchase price of the goods to the seller." That these are the principles applicable in cases where title is claimed by a bona fide purchaser for value without notice relying upon the principle of title by estoppel, can be seen from important decisions rendered by both English and Indian Courts. Thus in the decision reported in Central Newbury etc. Ltd. v. Unity Finance, (1956) 3 A11.E.R. 905 while dealing with a claim based on title by estoppel two of the three learned Judges Lord Justice Hodson and Morris Q. observed thus: "Hodson, L.J: by delivering the car registration book, as well as the car itself, to C the plaintiffs had not given him the means of appearing to be the owner or of having apparent authority to sell the car, since the registration book was not a document of title to the car, and since delivery of the car without more would not have amounted to giving C. apparent authority to sell it; and therefore the plaintiffs, who were the true owners of the car, were not estopped from denying the title of the third parties to sell the car to the first defendants, and were entitled to recover damages for its conversion. Per Morris, L.J.: it cannot be assumed that the person in possession of a car and its registration book is the owner of the car. The absence of a registration book when a car is being sold will naturally give rise to much inquiry. Per Morris, L.J.: it cannot be assumed that the person in possession of a car and its registration book is the owner of the car. The absence of a registration book when a car is being sold will naturally give rise to much inquiry. The existence of one in the hands of a seller does not remove all occasion for inquiry and does not prove legal ownership." Denning L.J. who dissented from the majority view upheld the claim of the bona fide purchase in a very forceful judgment in the following manner: "It is said, however, that the original owner owed no duty to the innocent purchaser. I do not agree. When the original owner handed over the car and log-book to a complete stranger, intending to part with the property in them, he ought to have foreseen the possibility that the stranger might try to dispose of them for his own benefit to someone or other. That is what does happen when you hand over goods to a stranger reserving no right to yourself. The original owner owed a duty to any person to whom the stranger might try to dispose of them. The case comes within the words of Lord Wright in Mercantile Bank of India Ltd. v. Central Bank of India Ltd. (4) (1938) 1 All E.R. at p.62): 'The duty may be, in the words of Blackburn, J., 'to the general public of whom the person is one' His identity may be ascertainable only by the event, in the sense that he had turned out to be the member of the general public actually reached and affected by the conduct, negligence, representation or ostensible authority". In the decision reported in Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. Twitchings (1977) A.C.890 it was again held by the House of Lords that in the case of motor vehicles, delivery to another of possession of the vehicle with the vehicle registration book (or registration certificates) does not constitute a representation that the bailee has authority to sell the vehicle. It is interesting to note that the said decision was also a majority decision and two of the law Lords dissented from the majority and upheld the claim of the bona fide purchaser. 25. In the decision reported in Rameshwar v. Tarasingh, AIR 1958 Raj. It is interesting to note that the said decision was also a majority decision and two of the law Lords dissented from the majority and upheld the claim of the bona fide purchaser. 25. In the decision reported in Rameshwar v. Tarasingh, AIR 1958 Raj. 269 a learned judge of the Rajasthan High Court rejected the claim of a bona fide purchaser applying the above principles and finding that the bona fide purchaser has failed to bring his case within any of the exceptions to the principles contained in S.27 of the Act. 26. Further it is necessary to refer to some of the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Act IV of 1939) and to understand the exact scope and effect of the registration of the vehicles under the said Act and the nature and implications of the certificate of registration issued under the Act. S.24(2) provides that the registering authority shall issue the owner of a motor vehicle registered by it in accordance with S.21 and 22 of the Motor Vehicles Act; a certificate of registration in the prescribed form. It has been further provided in S.31 of the said Act that whenever a transfer of ownership takes place the transferor as well as the transferee are bound to inform the registering authority of such transfer of ownership and on complying with the requirements of that Section the registering authority shall register the transfer reported to it. Provision is also made as to what should be done when the transfer is omitted to be reported by the transferor and transferee. Relevant portions of S.31 are in the following terms: "Transfer of ownership. Provision is also made as to what should be done when the transfer is omitted to be reported by the transferor and transferee. Relevant portions of S.31 are in the following terms: "Transfer of ownership. (1) Where the ownership of any motor vehicle registered under this Chapter is transferred, (a) the transfer-or shall (i) within fourteen days of the transfer, report the fact of transfer to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction the transfer is to be effected and shall simultaneously send a copy of the said report to the transferee; (ii) within forty-five days of the transfer, forward to the registering authority referred to in sub-clause (i) - (A) a no objection certificate obtained under S.29-A; (B) in a case where no such certificate has been obtained,- (I) a receipt obtained under sub-section (2) of S.29-A; or (II) a postal acknowledgment received by the transferor if he has sent an application in this behalf by registered post acknowledgment due to the registering authority referred to in S.29-A, together with a declaration that he has not received any communication from such authority refusing to grant such certificate or requiring him to comply with any direction subject to which such certificate may be granted; (b) the transferee shall, within thirty days of the transfer, report the transfer to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction he resides, and shall forward the certificate of registration to that registering authority together with the prescribed fee and a copy of the report received by him from the transferor in order that particulars of the transfer of ownership may be entered in the certificate of registration. (1-A) (1-B) (1-C) (2) A registering authority other than the original registering authority making any such entry shall communicate the transfer of ownership to the original registering authority." 