JUDGMENT B.L.Loomba, J. - This writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the judgment and order, dated 31.5.82 of District Judge, Bahraich, whereby the petitioner's appeal against the judgment of the Prescribed Authority in Case No. 42/415 under Section 10 (2) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act was dismissed. 2. The factual position relating to the matter appears like this. A notice under Section 10 (2) of the said Act was received by the petitioner tenure holder on 2.3.75, according to which 47.15 acres in terms of irrigated land was found to be surplus. The petitioner filed his objections which were subsequently amended on 7.6.76. Another notice from the Prescribed Authority under Section 10 (2) of the Act was received according to which surplus land shown was 58.510 acres. The petitioner filed objections which were subsequently amended. One of the main grounds raised through these objections filed by the petitioner was that while calculating the holding of the petitioner the land which belonged to his two wives, Smt. Shanti Devi and Smt. Ram Murti Devi, was wrongly included and clubbed with his land because his both the wives were judicially separated from the petitioner. It was also pleaded that the petitioner had executed a sale deed in favour one Bharat Lal in respect of 4.78 acres, vide sale deed, dated 22.10.71 and that Smt. Shanti Devi and Smt. Ram Murti Devi had sold land to various persons, vide registered sale deed particulars whereof are set out in paragraph 4 of the writ petition; 3. The Prescribed Authority accepted the plea of the petitioner in respect of the sale deeds which had been executed by Smt. Ram Murti Devi in favour of one Rai Singh and Smt. Bina Rani on 7.1.70 i.e. prior to the crucial date being 24.1.71. However, the objection was rejected in respect of the remaining five sale deeds which were executed after 24.1.71, the plea of judicial separation of the two wives of the petitioner was rejected. 4. The petitioner filed his appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority which was allowed by Shri R.P. Pandiya, the then District Judge, Bahraich by his judgment and order, dated 14.4.77. The notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act was discharged and it was held that there was no surplus land of the petitioner. 4. The petitioner filed his appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority which was allowed by Shri R.P. Pandiya, the then District Judge, Bahraich by his judgment and order, dated 14.4.77. The notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act was discharged and it was held that there was no surplus land of the petitioner. The State of U.P. filed writ petition before this Court Being No. 2073 of 77 State of U.P. v. Jaleshwar Nath Tewari and others. That writ petition was allowed and the judgment and order of the District Judge dated 14.7.77 was quashed. The appeal was directed to be restored to its original number and the Distt. Judge was required to decide the same afresh in accordance with law, as would appear from the judgment in Writ Petition No. 2073 of 77 (the record whereof was obtained and seen by me), applications by both the wives of the petitioner under Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act has been filed on the same date being 2.5.73 through different counsel. It was found that averments made in both these applications were just the same. It was held that even though the suit under Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act was allowed and decree for judicial separation was granted on 7.7.73 but will relate back to the date when the objection for judicial separation was filed i.e. 8.6.73 after which date no one was entitled to have land beyond the ceiling limit. It was "Merely because an application under Section 10 of Hindu Marriage Act was filed at the instance of husband and the wives that itself will not mean that separation has been recognised judicially. Filing of an application under Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act will not affect the relationship of husband and wives to the extent it is contemplated by a decree for judicial separation. The view of law taken by the District Judge on this score is manifestly erroneous." 5. Upon this decision of this High Court, the plea of the petitioner as to the judicial separation of his wives was no more available to him for purpose of exclusion of the land holding in the names of his wives in determining the surplus land under this Act. 6. Upon this decision of this High Court, the plea of the petitioner as to the judicial separation of his wives was no more available to him for purpose of exclusion of the land holding in the names of his wives in determining the surplus land under this Act. 6. After remand the appeal was heard and decided by Shri Harish Chandra, the then District Judge, Bahraich and as mentioned above this appeal was dismissed giving rise to the present writ petition. 7. The District Judge, under the said judgment and order, dated 31.5.82 held that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden cast under Section 5 (6) of the said Act. He ought to have established that the sale deeds in question were in good faith and for adequate consideration. It was mentioned that none of the alleged transferees was examined by the tenure holder before the Prescribed Authority. No examplers were filed before the Prescribed Authority and no oral evidence about examplers was led to prove that the sale deeds were executed for valuable considerations. Three of the sale deeds were executed and registered on 22.10.71 while the remaining two were executed and registered on 21.4.72. The learned District Judge with reference to the area transferred under each of the sale deed and the consideration underlyinq the transfer mentioned that variation in the consideration was apparent and remained unexplained by tenure-holder. The contention that