This is an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of 129 days delay in filing Second Appeal (T) No. 241 (a) of 1989. The impugned judgment was delivered on 15. 9. 88, the certified copy was received by the appellant on 3.12. 88, the last date for filing the appeal was 9. 2. 89 and the appeal was filed on 17. 6. 89. 2. I have heard Mr. A. R. Paul Mazumdar, learned Government Advocate, Assam. I have also perused the petition for condonation of delay and the grounds stated therein. The grounds, in brief, are that till 1.6.89 the matter was delayed in the Government offices and after I. 6. 89 the papers were handed over to the Advocate who took 17 days time to file the appeal due to land-slide and heavy rains in Gauhati. Learned counsel Mr. Paul Mazumdar submits that this being an appeal filed by the State the Court should take a liberal view as it is known that the Government have to follow long cumbersome procedure in filing an appeal and that due to such procedure delay takes place in filing the appeal. In support of his contention the learned counsel referred to the decisions of Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 and G. Ramegowda vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, AIR 1988 SC 897 . 3. Also heard Mr. A. M. Mazumdar, learned counsel for the respondent opposite party. Mr. Mazumdar submits that in the instant case, there is absolutely no ground for condonation of delay. The delay in Government offices, as such, cannot be a ground. According to the learned counsel, there may be some justification for 17 days delay from 1.6.89 to 17.6. 89, because, if the statement of the appellant is accepted, this delay was caused while the matter was pending with the Advocate due to heavy rains and land-slide in Gauhati. But there is no explanation for the balance period of Ii2 days. According to Mr. Mazumdar, the law of limitation is not different for the Government, it is equal for all, and that the Supreme Court has not given a licence to the Government to get extension of limitation in all cases without satisfying that there was sufficient cause for the delay. According to Mr. Mazumdar, the law of limitation is not different for the Government, it is equal for all, and that the Supreme Court has not given a licence to the Government to get extension of limitation in all cases without satisfying that there was sufficient cause for the delay. The learned counsel submits that the above decisions of the Supreme Court have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case and it is not a fit case for condonation of delay, 4. I have carefully considered the rival submissions of the learned counsel for both sides. I have also perused facts of the case and the decisions of the Supreme Court. I do not find that the Supreme Court has laid down that whenever a condonation petition is filed by the Government the delay should be condoned keeping in view the slow working of the Government offices. No such proposition of law has been laid down. The judgments in the above cases were delivered by th2 Supreme Court on consideration of the facts of cases before it. In G. Ramegowda's case the Supreme Court specifically observed that the law of limitation is the same for a private citizens as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant, must take responsibility for acts or omissions of its officers. It however, under the facts and circumstances of that case it observed as follows : "But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes 'sufficient cause for purposes of S. 5 it might, perhaps, be somewhat un­realistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Govern­mental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a conquerable degree of procedural-red tape in the process of their making. A. certain amount of latitude is therefore, not impermissible". Govern­mental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a conquerable degree of procedural-red tape in the process of their making. A. certain amount of latitude is therefore, not impermissible". From the above it is clear that the Supreme Gout has permitted the Courts to take into consideration the circumstances like those mentioned in the above judgment and to allow some amount of latitude in the matter of condonation of delay if the facts and circumstances of the case justify doing so. In the instant case, it is not the case of the Government that public interest has suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of the officers of the Govern­ment or its agent or that the Government or its officers were at cross-purposes. If we allow latitude to the Government for the acts of its officers generally, there may not be any justification for not allowing, similar latitude to companies, firms or other organisations for the acts of omission of their staff. S. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag, the Supreme Court laid down that the Courts should take a liberal approach in the matter of condonation of delay. What was held in that case was that the Court should take a pedantic approach in applying the oft-quoted doctrine that "every day's delay must be explained”. The doctrine should be applied in a rational and pragmatic manner. The Court, however, made it clear that "the fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation of delay and not a private party was altogether irrelevant'. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and that law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according step-motherly treatment when the ' State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay". 