JUDGMENT - RATNAPARKHI M.S., J.:---The order passed by Executing Court (Civil Judge, Junior Division, Katol) on 17-1-1985 dismissing the execution application on the ground that the decree sought to be executed is a nullity, has been challenged in this revision. 2. The facts giving rise to this litigation may be briefly stated as follows: One Shantabai Moreshwar Hingnekar-the petitioner in this revision, obtained a decree against the respondent Mariambi in Regular Civil Suit No. 211/81. This decree was for Rs. 5,800/-. The suit was instituted before the Civil Judge, Junior Division at Nagpur and the decree was ultimately passed directing the defendant-judgment-debtor to pay Rs. 5,800/- with costs and interest. The decree was ex parte. The Nagpur Civil Court transferred this decree for execution to the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Katol. A darkhast was filed before that Court. The judgment-debtor put in her appearance before the Executing Court and filed her objections to the decree. The objections were two fold : (i) That summons of Civil Suit No. 211/81 was never served upon her and the decree was fraudulently obtained by the decree-holder. (ii) That the Court of Civil Judge at Nagpur who entertained and disposed of this suit had absolutely no territorial jurisdiction as (a) the property was not situated at Nagpur. (b) No part of cause of action had accrued at Nagpur, and (c) The defendant was also not the resident of Nagpur. On these three counts, the decree was challenged before the Executing Court. However, at the stage of hearing, the first objection was given up, and it is not pressed even at the stage of revision. However it was urged before the Executing Court, that the Court entertaining the suit and passing the decree had absolutely no territorial jurisdiction, and therefore, the decree was without jurisdiction. The Executing Court appears to have been impressed with this argument. This argument was accepted and the Court declared the decree as nullity being passed by the Court without any jurisdiction. It is this order which has been challenged in this revision. 3. Mr. Shukla, the learned Advocate for the petitioner strenuously urged before me that the Executing Court fell into error in branding this decree as without jurisdiction. There is no dispute at this stage that the claim made in Regular Civil Suit No. 211/81 was on the basis of unpaid consideration of the sale deed. 3. Mr. Shukla, the learned Advocate for the petitioner strenuously urged before me that the Executing Court fell into error in branding this decree as without jurisdiction. There is no dispute at this stage that the claim made in Regular Civil Suit No. 211/81 was on the basis of unpaid consideration of the sale deed. The suit was filed at Nagpur and it went ex parte and ultimately an ex parte decree came to be passed. The question which arises for decision in this revision is, whether there was an inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Court. In short, the question is, whether the lack of territorial jurisdiction agitated before the Court is tantamount to lack of inherent jurisdiction. 4. There is no much dispute that the Court of Civil Judge at Katol comes within the civil district of Nagpur. From this view point, it will be proper and necessary to look to section 21 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869 which reads as follows : "There shall be in each district so many Civil Courts subordinate to the District Court as the State Government shall from time to time direct : Provided that for special reasons it shall be lawful for the State Government at any time to close temporarily any such subordinate Court." Section 22 reads as follows : "The Judges of such Civil Court shall be appointed by the State Government and shall be called Civil Judges". 5. The scheme of the Act thus shows that the Civil Judges are appointed in the District and all of them are subordinate to the District Judge who is a head of that Civil District. Bombay Civil Courts Act does not contemplate an appointment of a Civil Judge for a particular taluka. If the provisions of these two sections are examined, it will be clear that Judges are appointed for the District and not a particular part thereof. What work should be assigned to a Civil Judge is more or less on administrative function of the District Judge. In short, the jurisdiction is not necessarily affected by their posting at a particular place. 6. Looked from this point of view, it cannot be legitimately said that the Court of Civil Judge, Nagpur was devoid of any jurisdiction to entertain the suit which has been decreed and in execution of which decree the objection has been raised. In short, the jurisdiction is not necessarily affected by their posting at a particular place. 6. Looked from this point of view, it cannot be legitimately said that the Court of Civil Judge, Nagpur was devoid of any jurisdiction to entertain the suit which has been decreed and in execution of which decree the objection has been raised. There is thus no lack of inherent jurisdiction. 7. Reliance was placed by both the Counsel on a ratio laid down in (Hiralal Patni v. Shri Kalinath)1, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 199. Mr. Shukla, the learned Advocate for the petitioner took me through paragraph 4 of the judgment and particularly the following observation : "The objection to its territorial jurisdiction is one which does not go to the competence of the Court and can therefore be waived." Referring to the ratio laid down by the Privy Council in 13 Indian Appeals 134, the Supreme Court observed : "That the decision has no relevance to a case like the present where there could be no question of inherent lack of jurisdiction in a sense that the Bombay High Court was incompetent to try the suit on that count." Thereafter the Supreme Court has made the observation which is quoted above. 8. Looked from that angle, the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nagpur which decided the case, cannot be called as a Court lacking in jurisdiction. The provisions of sections 16 and 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure no doubt are substantive. But they have no tendancy to make the Court devoid of inherent jurisdiction. It is true that "territorial jurisdiction" and "pecuniary jurisdiction" are the terms recognised by the Code of Civil Procedure. But the law contemplates that this shall be one of the defences put to the claim and the party would be entitled to seek the finding on these issues at the stage of trial. Section 21-A of the Code of Civil Procedure enacts a prohibition in instituting a suit for challenging the validity of decree on any ground based on an objection of the place of suit. This provision throws a considerable light on the competence of the Court. 9. Mr. Section 21-A of the Code of Civil Procedure enacts a prohibition in instituting a suit for challenging the validity of decree on any ground based on an objection of the place of suit. This provision throws a considerable light on the competence of the Court. 9. Mr. Muley, the learned Advocate for the respondent, however, urged before me that the point involved in A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 199 was the waiver to the point of jurisdiction, and therefore, the Supreme Court took a view that the objection was waived. If the report is read carefully, these observations regarding waiver were incidental. The Supreme Court categorically expressed that there is no inherent lack of jurisdiction. In addition the Supreme Court also found that there was a waiver by the conduct. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the argument of Mr. Muley that the objection of the jurisdiction was waiver in that case, and therefore, the ratio is not applicable to the present case. 10. In view of what has been discussed so far, I find myself unable to accept the reasoning of the learned Judge of the Executing Court that the Court at Nagpur had absolutely no jurisdiction to decide the suit and hence consequently the decree has been a nullity. On the other hand, it has to be stated that the Court which decided the suit and which ultimately passed a decree had the jurisdiction to entertain the matter and decide it. The jurisdiction is not affected because the decree was an ex parte. It remains a decree of the Court of competent jurisdiction and the Executing Court cannot go behind that decree. 11. The revision thus succeeds. The order passed by the Executing Court on 17-1-1985 rejecting the application on the ground that the decree is a nullity is hereby set aside. The trial Court is directed to proceed with the execution according to law. The costs of this revision shall be the costs in execution. The rule is made absolute in terms above. Revision allowed. -----