JUDGMENT Brijesh Kumar, J. - This bunch of writ petitions relates to the service matter of the employees of different co-operative institutions. Most of the petitions have been filed by the employees of the U.P. Co-operative Processing and Cold Storage Federation Ltd. and .some relate to the employees of the U.P. Co-operative Bank and U. P. Co-operative Federation. One another petition relates to an employee of Hardoi, District Co-operative Bank, Hardoi. There are some questions which are common in all the writ petitions and decisions on those points may help in disposing of all the petitions in this bunch. In some of the writ petitions, orders of termination of the employees of the Societies have been challenged and in some of the petitions, a grievance has been raised that the Society concerned wrongly refused to extend the appointments of the employees which came to an end and it amounted to retrenchment. It appears that the petitioners in different petitions were initially appointed on daily wages and thereafter they were given ad-hoc appointments for three months which was being extended from time to time for a further period of three months or 89 days. On expiry of the period of appointment, fresh appointment letters were being issued after a break of two or three days or in some cases, for a longer period, say five to ten days. These employees, however, continued to work for two-three years or more. 2. The case of the employees is that since they had completed more than 240 days in one calendar year, they had at-least one year or more continuous service to their credit and their discontinuance or termination, as the case may be, amounted to retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act. The retrenchment could not be resorted to without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act providing for payment of retrenchment compensation etc. Admittedly no retrenchment compensation was paid by the respective employer Societies. 3. The main defence of the employer Societies is that the employees did not complete one year's continuous service in the establishment as there had been breaks in their services and that the appointments were for a fixed term which had come to an end on expiry of specified period. Therefore, they were not entitled for the benefit of retrenchment compensation etc., as provided under the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, they were not entitled for the benefit of retrenchment compensation etc., as provided under the Industrial Disputes Act. Another plea raised is that under Regulation 5 of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Employees' Service Regulations, 1975, the appointments had to be made only through the Co operative Institutional Service Board. Even ad-hoc appointments could continue only for a specified period; thereafter it would cease to be operative in terms of the provisions contained in Regulation 5 of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Employees' Service Regulations, 1975. Undisputedly the appointments were not made through the Institutional Service Board and they continued in service against the provisions of Employees Service Regulations, 1975; therefore, the employees could not claim any retrench rent compensation or benefit under the Industrial Disputes Act. It was also argued that since the appointments had come to an end on expiry of a fixed term, the same could not be covered by the definition of the word `retrenchment' as provided under Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central). 4. In some of the petitions, it has been claimed that the employees are entitled for regularisation of their services in view of a notification dated July 30, 1985. Thus their services could not be brought to an end without considering them for regularisation. 5. One of the petitions, namely, Writ Petition No. 5177 of 1983 has been filed by the U. P. Co-operative Bank Challenging the award of the Labour Court by which three employees of the U.P. Co-operative Bank were held to be confirmed and they were held to be entitled for payment of their wages in the regular scale of the post concerned instead of daily wages. The employees involved in this petition were also appointed on daily wages and continued for several years but were not give regular scale of pay. Their claim was for grant of regular scale and for being treated as confirmed employees by the U. P. Co-operative Bank. This petition was cognisable by a Single Judge ; however, in view of the fact that the award given by the Labour Court was being relied upon in other petitions on the ground that similar question was involved in those petitions, it was ordered that this petition may also be heard alongwith other petitions. 6. This petition was cognisable by a Single Judge ; however, in view of the fact that the award given by the Labour Court was being relied upon in other petitions on the ground that similar question was involved in those petitions, it was ordered that this petition may also be heard alongwith other petitions. 6. We propose to decide that common points which emerge from the different writ petitions and to the extent necessary, we may deal with individual petitions as well. 7. We have heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the different parties. The main points which emerged for consideration are as, what is the effect of intermittent short breaks which have been given by the employers in issuing different letters of appointments for different periods and have these breaks to be ignored where the workmen have completed 240 days under one employer during one calendar year ; such employees, who have been in employment for a continuous period of one year, they are entitled for retrenchment compensation etc. as provided under Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act or not; if the termination of their employment is brought about without complying with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U. P. industrial Disputes Act, what will be its effect ? One of the questions to be considered would be if the cessation of employment of a workman brought about by lapse of fixed term of appointment or by non-renewal of the same would amount to retrenchment or it shall be excluded from the definition of `retrenchment' as amended under the Industrial Disputes Act (Central; by adding clause (bb) to Section 2 (oo) of the Act. Yet another question to be considered would be whether the workmen would be entitled for benefits under Section 6-1N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act whose appointment or continuance is against the Regulations, namely, U.P. Co-operative Societies Employees' Service Regulations, 1975. Since in some of the petitions, the workmen have claimed that they are entitled for regularisation of their services in terms of notification dated July 30, 1985, it will have to be examined in what circumstances the employees would be entitled for consideration for regularisation. 8. Since in some of the petitions, the workmen have claimed that they are entitled for regularisation of their services in terms of notification dated July 30, 1985, it will have to be examined in what circumstances the employees would be entitled for consideration for regularisation. 8. The main thrust on behalf of the petitioners is upon the ground that their services have been terminated or have been brought to an end without compliance with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 provides as follows : - " 6-N. Condition precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-No workmen employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice wages for the period of the notice: Provided that no such notice shall be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specified a dale for the termination of service ; (b) the workman has been paid, at `the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months ;.and (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the State Government " 9. According to the provision quoted above, before retrenchment i;, resorted to, certain preconditions have to be complied with by the employer ; viz., giving of one month's notice or wages in lieu thereof ; the workman has to be paid retrenchment compensation and notice in prescribed manner is to be served on the State Government. Undisputedly no retrenchment compensation has been paid nor one month's notice prior to retrenchment was given. This provision applies to the workmen who have been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer. Undisputedly no retrenchment compensation has been paid nor one month's notice prior to retrenchment was given. This provision applies to the workmen who have been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer. The term `continuous service' has been defined under Section 2 (g) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act as follows : - "2 (g) `Continuous service' means uninterrupted service, and includes service which may be interrupted merely on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work is not due to any fault on the part of the workman, and a workman, who during a period of twelve calendar months has actually worked in an industry for not less than two hundreds and forty days shall be deemed to have completed one year of continuous service in the industry. Explanation - In computing the number of days on which a workman has actually worked in an industry, the days on which - (i) he has been laid off under the agreement or as permitted by standing order made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 or under any other law applicable to the industrial establishment, the largest number of days during which he has been so laid oil' being taken into account for the purposes of this clause. (ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned in the previous year, and (iii) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave ; so however that the total period of such maternity leave shall not exceed twelve weeks, shall be included." 10. From the definition quoted above, it is clear that a workman would be taken'to be in continuous service if he has worked for not less than 240 days under an employer during a period of twelve calendar months. In the cases in hand we find that repeated appointments were made for a period of three months or 89 days from time to time with breaks of 2-3 days or a little more in almost all the cases. The workmen were continued adopting the same practice of giving them appointment letters for short periods as indicated above. In the cases in hand we find that repeated appointments were made for a period of three months or 89 days from time to time with breaks of 2-3 days or a little more in almost all the cases. The workmen were continued adopting the same practice of giving them appointment letters for short periods as indicated above. It has been averred in many of the petitions that sometimes an order of appointment for 89 days would follow after a lapse of quite some time but during that period as well, the workmen were continued and the wages were also paid later on. Even if the period of breaks is excluded, it is clear that the workmen had completed 240 days of work in twelve calendar months preceding cessation of their employment. We may observe that it was not a very healthy practice for the employers to give deliberate breaks with an intention or in an effort to avoid the liability which may accrue under the provisions of law. The workmen were being made to continue for years together on piecemeal appointments for three months or 89 days which leads to a conclusion that it was not done with bona fide intention. The employers should not shirk their liability in giving benefits which may accrue to a workman by virtue of the provisions under the Labour Laws. However, there is no dispute that the workman had worked for a period of 240 days during twelve calendar months preceding the cessation of their employment. Therefore, the provisions of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act would be applicable. 11. We may next see as to that would be the effect of non-compliance of the provisions contained under Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. We find that a similar provision is contained under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central), which may be quoted as follows: - "25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. 11. We may next see as to that would be the effect of non-compliance of the provisions contained under Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. We find that a similar provision is contained under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central), which may be quoted as follows: - "25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. - No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice : Provided that no such notice shall be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies a date for the termination of service ; (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months ; and (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the official Gazette." 12. Before we may proceed further on this point, it would be beneficial to have the definition of the word `retrenchment' under the two Acts. Before we may proceed further on this point, it would be beneficial to have the definition of the word `retrenchment' under the two Acts. The word `retrenchment' has been defined under Section 2 (s) of the U. P. Act which reads as follows : - "2 (s) `retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman or any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include - (i) voluntary retirement of the workmen ; or (ii) retirement of the workmen on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf." Similarly, it has been defined under Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central) which reads as follows as amended in 1984 : - "2 (oo) "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include - (a) voluntary retirement of the workmen ; or (b) retirement of the workman or reaching the age or superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contain a stipulation in that behalf ; or (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein ; or (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health." 