ORDER T.N. Singh.J 1. Dedicated to the hallowed memory of the legendary heroine of the First War of Independence, Maharani Laxmibai, is the National College of Physical Education at Gwalior, popularly called LNCPE. Established by the Union Ministry of Education and Culture., its management currently vests in the Sports Authority of India, successor to the erswthile Society for the National Institute of Physical Education and Sports, shortly, SNIPES. 2. From what has come on record, it is established that the petitioner was working as Resident Audit Officer at the Bhilai Steel Plant in the year 1985 when he appeared at an interview held on 14th April 1985 for the post of Administrative Officer at LNCPE, Gwalior. From Annexure R/1 it is disclosed that he was selected and was offered appointment in the said post, said to be a "permanent post", on the following, among other, terms and conditions: "4. You will be on probation for a period of two years from the date of your joining and during which period your services can be terminated at any time by one month's notice on either side, namely the appointee or the appointing authority, without assigning any reason. The appointing authority, however, reserves the right of terminating the services of the appointee without notice during the probationary period forthwith or before the expiry of stipulated period of notice by making payment of a sum equivalent to the pay for the period of notice or unexpired portion thereof. 6. You will be governed by such rules and regulations as may be framed by the Board of Governors of 'SNIPES' from time to time with regard to the increments, leave, medical facilities, gratuity, provident fund, pension and other general conditions of service". In the Return, a reference is made to Annexure R/1, but also to Rule 2, Sub-rule (ii) of the Service Rules, the portion whereof, extracted in the return, is quoted below : "(ii) Where a person appointed to a post in the National Institute on probation and during his period of prooation is found not suitable for holding that post or has not completed his period of probation satisfactorily the appointing authority may (a)..... (b) in the case of a person appointed by direct recruitment, terminate the services under the National Institute by giving one month's notice or salary in lieu thereof without assigning any reason for such termination." 3. (b) in the case of a person appointed by direct recruitment, terminate the services under the National Institute by giving one month's notice or salary in lieu thereof without assigning any reason for such termination." 3. Admittedly, the petitioner assumed charge of the post on 2nd August 1985 and it is not disputed that this he did after taking voluntary retirement from the post he earlier held in the Bhilai Steel Plant. However, within less than two years his services were terminated by an order dated 24th April 1987 (Annexure P/3), signed by Dean of the College "for and under orders of the Governing Body, Sports Authority of India". We extract the text thereof in exienso: "In pursuance of para 4 of the appointment Order No. 25/339/424 dated 20th April 85 issued in favour of Shri S.P. Mishra., appointing him as Admn. Officer on probation for two years, I, Dr. N.N. Mali, Dean LNCPE, Gwalior, for and on orders of Governing Body, Sports Authority of India, New Delhi, hereby terminate forthwith the services of Shri S.P.Mishra, Admn. Officer (on probation), LNCPE, Gwahor. Shri S.P.Mishra, shall be paid in lieu of one month's notice period, a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay and allowances for the period of notice, at the same rate at which he was drawing immediately before the termination of his service." 4. However, we have also read relevant part of the minutes of the meeting of the Governing Body of the Sports Authority of India, held on 14th July 1987 which has come on record as Annexure P/19. It speaks thus: "The Governing Body was informed by the Dean, LNCPE about the background of the case. He further observed that as per the legal advice tendered, the services of Shri S.P. Mishra, Administrative Officer, LNCPE, Gwalior, could be terminated during the period of his probation. The Governing Body accepted the recommendations of the Dean, for termination of the services of Shri Mishra during the period of his probation." 5. In the premises aforesaid, respondents have taken the stand that the petitioner's services having been terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of his appointment and relevant rules, he can have no grievance. The Governing Body accepted the recommendations of the Dean, for termination of the services of Shri Mishra during the period of his probation." 5. In the premises aforesaid, respondents have taken the stand that the petitioner's services having been terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of his appointment and relevant rules, he can have no grievance. That apart, it is also the case of the respondents that although there was some kind of a departmental enquiry into felling and disposal of some trees from the campus and temporary misappropriation of sale proceeds, that has no nexus to the impugned order. 