Judgment B.P. Singh, J. In both these writ applications, the petitioners have challenged the order passed u/s 15 of the Payment of Wages Act by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Dhanbad, the authority under the Act allowing the application filed by the employees of the petitioner no. 1-company and directing the employer to immediately pay to the employees applicants the sum claimed by them in their application which had not been paid by the employer to the employees. The two cases numbered as P.W. Case nos. 14 and 15 of 1979 were disposed of by the Authority under the Act by two separate orders both dated 23-2-1981. Since the questions involved in both these applications are common, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The facts of the case are similar and the two applications relate to two different sets of employees of the same employer. Since the plea of the Management as also the reason for the order passed by the Authority under the Act are identical, the facts stated in this judgment are taken from C.W.J.C. 974/81 (R). 2. The employees of the petitioner-company filed an application before the Authority under the Act through the Inspector of Factories claiming that large number of employees had not been paid their wages for different periods mentioned in the statement annexed to the application. They authorised the Inspector of Factories to represent their case before the authority. A show cause was filed on behalf of the employer. In that application, various technical objections were raised which is not necessary to mention in this judgment since those objections were not pressed. It was stated in the show cause that the purported claim of wages from 1.3.73 to 6.3.78 was untenable, fictitious, baseless and illegal. That no wages being in arrear the applicants were not entitled to any relief. It was then stated in paragraph 11 of the show cause that a serious labour trouble started in the Factory of the opposite party since the later part of the year 1973 and officers were gheraoed many times. The workmen resorted to violence and adopted slow down and tool down strikes and complete strikes so that the Management was compelled to declare a lock-out on and from 8.3.1975 and since then the Factory way lying closed. The workmen resorted to violence and adopted slow down and tool down strikes and complete strikes so that the Management was compelled to declare a lock-out on and from 8.3.1975 and since then the Factory way lying closed. It was stated in paragraph 13 of the show cause that the industry had a heavy loan of the Bank which was accumulating day by day and that the industry had been crippled down and was not only sick but was practically dead. The workmen were themselves responsible for the closure of the factory and it is their misdeeds which had brought about this situation. 3. The Authority under the Act by its order dated 23.2.81 in both the applications allowed the applications and directed the employer to pay to the employees the unpaid wages. I may only observe that the employers were called upon to produce all necessary documents, Registers etc. to support the plea raised by them that they had actually paid the wages or that some of the persons who claimed to be their employees were not their employees. The employers failed to produce necessary documents before the Authority and the Authority under the Act recorded finding of fact that the amounts claimed by the employees as their arrears of wages which hand remained due was genuine and real and legal. This finding of fact has not been challenged before me and, therefore, I must proceed on the basis that wages claimed by the employees had not been paid by their employer. That being so, the only point urged on behalf of the employer before the Authority under the Act was that the factory on account of labour trouble was faced with a difficult situation and ultimately with effect from 8th of March, 1975 the factory had to be closed down. I may only observe that the claims made by the employees in the two applications do not relate to any period after 8th of March, 1975. 4. Thus, the only reason disclosed by the employer for non-payment of wages was that it was in a difficult financial situation and as I understand the plea, it is not a plea disowning the liability to pay wages but pleading inability to pay wages. The Authority under the Act held that such a plea did not absolve the employer of its obligation to pay wages due to the employees. The Authority under the Act held that such a plea did not absolve the employer of its obligation to pay wages due to the employees. The Authority under the Act has found that no evidence was produced before it to establish that the closure was legal. In my view, this question did not arise for consideration because it was not the plea of the Management that on account of closure or on account of the illegal strike of the workmen, it was not liable to pay the wages. If such plea were raised, different considerations would arise in considering the claim of the workmen. 5. Sri Mitter appearing on behalf of the employers-petitioners urged before me that the order passed by tile Authority was clearly without jurisdiction. According to him the employers refused to pay wage. According to him, refusal to pay wages can never amount to delayed payment of wages. He submitted that so long as the employer does not pay wages to the employees, the employees cannot be heard to say that the payment of wages to them have been delayed so as to clothe the Authority under the Act with a jurisdiction to pass an order u/s 15 of the Act. According to him such grievance can be validly raised by the employees only after wages have been paid and it is found that the payment was not within the period prescribed by the Act. On the other hand it was contended by Sri B.S. Lal appearing on behalf of the respondents that this was too narrow a construction to be placed upon section 15 of, the Act. According to him, if the employer failed to pay wages within the period prescribed under the Act, the right accrued to the employees to move the Authority under the Act for a direction to the employer to pay the wages which have not been paid within the prescribed period. 6. Considerable reliance was placed by the counsel for the petitioner-employer upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1969 Supreme Court 590 Payment of Wages Inspector, Ujjain, v. Surajmal Mehta, and it was contended that the Authority under the Act had jurisdiction u/s. 15 of the Act only when the employer made any deduction not authorised under the Act or there was delay in payment of wages beyond the statutory period fixed. According to him, in the instant case, neither of the events had happened and, therefore, the Authority under the Act had no jurisdiction u/s. 15 of the Act to make an order. 