BALAKRISHNA. J, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a Writ Petition seeking the issue of a quo warrant against respondent-1 and fora direction for his discontinuance from the membership of the tumkur Zilla Parishad besides the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the membership of respondent-1 from Tumkur zilla Parishad. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is stated to be a resident of Amruthur, Kunigal Taluk, tumkur District. He claims to be evincing keen interest in the promotion of local self Government at the village level towards the realisation of Grama Swaraj in consonance with Gandhian school of thought. The petitioner claims to be a non-partisan in regard to political affiliations. According to the. petitioner, this is a public interest litigation. ( 3 ) THE allegation of the petitioner is that at the elections held on 2-1-1987, respondent-1 who contested for the membership of Tumkur Zilla Parishad suffered from a disqualification and this fact was not known to the petitioner among many persons. It is alleged that respondent-1 fraudulently suppressed the fact of disqualification and was elected as a member |n the words of the petitioner"the petitioner, per chance, came to know about very recently and soon he started verifying the facts. It transpired that the 1st respondent was connected with the local authority-The Village panchayat K Honnamachanahalli, Kunigal taluk-as a member and the President thereof during 1982, reportedly from 1979 or there about. It is reliably learnt that he had misappropriated public funds and he has removed from the membership and Presidentship by an order dated 22-5-1962 in VPC CR 33/81-82, passed by the jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner. It is learnt that the 1st respondent had appealed to the Divisional Commissioner in case No. VPC Appl. 13/82-83 and the said appeal was dismissed on or about 8-9-1982. A true copy of the said order (copy of the certified copy) is herewith produced as ANNEXURE 'c'. It is also learnt that he took the matter in revision before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal in Revision Petition No. 163/82 (Rev. 3) and that Revision also was dismissed on 4-10-1983, a true copy of the certified copy of the order is herewith produced as annexure D' The certified copy of the said Annexure was obtained in early march 1987, but the petitioner could not rush to this Hon'ble Court without making enquiry whether, per chance, there was any order in writ reversing those decisions. This became very difiicult in view of the difficulty involved in tracing document without any tangible clue, and there was summer vacation. The petitioner has not been able to get any information to the contrary. The petitioner bona fide believes that the 1st respondent's removal from the said local authority was final and not reversed". ( 4 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, the provisions of Section 154 (g) of the Karnataka zilla Parishads, Taluk Panchayat samithis, Mandal Panchayaths and Nyaya panchayaths Act, 1983, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') renders a candidate ineligible for contesting Zilla Parishad or mandal Panchayat elections if the candidate has been removed from membership of any local authority for a period of five years from the date of disqualification it is asserted that respondent-1 having suffered removal from membership was not eligible to contest in the elections. It is also contended that respondent-1 cannot continue as a member in view of the disqualification even though he has been elected. ( 5 ) THE case of the petitioner is that he could not file an election petition because of delay and respondent 1 should not be allowed to enjoy the benefit of deliberate suppression of fact. ( 6 ) THE point for consideration is whether a writ of quo warranto could be issued on the facts and in the circumstances of this case against respondent-1 directing his discontinuance from the membership of the Tumkur Zilla Parishad and for quashing of his membership. ( 7 ) ACCORDING to the learned Counsel for respondent-1, the petitioner is not entitled to the writ of quo warranto and the writ petition itself is not maintainable. The main objection to the maintainability of the writ petition is that having failed to avail himself of the special statutory remedy provided under Section 14 of the act, it is not open to the petitioner to approach this Court and invoke its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution It is contended that when the statute itself provides for an effective remedy of an election petition and the petitioner having failed to make use of the statutory remedy, the subject matter of dispute does not fall within the scope of public interest litigation. The other contention is that the disqualification, which is not disputed, which came into force on 22-5-1s82 expired on 21-5-1982 and, therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner continues to suffer from disqualification. ( 8 ) ON the other hand, it is vehemently contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that notwithstanding the expiry of the disqualification imposed on respondent-1, the fact remains that at the relevant point of time respondent-1 did suffer from disqualification which fact he had suppressed and successfully contested the election to become a member of the Tumkur Zilla Parishad and, therefore, respondent-1 cannot continue lawfully as a member of the Tumkur Zilla parishad. ( 9 ) THERE is no dispute about the fact that the petitioner is one of the voters of the constituency and, therefore, he is invested with a right to question the validity of the election of respondent-1. The Act is a special statute to provide for the constitution of Zilla Parishads, Taluk panchayat Samithis, Mandal Panchayats and Nyaya Panchayats and other matters connected therewith The scheme of the act provides for the establishment in rural areas of Zilla Parishads, Taluk Panchayat samithis, Mandal Panchayats and nyaya Panchayats to assign to them local government and judicial functions and to entrust the execution of certain works as well as development schemes of the state Five Year Plans to the Zilla parishads, Taluk Panchayat Samithis, mandal Panchayats and to provide for the decentralisation of powers and functions under certain enactments to those local bodies with the object of promoting the development of democratic institutions and to secure a greater measure of participation by the people in the said plans and in local and Governmental affairs for purposes connected with and incidental thereto. The Act received the assent of the President