13. Section 25-F and 2 (oo) (unamended) of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central) came for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and it was held that non-compliance with the provisions of Section 25-F rendered the termination of the services of an employee or cessation of employment as void and illegal. A reference to a case reported in (1976) SCC (L&S) page 132, The State Bank of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money, may be made. In this case, there were intermittent breaks but the employee had completed the requisite number of days of work for being treated in continuous service. A reference to a case reported in (1976) SCC (L&S) page 132, The State Bank of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money, may be made. In this case, there were intermittent breaks but the employee had completed the requisite number of days of work for being treated in continuous service. Thus he was held to be in continuous service but it appears that in the order of appointment, it was provided that the appointment was purely temporary one for a period of 9 days but he could be terminated earlier and in case the services were not terminated earlier, they will automatically cease on the expiry of the specified period. It was held that cessation of employment on expiry of specified period was nothing else but termination of services. It was observed that a termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the master or the running out of the stipulated term. It would be beneficial to quote para 9 of the judgments. "9. A breakdown of Section 2 (oo) unmistakably expends the semantics of retrenchment. `Termination ..... .. for any reason what- sever' are the key words. Whatever the reasons, every termination spells retrenchment. So the sole question is, has the employee's service been terminated ? Verbal apparel apart, the substance is decisive. A termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the master of the running out of the stipulated term. To protect the weak against the strong this policy of comprehensive definition has been effectuated. Termination embraces not merely the act of termination by the employer, but the fact of termination howsoever produced. May be, the present may be a hard case, but we can visualise abuses by employers by suitable (sic) devices, circumventing the armour of Section 25-F and Section 2 (oo). Without speculating on possibilities, we may agree that retrenchment is no longer terra incognita but area covered by an expansive definition. It means' to end, conclude, cease'. In the present case the employment ceased, concluded, ended on the expiration of nine days automatically may be but cessation all the same. That to write into the order of appointment the date of termination confers no moksha from Section 25-F (b) is inferable from the proviso to Section 25-F (1) (sic 25-F (a). It means' to end, conclude, cease'. In the present case the employment ceased, concluded, ended on the expiration of nine days automatically may be but cessation all the same. That to write into the order of appointment the date of termination confers no moksha from Section 25-F (b) is inferable from the proviso to Section 25-F (1) (sic 25-F (a). True, the section speaks of retrenchment by the employer and it is urged that some act of violation by the employer to bring about the termination is essential to attract Section 25-F and automatic extinguishment of service by effluxion of time cannot be sufficient." 14. It was held in the above came that it was necessary to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central) failing which, the order was held to be bad. Another case on the point is reported in (1976) 4 SCC page 222, M/s. Hindustan Steel and others. In this case, the case of Shri N. Sundara Money (supra) was followed and it was held that automatic termination of service on efflux of contractual period amounted to retrenchment and that non-compliance with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central) was fatal. In another case reported in (1980) 3 SCC page 340 - Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala, the fact was that the workman was given appointments with breaks of a few days but completed 240 days within a period of twelve calendar months. He was discharged on the ground that he had failed to pass the test for confirmation of his services. It was held that this too amounted to retrenchment and the order of termination was bad and the workman was ordered to be reinstated with full back wages. 15. In the case of Mohan Lal v. Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd., (1988) 3 SCC page 225, it was observed as follows: - "Reverting to the facts of this case, termination of service of the appellant does not fall within any of the excepted, or to be precise, excluded categories. Undoubtedly therefore the termination would constitute retrenchment and by a catena of decisions it is well settled that where prerequisite for valid retrenchment as laid down in Section 25-F has not been complied with, retrenchment bringing about termination of service is ab initio void. Undoubtedly therefore the termination would constitute retrenchment and by a catena of decisions it is well settled that where prerequisite for valid retrenchment as laid down in Section 25-F has not been complied with, retrenchment bringing about termination of service is ab initio void. In State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha this Court held that failure to comply with the requirement of Section 25-F which prescribes a condition precedent for a valid retrenchment render the order of retrenchment invalid and inoperative, In other words, it does not bring about a cessation of service of the workman and the workman continues to be in service. This was not even seriously controverted before us." 16. In the case of L. Robert D' Souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and another, (1982) 1 SCC, page 645, it was held that even a casual or seasonal workman who rendered continuous service for one year or more cannot be retrenched without complying with the requisite of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central). It was further observed that where the employee had acquired the status of a temporary employee having rendered continuous and uninterrupted service for six months, his service could not be terminated under Rule 2505 of the Railway Establishment Manual without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central) and Rule 2505 of the Railway Establishment Manual though may be attracted, would have to be read subject to the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. 17. In the case of Gammon India Limited v. Niranjan Dass, (1984) 1 SCC, page 509, it was held that where termination of service did not come under the exception as provided under Section 2' (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central), it amounted to retrenchment even though it may be on the ground of reduction in volume of business. The retrenchment, bringing about the termination was hold to be ab initio void in absence of compliance with the prerequisites as laid under Section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act. 18. Here we may mention that the cases cited above are based on interpretation of Sections 25-F and 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Acts (Central) as then stood. The retrenchment, bringing about the termination was hold to be ab initio void in absence of compliance with the prerequisites as laid under Section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act. 18. Here we may mention that the cases cited above are based on interpretation of Sections 25-F and 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Acts (Central) as then stood. An amendment in Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central) has been effected in the year 1984 which is being relied upon by the employers, We may advert to that point in the following paragraph ; presently suffice it to say that cessation of employment for whatsoever reason amounts to retrenchment and compliance with the provision providing for payment of retrenchment compensation etc, is essential, failing which the termination of employment is rendered illegal and void. 19. On behalf of the employers, in reply, its has been submitted that where the services of the employees come to an end expiry of specific period of appointments or where contract of service has not been renewed, it would not amount to retrenchment, in view of the amended definition of the word `retrenchment' as provided under clause (bb) of Section 2 o(o) of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central). The word `retrenchment' as defined under Section 2 (5) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act has already been quoted above. 20. By industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act No. 49 of 1984, Clause (bb) has been added in Section 2 (oo). As observed earlier, prior to this amendment, the definition of the word `retrenchment' in the two Statutes, namely, Industrial Disputes Act U. P. and Central, was the same except that the Central Act contained clause (c) as well with which we are not concerned. The submission is that the definition of word `retrenchment' as provided under the Central Act will be applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh as well even though a different definition is provided under the U. P. Act. 21. For examining the question as which of the two definitions contained in the U. P. Act and the Central Act would be applicable, we may have first to examine as the provisions of which of the two Acts shall apply in Uttar Pradesh for the purposes of determination of rights and liabilities of the employee and the employer in a case of retrenchment. Under the Central Act, provisions regarding retrenchment are contained under Chapter V-A. This Chapter contains Sections 25-A to 25-J. Section 25-J provides as follow : - "25-J. Effect of laws inconsistent with this Chapter : - (1) The provisions of this chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law including standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946) : Provided that where under the provisions of any other Act or rules, orders or notifications issued thereunder or under any Standing Orders or under any award, contract of service or otherwise, a workman entitled to benefits in respect of any matter which are more favourable to him than those to which he would be entitled under this Act, the workman shall continue to be entitled to the more favourable benefits in respect of that manner, notwithstanding that he receives benefits in respect of other matters under this Act. (2) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to affect the provisions of any other law for the time being in force in any State in so for as that law provides for the settlement of Industrial Disputes, but the rights and liabilities of employers and workmen in so far as they relate to lay off and retrenchment shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter." 22. According to Section 25-J (?.) of the Central Act quoted above, the rights and liabilities of employers and workmen in so far as they relate to retrenchment have to be determined in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V-A. So far the other matters relating to settlement of industrial disputes are concerned, the provisions of the State law are not affected However, supremacy of the Central Act has been preserved under sub-section (2) of Section 25-J in the matters of rights and liabilities of employers and workmen in a case of retrenchment. 23. 23. Under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, conditions precedent to the retrenchment of a workman are contained under Section 6-N. Section 6-R of the Act runs as follows: "6-R. Effects of laws inconsistent with Sections 6-J to 6-Q -The provision from Section 6-J to 6-Q shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law (including Standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 : Provided that nothing contained in this Act shall have effect to derogate from any right which a workman has under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, or any notification or order issued thereunder or any award for the time being in operation or any contract with the employer. (2) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing contained in Sections 6-J to 6-R shall be deemed to affect the provision of any other law for the time being in force so far as that law provides for the settlement of industrial disputes, but the rights and liabilities of employees and workmen in so far as they relate to lay off and retrenchment shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Sections 6-J to 6-Q." 24. According to Section 6-R of the U. P. Act quoted above, it has been provided that provisions contained in Sections 6-J to 6-Q shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent in any other law. Sub-section (2) of Section 6-R clarifies by way of removal of doubts that rights and liabilities of employers and workmen in so far as they relate to retrenchment shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Sections 6-J to 6-Q. By Section 6-R supremacy of the provisions of the U. P. Act has been preserved in the matters relating to rights and liabilities of employers and workmen in a case of retrenchment. 25. From a perusal of the two provisions quoted above, it is clear that an inconsistency exists in regard to the applicability of the provisions contained in Chapter V-A of the Central Act and the provisions contained under Sections 6-J to 6-Q of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. In this connection, we find that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 came into force on April 1, 1947. In this connection, we find that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 came into force on April 1, 1947. The U. P. Industrial Disputes Act came into force on February 1, 1948 after receiving the assent of the Governor General of India under Section 76 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Section 6-R has been added to the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act in the year 1957 by U. P. Act No. 1 of 1957. The President had accorded assent to U. P. Act No. 1 of 1957 on December 29, 1956. It was published in the Gazette of Uttar Pradesh dated January 2, 1957. So far Section 25-J of the C. rural Act is concerned, it was existing since prior to passing of U. P. Act No. 1 of 1957. Section 25-J of the Central Act was also amended by Act No. 36 of 1964 with effect from 19-12-1964 but by this amendment only proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 25-J was added. The other provisions which are material namely, sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 25-J remained the same as existing from before. From the above facts, it is clear that addition of Section 6-R to the U. P. Act was made by an amendment in the year 1957 i. e., subsequent to the existing provision contained under Section 25-J of the Central. Article 254 of the Constitution is attracted in cases where there exists conflict between the two provisions of the Statutes, one passed by the Parliament and the other, by the State Legislature. In such cases, it is the State law which is to prevail provided it has received the assent of the President and has been passed subsequent to the Act made by the Parliament. This position is clear from clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution. As observed earlier, inconsistency exists between the two provisions namely, Section 25-J of the Central Act and Section 6-R of the U. P. Act'. Both cannot operate simultaneously and one will have to give way to the other. Provisions contained under Section 6-R of the U. P. Act being a subsequent law, having been passed after receiving assent of the President shall override and provisions contained under Section 25-J of the Central Act as it was already existing since prior to 1957. The subject-matter of legislation is undisputedly in the concurrent list. Provisions contained under Section 6-R of the U. P. Act being a subsequent law, having been passed after receiving assent of the President shall override and provisions contained under Section 25-J of the Central Act as it was already existing since prior to 1957. The subject-matter of legislation is undisputedly in the concurrent list. Therefore we hold that in view of Article 254 (2) of the Constitution, provisions of Section 6-R of the U. P. Act will prevail over the provisions of Section 25-J of the Central Act, i. e. to say, in the State of Uttar Pradesh, in the matters relating to rights and liabilities of employers and workmen, in a case of retrenchment, Section 6-N of the U. P. Act will be applicable. 