JUDGMENT - Mrs. SUJATA MANOHAR, J.:---The present petitioner is the heir and legal representative of Gulab Abdul Fakir who was a tenant in respect of 1/3rd portion of Survey No. 351 admeasuring 1 acre and 29 gunthas situated at village Charam in Shirala Taluka of Sangli District. The 1st respondent is the owner of the said land. 2. On 17th October, 1967 the 1st respondent obtained a certificate under section 88-C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The certificate was received by her on 7th July, 1968. She made an application on 7th October, 1968 under section 33-B of the said Act for possession on the ground that the bona fide requires the said land for personal cultivation. The Tahsildar by his order dated 11th February, 1972 granted her application. The tenant preferred an appeal from this order before the Sub-Divisional Officer. In the mean while, however, pursuant to the order passed by the Tahsildar the 1st respondent obtained possession of the portion of the said land which was with the petitioner on 25th May, 1973. Soon thereafter the 1st respondent entered into an agreement to sell the said portion of the land to respondent No. 2 under an agreement of sale dated 29-9-1973. Pursuant to this agreement she put the 2nd respondent in possession of the said portion. 3. The appeal of the petitioner was dismissed by the Sub-Divisional Officer by his order dated 29-6-1974. A revision application was preferred by the petitioner before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal at Kolhapur. The Tribunal by its judgment and order dated 10th November, 1975 set aside the orders of both the officers and remanded the matter to the Tahsildar to decide two points: (i) Whether the application of the 1st respondent under section 33-B was barred by limitation, and (ii) As there were three tenants in occupation of the said land, the requirement of the landlady for personal cultivation should be determined taking into consideration the holding of 3 tenants simultaneously ? Special Civil Application No. 1728 of 1976 was preferred from this order before this Court. By its judgment and order dated 15-11-1977 this Court held that the application of the landlady under section 33-B was not barred by limitation. Special Civil Application No. 1728 of 1976 was preferred from this order before this Court. By its judgment and order dated 15-11-1977 this Court held that the application of the landlady under section 33-B was not barred by limitation. It, however, confirmed the order of remand in so far as it related to the determination of the quota of holdings as between the three tenants and the landlady. 4. In view of the agreement of sale between the 1st and the 2nd respondents, on 19th March, 1979 petitioner made an application before the collector, Sangli under section 84-C of the said Act for summary eviction of the 1st and the 2nd respondents from the said portion of the land of which possession had been taken by the 1st respondent on 25th May, 1973. This application was granted on 13th January, 1986. The 1st respondent preferred a revision application to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal from this order. The tribunal by its judgment and order dated 21st March, 1988 set aside the order of eviction of 13th January, 1986. The present writ petition is filed by the petitioner challenging the order passed by the Revenue Tribunal on 21st March, 1988. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in the judgment dated 21-3-1988 has mistakenly described the area of this land as 1-H 29 As. Throughout the tenancy proceedings and in the 88-C Certificate the total land is described as having an area of 1 acre 29 gunthas. 5. These proceedings were between the original tenant and the respondents Nos. 1 and 2. After the decision of the Tribunal but before the filing of the present writ petition, the original tenant died on 30th April, 1988. Hence the present writ petition is filed by his heir and legal representative. 6. The first question which requires consideration is whether the tenant is entitled to take recourse to section 84-C of the said Act in order to obtain possession from respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Under section 84 it is provided as follows : 84. Any person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of any land-- (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) xxx xxx xxx (c) to the use and occupation of which he is not entitled under the said provisions and the said provisions do not provide for the eviction of such persons, may be summarily evicted by the collector. 7. Any person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of any land-- (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) xxx xxx xxx (c) to the use and occupation of which he is not entitled under the said provisions and the said provisions do not provide for the eviction of such persons, may be summarily evicted by the collector. 7. In the present case the 1st respondent as landlord obtained possession of the said land from the original tenant in view of the order of Tahsildar on 11th February, 1972 granting her application under section 33-B. This order of the Tahsildar has been set aside by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Kolhapur under its order dated 10-11-1975. Since there is some controversy about the exact nature of the order, the material part of the order is reproduced : "Therefore in the light of the above discussion and the circumstances of the case 1 set aside the order of both the authorities below and remand the matter to the trial Court, according to law in the light of observations made above." 