In this second appeal by the impugned judgment learned lower appellate Court reversed the judgment of the learned trial Court and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 2. Appellant as plaintiff filed the suit against the sole defendant for a decree for a sum of Rs, 6,000/-and odd as arrears rent from 1st August, 1966 to July, 1969. The arrears of the rent for the earlier period of 1 year and 5 months were not claimed as it was barred by limitation. According to the plaintiff, the defendant was inducted as a tenant from 1st December, 1957 at a monthly rent of Rs. 170/-. There is no dispute that the suit premises is being issued as a cloth shop under the name and style as "Minerva Store". The suit was resisted by the sole defendant mainly on the ground that she did not take the suit premises on rent from the plaintiff. According to the defendant her husband, Kedarmal Agarwalla was the tenant of the said shop. It has been stated that the said Kedarmal has also purchased the land on which the suit house is situated and he has filed a title suit against the present plaintiff which is pending. It has been denied that the suit house belongs to the plaintiff. Defendant has also stated in the written statement that she is pardanashin 'Marowary' lady dependant on her husband and she has no business by the name Minerva Stores. The learned trial Court decreed the suit on the ground that defendant took settlement of the suit premises from the plaintiff. However learned lower appellate Court held that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties herein. 3. The present appeal was field on 30. 12. 81 and it was admitted on 3. 5. 82. On 15. 3. 84 an application under Order 41 Rule 23 read with Order 13 Rule 10 and section 151, CPC was filed in this appeal praying for calling for the record of Misc. Appeal No. 12 of 1972 from the Court of learned District Judge, Kamrup. Though petition was registered as Misc. Case No. 21/84 in connection with the present Second Appeal, earlier to that, on perusal of the order dated 5. 3.84 passed in the main Second Appeal I find that an application for taking additional evidence was filed by the appellant before this Court. Though petition was registered as Misc. Case No. 21/84 in connection with the present Second Appeal, earlier to that, on perusal of the order dated 5. 3.84 passed in the main Second Appeal I find that an application for taking additional evidence was filed by the appellant before this Court. Both the matters were disposed of by order dated 11. 7.84 passed in the above Misc. Case and this Court directed calling for the records as prayed for and further directed that the question of additional evidence would be considered at the time of final hearing. The record is before this Court and learned counsel for both the parties have advanced arguments both on merit of the appeal as well as allowing appellant a chance to give additional evidence by remanding this appeal to the learned lower appellate Court. Before I consider the prayer for taking additional evidence let me consider the merit of this appeal. 4. The main contention of Mr. Sarma, learned counsel for the appellant i$ that there is clear admission by the husband of the respondent and it has been overlooked by the learned lower appellate Court. In this connection Mr. Sarma has drawn my attention to Exhibits 5 and 7. On the top of that Mr. Sarma has further urged that in the memo of Misc. Appeal No. 12 of 1972 records of which has been called for, there is also clear admission by the husband of the respondent that in respect of the suit house present respondent was a tenant. According to Mr, Sarma admission being the best evidence the learned lower appellate Court ought to have decreed the suit relying on Exhibits 5 and 7. Mr. Sarma further urged that in the interest of justice additional evidence may be allowed to be adduced to prove the admission on behalf of the present respondent made in the memo of the said Misc. Appeal. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the respondent does not dispute the fact that admission is the best evidence. The learned counsel has, however, urged that taking the entire evidence on record there is no admission in the case in hand. According to Mr. Bhattacharjee admission by the husband in other proceedings will not come under the provision of section 18 of the Evidence Act and can not bind the present respondent. Mr. The learned counsel has, however, urged that taking the entire evidence on record there is no admission in the case in hand. According to Mr. Bhattacharjee admission by the husband in other proceedings will not come under the provision of section 18 of the Evidence Act and can not bind the present respondent. Mr. Bhattacharjee has further urged that at this late stage the question of allowing the present appellant to adduce further evidence is not legally tenable, 5. Relying on section 18 of the Evidence Act Mr. Sarma has urged that Exhibits 5 and 7 ought to have been accepted by the learned Court below for arriving at the decision that respondent was a tenant under the appellant. Exhibit 5 is the evidence of the husband of the respondent in Title Suit No, 159 of 1966. This statement was recorded on 22,5.69. Exhibit 7 is also the evidence of the husband of the respondent recorded in Title Suit No. 159 of 1966 and it was recorded on 2. 3 74. There is no dispute on the bar that in both the above suits the present respondent was not a party. 6. The first part of section 18, of the Evidence Act which is relevant for the present purpose runs as follows :- "Statements made by a party to the proceeding, or by an agent to any such party, whom the Court regards under the cir­cumstances of the case, as expressly or impliedly authorised by him to make them, are admission”. Question is whether Exhibits 5 and 7 can be deemed to be admission made by the present respondent and whether her husband was expressly or impliedly authorised to make the above statements. I may however note relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Union of India vs. Mokesh Builders and Financers Limited, AIR 1977 SC 409 , that admission by a party is substantive evidence of the fact admitted, and admission duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party mating them appeared in the witness box or not and whether that party when appearing as witness was confronted with those statement in case it made a statements contrary to those admissions. 7. As stated earlier in the above two suits where the husband of the respondent gave evidence on oath the present respondent was not a party. 7. As stated earlier in the above two suits where the husband of the respondent gave evidence on oath the present respondent was not a party. I am not aware under what circumstances such evidence was given. Before accepting such evidence as admission, it must be shown that the person making the statement was an agent, whether expressly or impliedly authorised. Mr. Sarma has drawn my attention to some of the petition etc. filed in the present suit by the husband of the respondent and has urged that he was an agent of the present respondent. I am unable to accept the contention of Mr, Sarma inasmuch as merely because the husband took some steps in this case it can not be held that it he was authorised expressly or impliedly to make the statement in Exhibits 5 and 7. In the other two suits as the present respondent was riot a party and in absence of any authority by the respondent on record, I am unable to accept that statements in Exhibits 5 and 7 made by the husband of the present respondent as admission of the respondent binding on her for the case in hand. That apart, I have also perused Exhibits 5 and 7 and I find that in Exhibits 5 in cross-examination the husband of the present respondent has specifically denied the suggestion that the present respondent took the suit premises on rent from the appellant. In view of the above position I hold that for the purpose of finding out the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties herein reliance can not be placed on Exhibits 5 and 7. 8. Drawing my attention to the impugned judgment Mr. Sarma has urged that the learned lower appellate Court erred in law in rejecting the entries in the books of accounts maintained by the appellant only on the ground that the writer of these entries was not examined. Entries in books of account regularly kept in course of business are relevant 'but such statement shall not alone the sufficient evidence to courage any person with liability as laid down in section 34 of the Evidence Act. Entries in books of account regularly kept in course of business are relevant 'but such statement shall not alone the sufficient evidence to courage any person with liability as laid down in section 34 of the Evidence Act. In Ram Janaki Devi vs. M/s Juggilal Kamlapat, AIR 1971 SC 2551 , it was held that books of account must be held to have been proved even in absence of its writer on proof of its proper maintaining and keeping and of impossibility of arranging presence of its writer. I have perused the impugned judgment and I find that the entries were rejecting not solely on the ground that the writer was not examined. The learned Court below while rejected these entries took into consideration other factors as well. I do not find any illegality in the judgment of the learned lower appellate Court in rejecting these entries. Sitting in Second Appeal it is not necessary for this Court to re-appreciate this piece of evidence. 9. Mr. Sarma has urged that the learned Court below placed wrongly the onus of proof on the appellant. Mr. Bhattacharjee has urged that the burden of proof was on the appellant as plaintiff can succeed only if he can prove the relationship of landlord and tenant. Mr. Bhattacharjse has placed reliance in Raghavamma vs. Chenchamraa, AIR 1964 SC 136 . lathis case the Apex Court held that there is an essential distinction between the burden of proof and onus of proof; Burden of proof liss upon the person who has to prove a fact and it never shifts, but the onus of proof shifts. It was further held that such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. In the case in hand as the plaintiff has claimed the amount on the ground that defendant was a tenant the burden is on the plaintiff to prove this fact. I, therefore, do not find any substance in the contention of Mr. Sarma. 10. Mr. Bhattacharjee has urged that the question of relationship of landlord and tenant being a question of fact the finding of the learned lower Court is binding on this Court in Second Appeal. In this connection the decision of the Apex Court in Singh vs. Tholu, AIR 1963 SC 361 has been placed before this Court. Sarma. 10. Mr. Bhattacharjee has urged that the question of relationship of landlord and tenant being a question of fact the finding of the learned lower Court is binding on this Court in Second Appeal. In this connection the decision of the Apex Court in Singh vs. Tholu, AIR 1963 SC 361 has been placed before this Court. It was held by their Lordships that in an a ejectment suit the finding whether a person was a tenant is a finding of fact and can not set aside in Second Appeal by the High Court. However this Court can definitely interfere, in view of the settled law, even in Second Appeal such a finding of fact if it is perverse, based on no evidence or in-admissible evidence or misconstruction of documents etc. In the case in hand I do not find any material to interfere with the finding of learned lower Court. 11. Regarding remand of the case for taking additional evidence Mr. Sarma has urged that in memo of appeal in Misc. Appeal No. 12 of 1972 there is a clear admission by the respondent that she was a tenant under the plaintiff. I have parused the case record and I find that neither the respondent nor her agent executed any power of attorney in favour of the learned counsel who filed the appeal. Mr. Sarma has placed reliance in Rajunder Naraian Rao vs. Bijai Govind Singh, Moores Indian Appeals, Vol. II (1837 -41) page 253 wherein it was held that admission and consent of a Vakeel made with due authority, will bind his client though not present at the time of making it. In Raja Prithwi Chand vs. Sukhraj Rai, AIR 1940 Federal Court 25 it was also held that when coun­sel take on themselves the responsibility of making statement of fact to the Court, the Court is entitled to assume that those statements are true in every particular, so that it may implicitly rely upon them and this is a rule which admits of no qualification. On the above legal proposition there cannot be any dispute. Now the only question is at this stage whether a remand can be ordered. 12. On the above legal proposition there cannot be any dispute. Now the only question is at this stage whether a remand can be ordered. 12. Relying under decision of the Apex Court in Venkataramiah vs. Seetharam Reddy, AIR 1963 SC, 1526 a Division Bench of this Court in Braja Behari Roy vs. Chitta Raojao Chakraborty, AIR 1968, Assam and N a gal and 19 this Court considered the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 and Order 42 Rule 1 CPC and held that the appellate Court has power to allow additional evidence not only if it is required to enable it to pronounce judgment but also for any other substantial cause. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs. Lala Pancham, AIR 1965 SC 1008 the above question was considered and the Apex Court held that the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 does not enable the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pro­nounce judgment in a case and it does not entitle the appellate Court to let fresh evidence only for the purpose of ^pronouncing judgment in a particular way and it is for purpose of removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence, 13. Situated thus, under Order 41 Rule 27 the appellate Court may allow production of any document for examination or any witness to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause but in so doing it can not allow any party such- an opport­unity for pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In the case in hand I also find no lacuna. That apart in Misc. Appeal No. 12 of 1972 the present appellant was a party and the said appeal was filed before the present appeal was disposed of by the learned lower appellate Court. Even before this Court the application for additional evidence was filed after two years. So I am of opinion that the appellant is trying to bring in fresh evidence to pronounce judgment in his favour in this case which is not permissible in view of the above law. Even before this Court the application for additional evidence was filed after two years. So I am of opinion that the appellant is trying to bring in fresh evidence to pronounce judgment in his favour in this case which is not permissible in view of the above law. I may refer to, a decision of this Court in Bhanbhass Seikh vs. Union of India, ALR 1970 Assam & Nagaland, 206 in which while rejecting the prayer for additional e vide ace the Court also took into consideration the delay of two years for making such a prayer. I am, therefore, unable to accept the prayer of the appellant to allow additional evidence. I have also perused the said memo of appeal and I am of the opinion that there is no such clear admission regarding the present tenancy. That apart, in view of other evidence of the record this piece of evidence, even if allowed, will not enable the appellant to get a decree. 14. For the reasons stated above find no merit in the present appeal and as such it is liable to be dismissed. In the result appeal is dismissed. No costs.