Judgment :- 1. The tenant is the appellant. 2. In execution of the decree in O.S.640/ 76, the shop room in dispute was delivered to the respondent. The delivery was effected at a time when the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act had been extended to the area where the shop room was situated. That means the decree could have been executed only subject to the provisions of the said Act. The appellant therefore filed an application under S.144 C.P.C. for restitution. This application was allowed by the executing court and on appeal the Appellate Court reversed the said order. The appellant thereupon filed E.S.A.30/79 against the judgment allowing the appeal filed by the landlord-respondent. The order directing delivery of the property was under challenge in C.R.P.2857/79. The appeal as also the revision were disposed of by a common order dated 10th November, 1980. Relevant portions therefrom read: "In C.R.P.2857/79 the challenge must succeed. As held recently by the Supreme Court in Mani Subrat Jain v. Raja Ram Vohra reported in A.I.R. 1980 SC 299 even when the provisions of the Rent Control legislation are extended to an area after the passing of the decree that Act would govern in the matter of execution. Therefore the execution court could not have executed the decree without reference to the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. It should not have therefore passed an order for delivery without notice to the judgment debtor as it has done. The order for delivery is set aside and I direct the execution court to go into the matter afresh after giving notice to the judgment debtor and hearing his objection". 3. The learned counsel for the appellant argues that this order virtually is an order directing the executing court to entertain the application and order restitution. That means the petition ought to have been allowed and the shop building ought to have been restored to the petitioner. Dilating on this point the counsel argues that, inasmuch as the order directing delivery of the property stands reversed, the respondent, who received delivery in consequence of the erroneous order, is obliged to make restitution to the petitioner. 4. How far this argument could be countenanced is the question before us. Dilating on this point the counsel argues that, inasmuch as the order directing delivery of the property stands reversed, the respondent, who received delivery in consequence of the erroneous order, is obliged to make restitution to the petitioner. 4. How far this argument could be countenanced is the question before us. It should in this connection be remembered that in order to apply the section the following three conditions are required to be satisfied: (a) the restitution sought for must be in respect of the decree or order which had been varied or reversed. (b) the applicant for restitution must be qualified for the benefit under the decree or order reversed. (c) the relief claimed must properly be consequential on the reversal of or variation of the decree or order. (See S.N. Banerji v. K.L. & S. Co. (ALR.1941 PC 128) and Ganesh Parshad v. Adi Hindu S.S. League (ALR.1975 AP 310). See also Binayak Swain v. Ramesh Chandra (ALR.1966 S.C. 948). It is clear that in a case where the above conditions are satisfied it is obligatory on the part of the court to order restitution. The granting of restitution therefore is not discretionary but obligatory. 5. There is another aspect that should be borne in mind in this connection and it can be stated thus: The order directing delivery of the property, the counsel says, stands reversed by the common order passed by this court, disposing of E.S.A 30/79 and C.R.P.2857/79 and therefore the respondent who received delivery in consequence of the erroneous order, is obliged to make restitution to the petitioner. It is true that the order directing delivery has been set aside by this court. Could this order be said to reverse the order, in execution whereof property was delivered to the respondent? The answer is 'No'. Even the appellant has no such case. It is a well established principle in law that the relief claimed in a petition under S.144 is consequential on the reversal or variation of the decree/order in execution whereof property was delivered. A reference in this connection to the words introduced into the Section by the Amendment Acts of 1956 and 1976 is profitable. Prior to the amendment of this section in 1956, this section was applicable only where a decree was varied or reversed. A reference in this connection to the words introduced into the Section by the Amendment Acts of 1956 and 1976 is profitable. Prior to the amendment of this section in 1956, this section was applicable only where a decree was varied or reversed. The words 'or an order' have been inserted after the word'decree' by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, Act 66/ 1956. The effect of this amendment is that the section would thereafter apply even to a, case where an order has been varied or reversed. The words "varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or other proceeding or set aside or modified in any suit instituted for the purpose, the court which passed the decree or order" introduced in the section in the place of 'varied or reversed, the court of first instance etc., by Act 104 of 1976 make it clear that after this amendment the section does not contain such restriction as to the manner in which a decree or order should be varied or reversed. The only condition that can be imposed in this regard must be that the variation or reversal shall be in accordance with law. The words 'or an order' takes colour from the word 'decree' in the Section and therefore 'the order' which is varied or reversed, within the meaning of this section must be an executable order, like a decree and therefore on the variation or reversal of such a decree or order, the application for restitution is maintainable. 6. It is not the case of the appellant that the order, in execution of which property was delivered to the respondent, has been varied or reversed by any proceeding contemplated under this Section. The delivery of the property in the case on hand was made in execution of the order which still stands and indeed is one which has never been attacked. Under such circumstances, in my judgment a party cannot maintain a petition under S.144 C.P.C.(See Swaminatha Odayar v. Official Receiver, A.I.R. 1957 SC 577). 7. I am therefore of the view that the courts below have rightly rejected the application. The appeal fails. Accordingly the same is dismissed. It is however made clear that this judgment will not in any way prejudice the rights, if any, of the appellant to challenge the decree which has already been executed.