RAJENDRA BABU, J. ( 1 ) SECOND-RESPONDENT was dismissed from service on the misconduct alleged against him which is as follows:1) ghcraoing the eleven staff members from 5. 15 p. m. on 14-3-1978 to 9 a. m. on 15-3-1978. 2) on 24th march, 1978, obstructing the movement of the company's guest and some members of the staff who were going outside at about 5. 30 p. m. (by car ). 3) instigating the staff members to go on strike and threatening them with dire consequences if they reported for work. 4) assaulting Shri N. Banganathan, on 3-4-1978, near the first railway crossing when he was waiting there for the tempo to come to the factory to attend to his duties. 5) stopping the company's car driven by Sri p. Chandrashekaran, asst. Purchase manager of the company on 11. 5. 1978, when he was returning to the office along with the other member of the staff and threatening the asst. Purchase manager with dire consequences, if he dared to drive the company's car once again. 6) attempting to puncture the front wheels of the car being driven by Sri p. Chandrasekaran, asst. Purchase manager on 11-5-1978, with three of his colleagues, namely, Sri m. g. arjun- wadkar, Sri p. s. hubli, and s. j. fernandis. 7. Assaulting Sri s. s. sawant one of the staff members at the main gate of the factory on 18-5-1978. second respondent gave his explanation to the charge-sheet but the petitioner not being satisfied with the explanation, instituted a domestic enquiry and on the basis of the report made by the inquiry officer concluded that the second respondent deserves dismissal and ordered so. Inasmuch as, certain conciliation proceedings were pending before the first respondent, the petitioner sought for approval of the dismissal with effect from 10-10-1978 under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, ('act' for short) before the first- respondent. First respondent, after noticing the various proceedings before the enquiry officer and the pleadings before him and the arguments addressed formulated the questions for consideration in the following words:"whether a proper domestic enquiry in accordance with the relevant rules/standing orders has been held by the management or not?"and concluded as follows:"as could be seen from the proceedings that the respondent has been ascerting that he has not committed any misconduct for which applicant can lawfully punish. Even the alleged misconduct if proved, stated that the applicant to the respondent; only model standing orders are applicable; and as per Section 12 (a) of the model standing orders, even according to so No. 22 of the model standing orders, none of the misconduct alleged to not fall under any of the acts which amount to misconduct; and as such the management has no right to punish or even issue charge-sheet for alleged misconduct clause (b) thereof reads thus: "going on an illegal strike or abetting inciting, instigating or acting in furlhcrcnce thereof" clause (k) reads thus; "drunkenness, riotous, disorderly of indecent behaviour on the premises of the establishment clause (1) reads thus: "commission of any act subversive of discipline or good behaviour on the premises of the establishment". The strike of the workman was not illegal. Further the alleged acts of misbehaviour were not committed on the premises of the establishment. Thus, the acts complained of do not fall under any of the acts which amount to misconduct. In the circumstances, the management has no right to punish or even issue any chargesheet for the alleged acts of the respondent. The punishment of dismissal given by the applicant-employer to the respondent workman is thus patently unauthorised and unlawful. It is very relevant and important to this authority to find out whether on the facts admitted or proved in the domestic enquiry, a particular action is in accordance with the standing orders or not. It is very pertinent that the charges should specifically fall under a particular misconduct ennumerated in the standing orders/service regulations and they should be proved beyond doubt that, that the particular misconduct is committed in accordance with the particular article of the standing order. The mere passive assertion that the misconduct alleged were under model standing orders is not going to substantiate the case of the management. Even this ascertion is made only when the respondent took an objection stated that the alleged misconduct do not fail under the model standing order which are applicable to him. There is no mention in the charge-sheets, enquiry reports, enquiry proceedings, or in the discharge order that the respondent committed a misconduct which fall under particular article of misconduct contemplated in the standing orders applicable. "and declined to grant the approval sought for. There is no mention in the charge-sheets, enquiry reports, enquiry proceedings, or in the discharge order that the respondent committed a misconduct which fall under particular article of misconduct contemplated in the standing orders applicable. "and declined to grant the approval sought for. Aggrieved by this Order, petitioner has approached this court under article 226 of the Constitution of india. ( 2 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contended by referring to various decision of the Supreme Court that the scope of enquiry under Section 33 (2) (b) of the act is limited to the following question:i) whether the domestic enquiry has been conducted following the due procedure provided in the standing orders and the principles of natural justice; ii) whether the findings of the domestic tribunal, prima-facie, are justified on the evidence adduced before it; iii) whether the management has taken action for dismissal bona-fide and not with a view to victimise the workman in question; iv) whether the employer has complied with the conditions under Section 33 (2) (b) of the act in paying or offering to pay one month's wages to the employee and simultaneously applied to the authority to do so before whom the procedings are pending for approval. ( 3 ) IT is submitted that the first responden thas not adverted to any one of these questions raised which fall within the scope of these propositions and considering the nature of the charges, the enquiry officer had found the second respondent guilty on the charges referred to earlier. ( 4 ) PETITIONER has not framed any standing orders which have been approved by the relevant authority under the industrial employment (standing orders) Act, 1946. Therefore, the model standing orders as provided under the act by the Karnataka government are applicable. The relevant standing order reads as under: disciplinary action for misconduct:-1 ). . . . . . 