JUDGMENT - KANTHARIA H.H., J.:—The petitioner herein who is the President of Shikshan Prasarak Sangh impugns the propriety and validity of the order dated January 3, 1989 passed by the first respondent appointing an Administrator, after taking over the management of a school called Sharada English High School, Durbhat conducted by Shikshan Prasarak Sangh, for a period of 3 years. The All Goa Secondary School Teachers' Organisation and a rival body of Shikshan Prasarak Sangh are the interveners. 2. The impugned order was passed by the first respondent, the State of Goa, invoking the provisions of section 20 of the Goa, Daman and Diu School Education Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") for the alleged violation of Rule 42 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Education Rules, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Rules"). 3. The State Government passed the order in question on the grounds that various complaints were received against the petitioner regarding unauthorised shifting of the school to a different locality and its improper functioning in respect of which a show cause notice dated November 4, 1988 was served on the management of the school calling upon them to explain why the management of the school should not be taken over by the Government for a period of 3 years in the first instance so as to secure the proper management of the school in the public interest. The petitioner explained the matter by a reply dated November 21, 1988 and according to him the school was not shifted as alleged but some of the classes thereof were shifted because it was necessitated by the force of circumstances and for the safety of the students as the premises were unsuitable and required heavy repairs and the landlord also wanted bank the premises for which an eviction notice was served. It was further contended that the shifting of some of the classes had not prejudiced the interest of any other school or the students of the school in question. At any rate, according to the petitioner, he had not shifted the school to a different locality as the distance between the original premises and the new place was only about half a kilometre. At any rate, according to the petitioner, he had not shifted the school to a different locality as the distance between the original premises and the new place was only about half a kilometre. The petitioner further contended that there was a rivalry between two groups in the village which was politically motivated and it was on account of the said rivalry that the impugned order was sought from the Government and was passed. These are also the contentions of the petitioner in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. Mr. Usgaonkar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, made three submissions for our consideration. Firstly, he contended that the act of the petitioner in shifting some of the division and/or classes would not amount to shifting of the school and secondly even if it was a shifting of the school it was not to a different locality. And lastly, Mr. Usgaonkar submitted that the impugned order was passed with total non application of mind. 5. In order to appreciate the submissions of Mr. Usgaonkar we may quote here the relevant provisions of section 20 of the Act and Rule 42 of the said Rules. Section 20 provides that: "20. Taking over management of school.---(1) Whenever the Administrator is satisfied that the managing committee or manager of any recognised school, (i) has contravened any provisions of this Act or of any Rule or order made thereunder, or (ii) has neglected to perform any duty or obligation imposed on it by or under this Act, or (iii) has mismanaged the affairs of the school or has misappropriated or has misapplied any money standing to the credit of any Fund of the school, or (iv) has managed the affairs of the schools in a manner prejudical to the public interest, or (v) .......... ........... .......... .......... (vi) .......... ........... .......... .......... (vii) .......... ........... .......... .......... and that it is expedient in the public interest or in the interest of school education or in order to secure the proper management of the school to take over the management of such school, he may, after giving the managing committee or the manager of such school a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action, take over the management of such school for a limited period not exceeding three years : Provided ............ ............. .............. (2) ............ ............. .............. (3) ............ ............. .............. (2) ............ ............. .............. (3) ............ ............. .............. (4) ............ ............. .............. (5) ............ ............. .............. (6) ............ ............. .............. (a) ............ ............. .............. (b) ............ ............. .............. (c) ............ . ............ .............. (d) ............ ............. .............. (e) ............ . ............ .............. (7) ............ ............. .............. (8) ............ ............. .............. (9) ............ ............. .............. (10) ............ ............. .............. (11) ............ ............. .............. Rule 42 reads as under : "42. Lapse of recognition in other case.