6. Indeed, in their Return, at para 7, the respondents have averred that a sum of Rs. 18,000/-was deposited by Sharif Khan, contractor, on 23rd December, 1985, with the petitioner; and that the latter kept the money with him till 23rd January 1986-Photo copies of what is called "hand receipt" dated 23rd December 1985, issued by the petitioner, and of the receipt dated 22nd Janaury 1986, issued by the Cashier in the printed form, form Annexures IV and IV-A respectively. Respondents concede that there ms no enquiry into the charge of the alleged misappropriation and assert in the return that services of the petitioner were not terminated for the misconduct, but it was so done in virtue of the entitlement which the respondents had under the relevant rules and, terms and conditions of petitioner's appointment. Petitioner's counsel, on the other hand, has drawn our attention to the material on record which, he submits, refutes conclusively and categorically respondents' assertion of want of nexus. It is petitioner's case that materials on record preponderate suggesting his alleged misconduct aforesaid as the basis of the impugned order. It is submitted that the foundation of the order has to be read in the report of the Enquiry Committee constituted to enquire into the transanction of sale of trees to Contractor, Sharif Khan. 7. The College campus is" spread over on an area of 153 acres and it is also disclosed in Annexure P/4 that there are "thousands of trees" on the campus which are maintained carefully under the guidance and care of a Landscaping Officer since April, 1984. 7. The College campus is" spread over on an area of 153 acres and it is also disclosed in Annexure P/4 that there are "thousands of trees" on the campus which are maintained carefully under the guidance and care of a Landscaping Officer since April, 1984. From Annexure P/7, it appears that Shri Jaideep Singh, Member of Parliament, had lodged a complaint about some trees being cut and sold illegally at the College Campus, and on 3rd September 1986 he had requested Smt. Margaret Aiwa, Minister of State tor Youth Affairs and Sports, Government of India, to take the matter seriously for an enquiry to be made into his complaint. Annexure P/4 is indeed a letter which the Dean of the College had addressed on 5th September 1986 to the Under Secretary, Ministry of Human Resources Development, Department of Education, Goverment of India. New Delhi, on the subject of "Complaint about cutting of trees". It appears from Annexure P/8 that the Dean constituted Committee with Shri C.V.Rao, Dr.P.K.Pande and Dr. S.R.Gangopadhyaya, Faculty Members, to make an enquiry into the complaint. On 27th November 1986, vide Annexure R/9, Mr. C.V. Rao wrote to the petitioner, to furnish particulars in respect of certain matters concerning felling of trees and disposal of the timber/firewood and about sale-proceeds thereof. Annexure P/12 is dated 15th December 1986, signed by Mr. C.V. Rao, Convenor, Enquiry Committee and it is captioned "List of Questions", apparently meant for the petitioner. As many as 17 questions are listed, but we indicate few of them : "How many trees were felled with your knowledge? How many trees were ordered to be felled by the Dean and how many were actually felled? What was the amount of the sale-proceeds and on what date the amount was received? On what date was the amount deposited with the Cashier? Did you yourself receive the amount from the Contractor and then deposit the amount with the Cashier? If so, when it was deposited?" 8. On 15th May 1987, it appears from Annexure P/14, the Dean addressed a letter to the petitioner asking him, inter alia, to "explain as to how (he) in the capacity of the Administrative Officer in the Institute, issued a hand-receipt on 23rd December 1985 over (his) signature and under (his) seal -of the Administrative Officer, LNCPE, Gwalion to Shri Sharif Khan, Contractor for Rs. 18,000/-". 18,000/-". He was also asked to explain why the amount collected by him remained unaccounted for in Society's account till 21st January 1986 and why it was finally accounted for in the Cash Book on 22nd January 1986, In his reply, the petitioner denied having received any cash and added that it was no part of his duty either to do so. However, he solicited certain information in order to furnish a fuller explanation, praying access at the same time to relevant records for that purpose. In the report of the Enquiry Committee, signed by Dr. P.K.Pande, Dr. S.R.Gangopadhyaya and Mr. C.V.Rao, we read the following among other "findings", which we extract : "3. The trees were felled on the order/ instructions of the A.O. Mr. S.P.Mishra. 4. It has been proved that Shri S.P.Mishra has received Rs. 18,000/- from the Contractor Shri Sharif Khan unauthorisedly. 