8. As the order of 11th February, 1982 has been set aside, respondent No. 1 had no right to retain possession of the said portion of the land when her application under section 33-B was still pending. The use and occupation of the 1st respondent, therefore, was unauthorised. What is more important, she in turn, handed over possession of this land to the 2nd respondent who clearly has no right either to use or occupy the said land. 9. Under section 84-C of the Act any person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongly in possession of any land to the use and occupation of which he is not entitled and for whose eviction there are no other provisions in the said Act, may be summarily evicted under section 84-C. It is urged by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 that for eviction of respondents Nos. 1 and 2, the petitioner has a remedy under sections 37 and 39 of the said Act and hence the provisions of section 84-C are not applicable in the present case. 10. 1 and 2 that for eviction of respondents Nos. 1 and 2, the petitioner has a remedy under sections 37 and 39 of the said Act and hence the provisions of section 84-C are not applicable in the present case. 10. Under section 37 of the said Act when a landlord who has taken possession of the land under section 33-B fails to use it for personal cultivation within one year or ceases to use it for this purpose within 12 years, he is required to restore possession to the tenant whose tenancy was terminated by him. Section 39 provides for an application being made by the tenant who has so lost possession for recovery of possession. These two sections have no application to the present case. They came into operation only after an application under section 33-B is granted. In the present case proceedings under section 33-B are still pending. It is true that the landlord has originally obtained possession by virtue of the Tahsildar order under section 33-B. But the order has been now set aside and section 33-B application is still pending. In these circumstances, section 37 and section 39 of the Act do not come into play. 11. Learned Advocate for the respondent relies upon the case of (Nemchand Chunilal Gujar v. Bhimrao Anna Patil)1, reported in 1968 Mh.L.J. 739 where the landlord who had obtained possession of the land from the tenant for personal cultivation leased it and sold it thereafter within 12 years. The Court held that the heirs of the original tenant were entitled to restoration of possession under section 37. This case does not help the respondents because the possession obtained by the landlord in that case was under section 34 read with section 39 of the Bombay Tenancy Act as it then stood. Sections 37 and 39 were clearly attracted. The only question was whether the heirs of the original tenant could apply under those sections. The Court held in the affirmative. 12. In the case of (Vasant Hariba v. Jaganath)2, reported in 1969 Mh.L.J. 249 a Full Bench of this Court considered a case where the landlord obtained possession on the ground of need for personal cultivation. The landlord thereafter transferred the land to another person after cultivating it for 3 years. The original tenant had, in the meanwhile died and his son made an application for restoration of possession. The landlord thereafter transferred the land to another person after cultivating it for 3 years. The original tenant had, in the meanwhile died and his son made an application for restoration of possession. The Court was required to consider whether such an application was maintainable by the son of the original tenant. The Court said that when the landlord obtains possession for personal cultivation, the original tenancy does not stand terminated absolutely but it remains in abeyance. So that an heir of the original tenant can maintain an application for restoration. The ratio of this case has no application to the present case. 13. The case of (Damodar Ganpat Wani v. Rajaram Dhondu Wagh)3, reported in 1978 Mh.L.J. 700 also does not help the respondents. In that case the Supreme Court held that where the landlord had terminated the tenancy of a protected tenant under section 34(1) of the Act, section 37(1) of the Act comes into play if the landlord fails to use it for any of the purposes specified under section 34(1) over the period as specified in the said section. I am not concerned in the present case with the other aspects of law which were decided in this case. In none of these cases was an application under section 33-B still pending. Sections 37 and 39 do not come into play until after an application under application 33-B is granted and possession is obtained by the landlord pursuant to it. The contention of the respondents that a remedy under this section is available to the petitioner must be rejected. 14. It is also contended by the respondents that the petitioner is not entitled to resort to section 84 of the said Act because he has a remedy under section 29 of the said Act. Under section 29, sub-section (1), a tenant entitled to possession of any land under any of the provisions of this Act may apply in writing for such possession to the Mamlatdar in the manner prescribed in the said section. A tenant entitled to possession from the landlord under the Act can, therefore, resort to section 29. In the present case, however, the possession is sought by the tenant not only from the landlady but also from the 2nd respondent who claims to be a purchaser of the said land from the landlady. A tenant entitled to possession from the landlord under the Act can, therefore, resort to section 29. In the present case, however, the possession is sought by the tenant not only from the landlady but also from the 2nd respondent who claims to be a purchaser of the said land from the landlady. Respondent No. 2 is today in possession of the said land. He is sought to be evicted by the petitioner on the strength of his own title as a tenant. Such an application for possession is not under any provision of the Act. Section 29 has no application. 15. In cases where the tenant claims possession on the strength of his own title and not under any of the provisions of the said Act, it has been held that section 84 is the appropriate section for making an application and not section 29. 