Sitaram s/o Baliramji Bramhane v. Ragho s/o Baliramji Bramhane
1989-01-25
M.S.RATNAPARKHI
body1989
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT - M.S. RATNAPARKHI, J.:---The order passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Morshi on 23-9-1986 at Ex. 31 directing the judgment debtor to restore the motor pump to the decree holder within 7 days or in default attachment of the field belonging to the judgment debtor under Order 21, Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has been challenged in this revision. 2. It is not disputed that the non-applicant decree holder obtained a decree for declaration and injunction, against the judgment debtor. We are not much concerned here with the decree of declaration. Enough to point out that the injunction was to restrain the judgment debtor from disturbing plaintiff's possession over the electric motor pump. This decree came to be passed some time on 28-7-1982. The decree holder, in pursuance of this decree filed an execution application on 28-7-1982. The prayers made in this execution application were: (1) That the judgment debtor should be given notice about the injunction. (i) That the costs of Rs. 124.68 be recovered from him; and (ii) The judgment debtor should be restrained from obstructing the plaintiff in removing the motor pump fitted in the well situated in the field of judgment debtor. In this execution, the decree holder filed an application Ex. 12 on 20-10-1982 informing the Court that the motor pump was in constructive possession of the judgment debtor and it is he who removed this pump and therefore, the order under Order 21, Rule 32 (1) and (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure be passed. The judgment debtor filed reply. The Court passed an order on 21-1-1983 directing the judgment debtor to produce the electric motor pump with accessories by 25-2-1983. On 16-3-1983 the Court passed an order directing the arrest of the judgment debtor and detaining him in civil prison for 3 months or till the compliance. 3. The judgment debtor then filed an application under section 151 read with 47 of Code of Civil Procedure Vide Ex. 31. The main contention was that he has not removed the pump. His further, contention was that the order directing the arrest and detention in civil prison was without any enquiry. He, therefore prayed that this order be withdrawn and further be made before passing any order.
31. The main contention was that he has not removed the pump. His further, contention was that the order directing the arrest and detention in civil prison was without any enquiry. He, therefore prayed that this order be withdrawn and further be made before passing any order. On 12-1-1984, the Executing Court passed an order that the order directing the arrest of judgment debtor and detaining him in civil prison are vacated. The Court further directed the parties to lead evidence regarding the removal of the electric motor pump in question It is thus clear from the order that all previous orders have been vacated and a fresh enquiry was contemplated in pursuance of this order. 4. The enquiry was made by the Court The decree holder examined himself and the Bailiff, whereas the Judgment Debtor-examined himself, his wife and one Upsarpanch of the village. The Court on the basis of this evidence held that the judgment debtor was in constructive possession of the pump. He also found that the circumstances are cogent enough to lead to a conclusion that judgment debtor must have removed the Pump, and therefore, it passed a final order on 23-9-1986 directing the judgment debtor to restore the possession of the Pump within 7 days and in default the field of the judgment debtor be attached under Order 21, Rule 32 of C.P.C. It is this order which has been the subject matter of challenge in this revision. 5. Mr. Gilda, the learned advocate for the petitioner has strenuously urged before me that the trial Court committed an error not only in appreciating the evidence led by the parties, but also drawing the inferences which are not at all supported by evidence on record. The case of the decree holder, as appears from his application is that , the Pump was fitted on the well situated in the field belonging to the judgment debtor. This pump was the property of the decree holder and adjudication has been made in that respect. The pump was there till at least a day prior to 2-10-1982. However, when the plaintiff and the Decree Holder went to the village on 3-10-1982, the judgment debtor was found inside his house. Thereafter he made his escape from the back door. He (judgment debtor) went into his field.
