RAMA JOIS, J. ( 1 ) IN this appeal, in view of the contention urged by the learned government advocate, the following question of law arises for consideration:-"whether the benefits extended by the Provisions of Section 23 (2) and Section 28 as amended by the land acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 does not apply to the awards made by the court in a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, subsequent to the coming into force of the amending act with effect from 24-9-1984, in respect of acquisitions initiated by the issue of preliminary notification under section-4 (1) of the act or the awards made by the land acquisition officer prior to 30th April 1982?. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case are these. The lands which constitute the subject matter for award of compensation under the Act, were acquired pursuant to a preliminary notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the act on 21-2-1974, the land acquisition officer made an award on 27-1-1979. Dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation awarded by the l. a. o. , the claimant sought reference under section-18 of the act. The learned civil judge made the award in the reference on 10th january, 1986. The learned civil judge enhanced the compensation from Rs. 1,600/- per acre to Rs. 5,400/- per acre. To the total amount of compensation awarded at the said rate, the learned civil judge also added solatium at 30% of the amount and also 12% of the said amount from the dale of preliminary notification i. e. , 21-2-1974, to 27-1-1979. . Aggrieved by the said award the special land acquisition officer is in appeal before us, ( 3 ) AS regards the quantum of compensation awarded, it should be pointed out that the learned civil judge has adopted the capitalisation method. Though the evidence of the claimant was that the yield of jowar per acre per annum was 10 to 12 quintals and the yield of cotton was 5 to 6 quintals, the learned civil judge did not believe it on the ground that there was exaggeration. Relying on the book-let published by the agricultural university relating to the yield of jowar and colton from the type of lands in question, the learned judge was of the view that the yield from rabi jowar was 6 quintals per acre per annum and the yield of cotton was 4 quintals. Relying on the book-let published by the agricultural university relating to the yield of jowar and colton from the type of lands in question, the learned judge was of the view that the yield from rabi jowar was 6 quintals per acre per annum and the yield of cotton was 4 quintals. Taking the price of these two commodities on the basis of price list of the agricultural produce marketing committee, raichur, the learned judge worked out the gross income from the lands. After deducting 50% of it as the cost of cultivation he came to the conclusion that net income per acre, if white jowar is taken as the principal crop, would be Rs. 515/- and if the cotton is taken as principal crop, it would be Rs. 566/ -. The learned judge also took into account Rs. 1007- per acre as income from subsidiary crops. He took the average net income as Rs. 5407- and applied the multiple of 10 in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in special land acquisition officer, Davangere v P. V. Eerabhadrappa, AIR 1984 SC 774 , and computed the value of the land at Rs. 5,400/- per acre. In our view, the quantum of compensation fixed by the learned civil judge is correct and on valid basis and the appellant can make no grievance against the said quantum of compensation. ( 4 ) SHRI. N. Deva dass, learned government advocate, however, submitted that as the preliminary notification was issued prior to 30th April 1982, the amended sections 23 (1a), 23 (2) and 28 were inapplicable, nevertheless the learned civil judge had extended the benefit flowing from these Provisions in the award, and therefore the award to that extent was liable to be set aside. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on the Provisions of section-30 of the land acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. ( 5 ) IN order to appreciate the contention, it is necessary to state the material facts relating to the said amendment. The land acquisition amendment bill proposed to amend the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was introduced in the lok sabha on 30th april, 1982. Ultimately it became the land acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. It was assented to by the president on 9th September 1984 and it was published in the official gazette on 24-9-1984 on which date it came into force. The land acquisition amendment bill proposed to amend the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was introduced in the lok sabha on 30th april, 1982. Ultimately it became the land acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. It was assented to by the president on 9th September 1984 and it was published in the official gazette on 24-9-1984 on which date it came into force. The material amendment made by the amending act were to sections 23 and 28 of the act. By section-15 of the amending Act, sub-section (1a) was introduced to section-23. It reads :-" (1a) in addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the court shall in every case award an amount calculated al the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under section-4, sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the dale of the award of the collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier; explanation.- In computing the period referred to in this sub-section any period during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were help up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court shall be excluded. "by the same Section of the amending act sub'section-2 of section-25 was amended. According to the amendment, in addition to the market value of the land, the court was required to award 30% of it which is described as solatium instead of 15% prescribed in the said provision earlier. The relevant provision of section-23 as amended by the act of 1084 reads;"seelion-23 (1 ). . . . . . . . . Seclion-23 (1a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . Scclion-23 (2) in addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the court shall in every ease award a sum of thirty per centum on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. "while sub-section (1a) is an insertion to Section 23, in sub-section (2) of Section 23, the words, thirty per centum' were substituted to the words 'fifteen per centum'. By Section 18 of the amending Act, section-28 was amended. The amendment was, substitution