CHANDRAKANTHARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a petition filed by the Pradhan. Petitioner, who is a Pradhan of Kakol mandal Panchayat, is aggrieved by the notice issued by the incharge Assistant commissioner of Haveri Sub-Division, haveri in Dharwad District in accordance with sub-section (3) of Section 47 of the karnataka Zilla Parishads, Taluk Panchayat samithis, Mandal Panchayats and Nyaya panchayats Act, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). In the Scheme of Section 47 of the Act, the Assistant Commissioner is authorised to receive a motion of no confidence proposed to be moved against the pradhan of the Mandal, if such requisition is tendered in writing by more than half the members of the Mandal and presented in person by atleast two of the signatories to such requisition: That such a requisition was submitted as at Annexure-A is not in dispute; that the incharge Assistant Commissioner by his notice dated 15. 7. 1989 called for a meeting to consider the motion of no confidence proposed to be moved by the signatories against the Pradhan on 4. 8. 1989 at 11 a. m. is also not in dispute. That notice is at Annexure-B to the writ petition. ( 2 ) EMERGENT notice regarding rule was issued in this petition. But an interim direction was, however, made on the same date, i. e. , 31. 71989 that if the motion is carried, it shall not be given effect to for a period of 14 days. Thereafterwards, on 16. 8. 1989, the interim direction or stay as granted was continued until further orders. Subsequently, some of the members of the mandal panchayat made an application to implead themselves. That I. A. appears to have been allowed a learned Single Judge by his order dated 30. 8. 1989. ( 3 ) THE matter coming up today for further orders the petition is taken up for final disposal in view of the importance of the matter and the urgency, by consent of the learned Counsel for the parties. I dispose of the petition by the following order. ( 4 ) THE short question which falls for determination is whether the notice (Annexure-B) may be construed as valid and legal as the person who issued it, was the tahsildar of Haveri who by notification dated 31. 7. I dispose of the petition by the following order. ( 4 ) THE short question which falls for determination is whether the notice (Annexure-B) may be construed as valid and legal as the person who issued it, was the tahsildar of Haveri who by notification dated 31. 7. 1989 of (which is in Kannada) the State government has been directed that in view of the selected I. A. S. Officers, Smt. Gowri and smt. Kalpana, not having taken charge of their postings as Sub-Division Officers of haveri and Savanur Sub-Divisions respectively, the Tahsildars of Haveri and savanur shall be in current charge of the duties and functions of the Assistant Commissioners of the said Sub-Divisions. These facts also are not in dispute. As noticed earlier by Annexure-B dated 15. 7. 1989 is long before the Government issued the notification on 31. 7. 1989, posting the Tahsildars of haveri and Savanur, incharge of the Subdivisions referred to earlier. Therefore, even before they were asked to discharge the current duties of the higher office as per notification dated 31. 7. 1989, the impugned notice in this petition had already been issued. It is in these circumstances as well, this court has to examine whether the notice conforms to the requirement of law under the Act, viz. , sub-section (3) of Section 47 thereof. ( 5 ) POWER to place incharge officer of the current duties is governed by Rule 32 of the karnataka Civil Services Rules and it reads as follows:"instead of appointing a Government servant to officiate, it is also permissible to appoint him to be incharge of the current duties of a vacant post. In such a case a 'charge allowance' (additional pay) is payable as specified in Rule 68. (Note-1 : A Government Servant can be appointed under this Rule to be incharge of the current duties of a vacant post only if he is eligible to be promoted to officiate in that post according to the Cadre and recruitment Rules applicable to that post or if he is holding a post in an equivalent or higher grade ). (Note-2 : The provisions of this Rule apply also to cases where a Government servant being relieved of his own appointment is appointed to be in independent charge of a higher appointment as a temporary measure. (Note-2 : The provisions of this Rule apply also to cases where a Government servant being relieved of his own appointment is appointed to be in independent charge of a higher appointment as a temporary measure. The scope and ambit of the rule fell for consideration before a Division Bench of this court in the case of M. Maridev (M. Mariyappa) v state of Mysore and Others [1968 (1) Mys. LJ. 325]. It suffices to extract a passage from the head note, which reads as follows: "the Note to R. 32 of the Mysore Civil services Rules means that instead of appointing a Government servant to officiate, it is also permissible to appoint him to be in independent charge of the current duties of a vacant post in a higher appointment does not amount to his promotion to the higher post. Officiating appointments and incharge arrangements are well understood terms in civil service. When an Officer is appointed to officiate in a higher appointment, he is invested with the powers of the higher post, but when he is placed incharge of the current duties of vacant post in a higher appointment, whether in addition to his own or independently, he cannot exercise any of the statutory powers of the office, he can merely perform the day to day duties