JUDGMENT - DUDHAT M.L., J.:---The petitioner company filed the present petition against the order dated 30th of December, 1986, passed by the learned Presiding Officer, First Labour Court, Thane, in Complaint (ULP) No. 137 of 1980. Few salient features of this case are as under : 2. The petitioner is the company wherein the respondent No. 1 was employed as a chargeman. His last drawn pay was Rs. 750/- per month. It appears from the record that his attendance in the petitioner-company showed lot of absenteeism and, therefore, on 3rd of April, 1979, vide Exh. A the petitioner-company gave warring to respondent No. 1. In the said warning about his absenteesim during the years 1978-79 was specifically mentioned. He was also asked to give explanation and was ultimately warned that if he continued to remain absent, his services would be terminated. The petitioner-company again gave him a second warning on 30th of November, 1979, wherein also it was shown about his absence in the company in the year 1979 and particularly in the month of November of the same year he was continuously absent for a number of days. In this notice the company further indicated that because of his absence on duty the petitioner-company had suffered heavy financial loss. By this notice warning was again given that if he continues to remain absent, the company will have no alternative, but to terminate his services. Similar notice was also given on 19th December, 1979, in respect of his absenteesim during the period of December, 1979. In spite of these several warnings, it appears that the respondent No. 1 did not have any change in his behaviour of remaining absent frequently. This is not enough, but he even never cared to reply to the said notices given to him. Thereafter, in the year 1980 he was totally absent in the months of January and February. In March, 1980, he was absent for ten days and again he remained absent from 2nd April, 1980, till 23rd of May, 1980. In such circumstances, it appears, that the company had no other alternative, but to start departmental inquiry against him. Accordingly, on 23rd of May, 1980, the petitioner-company filed charge-sheet against respondent No. 1 which is at Exh. D to this petitioner. In such circumstances, it appears, that the company had no other alternative, but to start departmental inquiry against him. Accordingly, on 23rd of May, 1980, the petitioner-company filed charge-sheet against respondent No. 1 which is at Exh. D to this petitioner. After giving all the accounts of his absenteeism in the charge-sheet, three charges were levelled against him which are as follows : "(1) Absent from the work for more than ten consecutive days. (2) Prolonged intermittent and continuous absenteeism from work without any prior sanction or without any intimation. (3) An act subversive of good behaviour and discipline." He was, therefore, called upon to remain present at 10 a.m. on 27th of May, 1980, before the Inquiry Officer Mr. R.K. Sahane. In the said notice he was also called upon to show cause as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for such serious misconduct. Respondent No. 1 received the charge-sheet, but submitted no explanation except making an application on 30th of May, 1980, for the adjournment of the inquiry on the ground that the Union representative was not present on that day. That application is at Ex. E to the present petition. On the basis of the said application the Inquiry Officer adjourned the proceedings to 6th of June, 1980. On 6th of June, 1980, respondent No. 1 was absent and, therefore, the Inquiry Officer on his own adjourned the proceedings to 23rd of June, 1980. On 23rd of June, 1980, again respondent No. 1 remained absent and, therefore, the Inquiry Officer adjourned the said inquiry to 1st of July, 1980, and the adjourned date was communicated to respondent No. 1. Still on 1st of July, 1980, respondent No. 1 remained absent. However, it appears that on that day the matter was adjourned at the behest of the Company to 9th of July, 1980. This was also communicated to respondent No. 1 and his signature to that effect was obtained. Still on 9th of July, 1980, respondent No. 1 remained absent. In fact, on that day the Inquiry Officer waited from 11 a.m. to 12.30 p.m. and ultimately adjourned the proceedings to 11th of August, 1980. In the meantime, it appears, that on 11th of July, 1980, the petitioner-company received a letter dated 6th of July, 1980, from respondent No. 1 which is at Exh. H to the petition. In fact, on that day the Inquiry Officer waited from 11 a.m. to 12.30 p.m. and ultimately adjourned the proceedings to 11th of August, 1980. In the meantime, it appears, that on 11th of July, 1980, the petitioner-company received a letter dated 6th of July, 1980, from respondent No. 1 which is at Exh. H to the petition. In the said letter the respondent No. 1 requested that the inquiry kept on 9th of July, 1980, may be adjourned to 21st of August, 1980. In the said letter he also request to extend his sick leave from 5th July, 1980, for a further period of two months. The petitioner-company forwarded the said letter to the Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Officer vide his letter dated 1st of August, 1980, rejected respondent No. 1's application for adjournment of the proceedings and in the said letter the Inquiry Officer also made a mention that on 11th of August, 1980, respondent No. 1 will have to remain present and in case he remained absent the proceedings would commence ex parte. 