JUDGMENT : G.B. Patnaik, J. - Defendant is the Appellant against a reversing judgment. Plaintiff filed the suit for a declaration that he belongs to scheduled tribe being 'Kamar' by caste on the averment that he purchased some land from the Defendant on 11-6-1966 and thereafter the Defendant filed a petition before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bargarh, under Sections 22 and 23 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act (for short 'the O.L.R. Act') for declaring the sale to be void. It was specifically averred in the plaint that since the Defendant had filed an application under Sections 22 and 23 of the O.L.R. Act to declare the transfer to be void, the Plaintiff filed the present suit and the cause of action arose on 16-2-1979 when the Plaintiff came to know about the filing of the aforesaid application by the Defendant. 2. Defendant in his written statement took the stand that the sale by his father was not backed by consideration and was without due permission from the revenue authorities. Since the Defendant is admittedly a scheduled tribe being 'Gond' by caste and the Plaintiff is a non-scheduled tribe, an application under Sections 22 and 23 of the O.L.R. Act had been filed. It was further averred that the suit is not maintainable and the civil Court has no jurisdiction. 3. On these pleadings, the trial proceeded. The trial Court Gme to the conclusion that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to declare that a particular person belongs to scheduled caste or scheduled tribe since under the statute, it is the President of India who is empowered to issue notification in this regard in consultation with the Governor of a State. The learned Munsif ultimately came to hold that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to maintain the suit. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge reversed the judgment and decree of the learned Munsif on a conclusion that the civil Court's jurisdiction cannot be ousted in view of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, referring to the schedule in question, he equated the caste 'Kawar' with the caste of the Plaintiff 'Kamar' and held that the Plaintiff is entitled to be declared as a scheduled tribe and accordingly allowed the appeal decreeing the Plaintiff's suit. 4. Mr. Thereafter, referring to the schedule in question, he equated the caste 'Kawar' with the caste of the Plaintiff 'Kamar' and held that the Plaintiff is entitled to be declared as a scheduled tribe and accordingly allowed the appeal decreeing the Plaintiff's suit. 4. Mr. Misra, learned Counsel for the Appellant, contend that the suit is essentially- one which is meant to take away the effect of the decision of the competent authority under the O.L.R. Act, though it is clothed with the prayer for a declaration that the Plaintiff's caste be declared to be a scheduled tribe. Since the validity of a sale deed from a scheduled tribe in favour of a non-scheduled tribe is to be examined under the O.L.R. Act, the present suit is not maintainable. The learned Counsel further contends that the caste, Kamar' not being one described in the notification issued under the presidential order, the civil Court has no jurisdiction to declare the said caste to be a scheduled tribe. Accordingly, the impugned judgment is unsustainable in law. Mr. Sinha, learned Counsel for the Respondent, on the other hand, strenuously argues that the jurisdiction of the civil Court to declare the caste of a person cannot be ousted. 'Since in the present case, the Court on analysis of the materials has corne to the finding that the caste 'Kamar' is same as 'Kawar' described in the notification under the presidential order, the judgment of the Subordinate Judge cannot be assailed in this second appeal. 5. In view of the rival submissions of the counsel for the parties, the following questions arise for consideration: (i) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the jurisdiction of the civil Court can be said to be ousted to entertain the suit and grant the relief sought for? (ii) Even if such a suit is maintainable, whether the civil Court would be competent to add something to the 'presidential notification and declare a particular caste to come under the said notification, though such caste or tribe is not admittedly there in the notification? 6. In my considered opinion. the answer to both the questions must be in the negative. 6. In my considered opinion. the answer to both the questions must be in the negative. So far as the jurisdiction of the Court is concerned, the averments made in the plaint clearly establish that though the suit was filed for a declaration that the Plaintiff belongs to the scheduled tribe being 'Kamar' by caste, but it was so filed because the Defendant had 1iled an application under Sections 22 and 23 of the O.L.R. Act. The jurisdiction of the competent authority under the O.L.R. Act to declare a sale deed void if the conditions precedent are not satisfied is exclusive in nature and such authority can declare a transfer void not only on the application of any person interested, but also on his own information. In view of Section 67 of the O.L.R. Act, the civil Court has no jurisdiction to try and decide any suit or proceeding so far as it relates to any matter which any officer or other competent authority is empowered by or under the said Act to decide. In view of the aforesaid provisions and in view of the averments made in the plaint, in my opinion, the prayer in the suit is merely a manoeuvre to overcome any decision of the competent authority under the O.L.R. Act. Such a suit cannot be held to be maintainable notwithstanding Section 9 of the CPC on which Mr. Sinha, learned Counsel for the Respondent, placed reliance. It would not be out of place to mention at this stage that the competent authority under the O.L.R. Act, by order dated 15-2-1989 in O.L.R. Case No. 5179 has already declared the sale to be illegal and void on a finding that the sale is one by a member of the scheduled tribe in favour of a person who is not a member of the scheduled tribe. Any declaration made by the civil Court now to the effect that the Plaintiff belongs to a scheduled tribe is obviously intended to nullify the decision of the competent authority under the O.L.R. Act. In my considered opinion, what is prohibited under the statute, namely, the civil Court's jurisdiction to nullify an order under the O.L.R. Act, cannot be indirectly exercised by clothing the prayer with the relief for a mere declaration alone. In my considered opinion, what is prohibited under the statute, namely, the civil Court's jurisdiction to nullify an order under the O.L.R. Act, cannot be indirectly exercised by clothing the prayer with the relief for a mere declaration alone. Thus, reading the plaint as a whole and in view of the order of the competent authority dated 15-2-1989, I hold that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the civil Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The first contention of Mr. Misra is accordingly sustained. 7. So far as the second question is concerned, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhaiyalal Vs. Harikishan Singh and Others I am of the opinion that the lower appellate Court committed a gross error by equating 'kamar' with 'kawar' and, thetefore, coming to the conclusion that 'kamar' is a scheduled tribe. In the aforesaid case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court clearly indicated that to ascertain whether a particular tribe is a scheduled tribe or not within the meaning of Article 341, one is to look at the notification issued by the President in that behalf. It is not possible for a Court to hold an inquiry and come to a conclusion that some other caste is equal to the caste notified in the Presidential order. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it was not open for the lower appellate Court to hold an inquiry and come to the conclusion that 'kamar' is same as 'kawar' That apart, there was no material before the lower appellate Court to come to the aforesaid conclusion and the same is merely based on surmises and conjectures. Consequently, the conclusion of the lower appellate Court on this score cannot be sustained and is therefore set aside. 8. In the net result, therefore, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate courts are set aside and the Plaintiff's suit is dismissed. This Second Appeal is allowed. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed. Final Result : Allowed