only. When an officer is placed incharge of the current duties of a vacant post in addition to his own, the consideration is not one of seniority as in the case of promotion but one of public interest. "from the above, it is clear that the current duties referred to in the rule obviously has reference to the routine functions of the office which is vacant and in which another officer is placed incharge of the current duties in addition to the duties of his own office. By necessary implication, as held by the Division Bench, current duties exclude statutory duties which are required to be performed by the office which is vacant in respect of which incharge arrangements should be made purportedly in exercise of the powers under Rule 32 of the Karnataka civil Services Rules. ( 6 ) SIMILARLY, learned single Judge of this court in the case of Patel Channe Gowda and others v Krishna Gowda and Others, [1971 (1) mys. LJ. ( 6 ) SIMILARLY, learned single Judge of this court in the case of Patel Channe Gowda and others v Krishna Gowda and Others, [1971 (1) mys. LJ. 407] while deciding a Criminal revision Petition, took the view that where the preliminary order was passed by the tahsildar incharge of the duties of sub-Divisional Magistrate (Assistant commissioner), but the final order was passed by a regular Sub-Divisional magistrate, the Tahsildar acting as incharge assistant Commissioner of a Sub-Division was not entitled to take action under Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and issue a preliminary order. In other words, the conclusion reached by the learned single judge was that the order to be passed under section 133 of the Code of Criminal procedure was a statutory duty which could not be performed while incharge of current duties of the Assistant Commissioner. ( 7 ) THESE are the decisions relied upon by sri F. V. Patil, learned Counsel for the petitioner, in support of his contention that the notice (Annexure-B) is not valid in law and is without jurisdiction. ( 8 ) AS against this, learned Government pleader, Sri M. R. Achar, contends that both the Tahsildar and Assistant Commissioner being Officers of the Department of revenue, their duties and functions are governed by the provisions contained in the karnataka Land Revenue Act (hereinafter referred to as the Revenue Act ). In the revenue Act, Section 7 provides for appointment of Divisional Commissioners and enumerates their duties and functions under Section 8 of the Revenue Act, similarly, the State Government is empowered to appoint Deputy Commissioners and provides for their functions including that of Special Deputy commissioners. Section 10 provides for the appointment of Assistant Commissioners to the various Sub-Divisions. Specifically sub-section (1) provides that all such assistant Commissioners and all other officers employed in the Revenue Administration of the district shall be sub-ordinate to the Deputy Commissioner. Sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Revenue Act provides that the State Government may place any assistant Commissioner appointed under sub-section (1) to be incharge of the revenue administration of one or more taluks called a revenue Sub-Division and such Assistant commissioner shall perform all the duties and exercise all the powers conferred upon the Assistant Commissioner by the Revenue act or any other law for the time being in force. Such Assistant Commissioner shall also, subject to the provisions of Chapter V and to the orders of the State Government, if any, perform all the duties and exercise all the powers conferred upon the Deputy commissioner by that Act or any other law for the time being in force. ( 9 ) SIMILARLY, Section 11 of the Revenue act provides for the appointment of tahsildars to be incharge of the Revenue administration of the Taluks, enumerating their duties including that of the Special tahsildar. Section 14 is the one on which there is emphasis by the learned Government advocate and it is as follows:"officers to discharge duties during temporary vacancy (1) If the Divisional Commissioner is disabled from performing his duties, or is on leave or for any reason vacates his office or dies, the Deputy commissioner stationed at the headquarters of the Divisional commissioner, shall unless other provision is made by the Government, succeed temporarily to his office and shall be deemed to be the Divisional commissioner of the Division under this Act, until the Divisional commissioner resumes charge of his division, or until the Government appoints a successor to the former divisional Commissioner, and such successor takes charge of his appointment. (2) If the Deputy Commissioner is disabled from performing his duties or for any reason vacates his office or leaves his district or dies, the Special deputy Commissioner, if any, or in his absence, the senior most Assistant commissioner at the District Headquarters shall, unless other provision has been made by the State government, succeed temporarily to his office, and shall be deemed to be the Deputy Commissioner under this act, until the Deputy Commissioner resumes charge of his district, or until the State Government appoints a successor and such successor takes charge of his appointment. (3) If the Assistant Commissioner of a revenue Sub-Division is disabled from performing his duties or is on leave or for any reason vacates his office or dies, the Tahsildar stationed at the headquarters of the Assistant commissioner shall, unless other provision is made by the Government, succeed temporarily to his office and shall be deemed to be the Assistant commissioner of the Revenue