The pump was there till at least a day prior to 2-10-1982. However, when the plaintiff and the Decree Holder went to the village on 3-10-1982, the judgment debtor was found inside his house. Thereafter he made his escape from the back door. He (judgment debtor) went into his field. The Bailiff and the decree holder went into field where he found judgment debtor and the pump missing. On these circumstances, the trial Court was mercilessly commented by Dr. Gilda, the learned Advocate for the petitioner. According to him, these circumstances are not at all established on record. He took me through the evidence of the decree holder and the judgment debtor. The decree holder and the Bailiff in their examinations have admitted that they did not find the judgment debtor at his house when they went there. They also specifically admitted that they did not find the judgment debtor present in the field when they went there subsequently. There is no evidence that they saw the judgment debtor making good his escape from the back door of his house, when they were there. Thus, the circumstances which are alleged to have a tendency to lead to inescapable inference, that it must be the judgment debtor who must have removed the Pump, are not at all established What is apparent from the record is that the well was situated in the field of judgment debtor. The pump was fitted in that well and the pump belonged to the decree holder. Further there was a decree of injunction against the judgment debtor restraining him from obstructing decree holder's possession over that well. Now, the field belonging to the judgment debtor is not a place to which none has access. On the other hand, it is an open place where everyone can have an access. It is not a closed up place and closed with doors. Chains and locks. 6. Thus, in the circumstances of the case, it will be well high impossible to draw the inference that it is the judgment debtor who has done this mischief. Mr. Mohta, the learned Advocate for the respondent, however, commented on the conduct of the judgment debtor.
It is not a closed up place and closed with doors. Chains and locks. 6. Thus, in the circumstances of the case, it will be well high impossible to draw the inference that it is the judgment debtor who has done this mischief. Mr. Mohta, the learned Advocate for the respondent, however, commented on the conduct of the judgment debtor. His argument was that the judgment debtor knew well that the pump which was fitted in his well was removed by some miscreant, and therefore, it was his duty to report the matter to the police, because he knew well that the property belonging to some other person has been stolen. It is true that the judgment debtor has not reported the matter to the police. While considering the conduct of judgment debtor, the conduct of decree holder also has to be scrutinised, because the decree holder is a person interested most, as his property has been removed. He is knocking the doors of the Court to seek redress for the damage caused to him. If such person goes to the spot and finds that his property has been removed by miscreants, what should be his natural reaction ? He will immediately run down to the police station and report that his property has been stolen Surprisingly enough, the decree-holder has not reported the matter to the police at least for 1½ months. He has reported this matter to the Court only after the lapse of more than 15 days. Is this conduct consistent with the conduct of a man of ordinary prudence ? What Mr. Mohta urged before me is that the conduct of the decree holder was not at all relevant in the case and it was only the conduct of the judgment debtor which assumes considerable importance. In the case of circumstantial evidence the evidence of conduct assumes a considerable importance. It is not the conduct of one person, but the conduct of both the parties that assumes equal importance. Therefore, the trial Court was not justified in relying on the evidence of conduct. 7. The action contemplated under Order 21, Rule 32(1) and (2) of C.P.C. contemplates a penal action against the defaulting party. It is more or less in the nature of a quasi criminal action.
Therefore, the trial Court was not justified in relying on the evidence of conduct. 7. The action contemplated under Order 21, Rule 32(1) and (2) of C.P.C. contemplates a penal action against the defaulting party. It is more or less in the nature of a quasi criminal action. Breach of injunction by the defaulter has to be established positively The Allahabad High Court in (Ram Nath v. Smt. Tapesara)1. A.I.R. 1985 Allahabad 26 observed that in such cases the mere proof of the breach is not enough. In addition it has to be established that the defaulter has willfully disobeyed the directions contained in the decree. The Court observed : "The jurisdiction under Order 21, Rule 32 C.P.C. can be exercised only when party against whom injunction has been passed wilfully failed to obey it. The Court shall not grant relief unless there is wilfull failure to obey the decree". 8. We have to consider on the background of the evidence that has been adduced, whether there has been a wilfully failure to obey the decree. It has to be said that there is absolutely no evidence to show that the judgment debtor is the author and that he has done it willfully. 9. In these circumstances, the order passed by the trial Court can not be sustained. The revision deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The order passed by the trial Court 23-9-1986 directing the production of the pump and on failure directing the attachment of the property to the judgment debtor is hereby set aside and the application Ex. 12 stands dismissed. Rule is made absolute in terms above. There shall be no orders as to costs. Rule made absolute. -----