JUDGMENT - I.G. SHAH, J.:---Original accused number 3 in Criminal Case No. 65 of 1987, which is styled as Regular Criminal Case Number 65 of 1987 in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nanded has come to this Court to challenge the order of issue of process against him and two other under section 295 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to this petition are as under:--- Parvatibai, the complainant who is a resident of Nanded, filed a complaint against the present petitioner and two others contending that she is owner and in possession of house and open space towards the southern side of her house, and that near the said house, there is a Gayatri temple, of which, respondent No. 1 is the priest an accused number 3 is the Trustee, whereas accused number 2 is the son-in-law of accused No. 1, and they reside near the said temple. It is further alleged in the complaint that the husband of the complainant died about 25 to 30 years back and since after his demise, the complainant raised a Samadhi in front of her house of her husband; and that the complainant used to worship the said Samadhi and has a spiritual attachment to the same. It is further stated that the accused numbers 1 to 3 were trying to dispossess the complainant of her house and open space as they were interested in expanding the Gayatri temple and that on 20th June, 1986, the complainant alongwith her mother left Nanded and went to Jagannathpuri on a pilgrimage and she had instructed one Ratandas Haridas to look after her house till her return. It is said that she returned from Jagannathpuri on 28th June, 1986 and found that the Samadhi of her husband was defaced, and damaged and the Almariah near the Samadhi was broken and certain valuable securities and document worth Rs. 800/- which were in the almariah, were missing. She then enquired about the same with accused number 1; but he abused her and also told her that he, alongwith accused numbers 2 and 3 had destroyed the Samadhi to teach a lesson to her and further takes up the matter with the police. 800/- which were in the almariah, were missing. She then enquired about the same with accused number 1; but he abused her and also told her that he, alongwith accused numbers 2 and 3 had destroyed the Samadhi to teach a lesson to her and further takes up the matter with the police. She further claimed that she thereafter enquired with Ratandas and learnt from him that on 26th June, 1986 at about 8.30 p.m., he had seen accused numbers 1 to 3 coming with iron rods and destroying the Samadhi and breaking the almirah near the Samadhi and throwing the documents which were in the almirah and that while destroying the Samadhi, they were abusing and assailing the Samadhi and her character and also her husband. She also claimed that Ratandas also told that he, Shankardas, Devidas and Nagorao had tried to prevent accused numbers 1 to 3, but they could not succeed. She also claimed that Ratandas had also told that he had actually sent a complaint to the Police Station Vazirabad on 26th June, 1986. She also claimed that on 3rd July, 1986 and on 5th August, 1986, she filed complaint with the Police Station Vazirabad, but as no action was taken by the police, she was required to file a complaint in the Court of law. 3. The complaint is filed on 23rd February, 1987. It appears that the verification statement of the complainant came to be recorded on 23rd February, 1987. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate passed an order directing the complainant to file affidavits of witnesses numbers 2 to 5 within fifteen days and further stated that after filling of their affidavits, further order would be passed. Thereafter, it appears that on 27th March, 1987, when the complainant and her Advocate were absent and though the affidavits as directed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate were not filed, he ordered to issue the process under section 395 of the Indian Penal Code against accused numbers 1 to 3. Against the said order of issue of process, the present petitioner i.e. the original accused number 3 preferred a Revision Petition bearing Criminal Revision No. 156 of 1987 in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Nanded. Against the said order of issue of process, the present petitioner i.e. the original accused number 3 preferred a Revision Petition bearing Criminal Revision No. 156 of 1987 in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Nanded. It appears that the learned Sessions Judge dismissed the Revision Petition holding that the Revision Petition was not maintainable as the order of issue of process is an interlocutory order and he relied on the decision reported in 1987 Mah.L.R. 1269 (M/s. Maheshwari Cotton Company v. Smt. Shakuntala Devi and others)1. The learned Sessions Judge, in view of the above said decision of the High Court observed that the Revision Petition was not maintainable as order section 204 of the issuance of process is an interlocutory order and the petitioner should move the High Court under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 4. Being aggrieved by the said order of dismissal of the Revision petition and issuance of process by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, the petitioner has preferred this petition under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code and also Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 5. In the complaint, the complainant no doubt appears to have stated that after noticing that the Samadhi and almariah were defaced and damaged, she had enquired with the accused number 1 and from him she learnt that he had accused numbers 2 and 3 had destroyed the Samadhi to teach her a lesson. But in the verification statement recorded before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, no such statement is made, and therefore, the said statement in the complaint cannot be taken into consideration while considering whether on the basis of the contents of the complaint, the process came to be issued by the Chief Judicial Magistrate or not. The other contents of the complaint are definitely not on the basis of her own information, but on the basis of the information received by her from witnesses stated in the complaint. In view of this, it does appear that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, instead of issuing the process, postponed the issue of process and directed the complainant to file the affidavits of the witnesses numbers 2 to 5 within 15 days. In view of this, it does appear that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, instead of issuing the process, postponed the issue of process and directed the complainant to file the affidavits of the witnesses numbers 2 to 5 within 15 days. Now, as per the provisions of section 202(1), a Magistrate is empowered to postpone the issue of process on receipt of a complaint of an offence, if he thinks