JUDGMENT S. C, Mathur, J. 1. The petitioner Dr. Rana Pratap Sahi has sought a writ of certiorari to quash the orders dated 2-1-1986 and 31-3-1986 Annexures-3 and 2 respectively to the writ petition, and a writ of mandamus to command the opposite parties to continue him on the post of Lecturer in History in Lal Bahadur Shastri Post-Graduate College, Gonda. A further writ has been claimed to prohibit Higher Education Services Commission, for short Commission from making selection for the post held by the petitioner. 2. Annexure no. 2 is copy of communication dated 31-3-1986 from the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the College to several ad hoc teachers of the College, including the petitioner. Through this communication, the concerned teachers have been informed that their adhoc appointments will continue only till candidates selected by the Commission join or till 30th June whichever is earlier. In this communication, reference has been made to the letter of the Director of Higher Education Services Commission dated 29- 1-1986 and to Section 6 of the U. P. Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980, for short Act. Copy of the Director's letter is Annexure no 3 to the writ petition. The Director also has referred to Section 16 of the Act and stated that there is no occasion for ad hoc Lecturers to be continued in service after 30th June. In view of Annexures 2 and 3, the petitioner was threatened with termination of his service and he accordingly approached this Court on 16-5-1986 through the instant petition. The petition was admitted the same day and an interim order was passed staying operation of the order dated 21-3-1986, Annexure-2. This interim order continues till date. The material controversy raised by the petitioner is that his services stand regularised under Section 31-B added to the Act with effect from 22-6-1985 through an Ordinance which was subsequently replaced by an Act. A few facts necessary for the disposal of the writ petition may now be noticed. 3. Admittedly, the petitioner who was M.A. in Medieval History and Ph.D. was appointed Lecturer in the concerned College by order dated 30- 11-1983, Annexure-1. Admittedly again, this appointment was made under the U. P. Higher Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties), Order, 1983. The appointment order specifically states that the appointment is purely ad hoc and can be terminated any time. Admittedly again, this appointment was made under the U. P. Higher Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties), Order, 1983. The appointment order specifically states that the appointment is purely ad hoc and can be terminated any time. In pursuance of the appointment order, the petitioner joined his post on 1-12-1983. With effect from 22-6-1985, the Act stood amended and Section 31-B found place therein. The petitioner claims that Section 31-B is applicable to him and even though his initial appointment was adhoc, the same, under Section 31-B, stands regularised and, therefore, neither his services can be terminated nor there is any vacancy against which the Commission can proceed to make selection. 4. Arrayed as opposite parties 1, 2, 3 and 4 are the Director, Higher Education Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad, Lal Bahadur Shastri Post-graduate College, Gonda through its Manager, Secretary, Committee of Management, Lal Bahadur Shastri Post-graduate College, Gonda and Higher Education Service Commission through its Secretary, Allahabad. Only opposite parties 2 and 3 have filed counter-affidavits. However, the writ petition has been contested by the Commission also. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite parties 2 and 3, it has been stated that the petitioner did not possess the prescribed qualification for being appointed Lecturer in History and, therefore, he cannot claim regularisation under Section 31-B. It is pointed out that under subclause (b) of clause (1) of statute 10.01 of the Avadh University Statutes, 1978 as amended by Avadh University (Third Amendment) Statutes, 1981, a candidate for the post of Lecturer is required to possess "consistently good academic record with atleast first or high second class Master's Degree" apart from the qualification mentioned in clause (a.) but the petitioner did not possess such record although he possessed the qualification mentioned in clause (a). It is stated in paragragh 1 of the counter-affidavit dated 23-7-1986 that the petitioner had secured 53 percent marks in his M. A. examination which did not qualify either for first class or for high second class. In the same paragraph, it is also stated that the Selection Committee did not relax the prescribed qualification. In support of the plea, minutes of the Selection Committee has been filed as Annexure B-2. Appointment despite lack of prescribed qualification is explained by stating that it was made in view of pressing need for the particular period. In the same paragraph, it is also stated that the Selection Committee did not relax the prescribed qualification. In support of the plea, minutes of the Selection Committee has been filed as Annexure B-2. Appointment despite lack of prescribed qualification is explained by stating that it was made in view of pressing need for the particular period. In support of this plea, copies of the letters exchanged between the Vice Chancellor and the College have been filed as Annexure B-3, B-4 and B-5. It has also been pleaded that the post against which the petitioner was appointed was not substantive and, therefore too, the petitioner cannot claim regularisation. 