27. From the above provisions it is evident that registering of the transfer of ownership is an act to be done by the statutory registering authority on the basis of the actual transfer of ownership already effected. It is only a record of the fact of change of ownership or title to a motor vehicle and cannot be equated to an act necessary for transfer of ownership or title. Under S.31 the statutory authority is bound to record what has been intimated to it and the authority has no option to refuse registration if the requirements of the Section are complied with. Under S.31 the statutory authority is bound to record what has been intimated to it and the authority has no option to refuse registration if the requirements of the Section are complied with. That this is the legal position can be seen from the decision reported in Santakumari v. R.T.O., Kozhikode, 1975 K.L.T. 580 wherein it has been observed as follows: "From this it is clear that once the transferee reports the fact of transfer within 30 days to the registering authority and certificate of registration is also submitted in order that particulars of the transfer of ownership may be entered in the certificate of registration together with the prescribed fee and a copy of the report received by him from the transferor, and the transferor also makes a report of the transfer to the registering authority, the registering authority has no option but to make the necessary entries in the registration certificate." The following observation in the decision reported in P.K. Panda v. Premalata Choudhury, AIR 1980 Orissa 102 is also worth noting in this connection: "There is no provision of law that the registration of a motor vehicle with the registering authority is a sine qua non for transfer of ownership or that transfer without registration would be void or ineffective. The provisions of S.22, 24 and 31 contemplate a completed transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle. The provisions of the Act regarding registration of vehicles have nothing to do with ownership. They only provide for regulation of the use of the motor vehicles in public places. The certificate of registration issued under S.24(2) of the Act is not a document of title, but it is a piece of evidence to show the owner of the vehicle who is liable to pay taxes and to perform duties and obligations under the Act " 28. In the light of the above legal principles we have to examine the sustainability of the claim of the 5th defendant for superior title as a bona fide purchaser for value. It is fairly clear from the evidence adduced by the contesting defendants and referred to earlier that on behalf of the 5th defendant no enquiry was made in to the title of either the 3rd or the 4th defendant before agreeing to buy the car. It is fairly clear from the evidence adduced by the contesting defendants and referred to earlier that on behalf of the 5th defendant no enquiry was made in to the title of either the 3rd or the 4th defendant before agreeing to buy the car. No attempt has been made to prove payment of consideration by defendants 3 and 4 in support of their alleged title. Defendants 3 and 4 have chosen not to enter the witness box and give evidence in support of their claim for title to the car. Defendants 5 and 6 have also not taken any steps to summon them to give evidence in support of their title or authority to sell the car with a view to sustain their title. Thus there is total absence of any material to prove that defendants 3 and 4 have paid any consideration for the purpose of acquiring ownership of the car. Their claim for title is solely based on the entries in Ext.B4 registration certificate of the car. 29. The defendants have in fact attempted only to prove that they have before agreeing to buy the car examined the registration certificate of the car and have purchased the car by paying valuable consideration. It is in evidence that they have also insisted upon registration of the car being transferred in the name of the 4th defendant before it is transferred in the name of the 5th defendant. This would indicate that on behalf of the 5th defendant they wanted to avoid somehow all enquiries into the title of the prior owners and wanted to finalise the sale and transfer of registration of the car with undue haste and hurry. Offer as well as the sale of the car is alleged to have taken place on 6-4-1977. Application for transfer was made on 6-4-1977. Registration in the name of the 4th and 5th defendants were effected on one and the same day namely on 7-4-1977 and that too as per one and the same proceedings. On 6-4-1977 when the car was offered for sale, the registration of the car stood in the name of the 3rd defendant. In that view it was only reasonable and proper for defendants 5 and 6 to have enquired about the title of at least the 3rd defendant. They deliberately refrained from making any enquiry. On 6-4-1977 when the car was offered for sale, the registration of the car stood in the name of the 3rd defendant. In that view it was only reasonable and proper for defendants 5 and 6 to have enquired about the title of at least the 3rd defendant. They deliberately refrained from making any enquiry. Their conduct in deliberately avoiding all enquiries into the title of the prior owners and insisting upon and intermediate transfer in the name of the 4th defendant, a car broker, when there was no difficulty in arranging for a direct transfer in the name of the 5th defendant is highly significant, when it is remembered that