5. Not depositing the amount on the same day and delaying for a month and misclassifying the amount indicate misappropriation arid foul play. 6. As Mr. S.P. Mishra used the evasive tactics, it indicates his being guilty." 9. To be fair to respondents' counsel Shri D.K. Nath, we must say that he persuaded us to refrain from making judicial scrutiny of the material aforesaid, relying mainly on the decision in Ram Chandra Trivedi's case which, counsel submitted, was applied by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vishwanath v. Bhobal Vishwa Vidyalaya ( 1979 MPLJ 370 ). However, we found no merit in counsel's opposition to the exercise undertaken by us as we entertained no doubt about our duty in that regard projected consistently in a long line of decisions of the highest Court of the land. In Ram Chandra (supra), at para 16 of the Report (P:207) the decision in Dhingra's case ( 1958 1 LLJ 544 ) and several other decisions were referred and it was held that the "test for attracting Article 311(2) of the Constitution is whether the misconduct or negligence is a mere motive for the order of reversion or termination of service or whether it is the very foundation of the order of termination of service of the temporary employee". Importantly, however, it was further held that "the form of the order, however, is not conclusive of its true nature" and that "the entirety of circumstances preceding or- attendant on the impugned order must be examined by the Court and the overriding test will always be whether the misconduct is a mere motive or is the very foundation of the order". Counsel's reliance on Ram Chandra (supra) would not obviously avail the respondents or support their contention, which the holding extracted in the last sentence destroys conclusively and convincingly. 10. At para 19 of the Report (p.208), in the same case, their Lordships took care to extract from a decision by seven Judges of the Court in Shamsher Singh's case substantial part of the Judgment of the Constitution Bench in that case in support or their view. We consider it appropriate to quote a small part of that extract, relevant to the controversy surfaced for our decision in this case. We quote: "Before a probationer is confirmed the authority concerned is under an obligation to consider' whether the work of the probationer is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post. In the absence of any rules governing a probationer in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or for temperamental or other object not involving moral turpitude the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment is involved in this, ...If, on the other hand, the probationer is faced with an enquiry on charges of misconduct or inefficiency or corruption and if his services are terminated without following the provisions of Article 311(2) he can claim protection... Where a departmental enquiry is contemplated and if an enquiry is not in fact proceeded with, Article 311 will not be attracted unless it can be shown that the order though unexceptionable in form is made following a report based on misconduct." It is true that in Vishwanath (supra), on reading Ham Chandra Trivedi (supra), this Court has expressed the view that judicial scrutiny of materials in such a case was prohibited. But, that view is not supported by what is to be read either in Ram Chandra Trivedi (supra) or in Shamsher Singh (supra) or even in the large number of cases to which we would have occasion to refer hereinafter and as such, it can only be said that law in that regard was rather widely stated in Vishwanath (supra). 11. Indeed, in the State of Maharashtra v. V.P. Saboji , the decision in Ram Chandra Trivedi (supra) was analysed and explained by R.S. Pathak, J. (as his Lordship then was) and at para 18 of the Report his Lordship, dealing with different types of cases of a temporary, as also a probationer, Government servant, noted that "There may still be another kind of case where although the termination of services is intended by way of punishment, the order is framed as a termination simpliciter." Proceeding further, his Lordship observed, "In such a case, if the Government servant is able to establish by material on the record that the order is in fact passed by way of punishment, the innocence of the language in which the order is framed will not protect it if the procedural safeguards contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution have not been satisfied." His Lordship had another occasion to deal with the same question subsequently, in the case of Nepal Singh (1986 11 LLJ 343), where, speaking for the Court, it was observed by him that (p.345): "When a Government servant satisfies the Court prima facie that an order terminating his services violates Arts. 14 and 16, the competent authority must discharge the burden of showing that the power to terminate the services was exercised honestly and in good faith, on valid considerations, fairly and without discrimination". It was further observed very pertinently, as follows: (P.346): .... where allegations of misconduct are levelled against a Government servant, and it is a case where the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution should be applied, it is not open to the competent authority to take the view that holding the enquiry contemplated by that clause would be a bother or a nuisance and that therefore it is entitled to avoid the mandate of that provision and resort to the guise of an ex facie innocuous termination order. The Court will view with great disfavour any attempt to circumvent the constitutional provisions of Article 311(2) in a case where that provision comes into play". 