JUDGMENT : S.C. Mohapatra, J. - Defendants are the Appellants in a suit for eviction and damages. 2. Suit land measures Ac.0.96 decimals in plot No. 1001 in Khata No. 106 and plot No. 1000 in Khata No. 430. Admittedly, they belonged to the ex-intermediary who was the predecessor in interest of the Plaintiffs. Undisputably there is a house on the suit land which is in possession of the Defendants since 1953. 3. Case of the Plaintiffs is that the suit land with the house is situated within the Kendrapara Municipality and the Plaintiffs have been mutated in the Municipality in respect of the suit land and house. It was a residential house of Sri S.M. Bose, the ex-intermediary which consists of 17 rooms. On the vesting of the estste of Sri S.M. Bose, Defendants were having their Anchala office in the building since 1953. The land has been recorded as Bajyapti sthitiban in name of the intermediary. On abolition of the estate, Tahasildar by an order in Misc. Case NoA/189 of 1957-58 acting as Collector under Sections 6 and 7 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act rejected the claim of the intermediary in respect of the suit land. Against the said order, intermediary filed an appeal bearing No. O.E.A. No. 3 of 1960-61 and the Additional District Magistrate, Cuttack by his order dated 28-8-1962 directed settlement of the plots in the name of the intermediary. Thereafter, rent was collected from the Plaintiffs although the house was in occupation of the Tahasildar. After the order of settlement in the year 1962, a notice u/s 80, CPC was issued on behalf of the predecessor-in-interest of the Plaintiffs in reply to which the Tahasildar in his letter dated 20-6-1968 informed the lawyer for the Plaintiffs that fair rent for the portion of the building in occupation of the Government will be paid after sanction of the same by the competent authority and steps are being taken to acquire the building along with the land under the Land Acquisition Act. There was correspondence going on and on 18-3-1974, Tahasildar into mated the Plaintiffs that as per decision, of the Government of Orissa rent at the rate of Rs. 170/- per month shall be paid after deduction of costs of maintenance and repairs etc. of the building and consent to the same may be given. There was correspondence going on and on 18-3-1974, Tahasildar into mated the Plaintiffs that as per decision, of the Government of Orissa rent at the rate of Rs. 170/- per month shall be paid after deduction of costs of maintenance and repairs etc. of the building and consent to the same may be given. In this back ground, Plaintiffs filed the suit for recovery of possession and damages. 4. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2, the Chief Secretary and The State of Orissa contested the suit. In their written statement they have mentioned that on vesting of the estate land and building vested in the State of Orissa under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act and the appellate order under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act is not binding on them. The disputed land and the building standing thereon were used as "Kacheri" or office purpose of the intermediary till the date of vesting and accordingly, there was no question of settlement of the same on the intermediary. 5. Three witnesses were examined in support of the case of the Plaintiffs. Rent receipts paid in the years 1974, 1976 and 1977 were exhibited along with the order of the Estate Abolition Collector and letters of the Tahasildar. Record of Rights prior to the estate abolition was also proved in the case. On behalf of Defendant Nos. 1 and 2, petition of the intermediary for settlement of the building under Sections 6 and 7 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act and the letter of the Tahasildar requesting for consent of the Plaintiffs to accept rent at the rate of Rs. 170/- per month after deduction of costs of maintenance and repairs etc. of the building were exhibited. 6. Appreciating the aforesaid materials on record, trial court found that Plaintiffs have title to the property on the basis of which decree for eviction was passed. As regards damages, it was held that a commissioner would be appointed to assess the damages for the illegal occupation and use of the suit property. 7. Learned Advocate-General submitted that the petition for settlement of the disputed land and building under Sections 6 and 7 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act (Ext. As regards damages, it was held that a commissioner would be appointed to assess the damages for the illegal occupation and use of the suit property. 7. Learned Advocate-General submitted that the petition for settlement of the disputed land and building under Sections 6 and 7 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act (Ext. A) clearly shows that the building was used as Kacheri and as such, there was no scope for settlement of such land and building as provided u/s 6 of the Act and accordingly, the appellate order is a nullity which is not binding. Academically, learned Advocate-General might have been correct. However, the nature of use of the land and building is a matter within the competence of the Estate Abolition Collector. The intermediary may explain to the Collector that the same is not actually so used and the Collector under that Act has jurisdiction to pass an order relating to the nature of the use of the land. Section 9 of that Act gives