2) 3) the following acts and omissions shall be treated as misconduct:- a ). . . . . . B ). . . . . . C) wilful damage to or loss of employer's goods or property, d ). . . . . . E ). . . . . . F ). . . . . . G ). . . . . . H) riotous or disorderly behaviour during working hours of the establishment or any act subversive of discipline. . . . . C) wilful damage to or loss of employer's goods or property, d ). . . . . . E ). . . . . . F ). . . . . . G ). . . . . . H) riotous or disorderly behaviour during working hours of the establishment or any act subversive of discipline. model standing orders for clerks have been framed separately and the relevant standing orders read as follows:"22. Any of the following acts or omissions on the part of a clerk shall amount to misconduct:- k) drunkenness, riotous, disorderly or indecent behavior on the premises of the establishment; (1) commission of any act subversive of discipline or good behaviour on the premises of the establishment; (q) wilful damage to work in process or to any property of the establishment: ***on these standing orders, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the acts complained of fall within one or the other clause and the act complained of against the second-respondent amounts to riotous and disorderly conduct as well as damaging the property of the establishment and would also amount to conduct subversive of discipline. It is further submitted, relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of mulchandani electrical and radio industries ltd. V their workmen, AIR 1975 SC 2125 and in the case of tata oil mills co. V its workmen, 1964 (ii) LLJ 113, that even when the riotous or disorderly behaviour is committed even beyond working hours and outside the premises of the establishment may also constitute misconduct, provided that there is a rational connection with the employment of the assailant and the victim. What is outside the scope of employment jurisdiction is such behaviour committed outside the factory or the establishment which was the result of purely a private and individual dispute. In mulchandani electrical and radio industries case, this aspect has been further elaborated. In that case, the dismissed workman was charged of assaulting the petitioner's employee at about 5. 30 p. m. that very day in the train between thana and mulund when he was on his way home after the day's work. In mulchandani electrical and radio industries case, this aspect has been further elaborated. In that case, the dismissed workman was charged of assaulting the petitioner's employee at about 5. 30 p. m. that very day in the train between thana and mulund when he was on his way home after the day's work. The contention urged on behalf of the workmen that the alleged assault having taken place in the train which was obviously outside the premises or precincts of the establishment was not covered by the relevant standing order was negatived by the Supreme Court by holding that on a proper reading of the expressions "within the premises or vicinity of the establishment", would refer not to the place where the act which was subversive of discipline or good behaviours is committed but is relatablc to its effect in the establishment. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that even though the employer cannot have any extraterritorial jurisdiction nor is the chief custodian of general law and order situation nor the guru or mentor of his workmen for their well regulated cultural advancement, as long as there is a causal connection providing link between the alleged act of misconduct and employment in a real and substantial sense, it cannot be said that employer has no power to take disciplinary action and therefore submitted that the whole approach made by the first-respondent is plainly illegal and calls for interference at the hands of this court. ( 5 ) SRI m. c. narasimhan learned counsel for the first respondent, submitted that the strike in question in which the second respondent and certain other persons were engaged during the relevant lime was not an illegal strike. He submitted that the strike is an important part of the bargaining process and in that process it is also possible that there can be an element of pressure applied by way of obstructing or ghcraoing other so-called loyal workmen who do not join them. That itself docs not constitute the act subversive of discipline. When the whole action of the employees to apply pressure is to bring the minority workmen into their fold which may some times lead to small excesses, should not be blown out of proportion and characterised as subversive of discipline. That itself docs not constitute the act subversive of discipline. When the whole action of the employees to apply pressure is to bring the minority workmen into their fold which may some times lead to small excesses, should not be blown out of proportion and characterised as subversive of discipline. It is submitted that the decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner arc decided on special facts and features of each one of those cases and no general principle can be evolved. To illustrate, he referred me to the decision of the Supreme Court in mis. Glaxo laboratories (f) ltd. V