JUDGMENT S.R. Bhargava, J. - This is respondents' application for recalling ex parte judgment and order dated 7th September, 1988, allowing F.A.F.O. No. 513 of 1988 Mor Mukut Sharma & anr. v. Harish Chandra & ors. and restoring Civil Appeal No. 513 of 1984 between parties. Prayer in the application is only for recalling the order dated 7th September, 1988. This Court has, however, preferred to describe the application in more appropriate way. This application was filed on 6th December, 1988 and there is neither any application nor prayer for condonation of delay. 2. Facts giving rise to this appeal are that Civil Appeal No 53 of 1984 filed by Mor Mukut Sharma and another against the applicants was dismissed in default by Civil Judge, Mathura on 29lh October, 1986. Mor Mukut Sharma and another preferred application under Order 41, Rule 19 of Civil Procedure Code for a re-admission of appeal. On 7th April, 1988 Civil Judge, Mathura dismissed their application. They filed F.A.F.O. No. 513 of 1988 against the order of the Civil Judge refusing re-admission of appeal. On 7th July, 1988. Appeal was ordered to be listed on 6th September, 1988. Notices were directed to be sent to the respondents by Registered Post. Personal service was also directed. It was further mentioned that personal service upon the respondents shall also be made. Appellant was required to file affidavit of service by 29th August, 1988. Appeal was directed to be listed for admission on 6th September, 1988. Notice was to contain direction that if possible the appeal shall be listed for disposal also. It is now not disputed that respondents were served with the notices. Appeal was not listed on 6th September, 1988 but was listed on 7th September, 1988. It was mentioned for admission under Order 41, Rule 11. In the list number of the appeal was given. Before that here was Appeal No. 455 of 1988 against which, F.A.F.O. was mentioned. In particulars of parties only the name of M.M. Sharma was given. Since notices by Registered A.D. Post had been sent and had not returned undelivered, service was presumed sufficient. In affidavit of service appellant asserted refusal of notice. On 7th September, 1988 none was present for respondents-applicants. Appeal was heard and allowed on merits. 3. On 6th December, 1988 respondents-applicants moved the present application. Since notices by Registered A.D. Post had been sent and had not returned undelivered, service was presumed sufficient. In affidavit of service appellant asserted refusal of notice. On 7th September, 1988 none was present for respondents-applicants. Appeal was heard and allowed on merits. 3. On 6th December, 1988 respondents-applicants moved the present application. They contended that pairokar Shyam Singh came to Allahabad on 4th September, 1988 along with a local lawyer of Mathura and engaged Shri K.N. Tripathi on payment of fee. Vakalatnama was handed over to Shri K.N. Tripathi. Counter affidavit of Shyam Singh was drafted and papers were handed over along with he vakalatnama to the counsel who asked Shyam Singh to go back to Mathura on 6th September, 1988. The counsel instructed his clerk to watch the case and file vakalatnama and counter affidavit. Respondents-applicants further contended that list of 7th September, 1988 did not contain full particulars of the appeal and so the clerk of the counsel could not locate the appeal. It might have been a mistake. But there was sufficient cause for the absence of the respondents. It was further alleged in the affidavit filed on behalf of respondent-applicants that in view of Explanation added in Order 41, Rule 17 of Civil Procedure Code the appeal could not be heard on merits. Then he contention of the respondents-applicants was the Shyam Singh came to Allahabad on 5th November, 1988 to enquire the progress of the case and when he contacted his counsel Shri K.N. Tripathi, he was unable to tell the progress. Only the enquiries made in the office revealed that appeal was allowed ex parte on 7th September, 1988. 4. On behalf of the appellants counter affidavit was filed and the story given by the respondents in their application for recalling the order dated 7th September, 1988 was denied. It was asserted that Shyam Singh was present in the court even on 7th September, 1988 and was watching the proceedings. Respondents had full knowledge of 7th September, 1988. Yet, they preferred not to participate in the hearing. 5. On behalf of the respondent applicants rejoinder affidavit was filed and story of original affidavit was reiterated. 6. Appeal against order refusing restoration was an appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code. Respondents had full knowledge of 7th September, 1988. Yet, they preferred not to participate in the hearing. 5. On behalf of the respondent applicants rejoinder affidavit was filed and story of original affidavit was reiterated. 6. Appeal against order refusing restoration was an appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code. Rule 2 of Order 43 makes it clear that provisions of Order 41 should be made applicable to appeals against orders. Explanation added to Order 41, Rule 17(1) no doubt, lays down that in default of appellant, appeal should not be dismissed on merits. But Order 41, Rules 17(2) makes it clear that if the respondent is absent, appeal should be heard ex parte. Contention that appeal could not be allowed ex parte has no meaning. When an appeal is allowed ex parte, remedy of the respondents lies in application for rehearing of the appeal under Order 41, Rule 21 of Civil Procedure Code. Hence the application moved by the respondents although not properly couched, has to be treated, an application under Order 41, Rule 21 of Civil Procedure Code. Under this provision rehearing can be allowed only on the grounds that the respondents were not served with notice or had sufficient cause for absence on the date of hearing. In the instant case it is not disputed that respondents were served with notice, hence they can claim rehearing of the appeal of the appeal only on the ground that they had sufficient cause for their absence. 