5. In the rejoinder-affidavit, the petitioner has not denied the assertion that his marks at M. A. examination were 53 percent and that no relaxation was made by the Selection Committee. He has merely stated that "it was known to the Selection Committee that the petitioner is Ph.D. and he was eligible for appointment on the post of teacher. "In paragraph 12, it has been stated "the Selection Committee made the selection with open eyes that the petitioner is Ph.D. and condition of 54 percent marks in M. A. is not necessary in his case..................It is not open now to the Management to raise the allegation that the petitioner was not eligible." 6. Opposite parties 2 and 3 later filed supplementary counter-affidavit dated 31-1-1989 placing on record the fact that the commission has selected Km. Aman Chandra for the post in question and has notified her selection through letter dated 29-6-1988, Annexure-SCA-1 and the said Km. Chandra has been requesting the Management to issue her appointment letter but in view of the interim order of the Court, no appointment letter has been issued to her. Supplementary rejoinder-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioner in which it has been stated that the selection of Km. Aman Chandra is violative of the Court's interim order dated 27-6-1986 and is, therefore, liable to be ignored. In view of the pleadings of the parties, the following questions arise for determination :- 1. Whether the petitioner possessed the prescribed minimum qualifications ? 2. If not, whether the Management is not entitled to raise the plea of the petitioner's ineligibility to hold the post ? 3. Whether the petitioner is entitled to be regularised under Section 31-B? 4. Whether the selection of Km. Whether the petitioner possessed the prescribed minimum qualifications ? 2. If not, whether the Management is not entitled to raise the plea of the petitioner's ineligibility to hold the post ? 3. Whether the petitioner is entitled to be regularised under Section 31-B? 4. Whether the selection of Km. Aman Chandra is in violation of Court's order dated 27-6- 1986 ? 5. Whether the selection of Km. Aman Chandra is liable to be ignored ? 6. Whether the petitioner was appointed against a substantive vacancy ? Question No. 1 7. It is not disputed that the minimum qualifications for the post of Lecturer are contained in the statutes of the Avadh University. Statute 10.01 so far as is material for the purposes of the present case reads as follows ;- "10.1 (1) In the case of any college affiliated to the University, the following shall be the minimum qualifications for the post of a Lecturer in the Faculty of Arts (except the Department of Music), the Faculty of Commerce and the Faculty of Science, namely : (a) an M. Phil, degree or recognised degree beyond the Master's level or published work indicating the capacity of the candidate for independent research work ; and (b) consistently good academic record with at least first or high second class Master's degree or an equivalent degree of a foreign University, in a relevant subject. (2)............ (3)......... (4)......... (5) If the Selection Committee is of the view that the research work of a candidate as evident either from his thesis or from his published work is of a very high standard, it may relax any of the qualifications prescribed in subclause (b) of clause (1), or sub-clause (b) of clause (2), as the case may be. (6) Where no candidate possessing the qualification prescribed in subclause (a) of clause (1) or sub clause (a) of clause (2) is available or considered suitable the committee on the recommendation of the Selection Committee may appoint a person possessing a consistently good academic record on the condition that he obtains such qualifications within five years of his appointment, failing which he shall not be able to earn future increments until he fulfils the requirements. (7) For the purpose of this Statute- (a) marks above the mid-point between the minimum percentage of marks fixed by the University for award of first and second divisions are said to be high second class marks ; (b) ..................... (c)............... (d) a candidate (other than a candidate for lecturership in the Faculty of Education and the Faculty of Law) having obtained either an average of 55 percent marks in the two examinations prior to Master's degree that is to say Intermediate and Bachelor's degree examinations (irrespective of the marks obtained in any of the two examinations), or 50 percent marks in each of the two examinations separately is said to have consistently good academic record". The controversy between the parties centered round sub-clause (b) of Clause (1), Clauses 5 and 6 and sub-clause (a) of Clause 7. It is not disputed that the petitioner fulfills the requirements of sub-clause (a) of clause (1) reproduced above. It is not disputed that 53 percent marks do not qualify for either first class or high second class. 8. The requirement of sub-clause (b) is two-fold (i) the academic record of the candidate should be consistently good and (ii) he should have obtained at the examination for his Master's degree either first class marks or high second class marks. What constitutes high second class marks is mentioned in sub-clause (a) of Clause 7. As already mentioned, there is no dispute between the parties that 53 percent marks do not qualify either for first class or for high second class. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the requirement of first or high second class marks at the examination of Master's degree is not applicable in the case of a candidate possessing Ph. D. degree. We are unable to agree with the submission as on a plain reading of the statute, it cannot be sustained. There are two distinct subclauses of Clause (1) and each sub-clause contains alternative qualifications but the two sub-clauses are joint together with the conjunction '"and", the use of which shows that one of the alternative qualifications mentioned in each of the two sub-clauses has to be possessed simultaneously. In other words, once a candidate possess one of the alternative qualifications mentioned in subclause (a), he will further have to possess one of the alternative qualifications mentioned in sub-clause (b). Ph. In other words, once a candidate possess one of the alternative qualifications mentioned in subclause (a), he will further have to possess one of the alternative qualifications mentioned in sub-clause (b). Ph. D. is a "degree beyond the Master's level", and is covered by sub-clause (a). The petitioner is Ph. D. and, therefore, he qualified one of the alternative qualifications mentioned in sub-clause (a). But thereby the qualification mentioned in sub-clause (b) does not become redundant. As already mentioned, sub-clause (a) and (b) are joined together with the conjunction "and" and, therefore, the petitioner will have to possess one of the alternative qualifications mentioned in sub-clause (b) also. In order to avoid applicability of sub-clause (b), the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the word "and" between sub-caluses (a) and (b) should be read " or". The framers of the statute have deliberately used the word "and" which is normally used in the sense of in addition to something and we must, therefore, have strong reasons for interpreting it in the sense of alternative for which ordinarily, the word used is "or". No such reason is suggested by the learned counsel except that Ph. D. is itself a very high qualification. When the framers of the statute used the expression "degree beyond the Master's degree", they can be taken to be conscious of the fact that such a degree would normally be Ph. D. degree inspite of this consciousness, they used the word "and" and not word "or" between sub-clauses (a) and (b). We are accordingly unable to read the word "and" used between the said subclauses as "or". 9. That possession of Ph. D. degree was not considered to be an end in itself by the framers of the statute is apparent also from the provision made in clause (5) which deals with relaxation of the prescribed qualification. Under this clause, relaxation is permissible if the Selection Committee on examination of the candidate's thesis comes to the conclusion that his research work was "of a very high standard". If possession of Ph. D. degree itself is sufficient, there is no necessity of granting relaxation by examining the quality of research work. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that possession of Ph. D. degree does not dispense with the requirement of possessing one of the qualifications prescribed in sub-clause (b). 10. If possession of Ph. D. degree itself is sufficient, there is no necessity of granting relaxation by examining the quality of research work. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that possession of Ph. D. degree does not dispense with the requirement of possessing one of the qualifications prescribed in sub-clause (b). 10. The learned counsel then submits that the semicolon appearing before the word "and" in sub-clause (a) should be read as occurring after the word "an M. Phil, degree or recognised degree beyond the Master's level". According to him, once the placement of the semi colon is altered, possession of Ph. D. degree will automatically count towards "consistently good academic record". Even by acceptance of the submission, the case of the petitioner is not advanced because under sub-clause (b) mere possession of consistently good academic record is not sufficient ; apart from consistently good academic record the candidate is further required to have obtained first or high second class marks at the Master's degree examination. This flows from the use of the word "with" between expression "consistently good academic record" and "atleast first or high second class Master's degree." Consistently good academic record is determined with reference to sub-clause (d) of Clause (7). Neither party has placed on record any material from which it may be ascertained whether the petitioner fulfills the requirement of consistently good academic record as mentioned in sub-clause (b). We may also read the clause as suggested by learned counsel in order to find out whether the petitioner's case is advanced by reading the semi colon in the manner suggested by the learned counsel. If the semi colon referred to hereinabove is altered, sub-clauses (a) and (b) would read as follows :- "(a) An M. Phil. We may also read the clause as suggested by learned counsel in order to find out whether the petitioner's case is advanced by reading the semi colon in the manner suggested by the learned counsel. If the semi colon referred to hereinabove is altered, sub-clauses (a) and (b) would read as follows :- "(a) An M. Phil. degree or recognised degree beyond the Master's level ; (b) or published work indicating the capacity of the candidate for independent research, and consistently good academic record with atleast first or high second class Master's degree or and equivalent degree of a foreign University, in a relevant subject." The only consequence of changing the placement of semi colon will be that one of the alternative qualification which originally found place in sub-clause (a) will find place after alteration in sub-clause (b) but so long as the word "and" remains before the word "consistently good academic record, the requirement of possessing consistently good academic record with at least first or high second class Master's or an equivalent degree of a foreign University, cannot be dispensed with. Further, in our opinion, by changing the place of semi colon, only the drafting of sub-clauses (a) and (b) will become unhappy as the alternative qualification "published work including the capacity of the candidate for independent research work" goes more appropriately with the qualifications mentioned in sub clause (a) than with the alternative qualifications mentioned in sub-clause (b). 