of India on the tenth day of July, 1985 and published in the Karnataka Gazette on 2 8-1985 The sole object of the Act is to promote representation democracy and participatory government. In short, it is a self- contained code emboding the manner in which the scheme of the Act is to be implemented providing adequate statutory remedies whenever there is any breach of law contained therein. In other words, both the rights and remedies are self- contained in the Act. In short, it is a self- contained code emboding the manner in which the scheme of the Act is to be implemented providing adequate statutory remedies whenever there is any breach of law contained therein. In other words, both the rights and remedies are self- contained in the Act. ( 10 ) SECTION 14 (1) of the Act provides :"no election to fill a seat or seats in a Mandal Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section (1) of section 18 and section 19 to the Munsiff within whose territorial jurisdiction the mandal concerned or the major portion of the mandal concerned is situate by any candidate at such election or by voter qualified to vote at such election together with a deposit of one hundred rupees as security for costs, within thirty days from, but not earlier than, the date of declaration of the result of the election of the returned candidate, or if there are more than one returned candidate at the election, and if the dates of declaration of the results of their election are different. the last of those dates. "this section deals with the right and remedy of any candidate at such election or by any voter qualified to vote at such election to call in question any election to fill a seat or seats in a Mandal Panchayat only by means of an election petition presented on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section (1) of section 18 and section 19 of the Act to the Munsiff invested with territorial jurisdiction. The person challenging the election has to file an election petition with a deposit of Rs. 100/- as security for costs within a time limit provided under Sec. 14 (1) of the Act. The time limit prescribed is 30 days from the date of declaration of the result of the election of the returned condidate and if there are more then one returned candidate at the election and if the dates of declaration of results of their election are different, the last of those dates. The time limit prescribed is 30 days from the date of declaration of the result of the election of the returned condidate and if there are more then one returned candidate at the election and if the dates of declaration of results of their election are different, the last of those dates. Under sub-section (2) (a) of Sec. 14 of the Act, it is provided that besides claiming a declaration that the election of all or any of the returned candidates is void, if the petitioner claims a further declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected, all the contesting candidates other than the petitioner, and where no such further declaration is claimed, all the returned candidates and (b) any other candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made in the petition shall be impleadedas respondents. In the explanation to Section 14, the expression "returned candidate'" means a candidate who has been declared as duly elected. Section 15 of the Act elaborately sets out the contents of the petition and relief that may be claimed. Section 16 of the Act provides for the trial of the election petition. Section 17 of the Act provides for the decision of the Munsiff whereas Section 18 enumerates the grounds for declaring election to be void and lastly sec. 19 contemplates the grounds on which a candidate other than the returned candidate may be declared to have been elected. ( 11 ) IT is also necessary to refer to the provision relating to disqualification of members. Sec. 155 of the Act describes the circumstances in which the seat of the returned candidate shall be deemed to be or to have become, as the case may be, vacant subject to the proviso contained therein. Sub-section (2) of Sec. 155 envisages that the State Government on a report made to it and after giving a reasonable opportunity to the person concerned of being heard shall declare whether the seat of the person concerned is or has become vacant. ( 12 ) SECTION 154 of the Act contemplates that a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as and for being member of a Zilla Parishad in the circumstances mentioned under the provisions of sec. 154 (1) (a) to (j) of the Act subject to the proviso contained therein. ( 12 ) SECTION 154 of the Act contemplates that a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as and for being member of a Zilla Parishad in the circumstances mentioned under the provisions of sec. 154 (1) (a) to (j) of the Act subject to the proviso contained therein. ( 13 ) AS far as Sec. 154 of the Act is concerned, the plain language of the section manifests the disqualification of the candidates prior to the election for being chosen as and for being a member of a Zilla Parishad whereas Section 155 of the Act refers to disqualification of a person who has already become a member of a Zilla Parishad. In other words, it referes to a "returned candidate" as defined under explanation-2 to Section 14 of the Act. ( 14 ) THE above provisions of law are so exhaustive and comprehensive that the object of the Legislature is made crystal clear that whenever a candidate or a voter intends to call in question the elec ion of a returned candidate, the j remedy lies only within the framework of the special statute which is the Act itself. ( 15 ) IT is difficult and not at all permissible to accept the view that there is any extra statutory remedy by means of a public interest litigation to challenge the validity of the election of a returned candidate. Even the remedy provided under Section 155 of the Act can be characterised as a self-contained remedy available to the aggrieved person within the framework of the Act. Whereas under Section 14 of the Act the statutory remedy is available against the election of a candidate based on the grounds specified in sub-section (1) of Section 18 and Section 19 of the Act before the concerned Munsiff, the remedy contemplated under Section 155 of the Act is the one available before the Government on a report made to it that a returned candidate is or becomes subject to any of the disqualifications specified in Section 154 of the Act or on the grounds mentioned in Section 155 (1) (b) to (d) of the Act subject to the proviso contained therein. Even after the report is received by the Government, the Government is under the statutory