MUKUL GOPAL MUKHERJI, J. ( 1 ) THE accused petitioner impugns an order of conviction and sentence under Sections 448 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. He has been sentenced to undergo R. I. for two months for the offence of house-trespass and R. I. for one month for criminal intimidation. The accused petitioner moved the learned Sessions Judge on appeal and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 4th Court, Alipore 24 - Parganas by an order dated 15-4-1985 has upheld the order of conviction and sentence. Hence this criminal revision. ( 2 ) THE Opposite Party No. 2 Debi Parsad Mukherjee lodged a complaint against the petitioner to the effect that he has been the owner of the premises No. 8/2, Jamir Lane and is in possession of three rooms in the first floor of the said premises, one through the present petitioner as licensee and the other two rooms were in his direct possession though the same were kept under lock and key. It is the prosecution case that on 15-6-1978 he found the two rooms which were under his direct possession and kept under lock and key, forcibly occupied by the accused petitioner who broke open the locks and when the complainant opposite party No. 2 wanted to go upstairs, the accused petitioner prevented him and abused him in a filthy and intimidatory language at the trial, four witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution and the accused petitioner examined two witnesses for the defence. P. W. 1 was the complainant himself who gave out in course of his testimony that after obtaining the probate in respect of the Will of- Late Taradasi Debi who was the owner of the house, he asked the accused petitioner to vacate the room occupied by him on the first floor. The accused petitioner was a servant of Smt Taradasi Debi and admittedly was in possession of one room in the first floor during the lifetime of Smt. Taradasi Debi and it was on her death when the complainant opposite party No. 2 came to own the house, the accused petitioner agreed to vacate but wanted some time for the purpose and he was granted occupation in respect of one room only. It came from the testimony of P. W. 1 that on 15-6-78 at about 6 p. m. while he along with one Pabitra Kumar Roy Chaudhury, a tenant in the ground floor and one Krishna Mohan Ghosh tried to go upstairs, the accused petitioner along with two others restrained them on the landing of the first floor and abused them in filthy language and threatened them in such a manner which resorted to criminal intimidation. P. W. 2 Pabitra Kumar Roy Chaudhury, the ground floor tenant in the disputed premises corroborated P. W. 1 as regards the incident. P. W. 3 Krishna Mohan Ghosh who allegedly accompanied P. W. 1 also gave his testimony which was believed by the learned trial Magistrate. P. W. 4 Susanta Dey a neighbour also corroborated the version as given by the other prosecution witnesses as regards the manner of possession of the rooms by the accused petitioner who forcibly caused criminal trespass in respect of two rooms which were previously under the occupation of the O. P. No. 2. The learned Magistrate who tried the case was of opinion that none of the witnesses P. Ws. 2, 3 and 4 were interested witnesses and they were worthy of credence. ( 3 ) IT was the defence version that the accused petitioner was the adopted son of Late Taradasi Devi and D. W. 2 Anil Ch. Biswas came to support the said story just from the mere fact that the accused petitioner used to call Smt. Taradasi Devi as mother. The learned Magistrate took into consideration the admission of the witness that servants normally call their female employers as mother and the claim of the accused petitioner as an adopted son was completely demolished after the complainant opposite Party No. 2 obtained the probate in respect of the will of Smt. Taradasi Devi. One of the unsuccessful contestants to the probate proceeding Samar Mukhetjee came to depose in this case as a defence witness. But he did not remember exactly if he mentioned in his. written objection to the probate proceeding itself that the accused petitioner was engaged by them as a caretaker of the house. One of the unsuccessful contestants to the probate proceeding Samar Mukhetjee came to depose in this case as a defence witness. But he did not remember exactly if he mentioned in his. written objection to the probate proceeding itself that the accused petitioner was engaged by them as a caretaker of the house. He was taken to be an interested witness unworthy of any credence by the learned Magistrate and was found that there could not be any bona fide claim of possession of the accused petitioner in this case, particularly after the probate was granted in favour of the complainant opposite party No. 2. The learned m trial Magistrate was convinced on a proper sifting of the evidence that both the charges were brought home against the petitioner. ( 4 ) THE Court of appeal below considered the contention of the accused petitioner to the effect that the trial was vitiated because of the warrant procedure not having been followed and rejected the contention as baseless. It was argued on behalf of the accused petitioner that since the actual words used were sufficient to make out a case of such criminal intimidation which contained a threat to cause grievous hurt, the offence prima facie would be under Section 506 (2) of the Indian Penal Code and therefore, the Trial Court had no other alternative but to conform to the warrant procedure. But it was not so done. The learned Additional Sessions Judge thought that the mere words used would not be enough and that no prejudice was caused to the accused as summons procedure trial was adhered to. ( 5 ) IT has been argued by Mr. Banerjee appearing for the accused petitioner that as the two rooms which were in direct occupation of the complainant opposite Party No. 2 were not actually used by him but were kept vacant and the complainant opposite Party No. 2 did not live himself in the. said premises, there was no question of any criminal trespass being made out in the facts and circumstances of the case within the meaning of Section 441 of the Indian Penal Code. said premises, there was no question of any criminal trespass being made out in the facts and circumstances of the case within the meaning of Section 441 of the Indian Penal Code. If the accused enters upon the premises