11. For the aforesaid reasons, we are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel that sub-clauses (a) and (b) should be read with altered placement of the semi colon. 12. Once the above submissions of the learned counsel are rejected, it follows that although the petitioner possessed one of the alternative qualifications mentioned in sub-clause (a), he did not possess the alternative qualification of "at least first or high second class Master's degree" mentioned in sub-clause (b). The learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously submitted that under Clause (5) reproduced above it was competent for the Selection Committee to relax the qualification mentioned in sub-clause (b) of Clause (1) and since the Selection Committee selected the petitioner the Selection Committee will be deemed to have relaxed the said qualification. On this basis, it is urged that once the petitioner has been selected, it cannot be said that he did not possess the prescribed qualifications. 13. On this basis, it is urged that once the petitioner has been selected, it cannot be said that he did not possess the prescribed qualifications. 13. Clause (5) does enable the Selection Committee to relax the qualifications prescribed in sub-clause (b) of Clause (1) but the power to relax can be exercised on the basis of research work of the candidate. If on an examination of the research work of the candidate, the Selection Committee comes to the conclusion that the said work is of very high standard, it may relax the qualifications. There is no assertion by the petitioner that his research work or thesis on the basis of which he was awarded Ph. D. degree was before the Selection Committee. In fact, as already stated, there is no averment either in the writ petition or in the rejoinder-affidavit that the Selection Committee did in fact exercise the power of relaxation. Relaxation cannot be inferred merely from the fact that the petitioner's name was recommended for appointment. Relaxation is a conscious act and must appear from the recommendations of the Selection Committee or the minutes of the Selection Committee. The minutes of the Selection Committee have been placed on record by opposite parties 2 and 3 as Annexure B-2. These minutes do not contain any observation to the effect that the Selection Committee has relaxed the prescribed qualifications, much less any observation to the effect that the thesis or the published work of the petitioner (sic) material on record also indicates that no relaxation was in fact granted. It appears that after receipt of the recommendations of the Selection Committee, the Management sought approval to petitioner's appointment from the Vice Chancellor, Avadh University. The Vice Chancellor Avadh University wrote back to the Management on 7-12-1983, Annexure B-3 pointing out that the petitioner had obtained less than 54 per cent marks at the M. A. examination and, therefore, he was ineligible to be appointed. The college Management's reply is contained in the Principal's letter dated 16-12-1983 Annexure B-2. In this letter, it is mentioned that the Selection Committee should have considered the question of relaxation while recommending the petitioner for appointment. It however proceeds to State that the expert did not consider it necessary because the appointment was for a short duration which was to end on 30-6-1984 and there was no likelihood of the period being extended. In this letter, it is mentioned that the Selection Committee should have considered the question of relaxation while recommending the petitioner for appointment. It however proceeds to State that the expert did not consider it necessary because the appointment was for a short duration which was to end on 30-6-1984 and there was no likelihood of the period being extended. It is also stated that if the entire procedure of selection is to be adopted again, education of the students will suffer. It may be pointed out that the letter was written on 16-12-1983 and the appointment was to come to an end on 30-6-1984. In between the students had barely 3 or 4 months of classes. In view of the facts stated in the Principal's letter, the Vice Chancellor accorded his approval through letter, dated 12-1-1983 Annexure B-5. From these documents, it is apparent that no relaxation in the prescribed qualification was in fact given to the petitioner and the petitioner was appointed despite the fact that he lacked the prescribed qualification because the appointment was to be of short duration and the cause of the students may not suffer. Reliance placed upon Clause (5) of statutes 10.01 by the learned counsel is accordingly misconceived. Question No. 3. 