mandate to give a reasonable opportunity to the person concerned of being heard and then only proceed to declare whether the seat of the person concerned is or has become vacant. ( 16 ) ADMITTEDLY and undisputedly the petitioner has not availed himself of the remedy either under Section 14 or the remedy available under Section 155 of the Act by moving the Government. The explanation offered by the petitioner is that he could not file an election petition since the discovery of the disqualification was belated and was beyond the time limit prescribed under Section 14 of the Act. Assuming that the petitioner could not file the election petition under section 14 of the Act for the reason stated by him, there is not even a casual effort on the part of the petitioner to invoke the provisions of Section 155 of the Act. ( 17 ) IN the above circumstances, it is not possible to accept the contention of the petitioner that he could invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution by resorting to public interest litigation. In the circumstances and on the facts of the case, public interest litigation cannot be a substitute for the self-contained and statutory remedies available under the Act. In these circumstances, it is not necessary for me to go into the merits of the case and I hold that the writ petition is not maintainable. The petitioner is not entitled to either a writ of quo warranto or the writ of certiorari. ( 18 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision of the supreme Court in S P. Gupta and others v President of India and others, AIR 1982 SC 149 . in which it was held: ' We would, therefore, hold that any member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain an action fcr judicial redress for public injury arising from breach of public duty or from violation of some provision of the constitution or the law and seek enforcement of such public duty and observance of such constitutional or legal provision. This is absolutely essential for maintaining the rule of law, furthering the cause of justice and accelerating the pace of realisation of the constitutional objective "law", as pointed out by justice Krishna Iyer in Fertilizer corporation Kamgar Union v Union of India AIR 1981 SC 344 "is a social auditor and this audit function can be put into action when some one with real public inte'est ignites the jurisdiction. A fear is sometimes expressed that if we keep the door wide open for any member of the public to enter the portals of the Court to enforce public duty or to vindicate public interest, the court will be flooded with litigation. But this fear is totally unfounded end the argument based upon it is answered completely by the Australian Law reforms Commission in the following words :"the idle and whimsical plaintiff, a dilettante who litigates for a lark, is a spectre which haunts the legal literature, not the court room (Prof. K E. Scott: "standing in the Supreme court : A Functional Analysis" (1973) 86)". ( 19 ) THE petitioner certainly would have been justified in resorting to public interest litigation but for the adequate, effective and self-contained remedies which are available to him in an election dispute under the Act and which the petitioner as an enlightened voter has failed to avail Even assuming that the discovery of the disqualification by the petitioner was subsequent to the statutory period within which an election petition could be filed under the Act, it was still open to the petitioner to move the State government under Section 155 of the act ; but the petitioner has failed to do so. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, it may not be possible for the petitioner to take advantage of the ratio of the decision rendered in the aforesaid decision. I may also add that it is no justification for the petitioner to absolve himself of the responsibility to move the state Government under Section 155 of the Act merely because the State Government has rejected a complaint filed by another voter in this regard. The petitioner ought to have invoked the domestic jurisdiction under the Act. ( 20 ) HOWEVER, I do not agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for respondent-1 that the writ petiiion seeking a writ of quo warranto ought to be dismissed for laches. The petitioner ought to have invoked the domestic jurisdiction under the Act. ( 20 ) HOWEVER, I do not agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for respondent-1 that the writ petiiion seeking a writ of quo warranto ought to be dismissed for laches. Delay may not be a good ground for denying the relief sought because it is the very right to act in a responsible position that has been questioned. In Harishankar v. Sukhdeo, AIR 1954 all. 227 (FB), it was held :"if the appointment of on officer is illegal, every day he acts in that office, a fresh cause of auction arises ; there can, therefore, be no question of delay in presenting a petition for Quo Warranto in which his very right to act in such a responsible post has been questioned. "a point to be noticed is that though the 1st respondent was under a disqualification and was, therefore, not eligible or qualified to be elected at the date of the disputed election, on the date of the institution of the writ petition, he has become eligible being free from disqualification. In such a situation, it wouldbe futile to grant relief to the petitioner. In Sukhdeo v Mahadevananda, AIR 1971 AP 475, the Court was of the view that :"the writ would be futile e. g where though the respondent was not qualified to be elected at the date of the disputed election, has at the date of hearing of the petition becomes eligible, so that there was no bar to his reelection. "in a dispute which is undoubtedly electoral in nature, if the statute itself provides adequate remedy against the evil complained of in regard to the right of the respondent to continue in an office created by the statute itself, it would not be feasible to exercise the discretionary power under a writ of quo warranto ( 21 ) SINCE I have taken the view that the writ petition is not maintainable, it may not be necessary for me to refer to the various decisions cited by the learned counsel for respondent-1 in support of the election of respondent-1 as a member of the Tumkur Zilla Parishad. ( 22 ) IN the result, for the reasons stated above, this writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs on the facts and circumstances of this case. Writ petition dismissed. ( 22 ) IN the result, for the reasons stated above, this writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs on the facts and circumstances of this case. Writ petition dismissed. --- *** --- .