7. As to what is the scope of section 15 of the Act the position in law appears to be well settled by decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. In the case of Payment of Wages Inspector, Ujjain (supra) the Supreme Court observed thus :- "It is explicit from the terms of section 15 (2) that the Authority appointed under sub- section (1) has jurisdiction to entertain applications only in two classes of cases, namely, of deductions and fines not authorised under sections 7 to 13 and of delay in payment of wages beyond the wage periods fixed under section 4 and the time of payment laid down in section 5. This is clear from the opening words of sub-section (2) of section 15 namely, 'where contrary to the provisions of this Act' any deduction has been made or any payment of wages has been delayed. These being the governing words in the subsection the only applications which the Authority can entertain are those where deductions unauthorised under the Act are made from wages or there has been delay in payment beyond the wage period and the time of payment of wages fixed or prescribed under sections 4 and 5 of the Act Section 15 (2) postulates that the wages payable by the person responsible for payment under section 3 are certain and such that they cannot be disputed. xx xx xx It is true, as stated above that the Authority has the jurisdiction to try matters which are incidental to the claim in-question. Indeed section 15 (1) itself provides that the Authority has the power to determine all matters incidental to the claim arising from deductions from or delay in payment of wages. It is also true that while deciding whether a particular matter is incidental to claim or not care should be taken neither to unduly expand nor curtail the jurisdiction of the Authority. But it has at the same time to be kept in mind that the jurisdiction under section 15 is a special jurisdiction. It is also true that while deciding whether a particular matter is incidental to claim or not care should be taken neither to unduly expand nor curtail the jurisdiction of the Authority. But it has at the same time to be kept in mind that the jurisdiction under section 15 is a special jurisdiction. The Authority is conferred with the power to award compensation over and above the liability for penalty of fine which an employer is liable to incur u/s. 20." 8. Applying these principles, the Supreme Court held that to an application u/s. 15 of the Act claiming compensation u/s 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, the defence taken by the employer being that he was not the person responsible for payment of compensation and that the right of the workman was defeated by reason of proviso to section 25F being applicable in as much as these workmen were continued in employment by the new employer and, therefore, there had been no interruption in their employment; that the terms and conditions of service given to them by the new employer were is no way less favourable than those they had when the old employer was the employer and that the new employer was responsible for payment of compensation if any retrenchment took place in future, in view of the limited jurisdiction of the Authority under the Act, it was not intended to deal with such questions which in some cases might well raise complicated problems of both facts and law. In those circumstances, the Court held that it was not intended that such a claim for compensation which is denied on grounds which inevitably would have to be inquired into and which might entail prolonged inquiry into questions of fact as well as law was one which should be summarily determined by the Authority under section 15. The Calcutta High Court in the case reported in (1973) 77 CWN 64 Sri Kamal Prasanoa Roy v. Sri Maurie Hyam observed: "but the limited jurisdiction of the authority should not be unreasonably extended under the garb of deciding incidental maters. The Calcutta High Court in the case reported in (1973) 77 CWN 64 Sri Kamal Prasanoa Roy v. Sri Maurie Hyam observed: "but the limited jurisdiction of the authority should not be unreasonably extended under the garb of deciding incidental maters. In other words if a question involves a prolonged inquiry or inquiry into complicated questions of law and fact, the authority under the Payment of Wages Act would refuse to exercise his jurisdiction." This Court in the case of Union of India v. Surendra, 1976 L.I.C. page 26 reiterated the same principle and after a careful consideration of the case law on the subject, it was held that questions relating to matters not of deduction or delay in payment of wages simpliciter and innovating a complex consideration of acts of the jurisdiction of the Authority under whose orders the so-called deductions have been made, cannot be within the competence of the Authority appointed u/s. 15 of the Act. 9. The question then arises as to whether refusal to pay wages is included within the term 'delayed payment' under the Act. Das, C.J. in Sarangdar Singh and another v. Lakshmi Narayan Wahi answered the question after considering the observation of Chagla C.J. in A.I.R. 1951 Bombay 423 :- "If I may say so with great respect, I entirely agree with the aforesaid observations and whether refusal to pay wages, rightly or wrongly, within the time allowed by law comes within the expression 'delay in payment of wages' must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is certainly open to the authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act to construe the terms of the contract of employment in order to determine what wages are to be paid; and even if the contract of employment bas been terminated, it is open to him to construe its terms in order to determine whether any sums are payable by reason of the termination; this is clear from the last part of the definition of the expression 'wages' I have already said that I consider that the Lahore view is much too narrow, and it is not possible to lay down a general and inflexible rule that the authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act should try only cases of admitted wages. I agree 'that tile jurisdiction of the authority is to determine the terms of the contract in so far as they relate to the payment of wages and in so far as it has to decide the liability of the employer to pay wages under the terms of the contract. But the jurisdiction does not extend to a determination of the liability for accounting on account of acts of mismanagement etc. Such a liability can only be determined in the civil courts; and if an employer refuses to make a payment of wages on account of such liability, the aggrieved person has the right to come to the civil court to claim his wages. This in my opinion, is the correct view of S. 15, Payment of Wages Act, both on the basis of the plain words used therein and the case law on the subject." 