of others with intent to commit and offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property or having lawfully entered into or upon Such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate insult or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence, a criminal trespass is said to have been committed thereby. Mr. Banerjee argued that in order to establish that the entry on the property was with intent to annoy, intimidate or insult, it is necessary for the court to be satisfied that causing such annoyance, intimidation or insult was the main aim of the entry and it is sufficient to show merely that the natural consequence of the entry was likely to be annoyance, intimidation or insult and this was known to the accused. Mr. Banerjee contended that the alleged act of intimidation was a separate incident altogether and was not made at the time when the alleged dispossession took place. However, we may not forget in the context that ,a person having lawfully entered into or upon such property may still constitute criminal trespass, if any, by unlawfully remaining there and we do not find any bona fide claim being made out by the accused petitioner as alleged or at all. In Smt. Mathri and ors. However, we may not forget in the context that ,a person having lawfully entered into or upon such property may still constitute criminal trespass, if any, by unlawfully remaining there and we do not find any bona fide claim being made out by the accused petitioner as alleged or at all. In Smt. Mathri and ors. v. The State of Punjab1, the Supreme Court reiterated the principle as follows: In order to establish that the entry on the property was with intent to annoy intimidate or insult, it is necessary for the Court to be satisfied that causing such annoyance, intimidation or insult was the aim of the entry, that it is not sufficient for that purpose to show merely that the natural consequence of the entry was likely to he annoyance, intimidation or insult, and that this likely consequence was known to the persons entering, that in deciding whether the aim of the entry was the causing of such annoyance, intimidation or insult, the Court has to consider all the relevant circumstances, including the presence of knowledge that its natural consequences would be such annoyance; intimidation or insult and including also the probability of something else than the causing of such intimidation, insult or annoyance, being the dominant intention which prompted the entry. ( 6 ) IN Rash Behari Chatterjee v. Faqu Shaw and ors. 2 the Supreme Court reiterated the same principle and held that even if the complainant was not in actual possession of the property and even though the property was lying vacant after the complainant obtained possession, it would be deemed that the actual possession must be of the complainant. Further, the law did not require that the intention must to annoy a person who is actually present at the time of the trespass. Supreme Court thus repelled the contention that there would be no criminal trespass if it was a case of an absentee complainant whose property has been trespassed upon. Further, the law did not require that the intention must to annoy a person who is actually present at the time of the trespass. Supreme Court thus repelled the contention that there would be no criminal trespass if it was a case of an absentee complainant whose property has been trespassed upon. When an accused has trespassed upon the property of another and refused to go, when asked by the owner to do so and compels the owner either to use force within tbe limits of his rights of defence of private property to remove an intruder or else to go to the court to achieve the same object, the conduct of the accused amounts to intimidation and annoyance and the intention to cause these is clear in Harakanta Biswas v. Subhag Singh3 ( 7 ) WE find thus that the conviction under Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code has sufficiently been made out in the facts and circumstance of the case. ( 8 ) NOW we come to the other question as regards the offence under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code. We are convinced that the words used are indeed intimidatory and are also sufficient to cause a provocation. As regards the threat, we must have to bear in mind whether it is a real one and not just a mere expression of an out burst when the person utters the same but does not exactly mean what said and also when the person at whom the threat is launched did not feel threatened actually. We have considered the single Bench Judgment of the Madras High Court in Nolde Mohandass v. State. 4 But the facts of the said case are somewhat distinguishable from the present one. We find that despite the words used, taken in the context of the sequence of events, the words used are sufficiently provocative and were meant to cause intentional insult to the O. P. No. 2 with intent to provoke a breach of peace though it may also come within the first part of Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code having thereby made out an offence of criminal intimidation. Both under Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code as well as in the first pan of Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, the sentence is imprisonment upto two years or fine or both. Both under Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code as well as in the first pan of Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, the sentence is imprisonment upto two years or fine or both. ( 9 ) WE, however, think that the ends of justice would be sufficiently met if we uphold the conviction under the first part of Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code and alter the sentence to a fine of rupees two hundred (Rs. 200/-), in default, R. I. for Fifteen days in so far as the charge under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned. As regard the other charge under Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code for causing house trespass we think that the sentence should stand altered to a fine of rupees two hundred (Rs. 200/-), in default, R. I. for Fifteen days, the sentence of imprisonment in default of fine in respect of both the offences running consecutively. The revisional application stands rejected subject to the modification of sentence as indicated above. Sentence modified.