L. M. GHOSH, J. ( 1 ) ON the basis of a binapatra dated 5-12-65, executed by the defendant, the plaintiff filed a suit for Specific Performance of Contract against the defendant. It is not disputed that such a binapatra was executed. In defence, two points were urged : first that the transaction was a transaction of loan in substance and that the description of the property in the instrument was not sufficient to identify the property. ( 2 ) THE learned trial court decreed the suit holding that the insufficient of the description in the instrument. Ext. 1. was not enough for dismissal of the suit, when the property was capable of being identified. As regard the point of loan in substance the learned trial court just referred to t fact that the defendant claimed that he signed the document without knowing the contents which was not an acceptable story as he was a literate person. It may be noticed that the learned Munsif did not further process to examine whether in spite of his knowledge about the terms of the instalment, it could be construed as a loan in substance. ( 3 ) THE learned appellate court who heard the appeal preferred against the judgment and decree of the learned trial court upheld the judgment a decree of the learned trial court. Whether the insufficiency of the description was fatal to the suit or not was considered by the learned appellant court and the point was found in favour of the plaintiff. Unfortunate again there is no direct finding of the learned appellate court that the transaction was not loan in substance. However, the learned appellate Court has discussed the characteristics which can distinguish a loan in substance from a contract to sell outright. ( 4 ) THE defendant-appellant has come as before this court in second appeal 4a. Mr. Roy Chowdhury the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant has first referred to section 29 of the Contract Act. That provision enacts that an agreements, the meaning of which is not certain or capable being made certain are void. Undoubtedly that is the legal Position. If the meaning is not c1ear, Ext. 1, the agreement would fall through. But on a consideration of the document, I find that the property can very well be identified. Ext. That provision enacts that an agreements, the meaning of which is not certain or capable being made certain are void. Undoubtedly that is the legal Position. If the meaning is not c1ear, Ext. 1, the agreement would fall through. But on a consideration of the document, I find that the property can very well be identified. Ext. 1 gives the description of the suit property that the same relates to some structures and adjacent eastern shop rooms appertaining to No. 6, Gopal Nagar Road. From such description indeed the property was capable of being identified. The suit could not fail on the ground absence of more detailed description of the property, since, as observed by the learned courts below, there was no confusion in the mil of the parties as to what the subject-matter was. Neither there was a vagueness about the property, so as to make it incapable of identification. ( 5 ) THE other point agitated was that it was a loan in substance. As already noted, the treatment of the two courts below was not satisfactory. The learned trial court has not recorded any finding that it could not be a loan in substance. He has simply observed that the defendant could not be heard to say that he was not aware of the contents. He lost sight the fact that even if the defendant had failed there, the transaction still could be loan in substance, if there was proper material. That is to say, even if the defendant actually knew about the terms of the document, he was not debarred from showing the essential character of the transaction. The learned appellate court has also not recorded the direct finding but has made reference to certain tests for determining whether it could be a loan in substance. He has considered that the valuation could not be insufficient. Still there is no direct finding that it could not be a loan in substance. However, that by itself cannot be a ground for interference in second appeal, if there are no materials on the record for coming to the conclusion that it was a loan in substance. It has not been shown that the property was under valued; on the other hand, the Commissioner's report discloses about the nature of the building. No evidence as to the value of adjoining properties has been placed on the record. It has not been shown that the property was under valued; on the other hand, the Commissioner's report discloses about the nature of the building. No evidence as to the value of adjoining properties has been placed on the record. About stipulation of interest, D. W. 2 has merely stated that he took loan from Satish Babu, the father of the plaintiff. That does not take us anywhere. Then D. W. 3 has answered that the defendant paid interest to Satish Babu. But that evidence is not acceptable. He could not mention when the payment was made. He simply guessed that the payment was made about nine years ago. There was no occasion for making the payment in his presence. Such evidence is unworthy of credence. As against that, the evidence on the plaintiff's side is clear that the transaction was an agreement for sale outright. Even though there is no direct finding of the two courts below on the point, apparently there is an implied finding that the transaction was an agreement for sale. And, the materials on record suggest that indeed it could not be a loan transaction. In second appeal, interference is permissible only when there is a substantial question of law involved. There is no question of law, as there are sufficient materials on record for the conclusion. of the learned court below. ( 6 ) MR. Roy Chowdhury, the learned Advocate for the appellant, has referred to sections 20, 21 and 22 of the Specific Reliefs Act. No doubt under section 20 of the Specific Reliefs Act, it is discretionary for the appellant court to grant decree for specific performance. But that discretion is not arbitrary and guided by judicial principles. Under section 21 of the Act, the court can award compensation in certain cases. Section 22 of the Act is relating to relief for possession etc. I do not find that the plaintiff is debarred from getting any relief for specific performance of contract because of the provisions quoted before. There is no ground for not exercising the discretion. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Advocate for the respondent, has argued that the two points agitated in the court below having been found against the defendant, there cannot be any question of interference in second appeal. That indeed is the position. I find no ground for interference. The appeal fails. There is no ground for not exercising the discretion. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Advocate for the respondent, has argued that the two points agitated in the court below having been found against the defendant, there cannot be any question of interference in second appeal. That indeed is the position. I find no ground for interference. The appeal fails. It is dismissed on contest remake no order for costs. Appeal dismissed.