12. We have indeed taken care to look at some other decisions also of the Apex Court dealing with probationer's problems, but we could not trace any discordant note struck anywhere. In Union of India v. P.S. Bhatt (198l I LLJ 485), at para 9 of the Report, (p.488) their Lordships observed, "It may be true that in deciding whether an order is by way of punishment or not, the relevant facts and circumstances may have to be considered". Another decision of the same Judges is that of Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Md. Iskander Ali (I980 II LLJ 155) where also care was taken by their Lordships to probe into the service career of the probationer in reaching the conclusion that "his work had never been satisfactory and he was found not suitable for being retained in service though some sort of an enquiry was started, but not proceeded with and no punishment was inflicted on him." In Anoop Jaiswal it was- held that though the order of discharge may be non-committal, it cannot stand alone. It was further observed, "if the Court reaches the conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and that but for the incident it would not have been passed, then it is inevitable that the order of discharge should fall to the ground if the servant has not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided in Article 311(2) of the Constitution." Venkataramiah, J., who spoke for the Court in that case, spoke in the same vein in a recent decision in the case of Shesh Narain Awasthi v. State of U.P. (1988 II LLJ 99), when the order of termination of service simpliciter of a temporary police constable was quashed after probing into his character roll wherein adverseentry against his conduct was found recorded. To two other recent decisions, to which his Lordship was a party, our attention is drawn by petitioner's counsel Shri R.K. Jain. In the case of Shri Ishwsr Chand Jain. To two other recent decisions, to which his Lordship was a party, our attention is drawn by petitioner's counsel Shri R.K. Jain. In the case of Shri Ishwsr Chand Jain. v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana K.N. Singh, J., speaking for himself and Venkataramiah, J., in dealing with the case of a probationer judicial officer, found fault with the High Court for recommending services of the appellant to be dispensed with, "without having before it relevant material in coming to the conclusion that the appellant's work and conduct were not satisfactory during his probationary period." 12 A. In the case of Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Haryana State Electricity Board (1988 11 LLJ 360) M.M.Dutt, J. Speaking for himself and Venkataramiah, J., noticed the scope for arbitrary action in matters concerning a probationer's confirmation when no guidelines or rules are made in that regard. It was observed that weeding out of an unsuitable probationer during the probationary period was permissible, but there was no warrant for ''archaic rule of confirmation" to continue so as not to allow the petitioner to continue in service if he is not weeded out. The same view was expressed in R.L. Gupta's case observing that it a probationer is "found unsuitable within the period of probation, he should be weeded out of set vice" and that there was no merit in the act of placing the concerned judicial officer on probation, after he had put in nine years service, and then turning him out of service. In Harpal Singh v. State of U.P. (1988 I LLJ 329), reference was made to the decisions in the cases of Shamsher Singh (supra) and Dhingra (supra) and the Bench presided over by Ranganath Mishra, J, observed that "law is well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that even if the adverse order is innocuous and does not show any element of stigma, the Court has jurisdiction to peer below to find out what exactly is the foundation of the order." (p. 330) 13. The Court, speaking throught Ranganath Mishra, J., in State of Gujarat v. Sharad Chandra cited by Shri Nath, has not deliberately deviated, according to us, from the settled law. The Court, speaking throught Ranganath Mishra, J., in State of Gujarat v. Sharad Chandra cited by Shri Nath, has not deliberately deviated, according to us, from the settled law. The cryptic observation of their Lordships, "but for the rules which equate termination of service during or at the end of probation with removal, no proceedings would have been necessary to terminate the services of the petitioner", does not detract a bit from what was observed in Harpal Singh (supra). Be it noted that Sharad Chandra's case (supra) did not involve the controversy arising in this case, as also in Harpal Singh (supra) that the order of termination of probationer's services was a camouflaged order and indeed it cannot be supposed even for a moment that Apex Court's Division Bench, in Sharad Chandra's case, (supra) would make a deliberate departure from the law settled by the Constitution Bench of the Court in Shamsher Singh (surpa) or even in Harpal Singh (supra), without even referring to those decisions. 