JUDGMENT 1. By our judgment and order dated 8-3-1989 we have allowed the petition and quashed impugned order dated 12-7-84 but the reasons for the same were to follow. These are the reasons. 2. Whether the licence of gun within the meaning of Section 17(3)(b) of Arms Act, 1959 (for short the Act) can be revoked on mere suspicions without positive evidence which could lead breach of public peace or security of public, and as to whether the licence of a gun can be revoked without affording opportunity of hearing to the licence holder, are the short questions that fall for our determination in the present petition filed by the Petitioner for issuance of writ of certiorari to quash the order deted 12-7-84 passed by the Distt. Magistrate Banda (contained in Annexure 3 to the petition). 3. The Petitioner is licence holder (licence No. 0416) of the gun No. 315(2747 bore) and his brother Mahesh Prasad who was not having the licence was alleged to have possessed the gun. The only reason given in the impugned order cancelling the licence of the petitioner, is that the Petitioner was employed in the Army but he keeps his gun at his house. There is possibility that his brother Mahesh Prasad might use it or may offer the cartridges to anti-social elements. In the impugned order it was stated that there was possibility of breach of peace but neither any incident was quoted nor any evidence was referred or relied upon which could lead for an inference to breach of public security or public peace. Even no reference has been made to any criminal case in which Petitioner or his brother might have been involved. No reference of any FIR has been given nor any evidence has been led to indicate that the gun was ever used by the Petitioner or his brother. This is all so far as factual matrics are concerned. 4. As regards first point for our determination, we recollect an oft quoted maxim "Actus legitimi non recipiunt modum" which connotes that when doing of anything in a particular manner is sanctioned by the law, then the thing cannot be done in a different way. This is all so far as factual matrics are concerned. 4. As regards first point for our determination, we recollect an oft quoted maxim "Actus legitimi non recipiunt modum" which connotes that when doing of anything in a particular manner is sanctioned by the law, then the thing cannot be done in a different way. u/s 17(3) of the Act, five circumstances have been pointed out when the licencing authority may suspend or revoke a licence: (a) If the licencing authority is satisfied that the holder of the licence is prohibited from acquiring it, (b) If the licencing authority deems it necessary for the security of public peace or for public safety. (e) If the licence was obtained by suppression of material information. (d) If any of the conditions of the licence has been contravened. (e) If the holder of the licence has failed to comply with a notice under Sub-section (1) requiring him to deliver up the licence. 5. In the present case before us condition mentioned u/s 17(3)(b) of the Act is material. That condition of suspension or revocation is so simple as it required no interpretation (i.e. Absoluta Sententia Exposito non Indigent). 6. In Masiuddin v. Commissioner Allahabad Division Allahabad 1972 AWR 383 S.N. Dwivedi, J. (as he then was) held as follows: The mere existence of enmity between licencee and another person would not establish the 'necessary connection with security of the public peace or public safety. There should be something more than mere enmity. There must be some evidence of the provocative utterances of the licencee or of his suspicious movements or of his criminal designs, and conspiracy in re-enforcement of the evidence of enmity. 7. In Sheo Prasad Misra v. Distt. Magistrate, Basti 1978 AWC 123 a Division Bench of this Court held as follows: In the case before us also the Distt. Magistrate has not recorded any finding that it was necessary to cancel the licence for security of public peace or for public safety. All that he has done is to have referred to some applications and reports lodged against the Petitioner. The mere fact that some reports bad been lodged against the Petitioner could not form basis for cancelling the licence. The order passed by the Distt. Magistrate and that passed by the Commissioner cannot, therefore, be upheld on the basis of anything contained u/s 17(3)(b) of the Act. 8. The mere fact that some reports bad been lodged against the Petitioner could not form basis for cancelling the licence. The order passed by the Distt. Magistrate and that passed by the Commissioner cannot, therefore, be upheld on the basis of anything contained u/s 17(3)(b) of the Act. 8. The object of the licence of fire arm cannot; be underestimated. It is. for the safety and security of the life and property of the licensee. It becomes an instrument to keep his life safe. It is so vital to the life, liberty and protection of the licensee that it cannot be cancelled except in accordance with the law. It needs no mention that in view of Article 21 of the Constitution no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Once licence is granted, circumstances pointed out by the legislature for revocation or suspension of the licence have to be strictly construed as it militates against the fundamental rights contained under Article 21 of the Constitution. Technically speaking it may be that holding of a licence is just a privilege but once it is conferred it accelerates the items intended by the framers of the Constitution for the protection of the life of a citizen. Inspite of the fascinating use of the fire arm licence for protection of human life, its suspension or cancellation is taken very lightly. Substantially Section 17 is a piece of penal statute which has to be construed strictly in favour of the accused or the person sought to be deprived of the privilege. In Director of Public Prosecution v. Ottewell 1970 AC 642 it was pointed out that if after full enquiry and consideration one is left in real doubt, the accused or the person from whom the penalty is claimed must be given the benefit of doubt. 9. In Tuck & Sons v. Priester (1887) 19 QBD 629 it was held: If there is a reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any particular case, we must adopt that construction. If there are two reasonable constructions we must give the more lenient one. This is the settled rule for construction of penal Sections. 10. 9. In Tuck & Sons v. Priester (1887) 19 QBD 629 it was held: If there is a reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any particular case, we must adopt that construction. If there are two reasonable constructions we must give the more lenient one. This is the settled rule for construction of penal Sections. 10. It is well settled that the object of a statute particularly a penal statute is considered by a judge at two stages, one stage is when he asks himself a question whether he has any doubt about the meaning of the provision, and the second stage is when he has answered that question in affirmative and is assessing the pros and cons of a decision in favour of one of the several doubtful meanings. The distinction between the two is subtle and very often oversubtle. 11. We want to emphasis that provisions of Section 17(3) of the Act have to be construed and interpreted with reference to the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution, and in view thereof these provisions have to be strictly construed. 12. No reports for any criminal offence particularly those leading to public safety and security of public have been referred. It appears there would have been nothing like this, nor any evidence of provocative nature has been pointed out which could lead to the breach of public peace or public safety. It has been stated in the impugned order that there was possibility that the gun might be used by the brother of the Petitioner. There is no positive evidence available that the brother of the Petitioner used to handle the gun. Again remote possibility has been indicated that the cartridges might be given to antisocial elements. In the absence of any report against the Petitioner or his brother, indicating their involvement in a criminal case or use of gun with some criminal design, we see no reason that there was any justification or any ground was made out for cancellation or revocation of the licence u/s 17(3)(b) of the Act. Impugned order, accordingly, cannot be sustained. As the petition succeeds on the first point alone, we need not to decide the second point. Impugned order being manifestly erroneous cannot be upheld. 13. Impugned order, accordingly, cannot be sustained. As the petition succeeds on the first point alone, we need not to decide the second point. Impugned order being manifestly erroneous cannot be upheld. 13. In view of the premises aforesaid any applying Baconian and Aristotelian methods of reasonings, we hereby allow this petition and quash the impugned order dated 12-7-84. As under the interim order dated 16-10-84 passed by a Division Bench of this Court Respondents were restrained from auctioning the gun, we direct the Respondents to handover the possession of the gun to the Petitioner forthwith. There shall be however, no order as to costs. Petition allowed.