The Judgment of the Court is delivered by Hon'ble Manisana J. — This appeal arises form the Judgment and Order of the District Council Court, Shillong made on 4. 9 81 in Title Appeal No. 8 of 1980 allowing the appeal from the Judgment and Order dated 1. 10. 80 passed by the Subordinate District Council Court, Shillong. 2. The plaintiff-Respondents instituted Title Suit No. 6 of 1968 in the Court of the Subordinate District Council Court claiming, inter alia, declaration that three (3) paddy fields called (1) Ka Remkbla (2) Ka Baden Shrah and (3) Ka Mawdur are their properties as they have redeemed them by repaying the loan. The case of the plaintiff is that the three fields above mentioned and another field called "Shyrsang" were mortgaged by the plaintiffs ia the year 1957 to Ka Dressila Lyngdoh and her brother U Weliwis Lyngdoh, the defendant. The mortgage-money was Rs. 2,629/- In the year 1961 the plaintiffs paid a portion of the loan whereupon the defendant and his sister Ka Dressila returned one paddy field called 'Shyrsang' to the plaintiffs. On 23. 3. 67 the plaintiffs paid the balance of the loan to Ka Dressila and redeemed the remaining three paddy fields. But when the plaintiffs took over the possession of the three paddy fields and started working there, the defendant, in the month of April obstructed their work. 3. The case of the defendant is that on 1.4. 57 the plaintiffs sold the four paddy fields by executing an unregistered deed of sale dated 1. 4. 57. However, one of the fields, namely 'Shyrsang', had been reconveyed by him and his sister Ka Dressila by executing a deed (Ext. 4). Late Ka Dressila was a sick woman and was not in full possession of her senses. There was no reconveyance of the three paddy fields. Late Ka Dressila during her life time did not and could not return the fields. 4. The trial Court dismissed the suit. On appeal, the appellate Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. Hence this appeal 5. Before dealing with the substantive argument of the parties it may be noted that the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act are not in force in the State of Meghalaya. 6. The Courts below have held that the transaction was a sale, but a mortgage. Hence this appeal 5. Before dealing with the substantive argument of the parties it may be noted that the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act are not in force in the State of Meghalaya. 6. The Courts below have held that the transaction was a sale, but a mortgage. But the trial Court has held that the execution of the deed, Ext. 2, by Ka Dressila for the return or reconveyance of the three paddy fields in favour of the plaintiffs was doubtful. But the lower appellate Court relying on the evidence of the plaintiffs and on the report of the hand-writing expert has held that Ka Dressila executed the deed, Ext.2. We have perused the evidence and ma­terials on record. We find that the findings of the lower appellate Court is based on evidence and materials on records. 7. In view of the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, the question which arises for consideration is whether the transaction, vide the deed dated 1.4.57 (Ext-A), was a sale or mortgage. In the document (Ext-A), the word '-sale" was used. As stated earlier, the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act are not in force in the State of Meghalaya. Therefore, the trans­fer or transaction was not required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, and the document, Ext, A, was not required to be registered. la such a situation, the provisions of sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act are not attracted. For these reasons, th6 transaction or transfer was not required to be proved by the document itself and oral evidence or oral agreement can be admitted, as between the parties to such an instrument for the purpose of contradicting or varying the terms of the deed, the Ext-A. In other words, the oral evidence is admissible to prove the intention and conduct of the parties as to whether the transaction was to be treated as a sale or mortgage. It is admitted by the parties that the Ext-4, the deed of reconveyance or redemption, was executed by the defendant and his sister Ka Dressila. The learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the trans­action in respect of the field "Shyrsang", vide Ext-4 was not a deed of redemption, but reconveyance. The deed is in Khasi language. The word "Pynphai" has been employed in the deed. The learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the trans­action in respect of the field "Shyrsang", vide Ext-4 was not a deed of redemption, but reconveyance. The deed is in Khasi language. The word "Pynphai" has been employed in the deed. Similarly, in the Ext-2 the word 'pynphai' has been used. The word 'pynphai' means to make restitution or return. In the plaint the plaintiffs have used the word "return". In the written statement of the defendant, the defendant has stated that Ka Dressila could not return the paddy fields. In the deed, Exts-2 and4, the word "sale* has not been used. The evidence of the PWs show that the plaintiffs mortgaged the four paddy fields and that the paddy field called 'Shyrsang' was redeemed by the plaintiffs in the month of March, 1961 and other three were returned to the plaintiffs in the year 1967. The conduct of the parties, namely use of the word 'pynphai' (return) in the deeds, Exts 2 and 4, and the evidence of PWs to the effect that the four paddy fields were mortgaged to the defendant and his sister, and one of the paddy fields 'Shyrsang' was redeemed and the three others were returned on payment of the balance. We hold that the transaction was a mortgage, not a sale, though it was written in the form of sale. 8. Assuming the transaction under Ext-A dated 1.4.57 was a sale, let us now examine the next contention of Mr. Massar, the learned counsel for the appellant. 9. Mr. Massar has contended that according to the Khasi custom, the four plots of land belong to the clan and Ka Dressila being the Ka Khadduh (last daughter) will be the custodian of the pro­perties and the properties could not be sold by her without the consent of her brother, the defendant, and her other surviving family members. Be that as it may, we are not expressing our opinion about custom. However, sum and substances of the contention of Mr. Massar is that the clan properties can be transferred by Ka Dressila only as the Ka Khadduh, but she required the consent of the defendant and other surviving family members. 10. Be that as it may, we are not expressing our opinion about custom. However, sum and substances of the contention of Mr. Massar is that the clan properties can be transferred by Ka Dressila only as the Ka Khadduh, but she required the consent of the defendant and other surviving family members. 10. We are of the view that it is the principle of natural equity which must be universally applicable that if the Ka Khadduh is the only person who can transfer property and transfer the same for consideration, the transfer shall not be voidable on the ground that She transfers the same without consent of the surviving family members, as alleged, provided that transferee after making reasonable care to as­certain that the transferor had the power to make the transfer, has acted in good faith. 11. In the present case, the deed ; Ext-4, was executed by the defendant and his sister Ka Dressila, the defendant. In this written statement, the defendant has not stated that he and Ka Dressila transferred or reconveyed the properties with the consent of their surviving family members. There is also no evidence that the defen­dant and his sister Ka Dressila took consent of their surviving family members. We have already held that the transaction was a mortgage. According to the defendant Ka Dressila was the only person who could transfer the property though alleged consent was required. There are materials on record that there were strain relations between the defendant and his sister Ka Dressila. The balance of the loan was repaid to Ka Dressila. We have perused the evidence and materials on records for our satisfaction. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the plaintiffs after taking reasonable care to ascertain that Ka Dressila had a power to make a transfer, has acted in good faith. In these view of the matter, the transfer made by Ka Dressila is not voidable whether it was a sale or mortgage. 12. For The foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.