JUDGMENT Ram Nandan Prasad, J. - The prayer in this application is to quash the order dated 1.3.1984 whereby the learned Special Judge, Sitamarhi has taken cognizance of the offence under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') against the petitioners and ordered for issue of summons to them for appearance in court for standing trial. It has also been prayed that the entire criminal proceedings against the petitioners in that case (G.R. Case. No. 611/83 T.R. No. 27/84) be quashed. 2. Petitioner no.1 M/s Mithila Cycle Centre is a Partnership Firm having its place of business at the Main Road, in the town of Sitamarhi and petitioner no. 2 Suresh Kumar Hisaria is a partner of this firm. Petitioner no.3 Sajan Kumar Hisaria is the brother of petitioner no 2. Petitioner no. 4 Hansraj Agrawal is a resident of Janakpur Dham, Nepal and is said to be the proprietor of M/s Mahabir Cycle Stores situated there. The case was instituted on the basis of first information report lodged by one Jamuna Singh S. I. of Police (Food) Bhithamore Check-post, P.S. Sursand District Sitamarhi on 30.9.88 at 4 p.m. The first information report states that at about 12.15 p.m. the S.I. found one Thela on which cycle tyres and tubes and other accessories were loaded going along the Bhithajaleshwar Road and on questioning, the Thelawala Guttar Paswan told him that these articles had been brought from the shop of petitioner no.1 in Sitamarhi and after being unloaded from the same was being carried on Thela to the shop of petitioner no.4 at Janakpur Dham and the same belongs to him. Petitioner no. 4 was also going along with the Thela and he produced the Chalan (which the S.I. has found being a kachcha Chalan) issued by petitioner no.1 in favour of the purchaser petitioner no. 4. The first information report further states that since Hansraj Agrawal petitioner no.4 did not have any valid papers for the articles in question and since it was suspected that these articles were being taken for being sold in black-market, hence they were seized and the case was instituted for necessary action. The police after investigation submitted final form (Annexure-III) stating therein that it was a mistake of fact. The police after investigation submitted final form (Annexure-III) stating therein that it was a mistake of fact. The learned Special Judge was, however, of the opinion that an offence had been made out on the facts and accordingly he passed the impugned order. 3. It is not disputed that in respect of cycle and cycle parts, the only order applicable at the relevant time was the Bihar Essential Articles (Display of Prices and Stocks) Order, 1977, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Display Order'). It is also not disputed that the allegations in the present case relate to the application of Clause 4 (c) of the Display Order. The same may be quoted as under:- "4. Sale of articles - No dealer shall- (a) - - - (b) - - - (c) sell-any article or articles to any person without issuing a cash memo or a bill provided that the total value of such sale is above rupees ten or the value of one of the items included in it is above rupees five". According to the prosecution case, though petitioner no. 1 had sold the articles in question (details given in the seizure list Annexure-II) the same was not accompanied with a cash memo or a bill and as such there was violation of this clause giving rise to an offence under the Act. It has been admitted in the first information report (Annexure-I) itself that the goods which were carried on the Thela were accompanied by a Chalan. The original of this Chalan is on the record of the L. C. Case. This document termed as a Chalan contains the name and address of the dealer i.e. petitioner no. 1, name and address of the person to whom the goods were sold namely Mahabir Cycle Stores, Janakpur, Nepal and also the full particulars of the different items sold including the rate and quantity of each item and it also contains the signature with date of the seller. It has been urged on behalf of the petitioners that this document though termed the Chalan contains all the particulars which are required to be mentioned either in a cash memo or a bill and as such it should be deemed that by issuance of this document the seller had fully complied with the requirement of sub-clause (c) of Clause 4 of the Display Order. In this context it has been submitted that Sub-Clause (c) of Clause 4 no doubt mentions that the seller should issue a cash memo or a bill but the Display Order nowhere defines either a cash memo or a bill nor specifies the particulars which are required to be mentioned in the "Cash Memo" or a "Bill" to be issued under Sub-Clause (c) of Clause 4. It has, therefore, been urged that in the absence of any details mentioned in the Display Order, the particulars to be mentioned in the cash memo or a bill would be what is understood in common parlance and such details had in fact been mentioned in the document named the challan which was being carried by the purchaser along with the goods in question. It has been urged, and rightly in my opinion, that since no particulars of a "cash memo" or a "bill" have been prescribed in the Display Order, the seller is required to issue a document containing the particulars as would be necessary to be mentioned in a cash memo or a bill as understood according to the common business practice. In my opinion, the contention put forward on behalf of the petitioners is quite valid. The document (Annexure-II/A) though termed a "Challan" contains all the necessary particulars of a cash memo or a bill, and, therefore, satisfies