Judgment :- 1. This revision is by the judgment debtors. The decree sought to be executed is an order in R.C.P.No.80 of 1971, which was confirmed by the appellate authority, but reversed by the District Court in R.C.R.P.203 of 1976. The decision of the District Court was reversed in C.R.P.No.1628 of 1980 by this Court and eviction was ordered. 2. In execution, the judgment debtors, who were ordered to be evicted as per the order of this Court, contended that the order of this Court in C.R.P.No.1628/80 is null and void and without jurisdiction and so the order which has to be treated as a decree by virtue of the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is not executable. 3. The judgment debtors submitted that the order of this Court which has got the force of a decree is an order passed without jurisdiction and that question can be adjudicated by the execution court. The revision petitioners in advancing this argument banked solely on the decision of the Supreme Court in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai (1987(1) K.L.T. 53). 4. The execution court found that the decree sought to be executed is not a nullity and allowed the execution. The judgment debtors filed a revision as provided under S.14 of the Act. The revisional court completely agreed with the execution court and dismissed the revision. Now the judgment debtors challenge the orders of the execution court and the revisional court (District Court) in this revision. 5. From the narration of facts, it is clear that the question of law that has to be decided in this revision petition is whether this court when decided C.R.P.No.1628/ 80 totally lacked jurisdiction to decide the C.R.B. I have posed the question in the above form to give emphasis to the fact that only if it is substantiated that this Court lacked the inherent jurisdiction to decide the correctness of the order of the District Court exercising its power under S.115 C.P.C., a collateral contention that the decree is a nullity can be raised, before the execution court. 6. 6. Counsel for the revision petitioners submitted that in Aundal Ammal's Case the Supreme Court has observed that the High Court has no jurisdiction to decide the correctness of a decision of the District judge when he has acted as a revisional court under S.20 of the Act. True, the Supreme Court has overruled a Full Bench decision of this Court in Vareed v. Mary (1968 K.L.T. 583) which held that since the order passed by the District Judge under the Act is a decision of the District Court and so liable to be revised exercising the power of this Court under S.115 C.P.C. 7. Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Supreme Court has made it very clear that the High Court had no jurisdiction and to vest the High Court with such jurisdiction is contrary to the Scheme of the Act and also contrary to the public policy and the legislative intent. 8. To say in a collateral proceeding an order which has got the force of a decree by the highest court of the land is a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction is a matter of serious consequence and of vital importance. The Supreme Court had no occasion to advert to this question. Of course, it is possible to say in appeal against an order of the High Court that on a true construction of the sections of the Act that though the order challenged before the High Court under S.115 C.P.C. is an order of the District Court is not liable to be interfered with under S.115 on the ground that such an order is not revisable by the High Court exercising its power under S.115 C.P.C. It can be said that it is improper and illegal if High Court exercising its power under S.115 C.P.C. examines the correctness of an order passed by the District Court. When it is said that the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the learned District judge in view of the scheme and policy behind the Act is it possible to say in a case when the High Court had interfered with such an order of the District Court, it is done by the High Court with total lack of inherent jurisdiction and so the order is a nullity? Can such an order remain in force until superseded or reversed by a superior court in appeal or in other proceedings? Can the parties who are bound by the order say that the order is a nullity and it has to be ignored in collateral proceedings - in this case in execution proceedings? When it is said that the order is a nullity, it imports that since a nullity can have no legal consequence, the situation is as if nothing had happened. An execution court can accept the contention that the decree sought to be executed is a nullity only if the execution court is satisfied that the decree has been passed by a court which lacked the inherent jurisdiction to decide the question. It has to be noted that jurisdiction is an expression which is used in a variety of senses and takes its colour from its context. Total lack of inherent jurisdiction to decide the question alone will make the decision a nullity. 9. In this case, I have to examine the question whether the Supreme Court when said: "We reiterate that to vest the High Court with any such jurisdiction would be contrary to the scheme of the Act, would be contrary to the public policy, and would be contrary to the legislative intent as manifest from the different sections of the Act", wanted to say that the High Court has no inherent jurisdiction over the order of the District Judge under S.115 C.P.C. and any order passed by the High Court is a nullity. The Supreme Court held that it is against public policy to have a controversy tried by four courts. It said that it would be repugnant to the scheme manifest in the different sections of the Act in question. The Supreme Court in effect had no occasion to consider whether the High Court had any jurisdiction over the order passed by the District Court exercising its revisional power under the Act. When I say the Supreme Court had no occasion to examine the power of the High Court, I mean that the Supreme Court had only examined the question of the propriety of the High Court exercising its power under S.115 C.P.C. over the orders passed by the District Court under the Act. When I say the Supreme Court had no occasion to examine the power of the High Court, I mean that the Supreme Court had only examined the question of the propriety of the High Court exercising its power under S.115 C.P.C. over the orders passed by the District Court under the Act. What I want to say is that whether there is power for the High court under S.115 C.P.C. over an order of the District Court is totally different from saying that the High Court has lacked inherent jurisdiction under S.115 C.P.C. over an order of the District Court passed under its revisional jurisdiction under the Act. 10. I shall demonstrate the distinguishing aspects of the matter. There are appealable orders provided in 0.43 C.P.C. If an appealable order is challenged in revision and if the High court has interfered with that order, can it be said that the order passed by the High Court is a nullity. In the similar way an order which is not appealable has been appealed against on a wrong assumption that it is appealable under 0.43 C.P.C. and if the High Court interferes with the order passed by the lower court, can it be said that it is an order which is a nullity in the sense that "nullity can have no legal consequence. The situation is as if nothing had happened". 