of 'nine per centum' in the place of 'six per centum'. "while sub-section (1a) is an insertion to Section 23, in sub-section (2) of Section 23, the words, thirty per centum' were substituted to the words 'fifteen per centum'. By Section 18 of the amending Act, section-28 was amended. The amendment was, substitution of 'nine per centum' in the place of 'six per centum'. Section 28 as amended reads if the sum which, in the opinion of the court, the collector ought to have awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the collector did award as compensation, the award of the court may direct that the collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rale of nine per centum per annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into court. Provided that the award of the court may also direct that where such excess or any part thereof is paid into court after the date of expiry of a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been paid into court before the dale of such expiry. The amendments made to section-23 (2) and section-28 came into force on 24-9-1984. In the absence of any other provision these sections would be operative only in respect of awards made by the land acquisition officer or the court on reference on and after 24-9-1984. ( 6 ) THE parliament, however, considered that the benefit of the aforesaid amendments should be extended to certain categories of claimants, in whose cases the awards had been made after 30-4-1982, the date when the bill was introduced in the lok sabha and before 24-9-1984, the date on which the amendment came into force. For this purpose section-30 was introduced as transitional provision. Section 30 of the amending act reads :-"30. Transitional Provisions:- (1) the Provisions of sub-section (1a) of section-23 of the Principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of section-15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to and in relation to. For this purpose section-30 was introduced as transitional provision. Section 30 of the amending act reads :-"30. Transitional Provisions:- (1) the Provisions of sub-section (1a) of section-23 of the Principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of section-15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to and in relation to. (a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the Principal Act pending on the 30th day of april, 1982 [the date of introduction of the land acquisition (Amendment) bill, 1982, in the house of the people, in which no award has been made by the collector before that date; (b) every proceeding tor the acquisition of any land under the Principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an award has been made by the colleclor before the commencement of this act. (2) the Provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the Principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 and Section 18 of this act respectively, shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied, also to and in relation to, any award made by the colleclor or court or lo any order passed by the high court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the Provisions of the Principal Act, after the 30th day of april, 1982 [the date of introduction of the land acquisition (Amendment) bill, 1982, in the house of the people] and before the commencement of this act. (3 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 7 ) ACCORDING to the plain language of subsection (2) of section- 30, the additional benefits conferred on the claimants by amendment to sub-section (2) of section-23 and section-28 is required to be extended to every award made by the collector or the court and also to any order passed by the high court or the Supreme Court tn appeal against any such award made after 30th april, 1982 and before 24-9-1984 i. e. , the date of commencement of the act. The question as to whether the said benefit was to be extended also to the orders made by the high court or the Supreme Court in appeal, between the two dates viz. The question as to whether the said benefit was to be extended also to the orders made by the high court or the Supreme Court in appeal, between the two dates viz. , 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 had been the subject matter of consideration in the first instance by a two judge bench of the Supreme Court in k. Kamalajammanniavani (dead) by lrs. V the special land acquisition officer, air 1985 SC 576 . The Supreme Court ruled that, the benefit has to be extended only in respect of awards made by the land acquisition officer or the court in reference after 30th april, 1982 and before 24-9-1984. In coming to the said conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the expression 'award' could not take in the orders made by the high court or the Supreme Court. In a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in bhag singh and others v union territory of chandigarh, AIR 1985 SC 1576 , decided by the three judge bench the view in kamalaja- mmanniavaru's case was modified and it was held that the benefit of the amended provision should be extended in respect of all the orders made by the high court or the Supreme Court between 30th April 1982 and before 24-9-1984, irrespective of the date of the award of the land acquisition officer or the civil judge. In coming to the conclusion the bench took the view that the orders made by the high court or the Supreme Court in relation to the award made by the land acquisition officer (collector) or the civil judge were also awards. The correctness of the conflicting view has been the subject matter of consideration by a larger bench in union of India v raghubir singh, ILR 1989 KAR. 1945. The Supreme Court reiterated the view taken in kamalaja- mmanni's case. The resultant position is that the real scope of sub-section (2) of section-30 of the land acquisition (Amendment) act 1984, to held to be that the additional benefits flowing from the amendment of subsection (2) of section-23 and section-28 of the act had to be extended in respect of all awards made by the land acquisition officer or the civil court in reference after April 30th, 1982 and before the commencement of the amending act on 24-9-1984. To this extent the controversy is now fully settled. To this extent the controversy is now fully settled. ( 8 ) LEARNED government Advocate contends that in view of the ratio of the above decision the benefit flowing from the amendment of scctions-23 (2) and 28 by the land acquisition was Amendment Act, 1984 could be extended only in respect of the acquisition proceedings commenced or the awards made by the collector under the act after 30-4-1982, and