14. Law has been crystalised and put on sound constitutional basis by the Apex Court to prevent fluctuations in fortunes of a probationer in public employment. What is constitutionally permissible is weeding out a probationer without an inter-parte enquiry, but he is definitely not to be punished unheard. He cannot be told to pack up and go home without being given an opportunity to clear doubts and misgivings entertained about his conduct, especially when it affects his reputation. Because under our Constitutional dispensation "the dignity of the individual" is assured in the preamble and Article 21 has been construed to accord therewith, we think that he is assured of the right constitutionally to protest against invasions on his reputation. Indeed, the message of Kharak Singh (AIR) 1963 SC 1295 and Dilip Kumar (1983 I LLJ l) et al must have abiding effect to allow a citizen to enjoy the finer graces of civilisation, his reputation has to be treated with care to ensure him a dignified living. If a citizen is assured constitutionally the right to defend his reputation, we do not think if any citizen in public employment qua citizen loses that right. If a citizen is assured constitutionally the right to defend his reputation, we do not think if any citizen in public employment qua citizen loses that right. Therefore, whether or not, any citizen in public employment is stigmatized expressly in the order dispensing with his services, he would have the right to come to the writ Court to ask the Court to make enquiry into solid facts leading to formation of opinion by the appointing authority in a case of a probationer that he was guilty of misconduct. This court had an occasion to point out the distinction in the case of Gita Shrivastava 1988 (2) SLR 389, between the right to continue in service in virtue of right to hold any particular public post and the consequences of stigmatizing a temporary or ad-hoc appointee in public service by which he is disabled permanently from applying in future for any employment under the State. It is difficult indeed to ignore the reality that a stigma, even if not communicated to the public servant, would not be washed away from official records; it would be difficult for an erstwhile public employer to deny existence of such stigma when any reference is made to him by the successor employer with the object of satisfying himself about past conduct of a candidate for public employment even if he had suffered an order of "discharge" simpliciter. 15. We would also have to make it clear here that the question of motive of the appointing authority would not arise for an inquiry by the Court because the enquiry would not be into motive of the concerned authority in passing the impugned order; it would look into antecedent facts existing on the records and sometimes also disclosed to the petitioner, otherwise than in the order, affecting his reputation. In such a case, the Court cannot shirk its duty and refuse to make an enquiry to see if any provision of the Constitution has been circumvented in any manner, incurring violation of Articles 14, 16, 311(2) or of any other provision of the Constitution. In such a case, the Court cannot shirk its duty and refuse to make an enquiry to see if any provision of the Constitution has been circumvented in any manner, incurring violation of Articles 14, 16, 311(2) or of any other provision of the Constitution. Indeed, when a probatioer is sought to be weeded out and the impugned order is sought to be justified on that score, if there are no materials on record to suggest that the appointing authority had acted honestly in reaching the conclusion that probationer's performance was not satisfactory or he was otherwise not found suitable to be retained in service, then the order, in such a case, would evidently be an arbitrary order which will fell foul of the constitutional imperatives of Articles 14 and 16. Let it be noted in this connection that though Article 311(2) applies to a person holding a Civil post under the State, the scope of Articles 14 and 16 is wide enough to cover cases of all other persons in public employment. 