Phukan, J. — This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the order of termination of the petitioner passed by the General Manager, Nagaland State Transport, respondent No. 3 on 23.6.1983. The impugned order is available at Annexure-7 to the petition. 2. By the order dated 11.3.74 the petitioner was appointed as Grade-IV (Mech-helper) on casual basis for a period of 3 months and subseq­uently by order dated 27.9.77 he was regularised as temporary appointee vide order at Annexure-3 to the present petition. The petitioner was subsequently allowed to drive vehicles. While he was returning from Shillong by driving a Bus after dropping a marriage party at their residence at Dimapur, near the crossing of the over bridge at Dimapur, it is alleged, that a jeep with full speed appeared all on a sudden and the petitioner to avoid an accident took the Bus to the extreme left and as a result the Bus collided with fencing of the over bridge. Police registered a case and started investigation. It is stated at the bar that the charge sheet has been submitted and the case is pending for trial. By order dated 30.5.83 passed under rule 6 of the Nagaland Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1967, the petitioner was placed under suspension. The said order is available at Annexure-5 to the petition and in the order it is clearly stated that the suspension was in contemplation of a departmental proceeding. Subsequently, this order of suspension was revoked on 9.6.83 and thereafter the impugned order of termination was passed on 23.6.83. 3. Mr. Bedi, learned counsel for the petitioner relying on the provisions of rule 24 of the Nagaland State Transport Subordinate Service Rules, 1982 has urged that though the petitioner was appointed temporarily in fact his appointment should be deemed to be on proba­tion and as such by invoking provisions of rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, his services cannot be terminated. Mr. Bedi has further urged that the said Central Civil Services (Tempo­rary Service) Rules is not applicable to the employees of the State of Nagaland. We are not catering into these contentions as in our opinion the present case can be decided on consideration of law laid down by the Apex Court regarding termination of a temporary Government servant without departmental proceeding. 4. Before we consider the submission of Mr. We are not catering into these contentions as in our opinion the present case can be decided on consideration of law laid down by the Apex Court regarding termination of a temporary Government servant without departmental proceeding. 4. Before we consider the submission of Mr. Bedi, learned counsel for the petitioner, we would like to deal with the contentions raised by Mr. Renthunge learned Government Advocate. Learned Government Advocate has urged that the order of termination is a termination simplicitor and as no stigma has been attached, the petitioner has no case to invoke the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. In support, learned Government Advocate has drawn our attention to a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Sujit Kanta Neogi and another vs. Union of India and ors. AIR 1970 Assam & Nagaland 131. From the facts of the case, we find that the case relates to a railway employee and the order was passed under rule 149 of the relevant rules. Learned Govt. Advocate has drawn cur attention to paia 10 of the report. We have considered the said report and we quote below the relevant observations of the Court. “......... and it does not cast any slur or stigma on petitioner. The order cannot be said to be by way of punishment, as the petitioner, being a temporary employee, had no lien to the post." Learned Govt. Advocate has also drawn our attention to a decision of a learned Single Judge of Himachal Pradesh High Court in Roop Lal vs. State, A.I.R. 1973 Himachal Pradesh 14. Learned counsel has drawn our attention to para 8 of the report in support of his submission. In the said paragraph his Lordship has observed as follows : "His services had not been dispensed with because of any complaint of inefficiency, dishonesty or on any other ground, but because of the simple fact that his services were no longer required." We are unable to find out how these two decisions will help the respondents. The law is well settled and on this point there are catena of decisions of the Apex Court and various High Courts. In this conne­ction Mr. Bedi has drawn our attention to a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Ataur Rehman vs. State of Nagaland and ore. The law is well settled and on this point there are catena of decisions of the Apex Court and various High Courts. In this conne­ction Mr. Bedi has drawn our attention to a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Ataur Rehman vs. State of Nagaland and ore. (1988) 2 GLR (NOC) 27 wherein it was held that though a temporary Govt. servant stands on a different footing from a permanent Government servant, even so service of a temporary servant cannot be summarily terminated arbitrarily or for any reason which would make the order as one of punishment. 5. Mr. Bedi has also drawn our attention to two decisions of the Apex Court. In Jarnail Singh vs. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1626, their Lordships held that mere form of the order is not sufficient to hold that the order of termination was innocuous and the order of termina­tion of the services of a probationer or of an ad hoc appointee is a termination simplicitor in accordance with the terms of the appointment without attaching any stigma to the employee concerned. It was further held that it is the substance of the order i.e. the attending circumstances as well as the basis of the order that have to be taken into consideration. According to their Lordships when an allegation as one based on misconduct, though couched in innocuous terms, it is incumbent on the Court to lift the veil and to see the real circumstances as well as the basis and foundation of the order complained of; in other words, the Court, in such a case, will lift the veil and will see whether the order was made on the ground of misconduct/ inefficiency or not. The same law was reiterated by the Apex Court in Smti Rajindra Kaur, vs. Punjab State and another, A. I. R. 1986 S. C. 1790. 6. Situated thus, in the case in hand though the impugned order, at Annexure- 7 has been couched in innocuous terms we have to lift the veil and find out whether the said order was passed by way of punishment as a result of misconduct. 7. As stated earlier, from the suspension order, at Annexure-5, it is very clear that the respondents put the petitioner under suspension for contemplated disciplinary proceeding. 7. As stated earlier, from the suspension order, at Annexure-5, it is very clear that the respondents put the petitioner under suspension for contemplated disciplinary proceeding. This fact alone is sufficient for us to come to conclusion that the impugned order of termination was passed by way of punishment. In order to enable the respondents to pass the impugned order, the suspension order was invoked, other wise there was no necessity to do so having decided by the respondents to start a proceeding. It may be mentioned here that even after suspen­sion order was invoked the petitioner was not assigned any duty. We may also like to point out that in para 8 of the counter of the respondents it has been admitted that the petitioner was put under suspension on consideration of the report received from the Dimapur Traffic Police. This fact clearly shows that the respondents wanted to start a departmental proceeding in order to punish the petitioner. From these facts, we hold that the impugned termination order was passed by way of punishment and as such it is liable to be quashed, which we hereby do. 8. Petitioner approached this Court earlier and the Court directed the petitioner to file a departmental appeal which he did. The said appeal was dismissed by the Government by a criptic order and the order dated 15.6.84 is available at Annexure-11 (b) to the petition. It is really unfortunate that in spite of repeated directions by the Apex Court as well as by this Court that such appeal has to be disposed of by a speaking order, the State Government has failed to do so. Consequently we also set aside the said order. 9. From what has been stated above we quash the order of termination dated 23.6.83 passed by the respondent No. 3 which is available at Annexure - 7 and direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner within a period of 15 days from today. The petitioner shall be deemed into service from the aforesaid date i. e. 23.6.83 and he shall be paid all his back wages in accordance with rules within the aforesaid period of 15 days. 10. As the petitioner is a poorly paid junior driver, we are of the opinion that it is a fit case to award cost. 11. In the result, the petition is allowed with costs of Rs. 10. As the petitioner is a poorly paid junior driver, we are of the opinion that it is a fit case to award cost. 11. In the result, the petition is allowed with costs of Rs. 300/-and the rule is made absolute. Y. I. Singh, J. — I agree.