7. Before examining the facts of the case for as curtaining whether respondents had sufficient cause for their absence. It would be worthwhile to examine the question of limitation. Article 123 of the Schedule of Limitation Act, 1963, applies to applications for setting aside a decree passed ex parte or to rehear an appeal decreed or heard ex parte. Limitation for such application is 30 days from the date of the decree or where the summons or notice was not duly served, when the applicant had knowledge of the decree. In the instant case it is undisputed that the respondents were served with notice of the appeal. Hence the limitation of 30 days would have commenced from the date of the ex parte order in appeal. Limitation of 30 days expired on 7th October, 1988. In the instant case it is undisputed that the respondents were served with notice of the appeal. Hence the limitation of 30 days would have commenced from the date of the ex parte order in appeal. Limitation of 30 days expired on 7th October, 1988. Respondents wanted limitation from 5th November, 1988 when enquiries are alleged to have been made in the office and the respondents came to know that appeal was allowed ex parte on 7th September, 1988. Whether respondents came to know of the ex parte order in appeal on 5th November, 1988 is a question of fact which would be decided while discussing the credibility of respondents story of their absence on 7th September, 1988. But here it has to be said that absence of knowledge of the ex parte order in appeal till 5th November, 1988 could have only constituted sufficient cause for condoning delay but could not be a date for reckoning period of limitation. Even if the respondents came to know of the ex parte order in appeal on 5th November, 1988, they should have soon after applied for hearing of the appeal. Respondents have not explained why they waited and applied for rehearing on 6th December, 1988. Thus the respondents failed to explain the entire delay in filing of the application for rehearing. On the top of it there is no explanation or prayer for condonation of delay. Thus respondents' application for rehearing of appeal can be dismissed on ground of limitation. 8. However, I would proceed to decide the question whether the respondents had sufficient cause for their absence. It is admitted by respondents that they were served with notice requiring them to appeal on 6th September, 1988 or on subsequent date when the case is listed. According to the story given by the respondents their pairokar had pome to Allahabad on 4th September, 1988 and had got the counter affidavit prepared. He had also brought Vakalatnama and he appointed Sri K.N. Tripathi as counsel of the respondents. If that was so and even if the case was not listed on 6th September, 1988, counter affidavit and Vakalatnama could have been filed in the office on 5th or 6th September, 1988. If genuine efforts for filing counter affidavit and Vakalatnama would have been made the date on which the case was listed could have automatically become known to the respondents' pairokar. If genuine efforts for filing counter affidavit and Vakalatnama would have been made the date on which the case was listed could have automatically become known to the respondents' pairokar. No reason has been offered why the Vakalatnama and counter affidavit were not filed in the office. It is also not known why the respondents' pairokar preferred to go back to Mathura on 6th September, 1988 without filing of the Vakalatnama and counter affidavit. Then there is important piece of evidence which shows that despite the discrepancy in the particulars of the appeal in the list of 7th September, 1988 respondents had knowledge that the appeal was listed on 7th September 1988. On behalf of the respondents Vakalatnama alleged to have been executed in favour of Sri K.N. Tripathi has been filed. Admittedly it was not filed in the court or in the office on 7th September, 1988. Yet, it bears date of 7th September 1988. This itself shows that Vakalatnama was prepared for 7th September 1988. In face of this evidence contention of the appellants in the counter affidavit that respondent's pairokar was present in the court on 7th September, 1988 inspires greater confidence. It thus follows that respondents were playing hide and seek with the court. This cannot amongst to sufficient cause. When it appears that respondents had knowledge of the listing of the appeal on 7th September, 1988 and when the judgment was pronounced in the open court, the only inference can be that the respondents had knowledge of the ex parte decision of the appeal on 7th September, 1988 itself. 9. On behalf of the respondent-applicants reliance was placed on the case of Swarth Mahto and anr. v. Bharmdeo Narain Singh, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1300 and it was contended that in view of discrepancy in the Cause list sufficient cause for absence of respondents' counsel should be found. I am afraid that the facts of the instant case are altogether distinguishable. It has been seen above that the story of the appellants that respondents' pairokar was present on 7th September, 1988 inspired confidence and that the respondents had knowledge of the appeal having been listed on 7th September, 1988 despite discrepancy in the cause list. It is further evident that respondents' pairokar was playing hide and seek with the court. Hence the case relied upon has no application to the present case. It is further evident that respondents' pairokar was playing hide and seek with the court. Hence the case relied upon has no application to the present case. On behalf of the respondents reliance was further placed on the case of Rafiq & anr. v. Munshi Lal & ors, AIR 1981 SC 1400 . In that case appeal was dismissed in default of appellants' counsel. But there was no finding that appellants or their pairokar was present in the court In the instant case there is material for finding that the respondents' pairokar was present in the court and was playing hide and seek. When there is deliberate attempt by any party to avoid the hearing, no mistake can be attributed to his counsel. Even this case cannot be applied to the facts of the instant case. 10. Before parting with this matter, it must be observed that even in the High Court the application for rehearing of the appeal was too casually treated and it was considered that a party has unfettered right and privilege for getting ex parte judgment or order recalled. This approach can hardly serve the ends of justice. 11. Application fails and is hereby dismissed. However, not to tax respondents further, no order for cost is being passed.