the plaintiff had adduced evidence to probabilise his case that the 3rd defendant had illegally managed to get a transfer of the registration of the car from the name of the 1st defendant to his name forging the signature of the 1st defendant and that immediately after the purchase by the 5th defendant, the car was taken to Poona and allowed to be kept there in a dismantled condition for a considerably long period. We are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case defendants 5 and 6 have not only failed to prove that they have made reasonable and proper enquiries in the matter, but have also acted in a manner which lacks bona fide. The trial court has come to a definite conclusion after an elaborate discussion of all the relevant facts and circumstances either admitted or proved in the case, that defendants 3 to 5 had joined together and got the registration transferred first in the name of the 4th defendant and then in the name of the 5th defendant in order to see that no claim is made in respect of the car by anybody else. The evidence adduced by defendants 5 and 6 to prove payment of consideration by the 5th defendant is also not satisfactory, at all. Exts.B12 and B13 are the ledgers produced by the defendants to prove payment of Rs.15,000/- over and above the payment alleged to have been effected by the transfer of their Mercedez Benz car MRJ 4708 valued at Rs.80,000/-. Exts.B12 and B13 are the ledgers produced by the defendants to prove payment of Rs.15,000/- over and above the payment alleged to have been effected by the transfer of their Mercedez Benz car MRJ 4708 valued at Rs.80,000/-. A number of reasons have been pointed out in the judgment of the lower court for not relying upon the said ledgers as genuine documents in proof of payment of consideration on behalf of the 5th defendant. The writer of the account has not been examined to prove the entries in the ledgers. It was pointed out that though the accounts of the 5th defendant-firm is liable to be audited, they were actually not audited. It was argued that a perusal of the ledgers Exts.B12 and B13 would show that they are accounts written up at a stretch and cannot be relied upon. Moreover no reliable evidence have been produced to show that title to the car MRJ 4708 alleged to have been transferred to the 4th defendant towards part of the consideration has passed to the 4th defendant. Ext.B14 communication received by the 5th defendant from A. R. T. O., Bombay cannot be relied upon safely to come to a definite conclusion that there has been a completed transfer of title to the car MRJ 4708 in favour of the 4th defendant by way of part payment of consideration from the 5th defendant. We are inclined, in the circumstances of the case, to agree with the finding of the lower court to the effect that the 5th defendant is not a bona fide purchaser of the car for value without notice of any defect in title. 30. In the light of the above finding it becomes really unnecessary to consider the further argument of the learned counsel for the appellants to the effect that the plaintiff is estopped from disputing the title of the 3rd and the 4th defendants and thus defeating the title alleged to have been acquired by the 5th defendant as an innocent purchaser. However, since the learned counsel has argued the said point also at length, we propose to consider the merits of the said contention also. However, since the learned counsel has argued the said point also at length, we propose to consider the merits of the said contention also. The learned counsel has argued that by allowing the 3rd and the 4th defendants to have possession of the car with its registration certificate, the true owner has allowed them to deal with the car as their own and induce innocent purchasers like the 5th defendant to buy it for valuable consideration. In the circumstances, it was contended that by his negligent or careless conduct the plaintiff is estopped from disputing the title of the 4th defendant to sell the car. As has already been indicated above, mere carelessness or negligence on the part of the true owner in allowing the car to be possessed by strangers along with its registration certificate may not be sufficient to create an estoppel against the true owner. This is because the plaintiff owed no duty to the 5th defendant to take care and as such mere carelessness in respect of his car, even if there was any, may not amount to breach of any duty to take care. In the absence of a duty to take care and its breach, the true owner will not be estopped from disputing the title of bona fide purchasers. There must be some further act on the part of the true owner which amounts to a representation by him of the seller's right to sell. There is no case for the contesting defendants in this case that the plaintiff or the 1st defendant had made any representation either by word of mouth or by conduct as a result of which the 5th defendant or any other defendant was induced to buy the car. In fact the evidence on the side of the plaintiff would show that defendants 3 onwards were keeping possession of the car and its registration certificate quite illegally without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff. In the circumstances, we find no merit in the above contention also. Thus we are in complete agreement with the finding of the lower court that the plaintiff has not lost his title to the car by estoppel and that he is entitled to get the reliefs of declaration and recovery of possession prayed for in the plaint with reference to the car which is the subject matter of the suit. Thus we are in complete agreement with the finding of the lower court that the plaintiff has not lost his title to the car by estoppel and that he is entitled to get the reliefs of declaration and recovery of possession prayed for in the plaint with reference to the car which is the subject matter of the suit. The appeal is thus without any merit and we dismiss the same with costs. There is a memorandum of cross objection filed by the plaintiff in the suit challenging the decree of the lower court to the extent the lower court has denied his costs in the suit. We find no merit in the cross objection also and that too is dismissed. Dismissed.