JUDGMENT : P.C. Misra, J. - The Petitioner has filed this writ application challenging the order of reanimation of his Service passed by the Managing Committee and for directing the opposite Parties to give him his arrear of salary for the period during which he was illegally prevented to discharge his duties on account of the order of termination of service. 2. The Petitioner was appointed as a clerk in Radhakanta Jew High, School, Nalgara in the district of Balasore on 1-10-1974 by the Managing Committee. According to the Petitioner the School received grant-in-aid from the State Government in June, 1976 and the Petitioner continued as a clerk in the said School. On 11-11-1976 the Sectionretary of the Managing Committee communicated to the Petitioner that the Managing Committee Ins terminated his services. The Petitioner protested against such termination and the Inspector of Schools on various occasions directed the Managing Committee to permit the Petitioner to discharge his duties as the matter is under enquiry by him. It has been further alleged that the Inspector conducted the enquiry and the Managing Committee by Resolution No. 51 dated 22-2-1978 agreed to reinstate the Petitioner in his post. But the said Resolution was never given effect to in spite of repeated requests of the Petitioner. Subsequently the Managing Committee passed another Resolution not to allow the Petitioner to perform his duties. The Inspector of Schools directed the Managing Committee to allow the Petitioner to join in the School and directed the Petitioner to come to his office to receive his pay. The Petitioner claims to have received his pay for the months of June and July and till 23rd August, 1976 from out of the grant-in-aid, but he was not allowed to put his signature in the Attendance Register with effect from 24-8-1976 and thereafter his services were again terminated from 11-11-1976. The Inspector of Schools (opposite Party No. 3) moved the Director of Sectionondary Education, Orissa, Bhubaneswar (opposite Party No. 2) to take action against the Managing Committee since they have violated the instructions issued to them and the latter after hearing the parties passed an order superseding the Managing Committee and keeping the Inspector of Schools as Special Officer in charge of the management of the School. The Managing Committee unsuccessfully challenged the order of supersession and the Petitioner continued his request for reinstatement before the Inspector. The Managing Committee unsuccessfully challenged the order of supersession and the Petitioner continued his request for reinstatement before the Inspector. At one stage, the Inspector of Schools intimated the Petitioner that since the re-constitution of the Managing Committee of the School is in progress, the question of his re-installment would be taken up by the new Managing Committee when constituted. The new Managing Committee after its constitution did not permit the Petitioner to join his duties and the Petitioner has thereafter filed this writ application for the reliefs indicted earlier. 3. This writ application was contested by the Managing Committee disputing that the Institution is not an aided one and maintained that the termination of the Petitioner's service was legal inasmuch as all the required procedures were followed and the said order having not been challenged, it has become final. The Managing Committee also contends that the writ application is not entertain able on account of inordinate delay in approaching this Court. 4. The dispute as to whether the Institution was an aided one or not was not seriously pressed by either of the parties during the course of hearing. But the order of termination of service that was passed against the Petitioner was appeal able and it is conceded by the Petitioner that no appeal has never been filed against the said order. The subsequent Resolution of the Managing Committee dated 22-2-1978 which is relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner for the purpose of establishing that the Managing, Committee therein agreed to reinstate the Petitioner in the presence of the Inspector of Schools thereby affording an explanation for not approaching the appellate Court is not acceptable. According to the opposite Party No. 4, the Resolution to reinstate the Petitioner was subject to certain contiguities which were never complied with by Petitioner. The Managing Committee produced the aforesaid Resolution in original in the Court during the course of argument and we find in the said Resolution that the Managing Committee reiterated ail the lapses of the Petitioner and agreed to reinstate the Petitioner subject to the condition that the Petitioner would submit written confession of his guilt and beg, apology before all concerned in the management of the School and also pay penalty of Rs. 500/- to compensate for the expenses incurred on account of the dispute raised by him before various authorities. 500/- to compensate for the expenses incurred on account of the dispute raised by him before various authorities. I was also mentioned in the said Resolution that the Petitioner should submit an undertaking in writing not to indulge in any activity against the interest of the Institution. It is not the case of the Petitioner that he fulfilled any of the aforesaid conditions. Thus the Resolution dated 22-2-1978 cannot be taken advantage of for any of the purposes in favour of the Petitioner. Thus the effect is that the Petitioner whose service was terminated in 1976 challenged the same in this Court nine years after in the year 1985, (sic) Learned Counsel appearing for the opposite Parties relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1173 S.C. 1343 Jagdish Narain Maltiar v. The State of Bihar and Ors. and Naib Subedar Lachhman Dass Vs. Union of India (UOI )and Others, in support of his argument that no satisfactory explanation having been furnished to explain the delay the writ application is liable to be summarily dismissed. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner did not dispute the aforesaid proposition of law by contended that the very fact that the Petitioner moved the Inspector of Schools pursuant to which steps were taken against the Managing Committee for supersession is a sufficient explanation for the delay in approaching this Court. From the materials piked on record, we find that before the order of termination was passed, some enquiry was held by the Managing Committee and the service of the Petitioner was terminated as a consequence of such enquiry. Assuming that the enquiry was not proper and did not comply with the prescribed procedure, it was open to the Petitioner to challenge the same in an appeal. Approaching the Inspector of Schools or the steps taken by him for supersession of the Managing Committee cannot be taken as a substitute for an appeal nor could the order of termination of service of the Petitioner be set aside in that process. Thus the aforesaid event cannot afford any justification for approaching this Court nine years after. The writ application, therefore, liable to be dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay. 5. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner places reliance on a decision of this Court reported in Dhaneswar Nayak Vs. Thus the aforesaid event cannot afford any justification for approaching this Court nine years after. The writ application, therefore, liable to be dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay. 5. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner places reliance on a decision of this Court reported in Dhaneswar Nayak Vs. State of Orissa and Others, in support of the proposition of law advanced by him that the writ application is maintainable without exhausting the statutory remedy where the act complained of is prima facie without jurisdiction. (sic) stated in the said decision, failure to avail the alternative remedy is riot a Constitutional requirement but is more a matter of prudence arid propriety. The said decision does not lay down a rule to skip over the statutory remedy available to a party. It is, therefore, left to the discretion of the Court to decide the maintain liability of the writ application depending upon the facts placed before it. In the facts of this case, assuming that the Petitioner could approach this Court without availing the alternative statutory remedy, the same does not explain the delay of nine years which he took in coming to this Court. 6. Before the hearing was concluded, the Petitioner filed an affidavit alleging that the appointment of one Sambhunath Benera in the post which he was holding is not in accordance with the rules and therefore, his appointment should be quashed. We do not entertain this affidavit for the reasons, namely, (i) that such a prayer could not be made by way of affidavit during the course of hearing, and (ii) that the legality or otherwise of the appointment of Sri. Sambhunath Behera cannot be decided in his absence. 7. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ application is liable to be dismissed which we hereby do. There shall be no order as to costs. A. Pasayat, J. 8. I agree. Application dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed