S.B. SINHA, J. This first appeal arises out of a judgment and decree dated 25th July, 1978 passed by Sri Victor Topno, Subordinate Judge, Chaibassa in Title (Partition) Suit No. 8 of 1977 dismissing the plaintiff-appellant’s suit. 2. The facts of this case are not much in dispute. 3. One Nidhi Mahanti (Patnayak) was undisputedly the owner of the properties in suit. He and two sons, namely, Pramatha Mahanty and Dinabandhu Mahanty. During the pendency of this appeal the original plaintiff died leaving behind his daughter respondent No.8 as her heir, and the defendant No.8 has been pursuing the appeal as filed by the original appellant. 4. The contesting respondents are, admittedly, the sons and daughters of the Dinabandhu Mahanty, son of Nidhi Mahanty. It is the admitted case of the parties that pramatha Mahanty died some time between 1935 to 1938. It is also an admitted fact that Dinabandhu Mahanty died is the year 1975. There was dispute with regard to the date of death of Nidhi but before me the position has been accepted that the findings of the learned trial court that Nidhi died in the year 1953 be accepted to be correct. 5. The learned trial court had that as pramatha Mahanty died prior to the coming into force of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, his widow, namely, the original plaintiff did not inherit his interest. According to the learned trial court, therefore, she did not become an absolute owner in terms of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. The leaned trial court further held that in any event she being not in possession of the suit land after the date of death of her husband (Pramatha Mahanty), the same must be held to be in possession of the contesting defendant and thus the suit was barred by limitation. 6. Mr. S.K. Chattopadhyay, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant firstly submitted that in the instant case the succession do not open on the death of Pramatha Mahanty but opened upon the death of Nidhi. According to the learned counsel, therefore, on the date when Nidhi died Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, having come into force in the Saraikella State, the original plaintiff appellant would succeed as a widow of predeceased son of Nihdhi in terms of the provision of Hindu Women’s right to property Act. According to the learned counsel, therefore, on the date when Nidhi died Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, having come into force in the Saraikella State, the original plaintiff appellant would succeed as a widow of predeceased son of Nihdhi in terms of the provision of Hindu Women’s right to property Act. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that by reason of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the limited interest derived by her in terms of Hindu Women’s Right of property Act, would ripen into an absolute ownership. It is therefore, contended by the learned counsel that the very fact that in the revisional survey record of right the name of the plaintiff was also entered along with the defendants goes to show that she had been in possession of the properties in suit. Learned counsel further submitted that the finding of ouster arrived at by the learned trial court is erroneous in law, in a much, as, admittedly, the defendants-respondents did not raises any plea of outer in the written statement. In this connection learned counsel has placed strong reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mangal Singh and others Vs. Smt. Rattno (dead) by her legal representatives and another1 as also a decision of this court in the case of Dhanpal Singh and others V. Mt. Janki Kaur and others.2 7. Mr. P.K. Sinha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the original plaintiff on the date of death of her husband Pramatha Mahanty become a maintenance holder. 8. She, therefore, did not inherit the properties in suit as a widow of Pramatha Mahanty, inasmuch as, admittedly, at the point of time when Pramatha Mahanty died, Hindu Women’s right of property Act, was not operative in the State of Seraikella. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that as on the date of coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 the plaintiff was not in possession of the properties having a life interest therein, the question of her becoming absolute owner in relation thereto does not arise. 9. The learned counsel further submitted that, in the facts and circumstances of this case, particularly, in view of the fact that the suit being a suit for partition it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that she has exercised any Act, of possession along with her co-sharers. 9. The learned counsel further submitted that, in the facts and circumstances of this case, particularly, in view of the fact that the suit being a suit for partition it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that she has exercised any Act, of possession along with her co-sharers. According to the learned counsel, as in view of the findings of the learned trial court, the plaintiff had never been in possession of the properties in suit and which has all along been in possession of the land. The plaintiff’s right, if any, has become extinct. 10. According to the learned counsel, the succession did not open in 1953 but would be deemed to have opened in 1938 when Pramatha Mahanty died. It was further submitted on the date of death of Nidhi, also the plaintiff did not come in possession. 11. In the facts and circumstances of this case, it appears that the learned trial court did not address itself the right question of law. As admittedly the properties in suit were self-acquired of Nidhi the question of original plaintiff appellant inheriting the interest of the properties on the death of her husband will not arise. At the time of his death Pramatha Mahanty had no interest in the property. 12. It is therefore, clear that the succession would open only in the year 1953 when Nidhi died. 13. By reason of the provision contained in the proviso of sub-section(1) of section 3 of the Hindu Women’s Right of Property Act, (Act No XVII of 1937 amended by XI of 1938) the widow of a predeceased son shall inherit in like manner as a son if there is no son surviving of such predeceased son and shall inherit in like manner as a son’s son if there is surviving a son or son’s son of such predeceased son. It is admitted at the bar that Seraikella state become a Union of India by its merger with the then State of Orissa with effect from 1-1-48. 