16. According to us, the emerging judicial trend at the Apex level is a clear pointer of Court's anxiety to secure a real and positive safeguard to the unsecured tenure of a probationer by denigrating in no uncertain terms what their Lordships have called "archaic Rule of confirmation'. This has been evidently done to insulate the probationer against arbitrary actions of the appointing authority in order to articulate meaningfully, and enforce affirmatively, the constitutional injunction in that regard. A probationer may not have a right to the post on which he is rendering service, but he has still the right to continue in the post conditionally, flowing from the obligation on the appointing authority to assess his performance objectively and honestly because, without discharging that obligation, his right to continue in the post cannot be forefeited by the appointing authority. Indeed, the appointing authority, in making its assessment, is constitutionally required to abide by rules of fairplay in adversarial context and to give an opportunity to the probationer to explain his conduct in all cases in which such serious charges as involving moral turpitude are preferred, though not pursued. Indeed, the appointing authority, in making its assessment, is constitutionally required to abide by rules of fairplay in adversarial context and to give an opportunity to the probationer to explain his conduct in all cases in which such serious charges as involving moral turpitude are preferred, though not pursued. Thereby only, it would be possible to ensure compliance of the constitutional mandate by which the probationer, as a citizen, would be allowed to exercise his right to defend his reputation, or even his right to secure public employment subsequently, to earn his livelihood. We are sure that when there is any allegation against the probationer, involving moral turpitude, that has to be dealt in a different manner. In such a case, it would be difficult to terminate his services without an inter- parte enquiry as that would be affecting his reputation and also right to livelihood. 17. According to us, law was so stated authoritatively long ago by the Constitution Bench in Shamsher Singh (supra), in express terms, with great care, after making an exception in express terms for an act of a probationer "involving moral turpitude", that in other cases, generally, no inter-parte enquiry for assessment of the probationer's performance need be made as "no punishment" would follow such an inquiry. True, in the case of a Government servant, there would indeed be the question of the appointing authority circumventing Article 311(2) if no inquiry is held when "punishment" is intended, but in all other cases, the question still would be of violation of Articles 14, 21, 39A, 41 and 43. This Court, in Rajabai Gorkar (1987 Lab I.C. 1386) and Jiwanlal ( 1987 MPLJ 376 ) has taken the view that validity of any kind of order of termination of services of a public servant is answerable to tests envisaged under those provisions. We are of the opinion that principles of natural justice or, for that matter, rules of Airplay in adversarial context, of employer-employee contest, form part of the constitutional imperative underlying those provisions. "Fairness, founded on reasons," it was held in Beliappa's case ( 1979 1 LLJ 156 ) "is the essence of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution". We are of the opinion that principles of natural justice or, for that matter, rules of Airplay in adversarial context, of employer-employee contest, form part of the constitutional imperative underlying those provisions. "Fairness, founded on reasons," it was held in Beliappa's case ( 1979 1 LLJ 156 ) "is the essence of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution". In Oiga Tellis right to livelihood is held embraced by Article 21 and Maneka Gandhi has infused the concept of "reasonableness" into "procedure" referred thereunder, while in D.S. Nakara the Constitution Bench has emphasised the relevance and primacy of Articles 41 and 43 in our Socialist Republic to ensure that the working people are provided "security from craddle to grave" to make meaningful "Gandhian Socialism" by our founding father. Right to work is not constitutionally guaranteed, but right to continue in public employment till such time as services of the citizen so employed are not terminated following a reasonable procedure is still guaranteed under Articles 16 and 21 because, it is for Courts to say if the procedure adopted was, in the facts and circumstances of the case, reasonable; and when Service rules exist, on interpretation thereof. We recall in this context the dictum of Chinappa Reddy, J., in Chandrabhan's case that public employment opportunity is national wealth to be shared equally by citizens, from which it follows that there can be no arbitrary deprivation of a citizen of the share he is enjoying. 