26. Once we have come to the conclusion that the provisions of the U. P. Act will be applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh in the matters relating to retrenchment, there remains no difficulty in holding that the definition of the word `retrenchment' as given under the U. P. Act will be applicable. It is well settled that the word which has been defined in a statute has to be given the same meaning whenever occasion arises while applying the provisions of the statute concerned. The definition provided in a statute is not to be applied while interpreting the provisions of a different Act. The result would, therefore, be that the petitions in hand would be covered by the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to in the earlier part of this judgment holding that cessation of employment brought about without complying with the provisions of Section 25-J of the Industrial Disputes Act, as then stood, would be illegal and void. The decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are based on unamended definition of the word `retrenchment' as defined under Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which was the same as it is under the U. P. Act. 27. On behalf of the Co-operative Societies, the employers, it has been next contended that the recruitment and conditions of service of the employees of the Co-operative Societies are covered by the U. P. Co-operative Societies Employees' Service Regulations, 1975. According to the Regulations, the recruitment is to be made through the Institutional Service Board. 27. On behalf of the Co-operative Societies, the employers, it has been next contended that the recruitment and conditions of service of the employees of the Co-operative Societies are covered by the U. P. Co-operative Societies Employees' Service Regulations, 1975. According to the Regulations, the recruitment is to be made through the Institutional Service Board. Since the Petitioners in different writ petitions have not been recruited in accordance with the U. P. Co-operative Societies Employees' Service Regulations, 1975 their appointments were not legal and they could not be legally continued in service, so they would not be entitled for the benefits under the Industrial Disputes Act. In this connection, it would be beneficial to peruse the relevant regulations. Regulation 5 of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Employees' Service Regulations, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations of 1975) provides as under : "5. Recruitment, -(i) Recruitment for all appointments in a co-operative society shall be made through the Board whether the recruitment is - (a) direct, or (b) by promotion from employees already in service of the society ; or (c) by taking on deputation or otherwise, a person already in the service of another society, registered or deemed to have been registered under the Act, or a person in employment under a Corporation or an undertaking owned or controlled by the Central or the State Government body corporate administering a local fund. ................................ ................................. (iii) The Board may, pending selection for post to be filled in any direct recruitment, permit stop-gap arrangement to be made by the appointing authority for a period not exceeding 180 days : Provided that the intimation of such appointment is given to the Board forthwith and it is ensured that proper requisition for the post, as also additional information required by the Board, if any has been furnished to it : Provided further that the Board may in special circumstances, and at the request of the appointing authority, extent the period of 180 days, by a period not exceeding 120 days : Provided also that the appointment made under this clause shall cease to have effect from the date on which the original" period or the extended period of appointment under this clause expires. ............................... ................................ 28. The relevant provision of Regulation 15 reads as follows : "15. (i) No appointment shall be made except in the manner provided for in the Regulations hereinbefore. ............................... ................................ 28. The relevant provision of Regulation 15 reads as follows : "15. (i) No appointment shall be made except in the manner provided for in the Regulations hereinbefore. Where recruitment through or with the approval of the Board is provided for in Regulation No. 5, no appointment shall be made except of the candidate and in the order mentioned in the list communicated by the Board. .............................. ..............................." 29. Regulation 19 reads as under:- 19. Termination. - Services of an employee shall be terminable:- (a) in case of a temporary, employee on one month's notice in writing on either side, or in lieu thereof by payment of one month's salary by the party which gives notice : Provided that in case of direct appointments made for a specific period, it shall not be necessary to give any notice or any pay in lieu thereof : ................... .................... ....................." 30. Regulation 29 reads as follows "29. Retrenchment. - (1) A co-operative society may, subject to the approval of the Registrar, retrench its employee if the business of the society has either shrunk or the concerned posts are to be reduced to effect economy : Provided that compensation where required under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is paid to the employees. (ii) In making retrenchment the policy shall he to retrench the junior most employee of the grade." 31. Regulation 103 reads as under :- "103. The provisions of these regulations to the extent of their inconsistency, with any of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, U.P. Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhishthan Adhiniyam, 1962, Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and any other labour laws for the time being in force, if applicable to any co-operative society or class of cooperative societies, shall be deemed to be inoperative." 32. On the basis of Regulations 5 and 15, it has been submitted that no appointment could be made except as provided under the Regulations of 1975. Under Regulation 5 (iii), there is a provision for making stop-gap arrangement pending selection by appointing a person for not exceeding 180 days which period can be extended by the Board by 120 days more. Under the proviso to clause (iii) of Regulation 5-A, appointment in stop-gap arrangement has to cease to have effect from the date on which the original period or extended period of appointment, under the clause, expires. Under the proviso to clause (iii) of Regulation 5-A, appointment in stop-gap arrangement has to cease to have effect from the date on which the original period or extended period of appointment, under the clause, expires. Regulation 15 also prohibits appointments except it; accordance with the provisions contained in the Regulations. Therefore, it has been contended that at best, stop-gap arrangement could continue only for 180 days or till extended period and after lapse of that period it would cease to have effect. Thus the petitioners could not be appointed legally against the Regulations of 1975 ; in any case their continuance as such was illegal and against the Service Regulations. The result, according to the employer Societies, would be that the workmen would not be entitled for the benefits under Section 6-H of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, because, to be entitled for that benefit, there has to be, first, a valid appointment. It has also been contended that under proviso to clause (a) of Regulation 19 which provides for termination of service, no notice would be required in a case where the appointment was for a specific period and it has also been contended that the termination of employment would fully be covered under Regulation 19. 33. There is no doubt that there is a prohibition to make appointments except in accordance with the provisions contained in the Service Regulations 1975. The labour laws do not say that the appointments can be made in violation of Service Regulations. Regulation 5 provides for making ad hoc appointments though for a limited period- So their continuance after certain period can be said against the provision of Regulation 5, but once an employer itself chose to make appointment and continued the same despite the expiry of period of 180 days or extended period of 120 days, it is not open to it to plead that the benefits which has accrued to the employees for having worked for more than 240 days in one calendar year, would not be available to them. After all the employer societies had appointed and continued the employees beyond the specified period and also paid their wages which had accrued to them for having worked even beyond the period of 180 days or extended period of 120 days. After all the employer societies had appointed and continued the employees beyond the specified period and also paid their wages which had accrued to them for having worked even beyond the period of 180 days or extended period of 120 days. At the most, in our view, the employer societies can be said to have a good ground to bring about cessation of employment of such employees who have continued in violation of the service Regulations but it does not mean that if any benefit has accrued to those employees for the period they worked, that would not be admissible to them. Under the provisions of Industrial Laws, if an employee works for 240 days during one calendar year, certain benefits accrue to him and they cannot be wiped of on the plea which is now sought to be raised. There is no fault on the part of employees. It was for the society concerned to have sent requisition to the Institutional Service Board within the time stipulated for regular recruitment. It this was not done, the employers could only discontinue to take work from such employees after expiry of period of 180 days or the extended period, when their appointments ceased under the Regulations. But in the present case, the employees were in fact continued and work was taken from them, they were also paid their wages, therefore, to say that they would not be entitled for other benefits which accrued to them under the provisions of Industrial laws is not acceptable nor tenable. As observed earlier, the employers could very well dispense with their services and bring about cessation of their employment on the ground that their continuance was not in accordance with the provisions of service Regulations but then while doing so, they have to comply with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. The fact that the work was being taken by the employer and wages were being paid to the workmen would entitle them to the benefits accrued under the Industrial Disputes Act. All other considerations for not complying with the previsions of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act would be irrelevant and wholly extraneous. Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act will have an overriding effect over the provisions of Service Regulations. All other considerations for not complying with the previsions of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act would be irrelevant and wholly extraneous. Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act will have an overriding effect over the provisions of Service Regulations. If the requirements for entitlement of a workman for retrenchment compensation are fulfilled no impediment would come in his way in having that benefit. 