JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is the workmans appeal under Section 30 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), against the award dated 30th April, 1984, passed by the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation (Labour Court), Bilaspur. M. P. , in Case No. 27 of 1982 W. C. A. (E. F.), rejecting the appellants claim for compensation on account of injury sustained by him, during the course of employment on 11th March, 1981. ( 2. ) THAT the appellant was working as a labourer at Birri Dolomite Mines of the respondent on 11th March, 1981 and suffered injury on his left eye during the course of employment is now not in dispute. It appears that while the appellant was breaking Dolomite stone for cleaning the surface of the mine, a flying chip of the mineral struck his left eye and got stuck in his pupil. According to the appellant, since it was an employment injury resulting in 30% loss of his physical and earning capacity, he was entitled to compensation for the same. The defence of the respondent was that the appellant had been issued goggles, a safety equipment and was obliged to wear the same while on duty. They also relied upon standing instructions and rules that require employees to wear goggles while working. He did not use the same and suffered the injury. The respondent, therefore, claimed that the appellant because of the aforesaid disregard of standing instructions and the rules was not entitled to any compensation. The respondent further submitted that the appellant at the time he sustained the injury was not working but was resting near the work place. This, according to them, was the negligent act of the appellant disentitling him to any compensation. The learned Commissioner, on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties, held that the appellant sustained injury while working and not while resting. The learned Commissioner was of the view that the appellant was not wearing goggles while working and was, therefore, guilty of wilful negligence of instructions. Ex. D-1 to D-3 disentitles him to relief under Section 3 (1) proviso (b) (ii) of the Act. That is how the appellants claim was dismissed and hence this appeal. ( 3. ) APPELLANT Chaitram, in his statement on oath, has admitted that he had been issued goggles by the respondents to be used while working. Ex. D-1 to D-3 disentitles him to relief under Section 3 (1) proviso (b) (ii) of the Act. That is how the appellants claim was dismissed and hence this appeal. ( 3. ) APPELLANT Chaitram, in his statement on oath, has admitted that he had been issued goggles by the respondents to be used while working. According to him, the goggles are made in a manner that workers cleaning the surface are not able to properly see the surface while wearing it. They are therefore compelled to remove it while cleaning the surface. In cross-examination, he has admitted that he did not report this defect in the goggles to any one. He insisted that he had removed the goggles because he was finding it difficult to properly see and work while wearing it. Cheti Bai (P. W. 2) is another labourer of the gang and has corroborated his evidence. According to her, it is not possible to see properly through the goggles and, therefore, they have to work after removing them. In her cross-examination, she stated that goggles have double glasses and, therefore, it is difficult to see properly at a near distance. She further stated that she had made several representations in writing to the authorities but without any result. As against this, Shri R. K. Som (D. W. 1) has only deposed that the respondents nave issued notices ex. D/1, D-2 and D-3 requiring the workers to use goggles while working. According to him, it has been clarified that, in case the workers worked without goggles and suffered injuries, the management will not be responsible. He has not stated anything about the types of goggles and the difficulty in properly seeing through them as stated by the appellant and Cheti Bai. It would, therefore, appear that the statement of the appellant and Cheti Bai about the difficulty in properly seeing through the goggles has remained uncontradicted. In spite of it, it is clear that the appellant had been issued goggles to be used while working and was not wearing the same at the time when the accident took place, causing injury to his left eye. Question for consideration is whether provisions of Section 3 (1) Proviso (b) (ii) of the Act are attracted in such a situation. ( 4. Question for consideration is whether provisions of Section 3 (1) Proviso (b) (ii) of the Act are attracted in such a situation. ( 4. ) A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions would indicate that the employer shall not be liable to pay compensation for personal injury caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment if the accident be directly attributable to "wilful disobedience" of the workman of an order expressly given or a rule expressly framed for the purpose of securing the safety of workman". The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant, in the main, is that there was no wilful disobediance of the order by the appellant and hence the liability of the respondent subsists. A persual of the impugned award does not indicate that the learned Commissioner has found the appellant guilty of wilful disobedience of the orders Ex. D-1, D-2 and D-3. His conclusion as recorded in the paras 6, 7 and 8 of the impugned award, is that the explanation given by the appellant cannot be believed because he has failed to produce the goggles in the Court. According to the learned Commissioner once the reason for not wearing goggles is found to be unbelievable, the necessary conclusion would be that disobedience was wilful. This Court is not able to sustain the said conclusion as in its opinion, the same is not based on