18. In the instant case, in vain we scanned and sifted carefully, the materials on record. Not even a single whisper we could trace, suggesting independent assessment of the petitioner's performance as a probationer, dehors his conduct involving moral turpitude in the matter of temporary misappropriation of Rs. 18,000/- and his acts and activities concerning felling and selling trees of which the sale proceeds are said to have been temporarily misappropriated. It is difficult to accept the ipse dixit of the Dean, or for that matter, of the respondents generally, that there is no nexus between the impugned order terminating petitioner's services and the enquiry revealing his act and activities involving moral turpitude, albeit pertaining to the felling and selling of the trees of the College campus. The Enquiry Committee's "findings" held him "guilty" and definitely provided the foundation in this case for the impugned order. The Enquiry Committee's "findings" held him "guilty" and definitely provided the foundation in this case for the impugned order. About that, we have no doubt, That conclusion is inescapable in the absence of any other material being placed before us to enable us to take a different view of the matter. If anything more has to be said, it has to be noted that the Dean had himself raised the accusing finger at the petitioner, asking him to explain his conduct in respect of the shady transaction as per Annexure p/14. And, the Governing Body's Resolution refers to the "Background of the case" which was disclosed in the meeting by the Dean, whose "recommendation" was accepted by the Governing Body without anything else being done by it to make an independent assessment of petitioner's general performance as a probationer. Admittedly, no inter-parte enquiry was held and the Governing Body was of the opinion that the petitioner was not entitled to any opportunity to explain his conduct and the part, if any, played by him in the transaction in question. It is doubtful if the Dean or even the Governing Body attached any importance at all to petitioner's specific denial, as per Annexure p/15, of his involvement in the transaction in question. How, therefore, can it be said that the Dean or the Governing Body acted fairly in the matter? 19. In the circumstances aforesaid, the action of the respondents in dispensing with the services of the petitioner without holding inter-parte enquiry against him in respect of the shady transaction cannot "be constitutionally countenanced. For other reasons also, we are satisfied that the impugned order cannot be sustained in law. We have not found, on materials on record, any objective assessment, at any level, of petitioner's general performance in respect of duties of the post to which he was appointed for a specified term. On the other hand, what we have found in this case is that the petitioner's services were terminated on "findings" being recorded against him and and Enquiry Committee having found him "guilty" in respect of the transaction in question though the "background" which was disclosed to the Governing Body, is not revealed or mentioned in the impugned order. On the other hand, what we have found in this case is that the petitioner's services were terminated on "findings" being recorded against him and and Enquiry Committee having found him "guilty" in respect of the transaction in question though the "background" which was disclosed to the Governing Body, is not revealed or mentioned in the impugned order. There is no doubt that the said "background" was considered by the Governing Body and that was the foundation of the order, terminating the services of the petitioner on the "recommendations" of the Dean. 20. We are also required in this case to consider if the impugned order is intra vires the relevant Service Rules, cited in the Return, which we have extracted above. In this connection, the legal position which cannot be disputed is that any stipulation in an appointment order must be considered in the context of relevant Service Rules (See-Om Prakash Maurya. Although para 4 of the appointment order, in this case, authorises termination of service by one month's notice "without assigning any reason" and indeed before the expiry of the stipulated period of notice, the employer is authorised to do so by making payment of a sum equivalent of pay for the period of the notice, the power to do so can be exercised only in accordance with relevant Rules. In this connection, we would recall that though Clause (ii) of the relevant Rule, extracted in the earlier part of the judgment, contemplates expressly that "without assigning any reason for such termination" the probationer's services may be terminated, but it is also contemplated that only when he "is found unsuitable for holding that post or has not completed his period of probation satisfactorily". Because of the constitutional position as it obtains today, following their Lordships' decision in the case of W.B.S.E.Board v. Desh Bandhu Ghosh (1985 I-LLJ 373), and C.I.W.T. v. Brojonath Ganguly, we must read the relevant service Rules in the constitutional perspective to hold that though the requirement of giving reasons is dispensed with, that would not excuse (absolve) the appointing authority of its duty to comply with the requirements of the first part of the Rule to make an affirmative finding that the petitioner was "not suitable for holding that post" or that he had "not completed his period of probation satisfactorily". It would be necessary for the appointing authority to spell out in the termination order whether the probationer has "not completed his period of probaton satisfactorily". Any other view would render the relevant Service Rules unconstitutional. 