34. The word `retrenchment' has been defined under the Service Regulations, 1975 as well. Under Regulation 2 (iv) the definition of the word `retrenchment' provides that it means termination of services for any reason whatsoever otherwise than as punishment or on account of retirement or resignation. Therefore, even under the Service Regulations, 1975, cessation of employment brought about for any reason whatsoever those mentioned above, would amount to retrenchment. Section 29 provides that retrenchment can be effected for the reason of shrinkage in business or to effect economy with the approval of the Registrar provided the compensation as required under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is paid to the employee. But it does not an I cannot mean that compensation is not to be paid in cases of retrenchment resorted to otherwise that by reason of shrinkage in business or to effect economy. Under the Labour laws, such compensation has to be paid which is a prerequisite condition for effecting retrenchment. We have already discussed earlier that the rights and liabilities of the employers and the workmen in the matters relating to retrenchment shall be governed by the provisions contained under Sections 6 J to 6-Q of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. Section 6-R of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act is very clear on the above point. Therefore, compensation in a case of any kind of retrenchment for whatsoever reason will have to be paid in accordance with the aforesaid provisions. In this connection, Regulation 103 of the Service Regulations, 1975 may also be referred which provides that the provisions of these regulations to the extent of their inconsistency with any of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act etc. and any other labour laws for the time being in force, shall be deemed to be inoperative. Regulation 103 makes the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act and other labour laws applicable even though there may be some inconsistency in the Regulations. and any other labour laws for the time being in force, shall be deemed to be inoperative. Regulation 103 makes the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act and other labour laws applicable even though there may be some inconsistency in the Regulations. It is true that the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act has not been specifically mentioned under Regulation 103, nonetheless it is labour law for the time being in force. Section 6-R of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act read with Regulation 103 leaves no room for doubt about applicability of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 35. So far another argument raised that the termination of the employees would be wholly covered under Regulation 19 of the Service Regulations, 1975, which vests in the employer full powers to terminate the services of a temporary employee, need not detain us long. According to the definition of the word `retrenchment' as provided under Regulation 2 (xv) of the Service Regulations, 1975, it means termination of the employee for any reason whatsoever except by way of punishment, resignation or retirement. The employer certainly has right to exercise its powers to terminate the services of a temporary employee under regulation 19 but subject to the provisions of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act [Refer to 1982 (1) SCC page 645 (supra) 36. We may now take up the other point about regularisation of the services of the employees. On behalf of the petitioners, in several writ petitions, reliance has been placed upon a notification issued by the State Government dated July 30, 1985 enforcing Regulations, providing for regularisation of the services of ad-hoc employees, working in the Co-operative Societies on the posts within the purview of the Institutional Service Board. The Regulations are called the U. P. Regularisation of ad-hoc Appointment (on posts within the purview of the Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Institutional Service Board) Regulations, 198c hereinafter referred to as Regulation `85. Regulation 2 of these regulations provides that these regulations shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the U. P. Co-operative Societies Employees' Service Regulations, 1975. The Regulations are called the U. P. Regularisation of ad-hoc Appointment (on posts within the purview of the Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Institutional Service Board) Regulations, 198c hereinafter referred to as Regulation `85. Regulation 2 of these regulations provides that these regulations shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the U. P. Co-operative Societies Employees' Service Regulations, 1975. The relevant part of Regulation 4 provides as under:- " 4 (1) Any employee who - (i) was directly appointed on any post on ad-hoc basis in any Co- operative Society falling within the purview of the Board on or before May 1, 1983 and is continuing in Service, as such, on the date commencement of these regulations : (ii) possessed requisite qualifications prescribed for regular appointment at the time of such ad hoc appointment; and (iii) has completed or, as the case may be, after he has completed three years continuous service, shall be considered for regular appointment in permanent or temporary vacancy as may be available on the basis of his record and suitability before and regular appointment is made in such vacancy in accordance with the relevant service rules, regulations or orders. Explanation. - In computing the period of continuous service every break in one service for a period not exceeding thirty days shall be ignored and the employee shall be deemed to be continuing in service." 37. On a perusal of provision quoted above, it is clear that an employee who had been directly appointed on ad-hoc basis in any co-operative society on or before May 1, 1983 and was continuing as such on the date when the regulations came into force and further possessed requisite qualification for the post in question and had completed or may complete three years of continuous service, shall be entitled for consideration for regular appointment. The explanation to Regulation 4(1) further provides that a break in the service upto thirty days shall be ignored in computing the period of continuous service. In the writ petitions before us, several employees had been appointed prior to May 1, 1983 and had been continuing on the date when the regulations of 1985 came into force. The break in their service was less than thirty days. In the writ petitions before us, several employees had been appointed prior to May 1, 1983 and had been continuing on the date when the regulations of 1985 came into force. The break in their service was less than thirty days. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the employer societies, it has not been said that they do not possess requisite qualification as required, for the post held by them. In this view of the matter, we are of the view that those employees, who were directly appointed on ad-hoc basis on or prior to May 1, 1983 and have been in continuous service for three years and further fulfil the requisite qualification for the post, have a right to be considered for regularisation under Regulation 4 of the Regulations of r985. It was highly inappropriate for the employer societies to dispense with their services or to bring about cessation of their employment despite the fact that they fulfilled the condition as laid down by the Regulations of 1985. 38. In writ petitions No. 5487 and 5488 of 1986, the Regulations of 1985 have been challenged on the ground that fixation of date in Regulation 4 as May I, 1983 which is a cut-off date, is arbitrary and discriminatory. It has been submitted that no particular object is to be achieved by fixing May 1,1983 as the date on or before which an employee was appointed so as to be entitled for the benefit under the Regulations of 1985. It has been submitted that the petitioners of two writ petitions mentioned above, who have been appointed after May 1, 1983, could not be deprived of the benefit of regularisation of their services. It has further been submitted that unless the opposite parties could offer a reasonable explanation for fixing a particular date, namely, 1-5-1983, as cut-off date, it is divorced of achieving any object depending upon that date. The fixation of the date being arbitrary results in discrimination as those employees who may be possessing the requisite qualifications and who have been working for the last more than three years, would not be entitled for regularisation merely for the fact that they were appointed after May 1, 1983. 39. The fixation of the date being arbitrary results in discrimination as those employees who may be possessing the requisite qualifications and who have been working for the last more than three years, would not be entitled for regularisation merely for the fact that they were appointed after May 1, 1983. 39. So far the allegation of discriminatory and arbitrary fixation of date is concerned, the opposite party No. 1, namely, the employer society stated in the counter affidavit that this point does not relate to it and no effort was made to explain or justify the fixation of cut-off date in the Regulations of 1985, The State of U. P. was impleaded as a party in both the wraith petitions mentioned above and the notice on its behalf was also accepted by the Chief Standing Counsel but the State choose not to file any counter affidavit or to contest the point. No reason has been indicated for fixing 1-5-1983, as the cut-off date. Even during the course of the arguments the State Counsel was directed at-least to produce the statement and reasons for framing Regulations of 1985 or to produce some relevant material to find out reason of fixing cut-off date, but nothing has been done. No doubt it is true that in such matters, some date or dead line has to be fixed but while doing so, there should be some reasonable ground for fixing a particular date. 40. Let us examine the Regulation of 1985 in the light of the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners. The regulations, as indicated earlier, were notified on July 30, 1985. They provide for regularisation of services of employees of cooperative societies, who were appointed on or before May 1, 1983 and had completed three years of continuous service provided they fulfilled the requisite qualification on the date their ad-hoc appointment was made. Regulation 2 of the Regulations of 1985 provides that these regulations shall have an overriding effect upon the Service Regulations of 1975. The effect of clause (1) of Regulation 4 (1) is that it classifies the ad hoc appointee; into two categories, namely, those who were appointed on or before May 1, 1983 and those who may have been appointed thereafter. The benefit of regularisation of service is available to those appointees who were appointed on or before 1-5-1983. The effect of clause (1) of Regulation 4 (1) is that it classifies the ad hoc appointee; into two categories, namely, those who were appointed on or before May 1, 1983 and those who may have been appointed thereafter. The benefit of regularisation of service is available to those appointees who were appointed on or before 1-5-1983. The other category of ad-hoc appointees, who may have been appointed after 1-5-1983 even though they fulfilled the requisite qualifications and had completed three years of continuous service, have been deprived of the benefit of regularisation under the Regulations of 1985. It is no doubt settled position under the law that class legislation is permissible provided the classification is based on some reasonable criteria and that the classification has some nexus with the object to be achieved. As we have indicated earlier, no effort has been made on behalf of the State to justify the classification or to show any rationale in classifying the ad-hoc appointees. It was for the State to justify the classification once it was challenged and to show that a particular provision is not discriminatory or arbitrary. The purpose which, it appears, was sought to be achieved by Regulations of 1985, was to regularise the services of those employees who for one reason or the other, could not be given chance for regular selection in accordance with the Service Regulations of 1975 but were continued in employment for three years. It may have been thought that it would not be proper to throw such employees on the 'Street, after they had served the employer for a sufficiently long time having ail the requisite qualifications, for the posts they held. It may be noted that the regulations were notified on July 30, 1985 but the cut off date was fixed as May 1, 1983 i. e. to say the benefit of regularisation was available only to those who were appointed on or before May 1, 1983 but not to those who may have been appointed on May 2, 1983 or afterwards even before July 30, 1985. It is not that those who have completed three years by May 1, 1983 or July 30, 1985 had to be considered. It is not that those who have completed three years by May 1, 1983 or July 30, 1985 had to be considered. Even those who may have been appointed on May I, 1983 and had not completed three years of continuous service on July 30, 1985 were also to get benefit on completion of three years service, say sometime in 1986 i. e. after the date of notification of the regulations on July 30, 1985. To take an example, a person who may have been appointed on May 2, 1983, would not be entitled for consideration of regularisation of his services on completion of three years of service on May 2, 1986 but a person appointed on May 1, 1983 and who had not completed three years of continuous service on the date of notification of Service Regulations i. e July 30, 1985 but completed three years of service on May* 1, 1986 shall be entitled for consideration of regularisation of his services. Nothing has been indicated as to why this discrimination has been made aud what is the reason for classifying the ad-hoc appointees in the manner indicated above. Even this has not been indicated that any circular may have been issued restraining the societies from making ad-hoc appointments after May 1, 1983. May be that could provide some ground. We fail to understand how the cut off date resulting in classification of ad-hoc appointees has any nexus with the object to be achieved by the Regulations of 1985. There is nothing on the record nor has been brought to out notice a the basis of which we can hold that there was any rationale for classifying the ad-hoc appointees into two categories. As indicated earlier too, the cut off date is May 1, 1983 and the date of notification of the regulations of 1985 is July 30 1985. If under the regulations, cut-off date would have been fixed as the date of notification, it (could be understandable but it is not clear that for what good reason at-least those persons who were appointed between May 1, 1983 and July 30, 1983 could not be extended the benefit of consideration for regularisation. , 41. In our view, reliance his rightly been placed upon a case reported in AIR 1983 Supreme Court, page 130 : 1983 UPLBEC 378 (SC) D. S. Nakara v. Union of India. , 41. In our view, reliance his rightly been placed upon a case reported in AIR 1983 Supreme Court, page 130 : 1983 UPLBEC 378 (SC) D. S. Nakara v. Union of India. In that case, it w-as held that denial of benefit of revised pension scheme to these pensioners who had retired prior to a particular date, was bad. The case of D.S. Nakara (supra) was followed in a subsequent cate reported in AIR 1986 Supreme Court, page 210, B. Prabhakar Roa and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and other. In para 19 of the judgment, the principles enunciated in D.S. Nakara's case were referred to. It was held that in order to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled. The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group and that the differentia must have a rationale relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the statute in question. One of the questions passed in D. S. Nakara's case quoted in para 19 of this case was, "As a corollary to this established proposition, the next question is, on whom the burden lies to affirmatively establish the rational principle on which the classification is founded correlated to the object sought to be achieved? The answer to the above question as quoted is as follows: - "The State, therefore, would have to affirmatively satisfy the Court that the twin tests have been satisfied. It can only be satisfied if the State establishes not only the rational principle on which classification is founded but correlates it to the objects sought to be achieved." 