the requirement of Clause 4 (c) of the Display Order. Merely because it has been termed as "Challan", it does not mean that the requirement of the Sub-Clause has not been fulfilled. The spirit of the statute, namely Sub-Clause (c) of Clause 4, is that the seller must while making the sale issue a document to the purchaser which would specify his own name and address and also contain certain necessary particulars regarding name of the article, the rate, the quantity sold with date, the amount paid and the name and particulars of the purchaser, whether such a document is given the name of "cash memo" or a "Challan" is not at all material, more so when there is no specific definition of "Cash Memo" or "Bill" in the Display Order. I am fortified in this view by a decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in 1985 Sales Tax Cases Volume 58 page 336 (Commissioner Sales Tax v Krishna Brick Field). I am fortified in this view by a decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in 1985 Sales Tax Cases Volume 58 page 336 (Commissioner Sales Tax v Krishna Brick Field). In that case Sub-Section (4) of Section 8 A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act was under consideration, this Sub-Section provides that a dealer who sells goods shall issue to the purchaser a cash memo or bill, as the case may be signed and dated by himself or by his servant, manager or agent. It was held in that case that the expression "Bill" will take within its ambit a credit memo or a challan. It may be noticed that in Sub-Section (4) of Section 8 A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act there is specific direction at least about particulars relating to signature and date. In Sub-Clause (c) of Clause 4 of Display Order I no particulars regarding the cash memo or a bill to be issued by the seller have been prescribed. However, this does not make any difference and what has to be seen is whether the particulars necessary to specify the goods sold, the price paid and the names and addresses of the seller and purchaser and date of sale have been given or not, and if this has been supplied in a written document then it is immaterial whether it is termed as "cash memo" or "bill" or a "challan". In my opinion, therefore, the "Challan" issued by petitioner no. 1 fully satisfies the requirement of the Display Order and as such it cannot be said that there was any violation of the Order in question. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that there are other legal infirmities in the prosecution case. The first is the lack of sanction. The proviso to Clause 6 of the Display Order reads as follows:- "Provided that no prosecution shall lie against a person for contravention of any of the provisions of this Order unless the same has been sanctioned by the District Magistrate or Special Officer In charge Rationing or Additional District Magistrate (Supply), Sub-divisional Magistrate within limits of their respective local jurisdiction". This proviso makes it clear that no prosecution shall lie against any person for contravention of any of the provisions of the Order unless the sanction has been obtained from the appropriate authority. Mrs. This proviso makes it clear that no prosecution shall lie against any person for contravention of any of the provisions of the Order unless the sanction has been obtained from the appropriate authority. Mrs. S.L. Jha the learned State Counsel accepted the position that sanction has not been given in the case so far but she argued with great emphasis that this will not make the prosecution invalid and that sanction can be obtained subsequently. I am unable to accept this contention. The wordings of the proviso make it clear that no prosecution shall lie unless the same has been sanctioned by the appropriate authority. The prosecution against a person in respect of an offence under the Act for alleged violation of the Display Order must be deemed to commence the moment the case is instituted and the investigation machinery comes into action. What take place subsequently, namely continuation of the investigation, submission of the final form, taking of cognizance and so on, is part of the process of prosecution against the person who is made to figure as the accused in the case. In my opinion, therefore, the proviso to clause 6 of the Display Order does not permit either initiation or continuation of the prosecution at any stage without the necessary sanction. The legal position is now well settled that the prosecution for an offence under the Essential Commodities Act cannot proceed and must be deemed to be bad in the absence of the necessary sanction as required by the statute reference in this connection may be made to the case reported in 1983 P.L.J.R. page 72 (Purammal v The State). It was held in that case that although there may be sanction for prosecution of a firm, the prosecution against the partners without sanction would be bad in law and liable to be quashed. Similar view has been taken by this Court in cases reported in 1988 P.L.J.R. p. 500 (D.B.) and 1988 P.L.J.R. p. 563. The words "no prosecution shall lie unless the same has been sanctioned" clearly indicate that obtaining of sanction is a precondition for launching of prosecution for violation of any provision of the Display Order. 5. Before I close the discussion on the point of sanction, I may refer to the case reported in A.I.R. 1966 Supreme Court p. 220 (Baidyanath v. The State of Madhya Pradesh). 