---(1) If the recognised school ceases to function or is shifted to a different locality or is transferred to a different trust, society, individual, or a group of individuals without the approval of the Director of Education, its recognition shall lapse on such ceaser, shifting or transfer, as the case may be, and it shall, for the purpose of future recognition, be treated as a new school. (2) ............ ............. .............." 6. The petitioner here was charged for contravening provisions of sub-section 1(ii), (iii) and (iv) of section 20 of the Act. In other words, it was alleged against him that he had neglected to perform duty or obligation imposed upon him by or under the provisions of the Act or that he had mismanaged the affairs of the school or had misappropriated or misapplied money standing to the credit of the fund of the school or he had managed the affairs of the school in a manner prejudicial to the public interest. But in reality the charges levelled against him were that he had mismanaged the affairs of the school by shifting it to a different locality which was prejudicial to the public interest. 7. Mr. Usgaonkar points out that the record clearly shows that admittedly the whole school was not shifted but some of the classes viz. V-B, VI-B, VII-B and IX-B were shifted from Durbhat to Adpoi and the distance between these two places was half a kilometre and in any case not more than one kilometre. In the submission of Mr. Usgaonkar, therefore, shifting of some of the classes of the school will not amount to shifting of the whole school. We are not able to persuade ourselves to agree with Mr. Usgaonkar in the facts and circumstances of this case. In the submission of Mr. Usgaonkar, therefore, shifting of some of the classes of the school will not amount to shifting of the whole school. We are not able to persuade ourselves to agree with Mr. Usgaonkar in the facts and circumstances of this case. It should be borne in mind that it is all the classes and the divisions put together that make a school and, therefore, if some of the classes are shifted to a different place it would amount to shifting of a part of the school and the facts here disclose that out of eleven divisions of different classes five were shifted to Adpoi. Admittedly and more importantly out of 336 students, a majority of them, 201 were shifted. It means, a major part of the school was shifted. Further, the office of the school was also shifted to the new premises and the old office premises were closed. This is clear from the facts recorded by the petitioner himself in his letter dated September 12, 1988 addressed to the Zonal Officer, Central Education Zone, Panji wherein he had stated that the main office of the school was shifted to the new premises from June 6, 1988 and it was arranged that the teaching staff at the new premises would sign the muster roll at the new office and the teaching and the working staff at the old premises would do so at the old premises. An averment made in para 2 of the said letter shows that the old office had remained closed. Some of the teachers of the school had complained to the petitioner by a letter dated June 14, 1988 that on June 13, 1988 the Head Master of the school did not turn up to Durbhat but sent them a notice calling upon them to sign the muster roll at Adpoi as the office had been shifted temporarily there and accordingly they should sign the muster roll at Adpoi after the classes were over. On June 9/10, 1988 the petitioner wrote to the Hon'ble Chief Minister that the school committee had made all arrangements to shift the classes and the office of the school to another place nearby so that they could hand over the premises to the landlord as agreed and that necessary intimation in that behalf was sent to the Director of Education. The Head Master of the school by his letter dated June 6, 1988 informed the Inspector of Police at Ponda that on that day at about 5.30 p.m. while he was getting out of his office with two files one Luma Khumno Phatade of Durbhat objected and restricted him from carrying those files and compelled him to keep the said files in the new office. Obviously, the Head Master was carrying the files out to the new premises. The petitioner wrote a letter dated June 9, 1988 to the Inspector of Police, Ponda Police Station that some people of Durbhat were preventing, threatening and humiliating him in the matter of taking the school records from the old premises. All this goes to show that it was not a simple and innocuous act on the part of the petitioner of shifting some of the classes of the school to a different place but shifting the school itself and retaining some of the activities of the school at the old premises. 8. Now, the question is whether the petitioner shifted the school to a "different locality"? Mr. Usgaonkar urged that Durbhat and Adpoi are not two separate villages and that the Land Revenue Code shows that it is only one village for which there is a common panchayat. Assuming that what Mr. Usgaonkar submits is true even then we are of the opinion that the school was shifted to a different locality. Admittedly, village Durbhat consists of three wards viz. Durbhat Ward, Adpoi Ward and Agapur Ward. Shifting of a school from one ward to another ward (from Durbhat to Adpoi) would amount to shifting of the school to a different locality, the distance between the two being either half a kilometre or one kilometre notwithstanding. Mr. Bhobe pointed out from a ruling of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of (Hajari v. State of M.P. (F.B.))1, A.I.R. 1976 M.P. 76 that a different Mohalla in a village was considered to be a different locality. It is well to remember that the word "locality" should be construed to mean an area so sufficiently small that naming it amounts to abundant notice not only to the inhabitants of that area but also to the people of at large for easy identification. Therefore, Durbhat and Adpoi in our case have to be construed as different localities. 