42. As observed earlier, nothing has been shown on behalf of the State to establish the rational principle and the object, which was sought to be achieved by classifying the ad-hoc appointees by fixing a particular date, namely I-5-I983 and making the benefit of the regularisation rules available to those who were appointed prior to 1-5-1983 and not extending the benefit to the employees appointed thereafter. Under the provisions of Regulations of 1985 as existing, those who had to complete three years service even after 30-7-1985 were to be considered. Under the provisions of Regulations of 1985 as existing, those who had to complete three years service even after 30-7-1985 were to be considered. Fixation of date in Regulation 4 (1) of Regulations of 1985 is arbitrary and discriminatory and that part of the regulation is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as a result of which we hold without ourselves fixing any cut off date, that those petitioners who were appointed at-least on or before the date of notification i. e. 30-7-1985 are also en-tiled for consideration for regularisation according to Regulations of 1985 before these 'posts are regularly filled. 43. Next in regard to the employees belonging to Class IV, it has been submitted that their recruitment is not made through the Institutional Service Board. The Selection for appointment of class IV post is held by a Selection Committee as provided under clause (v) of the Regulations of 1975 and the appointment is also made on the basis of said selection. The same is the position in regard to the posts of typists and clerks in the lowest pay scale in a cooperative society. Therefore, it has been submitted that those class IV employees, typists and clerks in the lowest grade, who have been appointed after August 22, i979, their appointments are not in contravention of Regulation 5 of the Service Regulations of 1975. In support of this contention, a copy of the notification dated August 12, 1979 issued by the State Government has been filed as Annexure A-3 to C. M. Application No. 12198 (w) of 1988 in W. P. No. 5177 of 1983. The said notification provides for appointment by the Selection Committee in respect of different vacancies in cooperative societies for appointments to class IV posts or stenographers and clerks in the lowest grade. So far class IV posts are concerned, it may be observed that appointment on those posts had always been made by the society concerned alter holding the selection. By the above notification, selection for the posts of Stenographers, Typists and Clerks in the lowest grade was also provided to be held by the society concerned. It has been submitted that this notification remained operative from 1979 to 1981 when another notification was issued. So the said notification could be pressed into service in respect of these employees who were appointed during the period 1979 to 1981. It has been submitted that this notification remained operative from 1979 to 1981 when another notification was issued. So the said notification could be pressed into service in respect of these employees who were appointed during the period 1979 to 1981. It may further be pointed out that clause (VI) of Regulation 5 of the Service Regulations itself provides that the appointments which are made by the society on the basis of, ^election held by it are subject to the approval of the institutional Service Board. There is no averment that the selection was held through a duly constituted selection committee whose constitution was provided under notification of 1979 or as required, the appointment was approved by the Institutional Service Board. We therefore, find no merit in this contention and repel the same. 44. On behalf of some of the opposite parties, ground of alternative remedy has been raised and it; has been submitted that since the petitioners are claiming relief on the basis of the rights created under the Industrial Disputes Act, they should take resort to the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act for redressal of their grievance instead of approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In this connection we have come across an unreported decision of a Division Bench of this Court in a bunch of writ petitions, leading case of the bunch being Writ Petition No. 5219 of 1986 decided on 2-4-1987. The Bench while dismissing the writ petitions on the ground of availability of alternative remedy, placed reliance upon certain other decisions of this Court as well as one of the decision of Hon' ble the Supreme Court. So far the case reported in AIR 1975 SC page 2238 - Premier Automobiles v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke and others, relied upon by the Division Bench, is concerned, it may be pointed out that in that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the question of jurisdiction of the civil court and the Labour Court and in that connection it was observed that if the dispute relates to infringement of right or an obligation created under the Industrial Disputes Act, then the only remedy available to the workman is to get an adjudication under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. Wo need not emphasise that so far the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is concerned, it is a different kind of jurisdiction. It is well established that an alternative remedy is never an absolute bar in exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court. It may depend upon facts and circumstances of a particular case that the Court may have to decide as to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, despite availability of alternative remedy or not. We also do hold that normally and in general, it will be appropriate that the workman who claims the relief on the basis of a right created under the Industrial Disputes Act should press into service the machinery as provided under the Industrial Disputes Act itself for redressal of his grievance. In a given case, the High Court may have to consider, as observed earlier, whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, it will be proper in throw out the petition on the ground of alternative remedy or to entertain the same. 45. In this light, perhaps the Division Bench gave reasons for dismissing the writ petitions on the ground of alternative remedy which are mentioned at page 10 onwards and one of the reasons given is that under the Service Regulations, a society is required to fix the strength of the staff which can be expended and the appointments have to be made according to the provisions of the Regulations regarding approval etc. of the Board and in case a mandamus is issued restraining the employers from terminating the services of such ad-hoc employees who have not been appointed according to the Regulations, they will acquire status of regular employees though not selected according to Rules. In these circumstances, the Labour Court may award only compensation which may not exceed the amount as provided under Section 6-N of the Industrial Disputes Act while refusing reinstatement. 46. Yet another reason given was that right of substitution of employer's order by its own order is available to the Industrial Court or Tribunal and not to this Court. For the above reasons, it was held that alternative remedy was more efficacious for doing justice between the both parties and the petitions were dismissed. 47. 46. Yet another reason given was that right of substitution of employer's order by its own order is available to the Industrial Court or Tribunal and not to this Court. For the above reasons, it was held that alternative remedy was more efficacious for doing justice between the both parties and the petitions were dismissed. 47. It appears that the petitioners thereafter approached Hon'ble the Supreme Court but their Special Leave petitions were rejected on 21st September, 1987 with the following observation : "We find no infirmity in the judgment and Order of the High Court. We decline to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution on the ground that the petitioners have alternative remedy under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. The Special Leave Petitions are dismissed. Interim order shall continue for a period of one month to enable the petitioners to avail of the alternative remedy." 48. The question for consideration is whether the rejection of Special Leave Petitions as mentioned above, leaves it open to the Court any more, to consider the question of entertaining a writ petition directly in appropriate cases, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or not. We are of the view that rejection of Special Leave petition does not lead to the inference that alternative remedy available under the Industrial Disputes Act is to be taken as an absolute bar to entertain a writ petition under Article 226. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has only declined to interfere in the matter under Article 136 of the Constitution. There may still be cases, in which, it may be open to the High Court to entertain a petition directly without directing the parties to resort to the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has itself observed in certain cases that rejection of Special Leave Petition does not mean that the matter cannot be re-agitated before the High Court as there may be different consideration for rejecting a Special Leave Petition. In this connection, we may refer to a case reported in (1987) 166 ITR 210 - Controller of Estate Duty, Baroda v. Pratap Singhji Ramsinghji. 49. The result, we feel, is that in appropriate cases, it is still open to the High Court to consider the matter and for good reasons it may entertain a petition directly for enforcement of rights of a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act. 49. The result, we feel, is that in appropriate cases, it is still open to the High Court to consider the matter and for good reasons it may entertain a petition directly for enforcement of rights of a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act. In the Division Bench case decided by this Court, certain reasons were given for not entertaining the petitions but there are some other reasons which were not taken into consideration in that case. The first reason for entertaining a petition is that in the present bunch of cases, except in a few petitions, there is no serious dispute on material questions of fact. There is no denial of the fact that the petitioners are workmen except in a few cases : that they have worked for 240 days or more in one calendar year with short intermittent breaks which, according to the Supreme Court decisions, have to be ignored. Again there is no dispute on the fact that no retrenchment compensation etc. was paid to the petitioners by the employer societies. In one of its recent decision in the case of Bihar Rajya Vidyut Parishad Field Kamgar Union v. State of Bihar and others, reported in AIR 1987 SC, page 1975, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had declined to entertain a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, not on the ground that it was not maintainable due to availability of alternative remedy, but on the ground that there was considerable dispute in regard to the material facts which could not conveniently be adjudicated in a writ petition. 50. In several decisions cited in the earlier part of this judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to observe that the order terminating the services of a workman in contravention of the provisions contained under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act is void. If an order is null void, it has no existence in the eyes of law. For this reason too, we feel that an alternative remedy would be no bar in entertaining a petition. In this connection, we may refer to a case reported in AIR 1987 SC page 2186 : 1987 UPLBEC 734 (SC) - Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur and others. For this reason too, we feel that an alternative remedy would be no bar in entertaining a petition. In this connection, we may refer to a case reported in AIR 1987 SC page 2186 : 1987 UPLBEC 734 (SC) - Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur and others. In this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe that it is well settled that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a- petition. It was also found that the order passed by the Vice-Chancellor was without any authority of law and was a nullity. Such an order can very well be challenged in the High Court and the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy. We are, therefore, of the opinion that if an order is void and the petition does not involve controversial questions of facts, the High Court may not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. In the case of Olga Tellis and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others, reported in AIR 1986 SC 130, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that Article 21 of the Constitution which protects life and liberty of a citizen, also protects his right to livelihood. If a person is deprived of his livelihood against the procedure prescribed, it will offend Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In the present cases, admittedly while bringing about the cessation of the employment of the petitioners, the employer societies did not follow the procedure established under the law, namely, the U P. industrial Disputes Act. 51. On the question of alternative remedy, we may refer to yet another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dhari Gram Parchayat v. Saurashtra Mazdoor Mahajan Sangh and another, reported in (1987) 4 SCC 213 , in which it has been held that if the High Court" finds any action to be mala fide it can directly interfere with the action and grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India notwithstanding that the remedy is available under the Industrial Disputes Act. The order of retrenchment was found to be mala fide. The observation is. ".................... The order of retrenchment was found to be mala fide. The observation is. ".................... On the finding that the action of the Panchayat was mala fide, the High Court could have directly interfered with the retrenchment of the workman under Article 226 of the Constitution if the workman had straightway approached the Court without raising an industrial dispute." We have cited the above case only to indicate that it is not necessary that a workman must always resort to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act for redressal of his grievance against his retrenchment. There may still be cases where it will be appropriate to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In yet another case reported in 1985 UPLBEC page 789 - Dr. Surendra Kumar Shukla v. Union of India and others, a Division Bench of this Court observed that an order passed in contravention of Article 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act is null and void and such an action offends the rights of a workman protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In these circumstances, it was thought appropriate to entertain the writ petitioner and not to throw it out on the ground of alternative remedy. 