5. Before I close the discussion on the point of sanction, I may refer to the case reported in A.I.R. 1966 Supreme Court p. 220 (Baidyanath v. The State of Madhya Pradesh). In that case the question of sanction as required under section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure was under consideration. The provision of section 197 is to the effect that no court shall take cognizance except with the previous sanction of the prescribed authority. So in respect of section 197, the action taken prior to cognizance may not get vitiated due to lack of sanction, but sanction is essential at the stage of cognizance and if not obtained at that time the proceedings get vitiated. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held in the aforesaid case that the sanction has to be taken before the cognizance and subsequent sanction will not cure the illegality. The wordings of the proviso to clause 6 of the Display Order are more stringent. "No prosecution shall lie" means no prosecution shall be initiated without obtaining the necessary sanction. In other words it should be obtained at the very beginning and only thereafter the prosecution ought to be initiated. That being the position, taking of subsequent sanction will be of no avail and will not cure the illegality. 6. The other legal infirmity pointed out by the petitioners in the present case is that the police had after due investigation, submitted final form "mistake of fact" and as such the court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance on the basis of its own satisfaction. In this connection, attention has been drawn to the wordings of section 11 of the Essential Commodities Act. Section 11 is as follow : "Cognizance of offences:- No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act except on a report in writing of the facts constituting such offence made by a person who is a public servant as defined in section 21 of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860.)" It has been urged that a final report submitted by the police stating therein that no offence is made out cannot be construed as "a report of the facts constituting such offence". The argument is that the report in question must disclose that some offence has been committed and only then the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance; if the report does not indicate that any offence has been committed then the question of cognizance does not arise. In support of this the learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on a Division Bench decision of tills Court reported in 1968 P.L.J.R. p. 36 (Ratan Lal Sultania v. The State). In that case report for prosecution of tae accused had been made by the Supply Inspector and this was sent to the police for investigation. The police after completing investigation submitted a final report stating therein that there was no prima-facie case against the accused. Their Lordships considered the question whether on the basis of such a report the Sub divisional Magistrate was justified in taking cognizance, and relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1966 S.C. p. 928 held that he was not competent to do so. The relevant passage may be quoted as under:- "The point is now well settled that unless there is a report by a public servant who is satisfied that there is a prima facie case of contravention of any of the rules or orders issued under the Essential Commodities Act, no Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence and the prosecution cannot be launched in such a situation. The Sub-divisional Officer had no power to summon the accused person for trial after taking cognizance, as appears to have been done. The Sub-divisional Officer appears to have proceeded under Section 190 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is not applicable to a prosecution under the Act, because it is governed by the special procedure provided in Section 11". In the case of Kali Singh and others v. The State, 1978 Cr. Law Journal page 1575 (which was decided by a Special Bench) their Lordships made observations which support the view taken in the aforesaid Division Bench case. The point for consideration before the Special Bench was whether the Magistrate could on his own assessment proceed to take cognizance in the case even though the police had submitted a final report. Law Journal page 1575 (which was decided by a Special Bench) their Lordships made observations which support the view taken in the aforesaid Division Bench case. The point for consideration before the Special Bench was whether the Magistrate could on his own assessment proceed to take cognizance in the case even though the police had submitted a final report. Their Lordships expressed the view that even when the police submitted a final report section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gave full powers to the Magistrate to consider the case diary and the facts himself and then decide whether he may accept the final report or take cognizance in the case but this could not be done in cases where the Statute provides that a Court shall not take cognizance for an offence except on a report in writing of the facts constituting an offence, as provided under Section 11 of the Essential Commodities Act. The same view has been reiterated by this Court in other cases. Reference in this regard may be made to 1980 B.L.J.R. page 61 (Sudarsan Sharma v The State of Bihar). 7. In view of the discussion above it is clear that the prosecution against the petitioners is not only lacking in substance but also suffers from illegal infirmity as pointed out above, in the result, the impugned order is set aside and the entire criminal proceedings against the petitioners is hereby quashed. The application thus stands allowed.