the documents in themselves indicated that the consideration is disproportionate inter se was accepted and it was held that it would appear that the consideration in these sale deeds was not consistent. " There is a world of difference in the quantum of consideration per acre in these sale deeds". In other words, the learned District Judge was of the view that the difference in the quantum of consideration of the sale deeds in question was not satisfactorily explained by means of any evidence as to the quality of the land or with reference to the examplers which could be filed to substantiate the plea of the sale deeds being for valuable consideration and executed in good faith. Reference was also made to the circumstantial evidence. Reference was also made to the circumstantial evidence. It was mentioned that the amount of consideration of neither of the sale deeds was admittedly paid in the presence of the Sub-Registrar at the time of registration and in the absence of the evidence of the transferees or any other evidence the genuineness of the document was not accepted. The weight of circumstantial evidence according to the learned District Judge also indicated that the transactions were not genuine. 8. It appears that at the stage of arguments the petitioner sought permission to file four sale deeds. Learned District Judge mentioned that it was not indicated for what purpose these documents were brought on record. Copy of this application dated 29.5.82 has been filed as Annexure 14 to this writ petition and these four sale deeds appear to be the same sale deeds which are referred to in Paragraph 4 of the writ Petition (see ground G of the ground of challenge in the present writ petition). The material particulars and aspects relating to these sale deeds have been discussed in good details in the judgment of the District Judge and as such sale deeds were not formally admitted in evidence at the stage of hearing of the arguments in appeal. In any case, learned counsel for the petitioner has not pressed this point to make out the justification for filing these documents at the stage of arguments in appeal or about any prejudice caused to the petitioner in this regard. 9. The challenge to the judgment of the learned District Judge rests mainly on the grounds that the petitioner had led good and sufficient evidence to prove that the sale deeds were executed in good faith and for valuable consideration and that the learned District Judge misread the sale deeds and the evidence on record. Further that the evidence of the petitioner was not discussed by the learned District Judge and that this evidence has remained uncontroverted from the said of the State and ought to have been accepted by the District Judge. It is also argued that the learned District Judge decided the matter on unwarranted presumption and surmises. 10. Further that the evidence of the petitioner was not discussed by the learned District Judge and that this evidence has remained uncontroverted from the said of the State and ought to have been accepted by the District Judge. It is also argued that the learned District Judge decided the matter on unwarranted presumption and surmises. 10. Section 5 (6) of the Act is reproduced below: "5 (6) In determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure-holder, any transfer of land made after the twenty-fourth day of January, 1971, which but for the transfer would have been declared surplus land under this Act, shall be ignored and not taken into account; Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to - (a) a transfer in favour of any person (including Government) referred to in sub-section (2); (b) a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument not being a benami transaction of for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other members of his family. Explanation I - For the purpose of this sub-section, the expression transfer of land made after the twenty-fourth day of January, 1971 includes - (a)a declaration of a person as a co-tenure-holder made after the twenty fourth day of January, 1971 in a suit or proceeding irrespective of whether such suit or proceeding was pending on or was instituted after the twenty fourth day of January 1971; (b) any admission acknowledgement, relinquishment or declarations in favour of a person to the like effect, made in any other decree or instrument or in any other manner. Explanation II - The burden of proving that a case falls within clause (b) of the Proviso shall rest with the party claiming its benefit". 11. As mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (6) only these transfers which are proved to the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority made after 24.1.71 to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument not being a benami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other members of his family are to be excluded in determining the ceiling area. Burden of proving that a case falls within clause (b) of the proviso rests with the party claiming its benefit as mentioned in Explanation II. 12. Burden of proving that a case falls within clause (b) of the proviso rests with the party claiming its benefit as mentioned in Explanation II. 12. According to the findings of the Prescribed Authority and that of the District Judge the transfers in question are not proved to their satisfaction to be in good faith and for adequate consideration. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution does not act as an appellate Court. In the words of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radha Krishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 , the Jurisdiction of High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction of the court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of the evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. The observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are quoted below; "There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radha Krishnan(supra). 