JUDGMENT S. D. Agarwala, J 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel. 2. The petitioner was working as a Draftsman and posted in Alak Nanda Soil Conservation Department, Forest. Division, Gopeshwar, District Chamoli. By an order dated 3rd February, 1987 passed by the Divisional Forest Officer, who is equivalent to the rank of Assistant Conservator of Forest, the petitioner was suspended. The petitioner has, now, challenged the order dated 3rd February, 1987 by means of the present petition on the ground that the Divisional Forest Officer/Assistant Conservator of Forest had no jurisdiction to suspend the petitioner. 3. The services of the Draftsman in the Department of Forest are governed by the U. P. Forest Department Draftsman Service Rules, 1980. Rule 25 of these Rules specifically provides that in regard to the matters not specifically covered by these rules or by special orders persons appointed to the service shall be governed by the rules, regulations and orders applicable generally to Government servants serving in connection with the affairs of the State. 4. It is not disputed that the rules do not provide as to which is the authority empowered to suspend the Draftsman. In the circumstances, we have to fall back on Rule 49 A of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, which are applicable to the Government servant in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Rule 49-A of the above mentioned Rules provide that the Government servant against whose conduct an enquiry is contemplated or is proceeding may be placed under suspension pending the conclusion of enquiry in the discretion of the appointing authority. Proviso to this Rule specifically lays down that the Governor by general or special order in this behalf, can empower to a certain authority to place a Government servant under suspension. 5. A counter affidavit has been filed in this case. Annexure CA-2 to the counter-affidavit is the order passed by the Government dated 31st October, 1983, which specifically empowers the Deputy Conservator of Forest to pass an order of suspension under Rule 49-A (1) of the above mentioned Rules. In view of the specific authorisation, it is clear that it is only the Deputy Conservator of Forest who could have passed the order of suspension. 6. In the instant case, the order of suspension has been passed by the Assistant Conservator of Forest. In view of the specific authorisation, it is clear that it is only the Deputy Conservator of Forest who could have passed the order of suspension. 6. In the instant case, the order of suspension has been passed by the Assistant Conservator of Forest. In the circumstances, the order of suspension passed by the Assistant Conservator of Forest is wholly without jurisdiction. Learned Standing Counsel has, however, urged in view of Annexure CA-3 attached to the counter affidavit, the Conservator of Forest had authorised the Assistant Conservator of Forest to pass the suspension order. He has further urged that since there is no prohibition under the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1980 depriving the power of the Conservator of Forest to authorise any other authority to suspend the Draftsman, consequently, in view of Annexure CA-3, the Assistant Conservator of Forest was fully authorised to pass the suspension order. In our opinion, this argument is wholly fallacious. 7. Rule 49-A which is applicable to the Draftsman in the service of the Forest Department specifically provides that the Governor by a general or special order may empower an authority to place a Government servant under suspension. Since there is a specific provision that the Governor has to empower an authority to place a Government servant under suspension, there is a implied prohibition in this RULE itself that a Government servant can only be suspended by an authority empowered under RULE 49-A and not by any other authority. This also implies that the appointing authority cannot delegate its power of suspension to any other authority which goes contrary to the order passed by the Governor empowering any other authority to suspend a Government servant. In the circumstances, Conservator of Forest had no jurisdiction whatsoever to authorise any other person to pass the suspension order which goes contrary to the Government Order under RULE 49-A. We are, consequently, of the opinion that the argument raised by the learned Standing Counsel does not have substance. 8. Learned Standing Counsel has also placed reliance on the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. These provisions are not applicable to the case of suspension of an employee and as such, in our opinion, this argument is also fallacious. 12. Learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the two decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 8. Learned Standing Counsel has also placed reliance on the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. These provisions are not applicable to the case of suspension of an employee and as such, in our opinion, this argument is also fallacious. 12. Learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the two decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. These are State of Orissa v. Ram Prasad, AIR 1985 SC 701 and Mohd. Ghouse v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 246 . 13. In the case of State of Orissa v. Ram Prasad (supra) Rule 12 of the Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962 itself provided that the appointing authority or any other authority to which it is subordinate or any other authority empowered by the Governor or the appointing authority in that behalf may place a Government servant under suspension. It is because of this specific Rule 12 of the above mentioned Rules that the Hon'ble Supreme Court took the view that a person subordinate to the appointing authority could suspend. 14. In the case of Mohd. Ghouse (supra) also the decision is based on a specific Rule 13 of the Madras Civil Services (Classi6cation, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962. Both these cases, in our opinion, are distinguishable and are not applicable to the facts of the present case. In none of the authorities it has been held that the suspension order can be passed by an authority who is not authorised to do so. 15. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the impugned order which has been passed is by an authority who did not have the power to pass the same. 16. In the result, the petition is allowed. The order of suspension dated 3rd February, 1987 is, hereby, quashed. Petition allowed.