11. There is no doubt that an order of the District Court under S.20 of the Act can be challenged before the High Court and the High Court has got the power to interfere with that order; the only difference is that the order has to be challenged under Art.227 of the Constitution. This has been said so by the Supreme Court in a decision reported in Nataraja Chettiar v. Sulekha Amma (1987(1) K.L.T. 829). I refer to this aspect of the matter to emphasise the fact that though the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the District Judge exercising its power under S.115 C.P.C., certainly the High Court is not lacking power over the orders of the District Judge under the Act. So, this is not a case of total lack of inherent jurisdiction with the High Court. So, this is not a case of total lack of inherent jurisdiction with the High Court. This fact is clear from the discussion in the judgment in Aundal Ammal's Case where the Supreme Court was more concerned about the import of the finality attached to the order under S.18(5) read with S.20 of the Act. The Supreme Court said that the language of the provisions (S.18(5) and 20) inhibits further revision. It also said that to discern the jurisdiction under S.115 C.P.C. in regard to orders passed under S.20 of the Act, would be contrary to the scheme of the Act and would be contrary to the public policy and contrary to the legislative intent as manifest from the different sections of the Act. The Supreme Court never said that the High Court lacked inherent jurisdiction over orders passed by the learned District judge. It has to be understood that when the Supreme Court said that the High Court has no jurisdiction under S.115 C.P.C. to reverse an order passed by the District Court under the Act, it only meant that it will be a wrong exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under S.115 C.P.C. and that is only because of the fact that the scheme of the Act inhibits a further revision by the High Court. In such circumstances, if the High Court interferes with the order of the learned District judge under S.115 C.P.C. and passes an order, it will be a wrong order. It has to be corrected in appeal before the Supreme Court. 12. It has to be noted that in S.115 C.P.C. the power that has been given to the High Court is to examine whether any case has been decided by a court subordinate to the High Court and if such subordinate court appears to have exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or to have failed to exercise the jurisdiction so vested, or to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The phraseology used is "exercise the jurisdiction not vested in it by law". In a case where a subordinate court has passed an order which would come in that category of an order which is the result of an assumption of jurisdiction not vested in that court by law, can it be said that the order is a nullity. The phraseology used is "exercise the jurisdiction not vested in it by law". In a case where a subordinate court has passed an order which would come in that category of an order which is the result of an assumption of jurisdiction not vested in that court by law, can it be said that the order is a nullity. I am sure that it cannot be. Such an order has to be challenged under S.115 C.P.C.; otherwise it will have all the legal consequences of a valid order. This is because the order is passed by a court. In the same way the High Court has passed the order interfering with the order of the District Judge under S.20 of the Act, exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it by virtue of the provisions contained in the Act. Nevertheless, it is an order passed by the High Court under S.115 C.P.C. and it may amount to a wrong exercise of the power under S.115 C.P.C. Such an order remains in force until set aside in appeal before the Supreme Court. The reason is the order passed by this Court exercising its power under S.115 C.P.C. without taking adequate notice of the provisions of the Act making a second revision not entertainable by this court is only a mistake of law made in the course of the exercise of the power under S.115 C.P.C. by this court. This I feel is the correct and proper understanding of the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in Aundal Ammal's Case. In this view, since the High Court does not lack inherent jurisdiction over the subject-matter, I am of the view that a collateral attack in execution proceedings to say that the order of the High Court is a nullity is unavailable to the judgment debtors. The jurisdiction rule involves a power to bind despite error. The pertinent question and one which is particularly significant is what are the limits within which the jurisdiction rule applies? A proper delineation of the limits of jurisdiction rule applicable to execution or orders or decrees passed by the court is plainly explained by the Supreme Court in ALR.1962 S.C.199 at page 200 (Hira Lal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath). The pertinent question and one which is particularly significant is what are the limits within which the jurisdiction rule applies? A proper delineation of the limits of jurisdiction rule applicable to execution or orders or decrees passed by the court is plainly explained by the Supreme Court in ALR.1962 S.C.199 at page 200 (Hira Lal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath). "The validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the court which passed the decree was lacking in inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it could not have seizin of the case because the subject matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction" The High Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter - order of the District Judge -at any rate under its superintending power under Art.227. 13. In Kuriakose v. Varkey (1987 (1) K.L.T. 345), Paripoornan, J, has said that an order passed in like circumstances by this court is 'only voidable' in the sense that it could be appealed against to the Supreme Court directly. The said judgment could not be attacked collaterally in execution proceedings. 14. Now I may advert to the decisions cited before me by the counsel for the revision petitioners, Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan (AIR. 1954 S.C.340) and Vyankati v. Vithoba (A.I.R. 1953 Nagpur 126). True, the Supreme Court in ALR.1954 S.C. 340 has said that it is a fundamental principle that the decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to been forced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. It has to be noted that the fundamental principle is confined to a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction. It is a case where the court lacks total jurisdiction or what is called lack of inherent jurisdiction. Counsel referred me to A.I.R. 1953 Nagpur 126 (Vyankati Ashru v. Vithoba Gaibi) for the purpose that a precedent overruled is definitely and formally deprived of all authorities and that it becomes null and void. It is only to remind me that the Full Bench decision reported in 1968 K.L.T. 583 (Ouseph Vareed v. Mary) cannot be pressed into service. Counsel is right in his submission. 15. It is only to remind me that the Full Bench decision reported in 1968 K.L.T. 583 (Ouseph Vareed v. Mary) cannot be pressed into service. Counsel is right in his submission. 15. The case before me is a revision under S.115 C.P.C. The proviso to the section mandates that "the High Court shall not, under the section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where.- (a) (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made". 16. I am of the view that this Court should not take super technical view and interfere in a case where an order has been made irregularly or even improperly unless this Court is satisfied that maintaining such an order would result in failure of justice. In the result, I see no merit in this Civil Revision Petition. It is only to be dismissed. I do so. In the circumstances of the case, I do not order costs.