a right of appeal against an order purported to have been passed u/s 6 of the Act. Such an appeal was filed by the intermediary against the order of the Collector and under Ext. 7, appellate authority directed settlement of the disputed land with the intermediary. Thus, order of the Estate Abolition Collector merged with the appellate order and the same has become final. A wrong order by competent authority on erroneous findings of facts is not without jurisdiction and is not nullity. Any person aggrieved by such order is required to avoid the same and until the order is vacated, it is binding on all including the State Government. Accordingly, Civil Court has no jurisdiction to make an enquiry as to the nature of use of the building, and the order of settlement having created a title of the intermediary is to be respected by the Civil Court. 8. Added to the appellate order u/s 6 of the Act creating title of the Plaintiffs State Government through its agent, the Tahasildar has accepted rent in respect of the disputed land as per Ext. I series. Ext. B which is relied upon by the State Government clearly shows that the State Government has acknowledged title of the Plaintiff and on account of its occupation of the building, has offered monthly rent which was subject to consent of the Plaintiffs. I series. Ext. B which is relied upon by the State Government clearly shows that the State Government has acknowledged title of the Plaintiff and on account of its occupation of the building, has offered monthly rent which was subject to consent of the Plaintiffs. It is no more open to the Appellants to challenge the title of the Plaintiffs without explaining the circumstances under which Ext. B was issued. Trial court was justified in giving a finding of title in favour of the Plaintiffs and there is no scope for interference with such a finding in this appeal. 9. Plaintiffs have never accepted the State Government to be a monthly tenant of the house. If the Plaintiffs would have given consent to the monthly rent as offered under Ext. B, question might have been different. In absence of acceptance of the relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of the house and in absence of any material that the Defendants came into possession of the house under colour of any right, trial court was justified in rendering 11 finding that occupation of the Defendants was illegal and decree for eviction is unassailable. 10. Next question for consideration is compensation payable. Trial court has directed appointment of a commissioner to find out the damages on account of illegal occupation of the Defendants. This was also the prayer of the Plaintiffs. It is not disputed that in the year 1974, an offer was made by the Tahasildar that rent at the rate of Rs. 170/- per month deducting the expenses for maintenance would be paid by the State Government as sanctioned by it on getting consent from the Plaintiffs, with this document and in absence of any acceptable rebuttal evidence on behalf of the Plaintiffs, trial court ought to have held that the monthly profit in respect of the house would be Rs. 170/- per month. Admittedly, this is a house consisting of 17 rooms. Plaintiffs did not claim that they were maintaining the house. Thus, State Government in occupation of the house must be maintaining the same for which in Ext. B. it had been mentioned that the costs of repairs and maintenance would be deducted from the monthly rent payable. Appointment of a Commissioner and determination of the cost of maintenance would only further the litigation and finality of the same which is a public policy shall be deferred. B. it had been mentioned that the costs of repairs and maintenance would be deducted from the monthly rent payable. Appointment of a Commissioner and determination of the cost of maintenance would only further the litigation and finality of the same which is a public policy shall be deferred. In such circumstances, a reasonable guess work would be in the interest of both the parties which is permissible under law. In absence of any material, I determine the cost of repairs and maintenance at Rs. 20/- per month. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to damages at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month. In this view of my finding, there is no necessity for appointment of a Commissioner to assess damages as directed by the trial court. 11. Plaintiffs have not paid court-fees on the damages. They are entitled to get damages only for three years prior to the suit. Thus, Defendants are liable to pay damages at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month from 17-7-1971 since the suit was filed on 17-7-1974. In case Defendants pay the amount directly to the Plaintiffs, on receipt back of the record, trial court shall make an enquiry if delivery of possession has already been given by the Defendants and on determining the date of delivery of possession, shall calculate the damages payable and the court-fee payable thereon. In case, no delivery of possession has been given, trial court shall call upon the Plaintiffs to pay court-fees on the amount due till the date of enquiry. 12. In the result, appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above and the suit is remitted back to the trial court for a limited purpose of calculating the damages and determination and realisation of court-fee payable thereon by the Plaintiffs. No costs. Appeal allowed. Final Result : Allowed