sound reasoning. It must be appreciated that the provision requires a finding about "wilful disobedience" of the order". The emphasis in the provision is on wilful. In S. Harman Singh v. State, (AIR) 1976 SC 2140, (Delhi Admn.) the Supreme Court while interpreting word wilfully, appearing in Section 477-A, I. P. C. , held that it means intentionally or deliberately. In Balajee Cotton Mills Ltd. , Salem v. M. C. Manickam, 1981 Ace CJ 236: (Mad), it was held that the term wilful disobedience involves doing of something with the knowledge that it is likely to result in serious injury or with a wanton or reckless disregard of the probable consequences. The concept concerns the mental state of the party at the time of accident and is thus the antithesis of the idea imparted by the word accident. More or less similar is the effect of the decision of Patna High Court in Bhurangva Coal Co. v. Sahebjan (1957-II-LLJ-522 ). The concept concerns the mental state of the party at the time of accident and is thus the antithesis of the idea imparted by the word accident. More or less similar is the effect of the decision of Patna High Court in Bhurangva Coal Co. v. Sahebjan (1957-II-LLJ-522 ). This Court in Babulal Mulchand v. Ali Mohammed, 1962 MPLJ 454, was of the opinion that the negligence alone in carrying of duty is not relevant if the injury is caused in the course of employment. To the same effect is the decision of Orissa High Court in Padam Devi v. Raghunath Ray, (AIR) 1950 Orissa 207 and of Bombay High Court in G. I. P. Railway v. Kashinath, (AIR) 1928 Bom 1. In Mt. Chamni W/o Shiva Mahar v. Shaw Wallace and Co. , (AIR) 1937 Nag 397, a Division Bench of this Court held that a breach of safety regulation is not equivalent to wilful disobedience, nor acting against a warning notice would amount to prohibition. Under the circumstances, not wearing goggles, by itself, would not amount to wilful disregard of notices Ex. D-1, D-2 and D-3 and something more would be required to hold that it was intentional or wilful. In such situations, the injury must begin from the worker required to wear goggles and must be pointed to finding out whether he was not wearing goggles intentionally or was not wearing them because he had some reasonable and bona fide difficulty in seeing through them while working. The conclusion must depend on facts of each case and it is always the workman suffering injury who should be the focal point of the inquiry. It would not be proper for the Commission or the Judges or Lawyers to import their own notions into such an inquiry. Nor should we treat a worker like the appellant, to be as ideal person with 6/6 eye sight. This is not the case where appellant has taken a false defence. It was not difficult for him to take a false stand if he so wanted particularly when Ex. D-6 does not bear his signature witnessing supply of goggles. Then R. K. Som (D. W. 1) does not say anything about the difficulty faced by the appellant and his witness Cheti Bai. Cheti Bai (P. W. 2) has specifically stated that she had made several complaints but no one took notice of them. D-6 does not bear his signature witnessing supply of goggles. Then R. K. Som (D. W. 1) does not say anything about the difficulty faced by the appellant and his witness Cheti Bai. Cheti Bai (P. W. 2) has specifically stated that she had made several complaints but no one took notice of them. There is no denial from anyone by the respondent of her this statement. Shri R. K. Som (D. W. 1) has, on the contrary, admitted that the appellant worked in a gang. In this view of the matter, the report, by any member of the gang should be accepted as sufficient report on behalf of the members of the gang. It is, therefore, not proper to find fault with the appellant only because he himself did not make any report in writing. Non-production of goggles might have some consequence if R. K. Som (D. W. 1) had contradicted the appellant and his witness. The Act is welfare legislation and, therefore, procedural technicalities should not be permitted to defeat Justice. It should be kept in view that every procedure is designed to promote Justice and hence nonproduction of goggles should not have been accepted as sufficient to defeat the claim. It should also have been realised that burden of proving intentional disobedience on the part of the appellant would be on the respondent who claims benefit of the proviso. In such a situation, it was the obligation of the respondent to prove that the difficulty expressed by the appellant in using goggles while cleaning surface, was not real but fake. In the opinion of this Court, the learned Commissioner has not judged the matter in proper legal perspective and, therefore, his conclusion cannot be accepted. Considered conclusion of this Court, in the context of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, is that it is not established that the appellant was not using the goggles intentionally and in wilful disobedience of the orders in Ex. D-1, D-2 and D-3. In this view of the matter, the liability of the respondent-management would subsist. ( 5. ) IN view of the discussion aforesaid this Court is unable to sustain the impugned award. The appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned award is set aside and the appellant is held entitled to a sum of Rs. D-1, D-2 and D-3. In this view of the matter, the liability of the respondent-management would subsist. ( 5. ) IN view of the discussion aforesaid this Court is unable to sustain the impugned award. The appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned award is set aside and the appellant is held entitled to a sum of Rs. 8,820/- as found by the learned Commisioner together with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of accident till realization. However, in view of peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs of this appeal.