presiding officer, meerut, AIR 1984 SC 505 which has taken a view which is directly in conflict with the view taken in mulchandani's case. He also brought to my notice the observation in that decision on the construction to be placed on penal Provisions of law in matters of discipline falling within employment jurisdiction. He submitted that when a strike takes place, the employer and the employee relationship stands suspended, and therefore, the employee is not amenable to disciplinary control of the employer and, in those circumstances, there is no question of any act being characterised as subversive of discipline. When the act complained of was not done within the premises or vicinity of the establishment, the same could not be brought within the concept of the standing orders. Whatever may be the criminal culpability, the same has no relevance in deciding the issue that such an act would constitute one which comes within the expression "subversive of discipline" and urged that this court should not interfere in such matters in exercise of its power under article 226 of the Constitution when two views arc possible on the same aspect of the matter, as is evident from mulchandani's case and glaxo laboratories case, and therefore, one of the views preferred by the first respondent should not be disturbed. ( 6 ) THE parameters of investigation under Section 33 (2) (b) of the act is too well settled now and the bar under Section 33 (2) (b) will be lifted if the authority concerned is satisfied that the enquiry conducted is in accordance with the standing orders not in violation of the principles of natural justice, action taken is not mala-fide and the evidence adduced prima facie support the decision drawn. In the present case in view of the first respondent the alleged act of misbehaviour was not committed in the premises of the establishment and the same does not fall under any of the heads of misconduct referred to in the relevant standing orders, particularly, when the charge-sheet docs not disclose reference of misconduct falling under any heads of standing orders, but read as a whole, does disclose the acts of misconduct, though they do not bring it under any particular head of one or the other standing order. An enquiry conducted by the disciplinary authority is not a criminal case, where the charges have to be framed in a particular manner. The charge-sheet framed by the disciplinary authority sufficiently indicates clearly as to what constitute misconduct. It will be a mere matter of application of any particular standing order to bring it under one head or the other. Therefore the approach of the first respondent that they should have been specifically mentioned the clause under which the misconduct is alleged does not stand to reason at all. Let me first consider the basic objection raised by the workman to the course of action taken by the petitioner. ( 7 ) THE argument advanced by the learned counsel for the second respondent that while the employees are on strike the whole relationship of employer and employee stands suspended and therefore is not amenable to disciplinary jurisdiction of the employer docs not appeal to me at all. When the workman proceed on strike work ceases but the employment relation is deemed to continue albeit in a state of belligerent suspension as held in iron moulders' union v allis-chalmers co. (see ludwig settler in labour disputes and collective bargaining-vol. 1, pages 237-288 ). Similar view was expressed by the Supreme Court in express newspapers v michael mark, AIR 1963 SC 1141 . If that is so the striking employee cannot claim any immunity from the disciplinary control of the master such as in the present case stopping another workman from entering upon the premises to do his work. ( 8 ) IN the present case as the charge discloses the assault committed by the second respondent-workman was not purely a private matter as he committed the acts of assaulting the workmen who were not supporting the strike. ( 8 ) IN the present case as the charge discloses the assault committed by the second respondent-workman was not purely a private matter as he committed the acts of assaulting the workmen who were not supporting the strike. Assault was committed to terrorise the workmen with a view to force him to work, which acts certainly constitute an act of subversive of discipline. It is open to the employer to take disciplinary action against the delinquent workman when the act complained of is not one which is not far too remote and unconnected with the employment but one which has causal connection which has a link between the alleged conduct of misconduct and employment is real and substantial, immediate and proximate and not remote or tenuous, as was noticed by the Supreme Court in the case M/s. Glaxo laboratories (i) ltd. ( 9 ) ON the question whether the act alleged to have been committed on the premises of the establishment it self or outside, and if such acts had been committed outside the premises of the establishment, what is relevant has been discussed by the Supreme Court in the two cases referred to earlier. When the Supreme Court in the two decisions has taken divergent and diametrically opposite views as for the act of misconduct relatable to an employee though holding outside the premises, it cannot be said that the petitioner did not have a prima-facie case on such a controversial matter to come to the conclusion one way or the other. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out to me that in a decision of this court in bharath electronics ltd. V industrial tribunal, (xxxvi (1969) fj 74), this court interpreting the very Rule had taken the view that it was correct on the part of the tribunal to have rejected the conclusion that since the alleged assault took place outside the factory premises, the first part of this clause was wholly inapplicable and it placed dependence on the second part which refers to "any act of subversive of discipline". Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in tata oil mills case, misconduct outside the factory premises in order to entail the imposition of a punishment under a standing order such as those on which the management depended in that case, should have some 'rational connection with the employment of the assailant and the victim'. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in tata oil mills case, misconduct outside the factory premises in order to entail the imposition of a punishment under a standing order such as those on which the management depended in that case, should have some 'rational connection with the employment of the assailant and the victim'. If that nexus exists, and the act is an act subversive of discipline, it would be clear that the assault would be misconduct within the meaning of standing order 15 (1 ) (h) even if the assault took place outside the factory premises. But, in the present case, we are not only concerned with the standing order which is identical with the standing order with which their lordships were dealing in bharat electronics ltd. Case, but also another standing order which refers to misconduct subversive of the discipline also being complained of only in the factory premises. Therefore, this decision may not be of use in the present case. We have to fall back on the two decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above and shall proceed on the basis of the contentions raised on behalf of workmen that Supreme Court has expressed two different view in the matter's. ( 10 ) WHEN the Supreme Court itself expressed two different views in a matter and the employer and the employer just adopted one of the views and the view adopted by the employer is inconformity with one of the views, can it be categorically said that such a view is prima facie not justifiable on the material on record before him. The scope of enquiry before the authority approving an action of dismissal under Section 33 (2) (b) of the act is confined to investigation whether prima facie the disciplinary authority was justified in reaching the conclusion that the misconduct in this case proved to have taken place outside the factory premises, have a direct bearing on the employer. In the present case, indeed the enquiry officer referred to this aspect of the matter and stated the same in the following words:"a point has been raised by the delinquent in exh. D-1 on the ground that the misconduct, if any, taking place outside the premises of the factory does not amount to misconduct punishable under standing orders or otherwise. In the present case, indeed the enquiry officer referred to this aspect of the matter and stated the same in the following words:"a point has been raised by the delinquent in exh. D-1 on the ground that the misconduct, if any, taking place outside the premises of the factory does not amount to misconduct punishable under standing orders or otherwise. Now it is well established by the rulings of the Supreme Court also, if the misconduct having some connection with the working of the establishment has taken place outside the factory premises or their employees will still amount to a misconduct as having taken place in the factory premises itself. I therefore, have no hesitation to hold that the misconducts in this proved have taken place outside the factory premises, have a direct bearing on the working of the factory, as they have taken place during the course and as a part of the strike. They are deemed to have taken place in the factory premise itself, and therefore, they are punishable according to law. "therefore there is clear material on record to show that the first respondent exceeded his jurisdiction in not giving approval and by going into the question whether the act committed by the second respondent was within the premises or outside the premises. Therefore, I am of the view that the order made by the first respondent which is impugned before me deserves to be quashed. ( 11 ) HOWEVER, Sri narasimhan, learned counsel for the second respondent contended that in a case of this nature where the approving authority had taken a particular views, what this court can do under art. 226 is only to look to his order and find out whether it is in conformity with the one of the views expressed by the Supreme Court or not and not to look at the order made by the disciplinary authority. He explained to me that the view taken by the first respondent is in accordance with the latter view of the Supreme Court, and therefore, it cannot be said that such a view is perverse as to call for interference at the hands of this court. He explained to me that the view taken by the first respondent is in accordance with the latter view of the Supreme Court, and therefore, it cannot be said that such a view is perverse as to call for interference at the hands of this court. When by the same token of logic adopted by the respondent of the principle is so extended to examine the order made by the disciplinary authority whether prima facie justified or not, learned counsel for respondent workmen objects to the same that it is not permissible, because what is in issue before this court is only an order made by the first respondent and not that of the disciplinary authority. I am afraid there is too much of ingenuity in this argument. What was in issue before the first respondent was whether the order made by the disciplinary authority is prima facie justifiable. If that is so and if the authority exceeded its jurisdiction in deciding that matter, i think it would be certainly in order for this court under article 226 to quash such an order. 9. In the result the order impugned herein is quashed with liberty to the first respondent to decide the matter afresh in accordance with law and in the light of this order. Either party is at liberty to raise all contentions except those that have been decided by me in this order. Writ petition allowed. --- *** --- .