14. It is further admitted that Seraikella state upon a reorganization of the state become a part of the State of Bihar some times in 1956. 15. It is admitted at the bar that Seraikella state become a Union of India by its merger with the then State of Orissa with effect from 1-1-48. 14. It is further admitted that Seraikella state upon a reorganization of the state become a part of the State of Bihar some times in 1956. 15. It, is, therefore, evident that in the year 1953 when Nidhi died, the Hindu women’s Right of Property Act, 1937 was operative in the state of Seraikella and, as such the original plaintiff-appellant would succeed to the interest of Nidhi to the extent of the share his son would have herited upon his death his death. The share of the plaintiff would be that Pramatha Mahanty would have inherited i.e. 1/2. This being the legal position, she became the co-sharer along with Dinabandhu in the year 1953. 16. At this juncture it may be mentioned that in view of the fact that the plaintiff inherited half of the interest of Nidhi upon his death, the question as to whether she came in actual physical possession or not becomes wholly irrelevant. A possession of a co-sharer is a possession of all the co-sharers. In this view of the matter in terms of provision of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, she being possessed of the property in suit having a life interest therein on the date of coming into force of that Act, along with Dinabandhu she also must be deemed to have become an absolute owner, to the extent of ½ share in respect of the properties of Nidhi. 17. In the instant case, therefore, it was for the defendant-respondents to plead and prove ouster. The learned trial court in paragraph No.23 of its judgment has noticed that the defendants had not pleaded ouster. However, it proceeded on the basis that although no specific plea of ouster has been made out, such plea may be found out from the entire pleadings. 18. Mr. P.K. Sinha, learned counsel, in this connection has drawn my attention to paragraphs Nos. However, it proceeded on the basis that although no specific plea of ouster has been made out, such plea may be found out from the entire pleadings. 18. Mr. P.K. Sinha, learned counsel, in this connection has drawn my attention to paragraphs Nos. 4, 5, 7 and 10 of the written statement and submitted that in view of the fact that the original plaintiff appellant did not come in possession of her in 1938 when Pramatha died or in 1953 when Nidhi died or thereafter, the question of her becoming a co-sharer in respect of the properties for that matter acquiring a right to sue for partition did not survive when the suit was actually instituted in the year 1977. 19. This submission of Mr. Sinha cannot be accepted. It is now well-known that only by not remaining in actual possession a co-sharer cannot be said to have been ousted by the other co-sharers. It is further well-known that a plea of ouster has to be specifically raised and proved. In the instant case the onus to prove ouster of the plaintiff was upon the defendants. The said plea was, therefore, required to be pleaded and proved particularly in view of the fact that in the revisional survey settlement record of rights the name of plaintiff was also entered along with the contesting defendants respondents. 20. In terms of section 84(3) of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act, a presumption about the correctness of an entry made in the record of rights arises and it is for that party to prove who asserts that such entry is not correct by adducing a strong evidence in this regard. 21. Such a plea in this case could not have been locked into by the learned trial court in absence of any plea of ouster. 22. In Dhanpal Singh and others Vs. Mt. Janki Kuer and others (supra) it has been held by this court when a plea of ouster of a widow is taken. It is necessary to consider that possession of a co-sharer must be deemed to be a possession of all unless clear ouster is proved. As no plea of ouster was taking in the written statement the question of plaintiff’s looking her ½ share by reason there of does not arise. 23. A similar question arose in Mangal Singh and other Vs. As no plea of ouster was taking in the written statement the question of plaintiff’s looking her ½ share by reason there of does not arise. 23. A similar question arose in Mangal Singh and other Vs. Smt. Rattno (dead) by her legal representations and another (Supra) where in the Supreme Court after taking into consideration the legislative history of the right of inheritance of a widow held that in such a case possession of a co-sharer would be the possession of a limited interest holder and that right of such a limited owner ripens into an absolute ownership in terms of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. 24. The Supreme court in the aforementioned case laid down the law thus :- “This case also, thus, clarifies that the expression possessed by is not intended to apply to case of mere possession without title and that the legislature intended this provision for cases where the Hindu female possesses the right of ownership of the property in question. Even mere physical possession of the property without the right of ownership will not attract the previsions of this section. This case also, thus, supports our view that the expression “possessed by” was used in the sense of connoting state of ownership and, while the Hindu female possesses the right of ownership, she would become full owner if the other conditions mentioned in the section are fulfilled. The section are fulfilled. The section will, however not apply at all to cases where the Hindu female may have parted with her rights so as to place herself in a position where she could, in no manner exercise for rights of ownership in that property any longer.” 25. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court cannot, be sub-stained. The judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court is, therefore, set aside and the appeal is allowed with costs. Plaintiff’s suit for partition is decreed. It is hereby ordered that the plaintiff is entitled to ½ share in the suit property. Let a decree be prepared accordingly. Appeal allowed.