as in the present case the preliminary notification was issued on 20-3-1972 and the award of the land acquisition was made on 27-1-1979, the benefit flowing from the amended sections of the act could not be extended even though the award of the civil judge was made on 10-1-1986. Elaborating the contention, the learned counsel submitted that the reading of Section 30 of the amending act of 1984 would indicate that the said Section has prescribed a date bar and by doing so, the benefit of amended Provisions of the act is required to be extended only to acquisition proceedings commenced after 30-4-1982 or to awards made by the collector after 30-4-1982. ( 9 ) IN our opinion, the contention is fallacious. Section 30 is a transitional provision which is intended to give a limited retrospective effect to the additional benefits incorporated in sections 23 (1a), 23 (2) and 28 of the Principal Act. But for the Provisions of section-30, the collector/the land acquisition officer or the civil court as the case may be, could have extended the benefit flowing from the amended Provisions only to the awards made by them after 24-9-1984 i. e. , after the amended Provisions came into force. Section 30 (1) is intended to give retrospective effect to the amended Provisions in respect of two categories of claimants: (A) in respect of every proceeding for compensation which was pending on 30-4-1982 i. e. , the date of the introduction of the land acquisition (Amendment) bill, 1982 in the house of the people, in which no award had been made by the collector before that date, even if the acquisition proceedings had commenced prior to 30-4-1982, and (2) to every proceedings for compensation in respect of acquisition of any land under the act commenced after 30-4-1982 whether or not an award had been made by collecter before 24-9-1984 - the date of commencement of the act. (B) sub-section (2) of section-30 provided that the benefits flowing from the amendment of sub-section (2) of section-23 and section-28 would also apply to any award made by the collector or the court if such an award was made after 30-4-1982 and before the commencement of the amending act i. e. , from 24-9-1984. The said sub-section also provided that if any proceedings were pending before the high court or the Supreme Court in respect of any such award i. e. , an award made by the land acquisition officer or the court after 30- 4-1982 and before 24-9-1984, the high court or the Supreme Court was also required to extend the additional benefits flowing from sub-section (2) of section-23 and section-28 as amended, to the claimants concerned. As stated earlier, there was divergence of opinion only regarding one aspect of the matter viz. , As to whether even if the award of the collector or the civil court had been made prior to 30-4-1982 but the order of the high court or the Supreme Court had been made after 30-4-1982 and before 24-9-1984, the additional benefits flowing from sections 23 (2) and 28 should be extended. In kamalajamma's case, the Supreme Court held that what should be looked into for purposes of transitional provision under section30 (2) of the amending act was the date of the award of the collector or, of the civil court and if such an award was after 30-4-1982 and before 24-9-1984, the benefits should be extended and the date of the order in appeal by the high court or in further appeal before the Supreme Court, was not relevant. In baghsingh's case, a different view was taken and it was held that the benefits would have to be extended, if the order of the high court or the Supreme Court as the case may be was made after 30-4-1982 and before 24-9-1984. But again in raghubir singh's case, the view taken in kamalajamma's case is reiterated by a larger bench. All the three decisions related to the interpretation of section-30 of the act regarding the extent of retrospective effect given to the amended Provisions of the act. These decisions have no bearing on the question arising for consideration in this case. But again in raghubir singh's case, the view taken in kamalajamma's case is reiterated by a larger bench. All the three decisions related to the interpretation of section-30 of the act regarding the extent of retrospective effect given to the amended Provisions of the act. These decisions have no bearing on the question arising for consideration in this case. ( 10 ) THE contention urged is that the amended Provisions of scctions-23 (2) and 28 does not apply to acquisitions initiated prior to 30-4-1982 even if the collector or the court is making award after 24-9-1984 the date of the commencement of the act. It is in view of this, the question set out first arises for consideration. In our opinion the question has to be answered in the negative for, the court is bound to make an award in accordance with the Provisions of the Act, as they stand on the dale of making the award. There is no non-obstante clause or restrictive clause incorporated in any of the Provisions to the effect that the benefit of those Provisions even after they come into force is restricted to acquisitions commenced subsequent to 30-4-1982. In fact, section-30 has no relevance at all to the question arising for consideration in this case. The necessity to look into the Provisions of section-30 of the amending act arises only when the award of the collector or the civil court has been made after 30-4-1982 and before 24-9-1984 and if the award of the collector or the civil court falls within the two dates, then the benefit of the amended Provisions to the extent indicated in the transitional provision has to be extended, and if not the benefit cannot be extended. Section-30 does not at all deal with the awards made by the collector or the court after 24-9-1984 the date of commencement of the amending act. ( 11 ) IN fact answer to this question is to be found in the observations in the decision of the Supreme Court in kamatajaminanniavant, at paragraph-2. Section-30 does not at all deal with the awards made by the collector or the court after 24-9-1984 the date of commencement of the amending act. ( 11 ) IN fact answer to this question is to be found in the observations in the decision of the Supreme Court in kamatajaminanniavant, at paragraph-2. Which reads:-"this new Section 23 (2) of course, necessarily applies to awards made by the collector or court after the commencement of the Act, that is after September 9th, 1984, which was the date on which the act received the assent of the president,"in the result, we answer the question set out in the first paragraph of this Order, in the negative. Accordingly we make the following; -ORDER the appeal is dismissed. --- *** --- .