3. Accordingly, on 11th of August, 1980, the inquiry commenced and the Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the petitioner-company. After going through the said report, the petitioner-company vide its letter dated 28th of August, 1980, Exh. J to the petition, passed the order of termination of the services of respondent No. 1 from the company. In the said letter it is also stated- "The Inquiry Officer has now submitted the report of the inquiry together with his findings and conclusions and he has found you guilty of misconduct of absenteeism. Your absenteeism as it was frequent, and intermittent, was so serious that because of this serious absenteeism, the production was disrupted and, therefore, the company had no other alternative but to concur with the Inquiry Officer's findings and conclusions." Against the said order of termination of his services, respondent No. 1 filed his complaint on 25th of November, 1980, before the Labour Court, Thane, wherein he stated that by passing the said order the petitioner company has committed unfair labour practice under section 7 reads with Item No. 1 of Schedule-IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. I have gone through the said complaint filed by respondent No. 1 before the Labour Court. I have gone through the said complaint filed by respondent No. 1 before the Labour Court. At the outset, I would like to mention that the complaint is completely vague and there is no factual disclosure about which act of the company amounted to the breach of the unfair labour practice. Even there is no allegation that as to under what Item the alleged breach is committed because Item No. 1 of Schedule IV consists of Items (a) to (g). That means in the complaint the respondent No. 1 has made out no case with reference to anyone of the Items (a) to (g) under Item No. 1 of Schedule IV of the said Act. The company filed the written statement and denied the allegations made by respondent No. 1. The complainant i.e. respondent No. 1 filed his affidavit narrating the facts. Even in the said narration of the fact also respondent No. 1 has kept everything vague. He has neither disclosed the facts which amounted to unfair labour practice on the part of the petitioner-company nor has he tried to bring his case within any of the specific provisions of the said Act. The only case appears to have been made by him is that his request made on 6th July, 1980, to the company for adjourning the inquiry from 11th of August, 1980, to 21st of August, 1980, was not considered by the petitioner-company. Instead, the inquiry proceeded on 11th of August, 1980, itself and on 28th of August, 1980, his service were terminated. These facts, according to him, amount to violation of principles of natural justice. Before the Labour Court the complainant-respondent No. 1 was cross-examined. In para 8 of his cross-examined he has admitted that he was absent from duty for 145 days in the year 1978-79. The company on its behalf examined three witnesses to prove the misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1. One of these witnesses Shri Sanjeev Sakharam Sukhi, the Factory Manager of the petitioner-company, in para-2 of his deposition has stated that the complainant-respondent No. 1 was the chargeman in the company. One chargeman for each three shifts. Chargeman is the person who is in overall charge of the shift. The nature of the work of the chargeman was such that if he remained absent, the work of the whole shift had to be stopped. One chargeman for each three shifts. Chargeman is the person who is in overall charge of the shift. The nature of the work of the chargeman was such that if he remained absent, the work of the whole shift had to be stopped. He has further stated that respondent No. 1 habitually absent and, therefore, because of his absenteeism during the year 1979-80 the company suffered heavy losses. After hearing both the sides, the Presiding Officer, First Labour Court, Thane, by his decision dated 30th of December, 1986, declared that the petitioner-company indulged in unfair labour practice under Clauses (f) and (g) of Item No. 1 of Schedule-IV of the said Act and held that the termination of the services of respondent No. 1 was not legal and proper. He, therefore, ordered that the complainant-respondent No. 1 should be reinstated with continuity of his service from 28th of August, 1980, and 50% of the back wages which he could have earned from that date till his reinstatement should be paid to him. This order of the Presiding Officer of the First Labour Court, Thane, is challenged by the petitioner-company in this petition. 4. At the outset, the learned Counsel for the petitioner-company Shri Shrikrishna has pointed out that on 9th of March, 1987, the factory of the petitioner is closed and all the workmen in the said factory have been discharged and the learned Counsel Shri Cama for respondent No. 1 has not disputed this fact. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner-company that if one looks at the issues framed at para-8 f the judgment of the Labour Court which is under challenge, it appears that the Labour Court's whole approach in this case was as if it was sitting in appeal over the decision of the company. According to him, as per the accepted position in law, the trial Court had to function within the ambit of section 30 of the Act and come to a conclusion first as to whether there is any unfair labour practice under section 30 and it is after the said conclusion that the Labour Court has to pass the consequential order which is discretionary as regards the various reliefs under section 30(1)(b). I agree with this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner-company. The trial Court has framed the issues as if it was sitting in appeal. I agree with this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner-company. The trial Court has framed the issues as if it was sitting in appeal. Apart from that, I find that the trial Court on the points of various absenteeism without any relation to the facts of the case framed Issue No. 1 that whether the respondent employer proves that the complainant was habitually absent without any medical certificate, etc. On the said issue, the trial Court gave findings that the employer-company proved that respondent No. 1 used to remain absent on several days as mentioned in the charge-sheet without any medical certificate. The trial Court also held on various occasions the Inquiry Officer had given opportunity to the complainant to participate in the inquiry, but such adjournments did not amount to giving respondent No. 1 opportunities because the proceedings showed that the adjournments were not given with the reasonable margin in between, that the workman had not been noticed or agreed to the adjournment of the date and that there was no communication from the workman inspite of the knowledge of the date. I fail to understand the implication of these observations made by the Labour Court. In fact, it is not the case of respondent No. 1 that at the time the adjournment he wanted some reasonable margin and the