A. Raghuvir, C. J. — The issues raised in this writ petition pertain to tolls collected by Shillong Municipal Board in the State of Meghalaya. Soon after Meghalaya gained the Statehood the Government adopted the Assam Municipal Act, 15 of 1957 as one of the State Acts and exercising powers under that Act dissolved the Shillong Municipal Board on August 17, 1971. Later the State Government appointed on February 4, 1973 Shri Aubroy Herbert Scott as the Chief Executive Officer of the dissolved Municipality. The Chief Executive Officer felt the finance of the Shillong Municipality required to be augmented as expenses incurred by the Municipality were heavy on maintenance of roads, street lighting and on conservancy services. To improve the services the Municipality obtained a loan of Rs. 5 crores from the Life Insurance Corporation of India. After obtaining approval of the State Government the Chief Executive Officer published bye-law' on November 24, 1980 under which the rates of tolls were enhanced. Thereupon an Association registered under the Societies Registration Act, XXII of 1860 lodged the instant writ petition to quash the bye-laws. The name of the Association is Meghalya Truck Owners Association. The aims and objects of the Association is the welfare of truck owners. The broad issue raised in the petition is whether tolls are in the nature of fee. The Association contends tolls axe in the nature of fee. It is argued that no service is rendered to. those from whom tolls is collected therefore this Court should interdict the Shillong Municipality not to collect tolls. The learned counsel for the petitioner at first argued under the provisions of Act 15 of 1957 the Chief Executive Officer had no power to promulgate the bye-laws therefore the bye-laws are non est in law. In support of this contention sections 298 and 299 of the Act were cited. In advancing this argument the learned counsel for the Association overlooked Clause (5) of section 26 which recites on dissolution of a Municipal Board the Chief Executive Officer is to or can exercise powers envisaged in section 299 of the Act. The Shillong Municipality was dissolved on August 17, 1971. The Chief Executive Officer thus under section 299 read with section 26 (5) of the Act was competent to promulgate the bye-laws. This contention of the Association therefore fails. The Shillong Municipality was dissolved on August 17, 1971. The Chief Executive Officer thus under section 299 read with section 26 (5) of the Act was competent to promulgate the bye-laws. This contention of the Association therefore fails. The Association next argued the heavy vehicles in their onward journey pass through Shillong Municipality on a National Highway specified in Item 31 of the Schedule to the National Highways Act 48 of 1956. The goods that are carried by the vehicle are not intended to be consumed in the Shillong Municipality, Therefor passing through Shillong town on a National 'Highway the vehicles are not obliged in law to pay tolls. We see under Act 48 of 1956 Item 31 of the Schedule relates to Highway between Jorhat and Shillong. Section 2 however recites a National Highway when it passes through any 'local authority that segment of the National Highway is not a National Highway. Thus when vehicle' pass through Shillong Municipality it cannot be accepted vehicles run on a National Highway. This contention of the Association also does not hold water. The Association next raised the issue as to the nature and incidence of tolls. Tolls were a common feature of medieval Europe, England and in Egypt. In England they were known as ingate tolls collected at the gates at the barriers. There were many kinds of tolls - toll thorough, toll traverse, toll stallage. The first was prescribed for animals or men that went over through highways or over ferries and bridges. The second was charged for passing over a private persons grant. The third was a charge for occupation, of land by pitching stalls in towns and market. The word "octroi" came later from the French 'Octroyer' which means 'impost' or 'toll'. In France the impost was levied for 700 years on goods meant for consumption within the area of local authority. At first such imposts were collected in ports and in Roman Empire it had the name of "portorium". However it was abolished in Belgium in 1870, in Egypt in 1903 and in France in 1940. In India Mughal Rings levied octroi and tolls in the name of 'Chungi'. East India Company levied under Regulation 1805 in Bengal till 1835. In Madras province it was imposed till 1842; This impost is now levied in Bombay, Oudh and Punjab. It is no more levied at Hyderabad. In India Mughal Rings levied octroi and tolls in the name of 'Chungi'. East India Company levied under Regulation 1805 in Bengal till 1835. In Madras province it was imposed till 1842; This impost is now levied in Bombay, Oudh and Punjab. It is no more levied at Hyderabad. As on today in Karnataka Bombay tolls or octroi are levied under a Statute. In Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences Volume XIII by Edwin R.A. Seligman, Page 404, the history of tolls is recounted from the middle age. "From then on to 1774 Parliament passed hundreds of acts creating turnpikes, A turnpike trust was created with-jurisdiction over a certain stretch of road and with authority to borrow money on the security of the tolls, which were to furnish the funds for the maintenance of the road and repayment of; the loan. -The tolls collected yielded barely enough to maintain the road is satisfactory condition and in relatively few instances were they sufficient to pay interest on the loan. It was in 1895 that the last turnpike vanished from the British soil'. After the proclamation of Quean Victoria and the enactment of the Govt. of India Act 1851 the East India Company was divested of powers to rule