6 Thus, the mandate of the Supreme Court is to give equal treatment to the State and not to discriminate against it. It has nowhere stated that the State should be given more liberal treat­ment than a private party. The law in regard to condonation of delay is clear. If, on a justice-oriented approach the Court finds that there is sufficient cause for the delay, it should condone it. It should not take too technical view of the matter. It has nowhere stated that the State should be given more liberal treat­ment than a private party. The law in regard to condonation of delay is clear. If, on a justice-oriented approach the Court finds that there is sufficient cause for the delay, it should condone it. It should not take too technical view of the matter. The words "sufficient cause” should receive liberal construction so as to advance sub­stantive justice. 7. In construing section 5 of the Limitation Act the Court has to keep in mind two important considerations. First is that the very purpose of providing a period of limitation for challenging any order by way of appeal, revision etc. is to give finality to all legal proceedings on the expiry of specified time and to set at rest all judicial controversies in a particular matter. On the expiration of the period of limitation, a right is created in favour of a decree holder to treat the decree or an award as binding. The other consideration is that the delay might have been caused due to reasons beyond the control of the appellant or, in other words, there may be ''sufficient cause" for the delay and refusal to condone it might result in grave injustice. The Court has to strike a balance between the two equally important considerations. What is, therefore, necessary is to consider whether there was any gross negligence, deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide on the part of the appellant. If that be so, the delay should not be condoned. On the other hand, if sufficient cause is shown, the Court should exercise its discretion and condone the delay. Proof of 'sufficient cause', therefore, is a condition precedent for exercise of the discretionary power of the Court to condone the delay. No bard and fast rule can be laid down for determining what constitutes "sufficient cause'1. That would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case which should be considered by the Court in the proper perspective with the object of furthering substantial justice, 8. Now turning to the facts of the instant case, I find that no sufficient cause has been shown by the appellant for the long delay in filing the appeal except a period of 17 days during which the papers were lying with the Advocate. Now turning to the facts of the instant case, I find that no sufficient cause has been shown by the appellant for the long delay in filing the appeal except a period of 17 days during which the papers were lying with the Advocate. In the petition for condonation the appellant has simply stated which officer forwarded the paper to whom on what date. There is no explanation as to why the officer concerned did not or could not take up the matter in time. The argument advanced in course of hearing on behalf of the Government is that as in Government working delay is inevitable the Courts should take judicial notice of such state of affairs and treat the same as sufficient cause for condoning delay. In support thereof the learned counsel relied on the two decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above. I am afraid the argument of the learned counsel for the State cannot be accepted, I have carefully considered the two decisions of the Supreme Court and I do not find that the Supreme Court has any where laid down such a broad proposition of law. If the submission of the learned Go­vernment Advocate is accepted the period of limitation prescribed by the statute will, in effect, cease to apply in cases where the appellant is the Government. That is not the law nor legislative intent. The legislature itself by providing the same period of limi­tation for private parties as well as the Government has not made any distinction between the two. The limitation, therefore, is appli­cable to both with equal force. So also the benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act is equally available to both. The Courts should neither discriminate against the Government nor show undue latitude to it. Each petition for condonation of delay should be considered on its own merits. There may be a case where the Government may be able to satisfy the Court about the existence of special circumst­ances because of which official machinery could not work with promptitude resulting in the delay and the Court may find it to be a "sufficient cause'' for the delay. Routine slow working of the Government departments cannot in any view of the matter be consid­ered to be good ground to justify condonation of delay. Routine slow working of the Government departments cannot in any view of the matter be consid­ered to be good ground to justify condonation of delay. The Court cannot put its seal of approval on the negligence, inaction or laches on the part of the officers of the Government by treating it as "sufficient cause" for delay. However, as observed, by the Supreme Court in G. Ramegowda (supra) a somewhat different complexion will be imparted to the matter if the Government succeeds in making out a case that the delay was caused due to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents or the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it and public interest will suffer if the delay in such a case is not condoned. Evidently, the present is not a case falling in the description of any of the cases referred to by the Supreme Court. No satisfactory explanation is forthcoming for the delay of 112 days in the instant case. 9. On consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and the law on the subject, I am satisfied that there is no sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The petition for cond­onation of delay is therefore, rejected. 10. In view of the rejection of the prayer for condonation of delay the appeal is dismissed. Stay order stands vacated.