same was not given to him. In the absence of such allegation the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court ought not to have come to such a conclusion. Excepting that by his letter dated 6th July, 1980, respondent No. 1 sought adjournment of the proceedings from 11th of August, 1980, to 21st of August, 1980, but the same was denied to him, there is no other case made out by respondent No. 1 in his complaint. The trial Court concluded that on 11th of August, 1980, when the Inquiry Officer proceeded to decide the matter ex parte, since he was not aware as to whether the communication about the refusal of adjournment reached respondent No. 1 or not, Rules of natural justice have been violated. In my opinion, the Labour Court lost sight of the fact that on 4th of July, 1980, respondent No. 1 was present during the inquiry. In my opinion, the Labour Court lost sight of the fact that on 4th of July, 1980, respondent No. 1 was present during the inquiry. Not only this, but on 6th of July, 1980, respondent No. 1 made application for adjournment of the matter from 11th of August, 1980, to 21st of August, 1980. It is well settled that a party to the proceedings makes an application before the Inquiry Officer for adjournment of the proceedings, he cannot presume that the application for adjournment would surely be granted. In such a case, it was the duty of respondent No. 1 to remain present on 11th of August, 1980, or at least to depute somebody to see whether the adjournment sought by him is granted or not. Secondly, it is clear from the evidence on record that the respondent No. 1 was residing very near to the petitioner-company and, therefore, there is no reason as to why he either himself or through somebody or through the union representative did not remain present before the Inquiry Officer on 11th of August, 1980. It is also not his case either in the complaint or in his deposition that at that time he was out of Bombay. In the light of these circumstances, there is no justification for him not to remain present on 11th of August, 1980, before the Inquiry Officer. It was on account of this unwarranted attitude on the part of respondent No. 1 that the Inquiry Officer on the last occasion came to the conclusion that respondent No. 1 was exhibiting total indifference to the proceedings before him. In my opinion, it was the whole attitude of respondent No. 1 from the beginning till end contributed to such a conclusion by the Inquiry Officer. The Labour Court has also lost sight of the fact that in order to see whether there is a breach of Item 1(f) of Schedule-IV, the trial Court has to come to a conclusion that there is utter disregard of the principles of natural justice in the conduct of domestic inquiry or with undue haste. This utter disregard or undue haste is to be seen from the attitude of the Inquiry Officer as well as from the facts and circumstances of the case. This utter disregard or undue haste is to be seen from the attitude of the Inquiry Officer as well as from the facts and circumstances of the case. In my opinion, it was reasonable on the part of the Inquiry Officer to assume that respondent No. 1 is careless about the proceedings before him. In such state of affairs, it cannot be said that the behaviour of the Inquiry Officer was in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice or it had shown undue haste, more particularly in the light of the facts which I have mentioned above and the conclusions drawn thereon. I may further mention that in fact this breach is not specifically mentioned in the complaint and except mentioning Item No. 1 of Schedule-IV respondent No. 1 disclosed no facts in the complaint which amounted to breach of any one of these clauses under the said Item No. 1 of Schedule-IV. Therefore, the conclusion of the trial Court that the Inquiry Officer showed utter disregard of the principles of natural justice in the conduct of the domestic inquiry or that he showed undue haste are not at all sustainable and liable to be set aside. As regards the Labour Court's conclusion that the petitioner-company has also committed unfair labour practice under Clause (g) of Item No. 1 of Schedule-IV for misconduct of a minor or technical character, without having any regard to the nature of the particular misconduct or the past record of service of the employee, so as to amount to shockingly disproportionate punishment, here is a case where the Labour Court himself came to the conclusion that respondent No. 1 remained absent for a very long time without any prior permission or without producing any medical certificate. In other words, the trial Court itself has come to the conclusion that respondent No. 1 has committed misconduct. When the trial Court comes to a conclusion that there is misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1 and that respondent No l. 1 has not made out a case under Clause (g) of Item No. 1 of Schedule-IV, it is difficult to see as to how the trial Court could come to a conclusion that respondent No. 1 has proved that the petitioner-company has committed unfair labour practice as per the said clause. Apart from the aforesaid position, before the trial Court both the parties led evidence, oral as well as documentary, and that evidence clearly shows that in the year 1978-79 respondent No. 1 was absent for a very long period of 145 days, without intimation. As I have already pointed out that his position in the factory was that of chargeman i.e. shift-in-charge and Shri Sukhi who is the Manager of the factory has stated that because of his absenteeism, the company suffered heavy losses. Once these things are on record, I do not see under what circumstances under section 30 of the said Act the trial Court could interfere with the finding of the domestic Tribunal. In the light of this, the finding of the trial Court that the petitioner-company has committed unfair labour practice under Item No. 1 of Schedule-IV of the said Act is also liable to be set aside. 5. In the result, the petition is allowed. The order of the Presiding Officer of the First Labour Court, Thane, in Complaint (ULP) No. 137 of 1980 dated 30th of December, 1986, is set aside and order of termination dated 28th August, 1980, is restored. Rule made absolute with no order as to costs. Petition allowed. -----