India later in one of the earliest Acts passed by the British Crown was of the Tolls Act of 1851. Later Tolls Act 15 of 1864, Tolls Act 8 of 1888, Tolls (Army and Air Force) Act 43 of 1955 were enacted. The Patna High Court in AIR 1966 Patoa 462 (Maheshwari Singh vs. State of Bihar) considered the provisions of Tolls Act of 1851 when tolls were imposed on Haromar Bridge on the Barahiya-Lakhisorai Road, Monghyr District. That case referred to the decision in AIR 1962 SC 1406 (Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan) and held tolls levied were as compensatory taxes. The Supreme Court considered tolls in the case of AIR 1966 SC 1502 (Hardwar Municipality vs. Raghubir Singh) in that case the ancient history of tolls was recounted. That was an appeal from the High Court of Allahabad. Single Bench of the Allahabad High Court held vehicles going out of the Municipality are not obliged to pay tolls; vehicles which enter into the Municipality are liable to pay tolls. That was an appeal from the High Court of Allahabad. Single Bench of the Allahabad High Court held vehicles going out of the Municipality are not obliged to pay tolls; vehicles which enter into the Municipality are liable to pay tolls. On appeal a Division Bench of the High Court held the vehicles which pay tolls on entry need not pay tolls on exit. The Supreme Court cleared the obscurity and held tolls are paid on entry as held by the Single Judge and not when vehicles moved out of the local authority. At this distance of time it is not necessary to elaborate the distinction between tax and fee. The Association however referred to the Allahabad High Court decision an AIR 1982 Allahabad 402 which held in this regard: "Generally speaking, law does not require rendition of any service to support imposition of taxes. ...The strict principle of quid pro quo may not be attracted to such a case and the services rendered or the privileges conferred may not be fully commensurate with the amount of tax imposed but the tax cannot be justified where no service at all is rendered to the person saddled with the liability of tax". The association next referred to AIR 1987 SC 56 (Kamaljeet Singh vs. Municipal Board, Pilkhwa). In that case the Municipal Board, Pilkhwa imposed tolls on vehicles, at a point away from National Highway No. 24 where stage carriages stopped for picking up passengers. The Supreme Court in that ease held - "Usually, the consideration a toll is some amenity, service, benefit or advantage which the person entitled to the toll undertakes to provide for the public in general, or the persons liable to pay the toll". We cannot read the above passage to hold tolls are fee in nature as contended by the Association. The ratio in this passage even if it should strike a different note from what was held in AIR 1966 SC 1502 , in which case it is seen the case is decided by a Bench of two Judges whereas the former case of AIR 1966 SC 1502 was decided by a Bench of five Judges. The ratio in this passage even if it should strike a different note from what was held in AIR 1966 SC 1502 , in which case it is seen the case is decided by a Bench of two Judges whereas the former case of AIR 1966 SC 1502 was decided by a Bench of five Judges. In this connection we may refer to the rule of interpretation laid in AIR 1976 SC 2547 (State of U. P. vs. Ram Chandra Trivedi)-“ to find out and follow the opinion expressed by larger benches of this court in preference to those expressed by smaller beaches of the court which practice, hardened as it has into a rule of law is followed by this court itself". We have in the facts of the case no hesitation tolls are not fees. Tolls are compensatory tax as explained in Rajasthan case oy the Supreme Court. We may once again in this connection refer to what the Patna High, Court has held in AIR 1966 Pataa 462 (at p. 464) as we respectfully adopt the reasoning in that case to elucidate powers of Courts. That Court while considering section 2 of Tolls Act of 1851 held those who impose tolls do not have unfettered, unguided or arbitrary power to levy. “... in a particular case it can be shown that the rate of levy is so excessive as to make the levy not a 'toll' an understood in public finance, the particular levy may be struck down as being in excess of the statutory power”. In this case the Association argued that the rates collected by the Shillong Municipality are high and oppressive. The learned counsel for the Association referred to the rates prior to November 24, 1980 when rate was Rs. 2.50 p. for heavy vehicles Rs. 1.50 for a tractor with or without traitors load was Rs.2.00, without load Rs.1.00. Those rates were enhanced from November 24, 1980 - for light vehicles 'Rs. 5.00, for heavy vehicles Rs. 15.00 and for tractors with or without traitors Rs. 6.00, for tractors without load Rs. 1.00. On the facts of the instant case we hold no case is made for the interference of this Court. We however refer to one circumstance that in the adjacent town of Gauhati heavy vehicles are charged Rs. 10/-as toll. 5.00, for heavy vehicles Rs. 15.00 and for tractors with or without traitors Rs. 6.00, for tractors without load Rs. 1.00. On the facts of the instant case we hold no case is made for the interference of this Court. We however refer to one circumstance that in the adjacent town of Gauhati heavy vehicles are charged Rs. 10/-as toll. The Shillong Municipality will do well to follow that example as in our view Rs.15/- per heavy vehicle under the impugned bye-law is excessive. To sum up we hold toll is a compensatory tax. The impugned bye-laws published on November 24, 1980 do not suffer from any vice what­ever except what we have indicated as to the rate of heavy vehicles. The writ petition merits dismissal and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs. R. K. Manisana, J. — I agree.