52. In the earlier Division Bench decision of this Court, one of the reasons given was that in an appropriate case, tire Labour Court could award a relief looking to the relevant Service Regulations and in certain circumstances even though the retrenchment may not be valid, it may not order for reinstatement and only award damages equivalent to the compensation etc. provided under Section 6-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. In this connection, we may point out that in the present bunch of writ petitions, the position stands on a different footing. In almost all the cases, the petitioners are continuing in service on the strength of the stay order granted by this Court. Hence the question of payment of back wages etc. will not arise ; and secondly, we have already held in the earlier part of the judgment that it is always open to the employer societies to dispense with the services of its employees including the petitioners on the ground that they are not continuing in accordance with the applicable Service Regulations. will not arise ; and secondly, we have already held in the earlier part of the judgment that it is always open to the employer societies to dispense with the services of its employees including the petitioners on the ground that they are not continuing in accordance with the applicable Service Regulations. Bat while doing so, what we insist upon is, that they must comply with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. They must not act in violation of law which provides for welfare of workmen. It is surprising that despite lapse of forty years of the passing of the Industrial Disputes Act, even the corporate bodies like the opposite parties in these petitions including the apex organisations of the State level, are yet not aware that while bringing about the cessation of employment of a workman under certain circumstances, retrenchment compensation etc. has to be paid. 53. Yet another consideration for not throwing out these petitions on the ground of alternative remedy is that these are old writ petitions pending since several years. The petitions had been admitted for hearing and hearing has been provided. In these circumstances we feel that it will not in any manner advance the cause of justice if after lapse of several years we tell the workmen to go to labour Court for seeking redressal of their grievance, more so, when we find that in most of the cases, there is little controversy over the relevant facts. In this connection, we may beneficially refer to a case reported in AIR 1971 SC 33 , Hriday Narain v. Income Tax Officer, Bareilly. where it has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that it would not be appropriate to throw out a petition on the ground of alternative remedy after the petition was entertained and heard on merits. 54. For all these reasons given above, we are of the view that normally it is only appropriate for a workmen to approach the Labour Court under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act for enforcement of his rights but this general proposition may not be considered to be an absolute bar to entertain a a petition and in certain circumstances it is open to the High Court to grant relief under Article 2?.6 of the Constitution of India for the reasons mentioned above. In view of the facts and circumstances as mentioned above, we are not inclined to reject these cases on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. Writ Petitions No. 6887, 7241, 6997, 6995, 7090, 7637, and 6920 of 1986 : 55. This set of writ petitions relate to U. P. Provincial Co-oprerative Federation. The petitioners in these writ petitions were appointed as Junior Engineers in the scale of Rs. 515-86;, for a period of 180 days. Their services came to an end after expiry of the said period and an order to that effect was also passed. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that their services have been terminated in violation of the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. In this connection, we may observe that a paragraph was added in some of the petitions by way of amendment stating therein that the petitioners are workmen and are entitled for the benefit of the provisions contained in the (J. P. Industrial Disputes Act. It was submitted that their termination amounted to retrenchment and they were entitled for retrenchment compensation. In this connection, we may at the very out-set observe that in none of the petition, it has been averred that the petitioners had continuously worked for a period of one year so as to be entitled for benefit under Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 56. The next question is whether they are workmen. In this connection, we may at the very out-set observe that in none of the petition, it has been averred that the petitioners had continuously worked for a period of one year so as to be entitled for benefit under Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 56. The next question is whether they are workmen. The word `workman' has been defined in clause (z) of Section 2 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act which reads as follows: "(z) `workman' means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled of unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, charged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not includes any such person - (i) who is subject to the Army Act, 1950 or the Air Force Act, 1950, or the Nevy (Discipline) Act, 1934, or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison ; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity ; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding five hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature." 57. From the above provision, it is clear,that if a person who is employed in a supervisory capacity and draws wages exceeding five hundred rupees per mensem he is not included in the definition of the word `workman. The appointment letters issued to the petitioners indicate that they were appointed in the scale of Rs. 515-860. In such circumstances, it was necessary for the petitioners to indicate and establish that they were not working in supervisory capacity. The petitioners are diploma-holders and were appointed as Junior Engineers. They have not indicated. the nature of their work or may have purposely avoided to mention about the same. 515-860. In such circumstances, it was necessary for the petitioners to indicate and establish that they were not working in supervisory capacity. The petitioners are diploma-holders and were appointed as Junior Engineers. They have not indicated. the nature of their work or may have purposely avoided to mention about the same. We, therefore, find that the petitioners have not been able to establish that they are covered by the expression `workman' under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. We have already held that the provisions of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act shall be applicable in this State. We are, therefore, unable to accept the case of the petitioners on the ground of violations for the reasons given above. 58. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also made a reference to Regulation 29 of the Service Regulations 1975. Regulation 29 provides that it is permissible for the society to retrench its employee if the business of the society has shrunk or the post has been reduced to effect economy. This has to be done with the approval of the Registrar. Further the provision is that compensation where required under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is paid to the employee. In this connection we have already held that it has not been established that the petitioners are workmen or have continuously worked for one year. 59. It was next argued that the services of the petitioners have been retrenched because of a letter issued by the Institutional Service Board dated September 17, 1986. An application was also moved for summoning the said letter and for quashing the same. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of Provincial Co-operative Federation has handed over the original letter received by the Provincial Co-operative Federation from the Institutional Service Board. We have placed the same on the record. The letter reads as follows* Editorial Note - Contents of Letter missing in the certified copy of the jugment. 60. According to the letter mentioned above, the Board had issued the direction that 11 posts of Junior Engineers (Civil) in respect of whom approval was accorded for appointment on ad hoc basis for 89 days, those persons who had already been working on ad hoc posts, may not again be appointed. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the direction issued by the Institutional Service Board is without jurisdiction arbitrary and unreasonable. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the direction issued by the Institutional Service Board is without jurisdiction arbitrary and unreasonable. We find same force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Regulation 5(iii) of the Service Regulations, 11 75 provides that pending selection, the society may make stop gap arrangement not exceeding 180 days under intimation to the Institutional Service Board. Second proviso of clause (iii) of Regulation 5 of Service Regulations further provides that in special circumstances, the Institutional Service Beard can extend the period of 180 days by a period not exceeding 120 days. From the provisions mentioned above, it is clear that the institutional Services Board has power only to permit or not to permit extension of the period of 180 days, If the Institutional Service Board had sanctioned extension of 89 days, it could not be with a rider that those persons, who have already worked on ad hoc basis for i 80 days, they may not be given appointment. This direction has no sanction or backing of any provision under the Service Regulations. However, we find that period of 89 days has also expired. The direction issued by the Board contained in letter No. 4297/86 dated September 17, 1986 being without any authority of law is liable to be quashed. The result would be that in case the Institutional Service Board permits the U.P. Provincial Co-operative Federation to make any appointment by way of stop gap arrangement in terms of Regulation 5, it shall be open to the Provincial Cooperative Federation to appoint any person irrespective of the fact whether he has already worked for 180 days or not. Subject to the above direction, the writ petitions are dismissed. We, however, keep it open to the petitioners to approach the Labour Court, if so advised, to place proper material there on the point that they are workman, and claim relief on that basis. Writ Petition No. 5177 of 1983 61. It appears that opposite party No. 1 namely, U. P. Bank Employees Union sponsored the cases of three of its members who are employees of the U. P. Co operative Bank Ltd. The said three employees are Sarvasri Hari Babu, D.R.S. Sirohi and Govind Prasad Yadav, who were appointed on ad hoc basis on 5-9-1978, 20-10-1978 and 5-2-1980 respectively. It appears that opposite party No. 1 namely, U. P. Bank Employees Union sponsored the cases of three of its members who are employees of the U. P. Co operative Bank Ltd. The said three employees are Sarvasri Hari Babu, D.R.S. Sirohi and Govind Prasad Yadav, who were appointed on ad hoc basis on 5-9-1978, 20-10-1978 and 5-2-1980 respectively. It appears that they were appointed on daily wages on temporary basis in leave arrangement or ad hoc arrangement. Initially, the appointments of Sri Hari Babu and of D.R.S. Sirohi were for a particular period as is indicated vide Annexures 1 and 2 to the writ petition. The three employees mentioned above, however, continued to work in the establishment of U. P. Co-operative Bank and had been paid their wages. The grievance of the said three employees was that, though entitled, their services were not being confirmed nor they were being paid prescribed scale of pay for the post of Assistants. On the above dispute being raised, the Government referred the said dispute under Section 4-K. of the Industrial Disputes Act by means of a G. O. dated 18-8-1982. The reference was made in the following terms : "...............Kya Sevayojakan Dwara Apne Shramik Dharam Raj Singh (Putra Sri Gagpal Singh) Hari Babu (Putra Sri Raja Ram Gupta) Evam Govind Prasad Yadav (Putra Sri Prabhu Dayal Yadav) ko Sahayak ke pad par Sthayee Ghoshit Na kiya Jana Evam Sthayee Sahayak ke liye Nirdharit Vetankram na diya jana uchit tathajAthva Vaidhanik hai ? Yadi nahin to Sambandhit Shramik kya Labha (Relief) pane ka Adhikari hai kis vidhi se tatha kis Anya Vivaran Sahit" The Industrial Tribunal No, II, U. P. at Lucknow heard the reference. It framed five issues as follows : "1. Whether the dispute which is the subject-matter of this reference is an Industrial Dispute and if so, can it be adjudicated upon by this Tribunal on the basis of allegations contained in paras 1 and 2 of the written Statement ? 2. Whether the workmen were appointed on purely temporary and ad hoc basis for a period of three months only ? 3. Whether the employers' failure to confirm the workmen on their respective posts from the due dates is valid and justified ? 4. To what wages and emoluments are the workmen entitled ? 5. To what relief, if any, are the workmen entitled ?" 62. 3. Whether the employers' failure to confirm the workmen on their respective posts from the due dates is valid and justified ? 4. To what wages and emoluments are the workmen entitled ? 5. To what relief, if any, are the workmen entitled ?" 