10. Having regard to the principles laid down in the decisions abovementioned, it appears to be well settled that as a matter of law it cannot be said that whenever an employer refuses to pay wages, there is delay in the payment of wages. Such a question must be determined in the facts and circumstances of each case. The proper approach in such cases is to consider the plea of the employer in resisting the application under section 15 for payment of wages. Where the employer in defence to such an application raises the plea that he is not liable to pay the wages for certain reasons, the Authority under the Act has no jurisdiction to go into those reasons, if that involves an enquiry into complicated questions of fact and law. If the plea raised by the employer appears plausible and necessarily involves investigation into questions of fact and law, the Authority under the Act must refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. This, however, is subject to the exception that it has the jurisdiction to decide incidental matters. It may be that the employer has refused to pay wages rightly or wrongly. But the language of the section employed in the Act while conferring jurisdiction upon the Authority does not justify a detailed investigation into such facts, which are not merely incidental but which may raise complicated problems of both fact and law touching upon the liability of the employer to pay wages. But the language of the section employed in the Act while conferring jurisdiction upon the Authority does not justify a detailed investigation into such facts, which are not merely incidental but which may raise complicated problems of both fact and law touching upon the liability of the employer to pay wages. It must, therefore, follow that where the employer on the basis of certain facts denies his liability to pay the wages, the Authority under the Act cannot exercise jurisdiction to determine the issues arising out of such a plea if the plea raised is a plausible plea and not merely a lame excuse to avoid an order under the act. Mere denial of liability is not enough unless there is something more to it which justifies further investigation of the plea raised by the employer. Otherwise all that the employer is required to do is to deny his liability and oust the jurisdiction of the authority under the Act. This would completely defeat the very purpose of the Act and, therefore, I am not inclined to hold that a mere denial of liability will oust the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Act unless the plea of denial of liability is supported by some facts on the basis of which the plea gains plausibility and requires determination of other complex problems of fact and law. 11. In the instant case, I have referred to the defence raised by the employer-petitioners. It is not that the employer denied its liability to pay wages. It pleaded that on account of labour trouble and ultimate closure of the factory the establishment was in a bad financial state and was unable to pay the wages. Inability to pay wages is not a plea of denial of liability, and in many cases it may assume the existence of liability. Before me the employer/petitioner had not disputed the amount of wages payable nor it disputed the period to which they relate nor the fact that those wages were not paid within the prescribed period it was simply submitted that since the Management had disowned liability to pay wages, the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Act was ousted. Before me the employer/petitioner had not disputed the amount of wages payable nor it disputed the period to which they relate nor the fact that those wages were not paid within the prescribed period it was simply submitted that since the Management had disowned liability to pay wages, the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Act was ousted. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that their defence before the Authority must be construed to mean that since the strike was illegal, the employees were not entitled to wages for taking part in such an illegal and improper strike. I do not find this plea raised in the show cause filed before the Authority under the Act. Though the fact regarding labour unrest and subsequent closure of the factory was mentioned, the plea raised was that on account of such reasons the employers were not in a position to pay the wages in my view, the Authority under the Act rightly held that inability to pay wages is not a valid ground for denying the liability to pay wages. 12. It was then faintly submitted that in the instant case there was no question of delayed payment of wages. This was a case where there was non-payment of wages and section 15 does not contemplate a case where there is non-payment of wages. It was submitted that only when wages are paid, a right accrues to the employee to claim compensation if it is found that the wages were not paid within the prescribed period. As long as the wages are not paid the employees have no right to claim either payment of those wages or compensation for delayed payment of wages. In my view this is too narrow a construction to be placed upon section 15 of the Act. In my view, if wages are not paid the employees have a right to move the Authority under the Act for a direction to the employer to pay such wages. They are not expected to wait for the employer to pay the wages as and when he desires at his sweet will. Therefore the Act conceives of a situation where there is delay in payment of wages by reason of non-payment of wages by a particular date. They are not expected to wait for the employer to pay the wages as and when he desires at his sweet will. Therefore the Act conceives of a situation where there is delay in payment of wages by reason of non-payment of wages by a particular date. There is therefore, no force in the contention that the question of delayed payment of wages can arise only after the wages have been paid and that such a question will never arise if the wages are never paid. In my view having regard to the purposes and objective of the Act such an interpretation would defeat the very purpose for which the Act was enacted since such an interpretation would lead to the anamolous position that no workmen would be entitled to claim payment of wages under the Act even if it is shown to the Authority that wages have not been paid by the prescribed date. One of the purposes which the Act seeks to achieve is that the wages are paid to the employees in time. 13. I therefore find no error in the order of the Authority passed u/s. 15 of the Act. These writ applications are therefore, dismissed. There writ be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.