fit to do so and he can either enquire into the case himself or direct the investigation to be made by the Police Officer or any such person as he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding, whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Now in the present case, once the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has postponed the issuance of process and directed the complainant to produce the affidavits of the witnesses numbers 2 to 5 it must be held that he wanted to enquire into the case himself, and therefore, had directed the complainant to produce the affidavits of the witness. It is, therefore, clear that the learned Magistrate did not find that there was sufficient ground to proceed against the accused in the complaint that was filed. Once he had postponed the issuance of process and had directed an enquiry in respect of the same, to be done by himself, he ought to have proceeded with the enquiry, and thereafter only, he could have issued the process if he found that there was sufficient material or sufficient ground made out by the complainant and the witnesses whose affidavits were directed to be filed. 6. Suprisingly enough, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, on the next date. i.e. on 27th March, 1987, even though the complainant and her Advocate were absent and even though the affidavits of the witnesses were not filed, proceeded to issue process, thereby taking cognizance of the offences. Now this order is definately not in accordance with the provisions of section 202. The only course open for the Magistrate, really speaking was, either to postpone the case further or as the complainant and her advocate were absent and steps of filling the affidavits of the witnesses as directed were also not taken, he ought to have dismissed the complaint. But instead of that, as stated earlier, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate issued process. But instead of that, as stated earlier, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate issued process. Under these circumstances, the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate of issue of process is definitely not in accordance with the provisions of law. 7. On behalf of the State, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing before me tried to contend that if the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was of the opinion that it was a matter which required to be enquired into, an opportunity should be given to be complainant to produce her evidence in respect of the alleged offence, he can be said to have exercised his discretion in issuing the process. He, therefore, tried to contend that it is not necessary to interfere with the said order. Now really speaking, the question of discretion does not arise at all. If the complaint or the material produced by the complainant alongwith the complaint makes out sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, the Magistrate has no other option but to proceed against the accused stated in the complaint, but if no sufficient, grounds are made out in the complaint and the material produced before the Magistrate, he has got to postpone the issuance of process and direct an enquiry either by himself or by the police as per the provisions of section 202. In view of this, I do not think that there is any substance in the contention raised by Shri Dhuldhwaj, learned Additional Public Prosecutor. 8. In fact, in view of this position of law, when there is actually no sufficient ground made out by the complainant, the order of issue of process by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate being absolutely not in accordance with law, will have to be interfered with even under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. But apart from it, it is also necessary to consider as to whether a criminal revision against such an order is maintainable or not. It does appear that in the ruling reported in 1987 Mah.L.R. 1269 M/s. Maheshwari Cotton Mills v. Smt. Shankuntala Devi and others. Brother, Judge of this High Court has held that the order passed under section 204 of issuing process, is an interlocutory order, and it cannot be interfered with in revision under section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code in view of sub-section (2) of said section. Brother, Judge of this High Court has held that the order passed under section 204 of issuing process, is an interlocutory order, and it cannot be interfered with in revision under section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code in view of sub-section (2) of said section. Brother Judge also relied on another Single Bench judgment of this Court reported in 1977 Mh.L.J. 581 (Shriram Damodhar Mulay v. T. Ramnarayan Sharma and another)2. In that case also, Gadgil, J., took a view that the order of registration of a complainant by a Magistrate was an interlocutory order and that a revision is not maintainable. In both the above said decision, apparently it does appear that a very specious view has been taken that the order of issuance of process is an interlocutory order and cannot be interfered with in revision. With respect I may state that while deciding these two cases, it appears that the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2185 (Amarnath and others v. State of Haryana and others)3, and A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 47 (Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra)4, were not considered. In Amarnath's case, what the Supreme Court has laid down is that the term interlocutory order in section 397(2) has been used in a restricted sense and not in a broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decides or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties, cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in section 397. Their Lordships further observed in the said decisions that thus, for instance orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under section 397(2). Their Lordships further observed in the said decisions that thus, for instance orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under section 397(2). But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or Sessions Court. The same view has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in the later decision referred to above, and their Lordships observed that the purpose of putting a bar on the power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in an appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding is to bring about expeditious disposal of the cases finally. More often than not, the revisional power of the High Court was resorted to in relation to interlocutory orders delaying the final disposal of the proceedings. The Legislature in its wisdom decided to check this delay by introducing sub-section (2) in section 397. On the one hand, a bar has been put in the way of the High Court (as also of the Sessions Judge) for exercise of the Revisions power in relation to any interlocutory order, on the other the power has been conferred in almost the same terms as it was in the 1898 Code. The bar under section 397(2) will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. Similarly, it was also observed that ordinarily and generally and expression 'interlocutory order' has been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term 'final order'. But an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted, nor justified. If it were so, it will render almost nugatory the revisional power of the Sessions Court or the High Court conferred on it by section 397(1). But an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted, nor justified. If it were so, it will render almost nugatory the revisional power of the Sessions Court or the High Court conferred on it by section 397(1). On such a strict interpretation, only those orders would be revisable which are orders passed on the final determination of the action but are not appealable under Chapter XXIX of the Code. This does not seem to be the intention of the legislature when it retained the revisional power of the High Court in terms identical to the one in the 1898 Code. Their Lordship further observed that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceedings, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Their Lordships, on the facts of that case further observed that the impugned order in the instant case rejecting the application challenging the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed with trail, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of sub-section (2) of section 397. It must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course, and hence revisable. 9. Relying on these two decisions, this Court also in the ruling reported in 1981 Mh.L.J. 304 (Hasmukh J. Jhavari v. Sheela Dadlani and others)5, held that an order which substantially affects the rights of the parties; or decides certain rights of the parties, cannot be said to be an interlocutory order. Similarly, an order which adjudicates, or even affects either the rights of the parties or even any particular aspect of the trial or the proceedings, cannot also be termed as an interlocutory order. Kotwal, J., in the said decision held that an order directing attachment and sealing of flat under section 146 is not an interlocutory order. 10. Similarly, an order which adjudicates, or even affects either the rights of the parties or even any particular aspect of the trial or the proceedings, cannot also be termed as an interlocutory order. Kotwal, J., in the said decision held that an order directing attachment and sealing of flat under section 146 is not an interlocutory order. 10. Now therefore, in view of the above said decisions, it is clear that if the order passed by the trial Court could be considered as an order which decides the rights of the parties, or if it could be held that it is an order in respect of a plea which if acceptable would conclude the particular proceedings, it must be considered as a final order. In the present case, it is clear that once the Chief Judicial Magistrate had directed the complainant to file the affidavits of the witnesses numbers 2 to 5, and had decided to make an enquiry of the complaint before issuing the process, he could not have issued the process without completing the said enquiry, and therefore, the further order passed on the next date of issue of process under section 395 of the Indian Penal Code without making any enquiry as was contemplated by him in the order passed by him earlier, was not in accordance with law. The said matter would definately go to the foot of the case, and therefore, the said order cannot be said to be an interlocutory order. 11. Similarly, when the complainant and her Advocate were absent and the affidavits as directed were also not filed, there was no additional material before the Court on the basis of which, the process could be ordered to be issued. Similarly, in view of the fact that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding with, he ought to have dismissed the complaint; as per the provisions of section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Magistrate after considering the statements on oath, if any, of the complainant and all the witnesses and the result of the enquiry and/or investigation if any, under section 202, is of the opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he has to dismiss the complaint and in every such case, he has to briefly record his reasons for doing so. In the present case, when the complainant and her Advocate were absent and no affidavits as directed of the witnesses were filled by the complainant, there was actually no material before the trial Court, and therefore, the lower Court ought to have concluded that there was no sufficient ground for providing and should have dismissed the complaint. As the enquiry was directed after the complainant had filed the complaint, which was duly verified, the said verification statement also would not be considered as sufficient for the conclusion that he should proceed with the matters. Hence, the order of issue of process is also bad in law on this ground itself. 12. The only order that could be passed was to dismiss the complaint. Hence, even in Revision, this order must be held to be revisable. The learned Sessions Judge could have also revised the said order under the provisions of section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code. However, as in view of the two decision which I have referred to earlier in this judgment, the learned Sessions Judge felt that he had no powers to revise the orders : the petitioner is required to come to this Court. This Court however, in view of the fact that two revisions would not be maintainable, will have to ultimately pass an order under section 482 only and set aside the order of issue of process. 13. It may be stated here that the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State tried to support the matter of issue of process on the ground that the complainant is a lady and she should be given an opportunity to prove her case. But it is clear that she was absent. Her advocate was also absent and she also did not file the affidavits as directed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, and therefore, as she had not complied with the orders of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, it cannot be said that injustice would be caused to her. She had an opportunity to comply with the orders passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and she failed to do so for which she must thank herself. 14. In the result, the application will have to be allowed and the process issued against the petitioners will have to be quashed. Rule made absolute in above terms. Application allowed. ------