16. In the case of (Amrit Bhikaji Kale v. Kashinath Janardhan Trade)4, reported in A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 643 the respondent was a tenant of the suit land on tiller's day. The landlord died 2 years thereafter leaving a will under which the suit land was left to a minor. The name of the minor was entered in the revenue records and the sale was postponed on the ground that the landlord was a minor. It was ultimately held that the original landlord was alive and was under no disability on tiller's day. Therefore the sale had become effective and it could not be postponed, all subsequent proceedings therefore were null and void. The Court said that the proceeding taken by the tenant under section 84 of the Tenancy Act for recovery of possession which was illegally taken from him was maintainable. The Supreme Court held that the tenant was deprived of his possession by an order which had no legal sanction. He was deprived of possession knowing that he was a tenant ignoring and overlooking the statutory event that he had become the owner. Hence he was entitled to restoration of possession on an application under section 84 of the said Act. 17. The respondents rely upon the case of (Vallabhai Nathabhai v. Bai Jivi)5, reported in A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1190. In that case the surrender of tenancy by the tenant to the landlord was invalid for want of writing and registration. The tenant was, therefore, entitled to restoration of possession. 17. The respondents rely upon the case of (Vallabhai Nathabhai v. Bai Jivi)5, reported in A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1190. In that case the surrender of tenancy by the tenant to the landlord was invalid for want of writing and registration. The tenant was, therefore, entitled to restoration of possession. The Court said that as the tenant was claiming possession under the provisions of the Act and not on the strength of his own title, an application was required to be made under section 29. Where, however, the tenant claims on the strength of his own title, he would be entitled to file an application for possession under section 84. 18. My attention was drawn by the respondents to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Bhagwant Pundlik v. Kishan Ganpat Bharasakal)6, reported in A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 435. In that case the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act were considered. The Court said that in a case where possession was taken by the landlord from the tenant without compliance with the provisions of sections 20 and 36(2), such possession was invalid and the tenant was entitled to restoration of possession under section 36(1). This section is equivalent to section 29 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. This was clearly a case where the tenant was seeking possession under the provisions of the Act. 19. Similarly in the case of (Baswant Motiram Gavki v. Ganpat Dhanaji Gavki)7, reported in 1975 Mh. L.J. 9, which was also a case dealing with the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act of 1950 the Court said that section 36(1) of that Act provides a remedy in case of dispossession of a tenant when the tenant seeks restoration of possession under the provisions of the Act. 20. In the present case the tenant has been dispossessed without any authority of law because the order under which he was dispossessed has been set aside. In such a case the tenant is seeking possession on the strength of his own title and not by reason of any acts or omissions under the provisions of the Act. Hence section 84 is attracted. In such a case the tenant is seeking possession on the strength of his own title and not by reason of any acts or omissions under the provisions of the Act. Hence section 84 is attracted. Under section 84 sub-section (c) an application for summary eviction lies against any person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of any land when any other provision of the Act does not cover such a case or prescribe a remedy for eviction of such a person. The present case is not covered by any of the provisions of the said Act. Possession is sought by the tenant from the landlady as also from a stranger. Hence section 84-C is attracted. 21. The respondents also rely upon the case of (Dhondba Raoji Jadhao v. Krishnabai Gopalrao Raje)8, reported in 1980 Mh. L.J. 466 where it was held that section 120(c) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, which is equivalent to section 84(c) of this Act, essentially deals with those who occupy the land unauthorisedly or wrongfully without a samblance of right. If the person sought to be evicted falls within that category then only the provisions of section 120(c) apply. In my view, when a tenant's claim for possession is not covered by any other provision in the Act, he is entitled to apply under section 84(c). 22. It was also submitted by the respondents that the time for making an application under section 29 has expired and hence no application is now maintainable for restoration of possession. Since section 29 does not apply to the facts of the present case, this submission need not be entertained. 23. In the present case, both the respondents have no right to be in possession of the said land at all. There is no other provision of the said Act under which the petitioner can make an application for eviction of these persons and for restoration of possession. Hence the application under section 84-C was maintainable and was correctly filed. The revenue Tribunal was not right in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner ought to have filed an application under sections 37 and 39 of the said Act. 24. In the premises, the petition is allowed and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (B). 25. Respondents to pay to the petitioner the costs of the petition. 26. 24. In the premises, the petition is allowed and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (B). 25. Respondents to pay to the petitioner the costs of the petition. 26. On the application of the respondents, the operation of the order is stayed for a period of six weeks from today. Petition allowed. -----