14. Section 31-B of the Act under which petitioner claims regularisation reads as follows :- "(1) Every teacher, other than a Principal, directly appointed and or before January 3, 1984 on adhoc basis, against a substantive vacancy in accordance with the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1982 or the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1983 who possesses the qualifications prescribed under, or is exempted from such qualifications in accordance with the provisions of the concerned Statutes, shall with effect from the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission (Amendment) Act, 1985, be deemed to have been appointed in a substantive capacity provided that such teacher has been continuously serving the College from the date of such ad hoc appointment (sic) date of such commencement. A teacher claiming regularisation under the above provision will have to satisfy the Court on the following points :- (1) He was directly appointed to the post in question ; (2) The appointment was made on or before 3rd January, 1984 ; (3) The appointment was made on ad hoc basis in accordance with the provisions of the Removal of Difficulties Order, 1982 or 1983 ; (4) The appointment was made against a substantive vacancy ; (5) He possesses the qualifications prescribed under or is exempted from such qualifications in accordance with the provisions of the concerned Statutes; and (6) He has served the College continuously from the date of ad hoc appointment upto the date of commencement of the U. P. Higher Education Services Commission (Amendment) Act, 1985, which is 22nd June, 1985. A teacher satisfying the above conditions is deemed under Section 31-B to have been appointed in substantive capacity with effect from 22-6-1985. There is no dispute between the parties that the petitioner satisfies conditions 1 to 3 and 6. The dispute between the parties is confined to conditions 4 and 5 only. 15. We have held hereinabove that the petitioner did not possess the prescribed minimum qualification and the relaxation had not been granted by the Selection Committee. Accordingly, the petitioner does not fulfil 5th condition of Section 31-B. The petitioner cannot, therefore, claim regularisation under Section 31-B. Question No. 2 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner cited a number of authorities to press the point that the Management is not entitled at this late stage to say that the petitioner did not possess the prescribed minimum qualification. According to him, the Management is now estopped from asserting that the petitioner was lacking in the prescribed minimum qualification. The authorities relied upon by him are :- Rabindra Nath Bose v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 470 , Ram Swarup v. State of Haryana, (1979) 1 SCC 168 , Roshan Lal v. International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1981 SC 597 , Smt. Shanti Devi Verma v. The Deputy Director of Education, 1982 Education Cases 226, Surendra Narain Saxena v. Vice Chancellor, Kanpur University, 1982 Education Cases 337. All the above authorities, except the last, have been discussed and distinguished by us in our judgment dated 17-1-1989, W. P. 8001 of 1988 (See 1989 AWC 754 ) Dr. All the above authorities, except the last, have been discussed and distinguished by us in our judgment dated 17-1-1989, W. P. 8001 of 1988 (See 1989 AWC 754 ) Dr. Krishna Sinha v. U. P. Higher Education Service Commission through its Secretary, Allahabad and others. That case was also argued by Sri A. Mannan who has argued the present writ petition on behalf of the petitioner. Since the authorities have been elaborately discussed and distinguished in the earlier judgment, it is not necessary to refer them again. It may be pointed out that there is no conduct of the management on the basis of which the principle of estoppel may be applied against it. From the very beginning, the petitioner knew the nature of his appointment. He knew that it was of a precarious nature and would automatically come to an end as soon as a candidate selected by the Commission becomes available. At the time the petitioner was appointed, Section 31-B was not on the statute book. It was introduced subsequently. It is a statutory provision and a person claiming benefit under it will have to show that he fulfills the conditions prescribed therein. Since the regularisation is under a statutory provision, the petitioner cannot derive any benefit by raising the plea of estoppel against the Management. Section 31-B is not an Act of the Management but is an Act of the Legislature. Against a statutory provision, there can be no estoppel. The mere fact that counter affidavit in the present case has been filed only by the Management will not alter the legal position. The Management has merely invited our attention to the statutory provision and pointed out that thereunder, the petitioner does not qualify for regularisation. For the discussion hereinabove, we are of the opinion that neither the Management is estopped from pleading petitioner's lack of prescribed minimum qualification nor the principle of estoppel can be applied against the other opposite parties. Question Nos. 4 and 5 17. Along with the writ petition, the petitioner had filed application for interim relief which was numbered Civil Miscellaneous Application no. 6038 (W) of 1986. Copy of this application had been served upon the learned Standing Counsel for the U. P. Government who received the same on behalf of opposite party no. 1 only. Question Nos. 4 and 5 17. Along with the writ petition, the petitioner had filed application for interim relief which was numbered