13. The need for execution of sale is clearly another relevant factor. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radha Krishnan(supra). 13. The need for execution of sale is clearly another relevant factor. While considering whether transaction was in good faith, this aspect came to be considered by this court in Murli Manohar Sharma v. Prescribed Authority and others, 1982 ALJ 156. It was a case under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. In that case the tenure-holder set out to prove good faith by alleging that he had to pay off certain debts and that he needed money for certain other agricultural necessities. He appeared in the witness box twice and it was found that his testimony was contradictory as regards the need for which he transferred the land. The appellate court had emphasised that the petitioner failed to give any evidence to substantiate his contention that there were such debts in existence which were required to be paid off when the sale deeds were executed. It was held by this Court that the facts and aspects which found favour with the appellate court cannot be said to be irrelevant and that the High Court in these matters is not exercising appellate jurisdiction and it is not open to reappraise the evidence on record. 14. In the instant case the transaction underlying the sale deeds appear clearly to be of doubtful character. Three sale deeds were executed and registered on the date while other two on the other day. These sale deeds were executed by the two wives of the petitioner and the fact that judicial separation was sought and a decree to that effect was obtained was clearly is an attempt to avoid and circumvent the provisions of the said act. In any case, neither the two ladies nor any of the transferees was examined before the Prescribed Authority to state about the sufficiency of consideration. No evidence with the name was led to make out that there was any need to the petitioner or for that purpose his two wives to execute the sale deeds and that would obviously be another factor to raise a serious doubt as to the genuineness of that transactions. No evidence with the name was led to make out that there was any need to the petitioner or for that purpose his two wives to execute the sale deeds and that would obviously be another factor to raise a serious doubt as to the genuineness of that transactions. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the oral evidence led by the petitioner before the Prescribed Authority in the form of statements of petitioner himself and three witnesses, namely, Abdul Hakim Khan, Mohd. Umar Khan and Rai Singh, copies Annexure 7 to 10. The petitioner did not say a word about the need for execution of the sale deeds. He made a general statement that the transfer was made against cash payment in good faith and purchasers got possession of the land. Abdul Hakim did not state about the transferees, namely, Lalit Hari and Govind Narain. He only mentioned about Rai Singh. Mohd. Umar stated only this much that Rai Singh, Lalit Hari and Govind Narain and Bharat Lal have their separate fields and they live separately and have their own servants and they have no connection with petitioner Jaleshwar Nath Tewari. However, nothing has been stated with reference to the plots in question and its occupation. Rai Singh has stated only about one sale deed executed in his favour for Rs. 5,500/- which Sic is dated 7.1.70 already excluded from Sic. On behalf of the State Shahzad Khan, Lekhpal was examined. According to him Rai Singh is the manager of the petitioner and plot No. 67/3 though in the name of Rai Singh is in the occupation of petitioner Jaleshwar Nath Tewari Plot No.97/2 (3 acres) and 97/2 (1.87 acres) though in the name of Bharat Lal are stated to be in occupation of Jaleshwar Nath Tewari. It is stated that Jaleshwar Nath reaps crops from the land recorded in the names of Rai Singh and Bharat Lal. It is true that this witness have not stated about Govind Narain and Lalit Hari but that may not be very material as the burden of proof was clearly on the petitioner and he, according to the decision of the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge( failed to discharge the same. The judgment' recorded by the learned District Judge is quite detailed and he has gone into all the important and relevant aspects of the matter. The judgment' recorded by the learned District Judge is quite detailed and he has gone into all the important and relevant aspects of the matter. It cannot be said that the District Judge failed to consider the evidence on record. This is not a case where the Prescribed Authority or the appellate court erroneously refused to admit material evidence or based its decision on inadmissible or irrelevant evidence. On the other hand the finding is based on evidence on record which includes circumstantial evidence which in no case is less important and in a way is more important in arriving at a finding as to the transaction being in good faith or otherwise. As was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra) finding of fact recorded by the District Judge cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on the point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal the points cannot be agitated through a writ petition. 15. Upon consideration of the matter, I am of the view that the learned District Judge has carefully considered the matter and based his finding on relevant evidence. The finding of the learned District Judge cannot, in any way, be said to be unjustified and unwarranted. On the other hand, it appears to be well founded and justified on the basis of the material on record. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to make out any of the grounds raised to assail the impugned order. 16. The writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed with costs.