21. In Desh Bandhu (supra), though not a case of a probationer, it was still held that under the current Constitutional dispensation, the relevant Service Rules framed by the State Electricity Board authorising it to terminate service of its temporary employee on one month's notice or on payment of salary in lieu thereof, without assigning reason, was unconstitutional. The provision, it was observed, smacked of "hire & fire" policy comparable to Henry VIII clause, incompatible with Articles 14 and 311(2) of the Constitution. In Brojonath (supra) the relevant Service Rules of the Corporation were held void under Section 23 of the Contract Act as also Article 14 of the Constitution as it was not in the public interest to tolerate a contract of employment which invested arbitrary power in the employer to terminate services of an employee without assigning any reason. In that case, the offensive Rule 9(ii) enabled services of an employee being terminated on the ground that his "services (were) no longer required in the interest of the Company". 22. Construing Clause (ii) of Rule 2 of the relevant Service Rules of this case, extracted hereinabove, in constitutional perspective, we are of the view that there is an obligation on the appointing authority to make a finding and record reasons, though the same may not be communicated to the petitioner, in reaching the categorical finding that the petitioner "is found not suitable for holding the post" to which he was appointed or that he had "not completed his period of probation satisfactorily". In Belliappa (supra), the Apex Court has taken the view that the appointing authority cannot plead in Court that the order, in such a case, was "purely administrative, based in the exercise of administrative discretion". This was said relying on the dictum of Lord Denning in the case of Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971) 1 All ER 114 that "giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration" and the Court's own decision in Khudirasn's case. One of us (Dr. TN. Singh, J.), speaking for the Court in the case of Kishorinandan Shrivastava. One of us (Dr. TN. Singh, J.), speaking for the Court in the case of Kishorinandan Shrivastava. 1984 (1) GL R 99, had an occasion to observe on a survey of authorities that when discretionary power is claimed through statutory entitlement and that power enables formation of subjective opinion, it carries with it the duty to apply objective tests in such matters. For this view, support was derived from the Constitution Bench decision in Barium Chemicals as also other decisions of Apex Court, such as Rohtas Industries and Swadeshi Cotton Mills, besides referring to Padfield's case (1968) AC.997. Indeed, in the instant case, the language of the relevant Service Rule, particularly the word "found" used in Rule 2(ii) expressly limits the scope of appointing authority's subjective opinion of petitioner's performance. A clear and affirmative finding, in our view, is set out as condition-precedent for exercise of the power under the said Rule. 23. It was incumbent in this case on the appointing authority to record its findings, on the basis of objective criteria, on the unsuitabality of the probationer for the post or about his unsatisfactory performance during the probationary period before the power to dispence with his services could be exercised under the relevant Service Rule, Rule 2(ii). However, as we have already pointed out above, nothing of that sort is found on record and indeed, the stand taken by respondents in Court is that not only no reason has to be communicated, no reason and no finding even has to be recorded under the relevant Service Rules. It is not possible to accept the contention of the respondents that in the instant case, the impugned order could be or has been, validly passed in terms of the relevant Service Rules and in accordance with the terms and conditions of appointment of the petitioner. 24. For the several reasons aforesaid, in no view of law or facts, it is possible for us to sustain the impugned order Annexure P/3 passed by the Dean (respondent No. 3) and the Resolution dated 14th July 1987 passed by the Governing Body of the Sports Authority of India, terminating petitioner's services. The same are accordingly quashed. 25. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. We direct the petitioner to be reinstated in service with consequential benefits. However, we make no order as to costs in this matter.