Civil Miscellaneous Application no. 6038 (W) of 1986. Copy of this application had been served upon the learned Standing Counsel for the U. P. Government who received the same on behalf of opposite party no. 1 only. Copy of this application was served upon the learned counsel for the Higher Education Service Commission also. On this application, the following interim order was passed on 16-5-1986 :- "Issue notice to opposite parties no. 2 and 3. Meanwhile operation of the impugned order of termination of service dated 31-3-1986 contained in Annexure No. 2 shall remain stayed." Only a few days after the passing of the above order on 25-6-1986 to be precise, the petitioner moved another (sic) Civil Miscellaneous Application no. 7568 (W) of 1986. Copy of this application was served only on the learned Standing Counsel. It was not served upon the learned counsel for the Commission. Opposite parties 2 and 3 had not been served by them and, therefore, it was not served upon them too. On 25-6-1986, the application was directed to be put up with the record on 27-6-1986. On 27-6-1986, the following order was passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court:- "Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. Till further orders of this Court, the selection for the post of lecturer in Medieval and Modern History, due to be held on 29-6-86 (or any further date), may take place, but the result thereof shall not be announced by the opposite parties. Copy of this order may be given to the learned counsel for the petitioner today, if possible, on payment of usual charges." 18. From the above order, it would appear that it was passed only in the presence of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Neither the counsel for opposite party no. 1 was present nor counsel for the Commission. The application was not directed to be listed by publication in the cause list. The application was not required to be listed again. Be that as it may, the above order did restrain the Commission from pronouncing the result of the Selection for the post in question although selection itself was not stayed. The application was not directed to be listed by publication in the cause list. The application was not required to be listed again. Be that as it may, the above order did restrain the Commission from pronouncing the result of the Selection for the post in question although selection itself was not stayed. FROM the supplementary counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite parties 2 and 3, it appears that the Commission not only held the selection but also declared the result. If the Court's order dated 27-6-1986 had been communicated to the Commission, the Commission indeed was not entitled to announce the result. In that event, the selection of Km. Aman Chandra would be in violation of Court's order and, therefore, liable, to be ignored. However, before a party may be bound by an interim order, it is necessary that it should be informed of the interim order. There is no material on record to indicate that the order dated 27-6-1986 was communicated by the petitioner to the Commission. As already mentioned copy of the application was not served upon the learned counsel for the Commission. After 27-6-1986, the application was never listed in Court. In the rejoinder-affidavit dated 15-2-1989, there is no assertion by the petitioner regarding service of the interim order on the Commission. Accordingly, the selection made by the Commission is not liable to be ignored. Question No. 6 As already noticed, Section 31-B of the Act regularised those adhoc appointments which had been made against a substantive vacancy. On behalf of the respondent, it has been pointed out that the post was sanctioned on year to year basis and by the date of enforcement of Section 31-B, it had not been made permanent. In similar circumstances, we did not accept the submission of the Management that the post was not substantively vacant. For the reasons already recorded, in our judgment in Dr. Krishna Sinha's case, we hold in this case also that the vacancy was substantive. 19. In view of our finding that the petitioner did not possess the prescribed minimum qualification and he was not entitled to claim regularisation under Section 31-B, the petition lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed. Under grab of the interim order of this Court, the petitioner has kept a duly selected candidate waiting in the wings. We have already pointed out in Dr. Under grab of the interim order of this Court, the petitioner has kept a duly selected candidate waiting in the wings. We have already pointed out in Dr. Krishna Sinha's case (supra) that as soon as a candidate selected by the Commission becomes available, the adhoc appointee has to make way for the selected candidate. The petitioner instead of making way for the selected candidate has continued to hold the post. The pleas raised by the petitioner were untenable to his knowledge and he must, therefore, pay costs to the Management. 20. In view of the above, the petition is dismissed with costs to opposite parties 2 and 3 which are assessed at Rs. 500/-(Rs. Five Hundred). Interim orders shall stand discharged. Immediately after the judgment was pronounced the learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for certificate of fitness for preferring appeal before their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Our judgment does not raise any substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by their Lordships. Accordingly the certificate prayed for is refused.