9. Mr. Therefore, Durbhat and Adpoi in our case have to be construed as different localities. 9. Mr. Usgaonkar made a grievance that the impugned order was passed with total non-application of mind by the authorities concerned and, therefore, cannot be sustained in law. According to him, all that has been stated in the impugned order is that the explanation given by the management of the school was not found satisfactory which was not enough to pass the order in question and full reasons should have been given for passing the said order. In support of his contention, Mr. Usgaonkar relied upon a ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of (Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of India others)2, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1803 in which it was held : "The power to affect citizen's rights, especially by way of punitive impost or damages for wrong doing, is quasi judicial in the character even if exercised by executive echelons. This Court has underscored the importance of injecting the norms of natural justice when statutory functionaries affect the rights of a person. The most recent of the cases which lay bare the elementals of this branch of jurisprudence are : (1) (Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India)3, 1976 Supp. S.C.R. 489; (2) (Maneka Gandhi (Mrs.) v. Union of India)4, 1978(2) S.C.R. 621 ; (3) (Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi)5, 1978(2) S.C.R. 272 ." The Supreme Court further quoted from Siemen's case its observations as under: "It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi judicial function it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasi judicial order must be supported by reasons. That has been laid down by a long line of decisions of this Court ending with (N.M. Desai v. Testeels Ltd.)6, C.A. No. 245 of 1970 D/- 17-12-1975". There is no dispute about the above principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court. The point, however, here is that before the impugned order was passed there was a lengthy correspondence exchanged between the petitioner on the one hand and the respondents on the other. The reply to the show cause notice by the petitioner to the Director of Education itself ran into twelve pages. The point, however, here is that before the impugned order was passed there was a lengthy correspondence exchanged between the petitioner on the one hand and the respondents on the other. The reply to the show cause notice by the petitioner to the Director of Education itself ran into twelve pages. Therefore, all the facts and circumstances of the case here were considered by the authorities before the order was passed. Section 20 of the Act requires that the authorities passing the order have only to afford a reasonable opportunity of showing cause which, in our judgment, was fully done in the present case. Any detailed reasons for passing the impugned order would have merely resulted in repetition of the respective contentions of the parties in a case like this where facts were almost admitted. Therefore, we find it difficult to agree with Mr. Usgaonkar that only in one sentence the explanation of the management of the school was rejected as being unsatisfactory. 10. Admittedly, shifting of the school to a different locality was done by the petitioner without obtaining a prior approval of the Director of Education. That being so, thee was complete violation of Rule 42 of the said Rules and hence the impugned order cannot be defaulted. If there were compelling reasons for the petitioner, as he has pleaded here, for shifting the school to a different locality, he could have done it after getting a prior approval front the Director of Education. All his problems apart, Rule 42 of the said Rules imposed a condition on him that he could shift the school to a different locality only on obtaining a prior approval in that behalf. Once he fails to comply with this provision of law he had to face the consequences. There is no escape for him. We also find from the record that on account of the shifting of the school from Durbhat to Adpoi there was a lot of agitation amongst the villagers almost creating a law and order problem even to the extent of threatening the public peace and tranquillity. There was danger of breach of public peace in the area. Therefore, the public authorities were left with no alternative but to pass the impugned order which was done in the public interest generally and in the interests of the school education particularly. 11. There was danger of breach of public peace in the area. Therefore, the public authorities were left with no alternative but to pass the impugned order which was done in the public interest generally and in the interests of the school education particularly. 11. In this view of the matter, we find no substance in the petition which deserves to be rejected. Writ petition is accordingly rejected. Rule is discharged but with no order as to costs. Interim relief granted by this Court on January 12, 1989 stands vacated. Petition dismissed. -----