62. Issue No. I was decided in favour of the employees union holding that the dispute in question was as Industrial Dispute. On the basis of evidence of record and the legal position as laid down in the cases followed by the Presiding Officer, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the three employees mentioned above had been in continuous service of the establishment. The Tribunal was recorded the above finding taking into account the question of minor breaks here and there. On issue No. 2 the Tribunal has held that they will be deemed to have become permanent by efflux of time with effect from 1-7-1981. The finding of the Labour Court on issues No. 4 and 5 which relate to the relief, is that D. R. S. Sirohi and Hari Babu shall be paid basic salary of 325 per month from that dates of their appointments upto 30-6-1981 and thereafter they will be considered confirmed with effect from 1-7-1981 and from that date they will be entitled to get annual increments in the scale along with other allowances admissible to them and period from 1-7-1981 onwards shall be counted towards the length of their service etc. So far Govind Prasad Yadav is concerned it has been held that he will be paid basic salary of Rs. 325 per month from 6-2 1980 to 30-6- 981. Thereafter he was also found entitled to other allowances and benefits of a confirmed employee. 63. We have heard Sri R. N. Trivedi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. He has very fairly submitted that he would confine his challenge to the award regarding question of confirmation of three employees as ordered by the Labour Court. In this connection he has placed reliance upon the provisions of Regulations 0 and 15 of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Employees' Service Regulations, 1975, on the basis of which it has been submitted that no appointment could be made except through the Institutional Service Board. In this connection he has placed reliance upon the provisions of Regulations 0 and 15 of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Employees' Service Regulations, 1975, on the basis of which it has been submitted that no appointment could be made except through the Institutional Service Board. Since that has not been done and the said three employees were appointed only by way of interim arrangement, they cannot be treated, in any case, as confirmed employees. According to the statutory provisions, recruitment of the employees of the Co-operative Societies has to be in accordance with the provisions of U. P. Co-operative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975, as a matter of fact the said Regulations permit ad hoc appointment without intervention of the Institutional Service Board for a specified period only. 64. The question for consideration is, can these employees be treated as permanent and confirmed employees keeping in view the provisions of the Service Regulations, 1975. There is no dispute about the legal position that the recruitment in the Co-operative Societies has to be made through the Institutional Service Board. There is also no dispute about the fact that the said those employees were not recruited through the Institutional Service Board but they were appointed by the Society itself by way of stop gap arrangement and not in accordance with the relevant regulations of the Service Regulations of 1975, providing procedure for regular appointments In our view, the employees who have not been recruited in accordance with the statutory provisions framed for the purpose cannot claim the status of a confirmed employee. Our attention has not been drawn to any provision of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Employees Service Regulations or any other provision, applicable to the case, providing for automatic confirmation of ad hoc employees after laps of certain period of service. As a general principle also there is no automatic confirmation unless there is such an order of confirmation. We are, therefore, unable to upheld the finding of the Labour Court treating the said three employees as confirmed employee. 65. On behalf of the opposite parties it has been coin ended that so far Govind Prasad Yadav is concerned, his case stands on different for ting inasmuch as his appointment was made on 6-2-1980 and on that date, the power of appointment and recruitment vested in the Bank itself. 65. On behalf of the opposite parties it has been coin ended that so far Govind Prasad Yadav is concerned, his case stands on different for ting inasmuch as his appointment was made on 6-2-1980 and on that date, the power of appointment and recruitment vested in the Bank itself. Therefore he was not continuing in violation of the provisions of U. P. Co-operative Societies Employees'. Service Regulations. In this connection, reliance has been placed upon a Government notification dated August 22, 1979, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure A-3 alongwith the affidavit accompanying C. M. Application No. 12198 (w) of 1983 for dismissal of the writ petition. By this notification, clause (VI) of Regulation 5 of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Employees' Service Regulations, 1975 was substituted as follows : "(vi) Notwithstanding any tiling contained in clause (i) recruitment to the posts of typists and clerks in the lowest pay scales in a co-operative society shall be made by a Selection Committee constituted as under- .................... .................... (2) In case of apex Co-operative Societies, Co-operative Textile Mills Limited, Bulandshahr the Selection Committee shall consist of - (a) Chairman/Administrator of the Society who shall be the Chairman of the Committee, and (b) Secretary/Managing Director of the Society who shall be member/convener of the Committee, and (c) one officer nominated by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Uttar Pradesh, not below the rank of Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies Uttar Pradesh, who shall be the member of the Committee provided that if the Chairman and the member Convenor happens to be the same person the Committee shall consist of only two persons." 66. A perusal of the substituted provision only indicates that for the purposes of appointment on the posts of typists and clerks in the lower pay scales selection was to be held by the Society itself. This provision further provides for the constitution of the Selection Committee for the purposes of holding the selection. For recruitment to the posts in which category the three employees fell, the Selection Committee was to consist of Chairman/Administrator of the Society, who shall be the Chairman of the Committee, and the Secretary/Managing Director of the Society, who has to act as a member or convenor of the Committee. One member of the Committee is to be nominated by the Registrar. One member of the Committee is to be nominated by the Registrar. The above provision thus does provide that the recruitment to the posts of typist and clerk in the lowest scale could be made without any selection. By virtue of the substituted provision, the selection had to be held by a Selection Committee whose constitution was duly specified under the provision itself. Even otherwise also the appointment of an employee is always made by the society concerned. The Institutional Service Board selects the candidates for the posts. Therefore, by the substituted provision the only change that took place was that instead of Institutional Service Board selecting the candidates, they had to be selected by a Selection Committee constituted in accordance with the substituted provision. It is not the case of opposite party No. I that the three concerned employees were selected by any Selection Committee constituted under the substituted provision. That being the position, we are afraid, the opposite parties shall not be benefited in any manner by virtue of the substituted provision. 67. In our view, so as to be a confirmed employees one has to fulfil the required qualification and is to be selected in accordance with die rules framed for the purpose. It is a different matter that an employee continues, though not duly selected in accordance with the rules, without being confirmed on a given post. We are, therefore, of the view that the Labour Court erred in awarding that the said three employees acquired the status of confirmed employees with effect from 1-7-1981. 68. We would like to clarify that our holding that the said three employees were not entitled for confirmation does not follow or mean that they are not entitled for their salary in the prescribed scale meant for the post on which they are working. There is no doubt about the fact that they are continuously working since a long time and it will not at all be justified to make them to work on lower wages in comparison to those who are discharging the same function and duties in a higher scale. We are, therefore, inclined to upheld the order of the Labour Court in so far it provided for payment of salary in the prescribed scale and other allowances and increments with effect from 1-7-1981. 69. We are, therefore, inclined to upheld the order of the Labour Court in so far it provided for payment of salary in the prescribed scale and other allowances and increments with effect from 1-7-1981. 69. In the joinder affidavit, the petitioner Bank has stated in para 29 that the Government has published G. O. dated 30-7-1985 making special provisions for regularisation of services of such ad hoc employees. It has further been mentioned that the petitioner Bank has considered the cases of such ad hoc employees and has regularised their services. It is further stated that the said three employees had also opportunity to get themselves regularised under the G. O. mentioned above. That being the position, it will be just, proper and only appropriate that petitioner considers the cases of three employees as well for regularisation under the G. O. referred to above on the same footing as it has been done in respect of other similarly situated ad hoc employees The petitioner shall do it expeditiously without keeping the matter lingering on unnecessarily any further. The writ petition is thus partly allowed subject to observations made above and part of the award by which opposite parties have been held to be confirmed with effect from 1-7-1981 is set aside. Other petitions : 70. The net result of the findings recorded by us is that those petitioners who had completed 240 days even though with a few breaks here and there, is one calender year, cessation of their employment could not be brought about without complying with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. Even in cases where the business of the Society had shrunk or sanctioned strength of the staff was reduced resulting in retrenchment, there too compliance of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act was necessary Failure to comply with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act renders the cessation of employment of an employee invalid. So far the question of regularisation is concerned, we have already held that fixation of cut off date as 1-5-1983 is arbitrary and discriminatory and we feel that it will only be reasonable that all those employees who were appointed at least on or before July 30, 1985, namely, the date on which the notification was issued, should be considered for regularisation of their services in accordance with the Regulations of 1985. Writ Petition No. 5123 of 1986 Suresh Pratap Chand v. U.P. Cooperative Process-ding and Cold Storage Federation Ltd. and others : 71. In the result, the aforesaid writ petition is allowed. Annexure 16 to the writ petition is quashed and the petitioner shall be deemed to be continuing in service having been initially appointed on 28-9-1982 and having completed three years' of service. He shall also be considered for regularisation of his services in accordance with the regulations of 1985. Writ Petition No 5267 of 1986, Rajnish Kumar v. U. P. Co-operative Processing and Cold Storage Federation Ltd. and others ; 72. The writ petition is allowed and the order of termination contained in Annexure-21 to the writ petition is quashed. The petitioner shall be deemed to be continuing in service having been initially appointed on 11-6-1982 and having completed three years of period. He shall be considered for regularisation of his past in accordance with the Regulations of 1988. Writ Petition No. 5268 of 1986 Shiv Prasad and another v. U. P. Co-operative Processing and Cold Storage Federation and others. 73. The petitioners have not been able to establish that they are workman as defined under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. They were appointed as Mechanical Engineers as they held diploma in Engineering. Their scale of pay is admittedly above Rs. 500. In para 31 of the writ petition, a hold averment has been made that the petitioners are not entrusted or performing any supervisory or managerial duty and that no staff' is placed under their supervision. This fact, however, is denied in para 31 of the counter affidavit making averment to the effect that the petitioners discharge duties of supervisory nature. In para 31 of the writ petition, a hold averment has been made that the petitioners are not entrusted or performing any supervisory or managerial duty and that no staff' is placed under their supervision. This fact, however, is denied in para 31 of the counter affidavit making averment to the effect that the petitioners discharge duties of supervisory nature. Para 30 of the rejoinder affidavit contains reply to the denial made in para 31 of the counter affidavit but the averments made in the rejoinder affidavit are vague and it has been stated that besides supervising the construction work the petitioners were also entrusted with various other duties as Junior Engineers but the nature of these duties has not been elaborated. In our view the petitioners should have clearly indicated the job assigned to them and the nature of duties which they were performing but neither in the writ petition nor in the rejoinder affidavit, the duties have been specified. Being a disputed question is of fact, we would not like to antre into this question. As observed earlier, on the basis of the facts as it is on the record, the petitioners have not been able to establish that they are workmen. Therefore it is not possible to grant them any relief on the basis of valuation of provisions of U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. These petitioners are also not entitled to get any relief on the basis of Regulations of 1985 for regularisation of their services as the petitioner No. 1 was appointed on ad hoc basis on 17-12-1983 but his services came to an end sometime in July, 1986 i.e. before he could complete three years of continuous service. So far petitioner No. 2 is concerned, he was appointed on 21-11-1983 on ad hoc basis and his services also came to an end sometime in July, 1986 i.e. before completing three years of continuous service. The writ petition thus fails. However, we leave it open to the petitioners to approach the Labour Court, if they so chose for redressal of their grievance placing necessary and relevant material before Labour Court to show that they are covered by the definition of the word `workman'. The writ petition is thus dismissed with the observation made above. Writ Petition No. 5487 of 1986, Jitendra Prasad v. U. P. Co-operative Processing and Cold Storage Federation and others : 74. The writ petition is thus dismissed with the observation made above. Writ Petition No. 5487 of 1986, Jitendra Prasad v. U. P. Co-operative Processing and Cold Storage Federation and others : 74. The cessation of the employment of the petitioner was brought about without complying with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. So far relief for consideration for regularisation is concerned, it may be observed that the petitioner was appointed by appointment letter dated 27-6-1984 and he was refused further extension in July, 1986 i.e., before completion of three years of service, hence he was not then entitled for the benefit of Regulations of 1985 for regularisation of his services. The writ petition is thus allowed but only to the extent that he shall be treated to be continuing in service. Writ Petition No. 5488 of 1986, Ashwani Kumar Pandey v. U.P. Co-operative Processing and Cold Storage Federation and others : 75. This writ petition is allowed and it is directed that opposite party No. 1 shall treat the petitioner to be continuing in service. Since the petitioner has completed three years of service or. ad hoc basis with intermittent breaks from 2-8-1983 to 8-8-1986 the opposite party No. 1 is further directed to consider the case of the petitioner for regularisation of his services according to Regulations of 1985. Writ Petition No. 5888 of 1986 - Kailash Pati Mishra v. U. P. Co-operative Processing and Cold Storage Federation and others. 76. The writ petition is allowed for 'non-compliance with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U. P. industrial Disputes Act and also for the reason that the petitioners was entitled , for regularisation as having completed three years of service with intermittent breaks on ad-hoc basis having been appointed on 18-6-1983 and continuing till July, 1986 as is evident from Annexure 3 to the writ petition. He shall accordingly be considered for regularisation of his services according to Regulations of 1985 by opposite party No. 1. Writ Petition No. 5935 of 1986 - Purushottam Verma v. U. P. Co-operative Processing and Cold Storage Federation and others : 77. He shall accordingly be considered for regularisation of his services according to Regulations of 1985 by opposite party No. 1. Writ Petition No. 5935 of 1986 - Purushottam Verma v. U. P. Co-operative Processing and Cold Storage Federation and others : 77. The writ petition is allowed on the ground that cessation of the employment of the petitioner was brought about without complying with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act and also on the ground that he had become entitled for consideration of regularisation of his services under the Regulations of 1985 having completed three years of continuous service on ad hoc basis with intermittent breaks with effect from 1-8-1983 to August, 1986. It is therefore, ordered that opposite party No. 1 shall treat the petitioner to be continuing in service and shall also consider his case for regularisation in accordance with the Regulations of 1985. Writ Petition No. 6562 of 1986 - Smt. Aruna Saxena v. U. P. Co operative Processing and Cold Storage Federation and others : 78. The writ petition is allowed for the reason that cessation of the employment of the petitioner was brought about without complying with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioner shall be deemed to be continuing in service with all benefits. Writ Petition No. 6711 of 1986, Kumri Nivedita Sen v. U.P. Co-operative Processing and Cold Storage Federation and others. 79. The writ petition is allowed for the reason that cessation of the employment of the petitioner was brought about without complying with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. It is, further directed that opposite party No. 1 shall treat the petitioner as continuing in service with all benefits. Writ Petition No. 7445 of 1986, Syed Hasan Baqar v. U. P. Co-operative Processing and Cold Storage Federation and others ; 80. From a perusal of averments made in para 7 of the writ petition, it appears that since after his employment in November, 1982, the petitioner worked for more than 240 days in each year Thus for the purposes of Section 6-N of the U. P, Industrial Disputes Act, he shall be entitled for the benefit provided under the Section mentioned above. His discontinuance without compliance with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P, industrial Disputes Act is bad. His discontinuance without compliance with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P, industrial Disputes Act is bad. The opposite party No. 1 is directed to treat the petitioner as continuing in service with all benefits. So far benefit of regularisation is concerned, we find from the chart given in the writ petition itself that there have been repeated breaks of long duration i.e. of more than thirty days which cannot be ignored under the Regulations of 1985 for regularisation. He is, therefore, not entitled for benefit of the same. The writ petition is thus partly allowed to the extent mentioned above. Writ Petition No. 2969 of 1985 - Afaz Ali v. U. P. Co-operative Processing and Cold Storage Federation and others : 81. The petitioner was appointed as State Engineer on 26-4-1983. His services were, however, terminated by order dated 23-5-1985. In the writ petition, the petitioner has not set out any facts which may entitle him to get the benefits under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. He has not even averred that he is a workman within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act, although in the grounds, one of the grounds has been taken that his termination has been ordered without compliance with the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. He has not indicated the scale of pay in which he was working at the time his services were terminated nor he has indicated the nature of duties and powers as Site Engineer. In the above circumstances it is not possible to consider his claim on the basis of provisions under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. However, so far the question of regularisation is concerned, we find that although he was appointed before May 1, 1983 but his services had been terminated about two years of his appointment. Had the petitioner contained for three years, he would certainly have been entitled for consideration for regularisation but when his services were terminated before his serving the department for three years, he would not be entitled for any benefit under the Regulations of 1985. The writ petition is thus dismissed. Writ Petition No. 1397 of 1985 - Shashi Bhushan Tewari and others v. U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd., and others : 82. The petitioner No. 1 was appointed on 26-8-1983, petitioner No. 2 was appointed on 23-9-1983 and petitioner No. 3 on 15-2-1983. The writ petition is thus dismissed. Writ Petition No. 1397 of 1985 - Shashi Bhushan Tewari and others v. U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd., and others : 82. The petitioner No. 1 was appointed on 26-8-1983, petitioner No. 2 was appointed on 23-9-1983 and petitioner No. 3 on 15-2-1983. They continued till March, 1985 with intermittent breaks in their services. Nonetheless they had completed 240 days in preceding one year. Therefore, they could not be deprived of the benefit of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act while bringing about cessation of their employment. The opposite party No. 1 is therefore directed to treat the petitioners as continuing in service with all benefits. Annexure-1 to the writ petition will be inapplicable in the cases of petitioners. The writ petition is thus allowed. Writ Petition No. 1941 of 1985 - Jai Kishun and others v. U. P. Co-operative Bank Ltd. and others : 83. The petitioners Nos. 1 to 6 in the above noted writ petitions were appointed on 18-10-1983, 14-2-1984, 18-1-1984, 7-10-1983, 13-5-1983 and 6-3-1984 respectively. Their appointments were renewed from time to time with short and intermittent breaks and last orders for renewal of their appointments were made on 2-1-1985, 4-1-1985, 2-1-1985, 2-1-1985, 2-1-1985 and 4-1-1985 respectively. Thus they worked for more than 240 days in a year. Discontinuance of their employment without compliance with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act is invalid. Annexure-6 to the writ petition shall no be applicable to the petitioners. The opposite party No. 1 is directed to treat the petitioners as continuing in service with all benefits. The writ petition is thus allowed. Writ Petition No. 2068 of 1985 - Maya Ram Mishra and others v. U.P. Cooperative Bank Ltd. and others : 84. Petitioner No. 1 was appointed by order, dated 9-5-1983, petitioner No. 2 was appointed on 3-6-1983 and petitioner No. 3 on 4-6-1983. Their appointments were continued with intermittent breaks upto 31-3-1985 where-after it was provided by Annexure-7 that services of all Class IV employees which were extended upto 31-3-1985 shall come to an end. The petitioners have alleged that they were interviewed by a Selection Committee and were regularly appointed on the posts of Class IV. But this fact has been denied and from the counter affidavit it is apparent that no Selection Committee as provided under the Regulations was constituted. The petitioners have alleged that they were interviewed by a Selection Committee and were regularly appointed on the posts of Class IV. But this fact has been denied and from the counter affidavit it is apparent that no Selection Committee as provided under the Regulations was constituted. Therefore, the claim of the petitioners for being created as regular employees is not made out. However, it is evident that they continued for more than 240 days and they shall be deemed to be in continuous service. Therefore, the cessation of their employment be ought about by means of Annexure-7 to the writ petition without complying with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act is illegal. The opposite party No. 1 is, thereafter, directed to treat the petitioner as continuing in service with all benefits. Annexure-7 to the writ petition shall not be applicable to the petitioners. The writ petition is thus allowed. Writ Petition No. 4467 of 1985 - Raj Kumar Tiwari v. V. P. Co-operative Bank Ltd. and others : 85. The petitioner was appointed as Class IV employee by order, dated 27-7-1983. The appointment was fora fixed period upto September 30, .1983 but subsequently it was extended from time to time on a consolidated salary. The services of the petitioner were extended upto March 31, 1985 by means of different letters with intermittent breaks. By means of Annexure-1 issued by opposite party No. 1 it was provided that his services were extended upto March 31, 1985 and no further work would be taken from him. This is how the cessation of employment of the petitioner was brought about. It is evident that the petitioner continued to work for more than 240 days and as such he was entitled for retrenchment compensation as provided under Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act while dispensing with his services. The discontinuance of his service thus is illegal. It is, therefore, directed that opposite party No. 1 shall create the petitioner as continuing in service with all benefits. The order Annexure-1 to the petition shall be inapplicable to the petitioner. The petition is thus allowed Writ Petition No. 4551 of 1985 - Ravindra Kumar Tripathi and another v. U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd. and others. 86. The petitioner No. 1 was appointed in June, 1983 as Assistant Cashier. He joined on 1-7-1983. The order Annexure-1 to the petition shall be inapplicable to the petitioner. The petition is thus allowed Writ Petition No. 4551 of 1985 - Ravindra Kumar Tripathi and another v. U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd. and others. 86. The petitioner No. 1 was appointed in June, 1983 as Assistant Cashier. He joined on 1-7-1983. His services were, however, extended from time to time on consolidated salary by means of different orders with intermittent breaks. The last such order was passed on 2-l-19-5 extending his services upto 31-3-1985. The petitioner No. 2 was appointed on the post of Night Watchmen on 9-1-1983. His services as well were extended from time to time by means of different orders. The last such extension order was dated 2-1-1985 and his services were continued upto 31-3-1985. On expiry of the stipulated period i. e. after 31-3-1985, the services of the petitioners were discontinued. It is evident that the petitioners were continued in service, may be with short intermittent breaks, for more than 240 days and they had been thus in service continuously for cessation of their employment brought about without complying with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act is invalid. The opposite party No. 1 is, therefore, directed to treat the petitioner as continuing in service with all benefits. The orders providing for discontinuance of service of the petitioners after 31-3-1985 shall not be applicable to them. The petition is thus allowed. Writ Petition No. 8588 of 1986 - Shyam Nath Bajpai v. Administrator, District Co-operative Bank Ltd. and others. 87. The petitioner was appointed as Clerk in November, 1984 in the office of District Co-operative Bank, Hardoi on ad hoc basis for a period of three months. His appointment was extended from time to time, lastly by means of Annexure-3 dated May 20, 1985 for 89 days. From para 6 of the counter affidavit, it however, appears that his services were extended upto November, 1986. It is thus evident that the petitioner continued in service for more than 240 days during the preceding calendar year entitling him to the benefit under Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, failing which discontinuance of his services is invalid. The opposite parties are, therefore, directed to treat the petitioner as continuing in service with all benefits. The writ petition is thus allowed. 88. The opposite parties are, therefore, directed to treat the petitioner as continuing in service with all benefits. The writ petition is thus allowed. 88. In all the writ petitions in which the order of termination has been held to have been passed in contravention of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act alone, it will be open to the competent authority to terminate the services after complying with the requirements of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act as already observed. 89. Each of the writ petitions is decided as mentioned already. 90. In all the/writ petitions decided, the parties shall bear their own costs.