Sub-Division under this Act, until the Assistant Commissioner resumes charge of his Revenue Sub-Division, or until the Government appoints a successor to the former Assistant Commissioner, and such successor takes charge of the appointment. (4) If a Tahsildar is disabled from performing his duties or for any reason, vacates his office or leaves his Taluk or dies, the Special Tahsildar, si any, or in his absence, the seniormost ministerial officer in the Taluk Office shall succeed temporarily to the said tahsildar's office and shall be deemed to be the Tahsildar under this Act, until the Tahsildar resumes charge of his Taluk or until such time as a successor is duly appointed and takes charge of his appointment. "on the basis of the language employed in sub-section (3) above, it is contended for the 2nd respondent that in view of the vacancy in the office of the Assistant Commissioner in the absence of other provisions being made, the Tahsildar would, by operation of law, succeed temporarily to the office of the assistant Commissioner which was vacant for any one of the reasons mentioned in that sub-section and therefore, notwithstanding the subsequent arrangement made by the government as per Notification dated 31. 7. 1989, the 2nd respondent was competent to discharge not only the current duties of the Assistant Commissioner of Haveri sub-Division, but also statutory duties in the light of the provisions made in Section 10 (2) of the Revenue Act. It was also urged, that these provisions did not fall for consideration before the Division Bench which ruled that an Officer incharge of the higher office may only perform the current duties and not the statutory duties. ( 10 ) IT is difficult for me to take the view on the distinction sought to be made by the learned Advocate and ignore the Division bench ruling of this Court. Whether the revenue Act was considered or not, the division Bench while interpreting Rule 32 of the Karnataka Civil Services Rules came to the conclusion positively that the current duties of the higher office would exclude the statutory duties of the higher office. Therefore, following the Division Bench ruling I have no choice but to reject the learned Government Advocate's argument. ( 11 ) IN addition to this, Sri R. B. Guttal, learned Counsel for impleaded respondents-3 to 24 who are none other than the members of the Mandal Panchayat, who voted in favour of the motion of No confidence, brought to my notice certain passages in Wade on Administrative Law fifth Edition at pages-300 and 325. ( 11 ) IN addition to this, Sri R. B. Guttal, learned Counsel for impleaded respondents-3 to 24 who are none other than the members of the Mandal Panchayat, who voted in favour of the motion of No confidence, brought to my notice certain passages in Wade on Administrative Law fifth Edition at pages-300 and 325. He also brought to my notice Section 195 of the revenue Act which empowers the State government to delegate the powers and duties of various officers to other officers. ( 12 ) SO far as reference to passages in wade on Administrative Law are concerned, passage relied on by the Counsel at page 300 reads as follows:"officers AND JUDGES DE facto: in one class of cases there is a long-standing doctrine that collateral challenge is not to be allowed; where there is some unknown flaw in the appointment or authority of some officer or judge. The acts of the officer or judge may be held to be valid in law even though his own appointment is invalid and in truth he has no legal power at all. The logic of annulling all his acts has to yield to the desirability of upholding them where he has acted in the office under a general supposition of his competence to do so. In such a case he is called an officer or judge de facto, as opposed to an officer or judge de jure. "all that the above passage indicates and illuminates is that the mere fact of an appointment being invalidated for any reason will not ipso facto invalidate acts performed by such officers who are appointed to those posts and not more than that. That rule has no application to the facts of this case. That is a general principle of an established law that ipso facto invalidation of appointment of an Officer either to judicial or administrative posts does not have the effect of invalidating their orders and decisions as the case may be. If this principle is not given judicial recognition as has been done, when the orders of appointment are struck down for whatever reason in public interest such judicial principle has definite application to save the acts done by such officers particularly when the invalidation of their appointment is long after their appointment. If this principle is not given judicial recognition as has been done, when the orders of appointment are struck down for whatever reason in public interest such judicial principle has definite application to save the acts done by such officers particularly when the invalidation of their appointment is long after their appointment. Similarly reliance placed on a passage of the same book at page 325 reads as follows:"statutory power to delegate: since in practice government demands a great deal of delegation, this has to be authorised by statue, either expressly or impliedly. "nobody may question the accuracy or correctness of the proposition stated by the learned author. Government has activities in modern times which are so complicated, without delegation directly by enactment or by subordinate legislation it is almost impossible to carry on the administration of a modern State. Therefore, almost every enactment makes provisions for such delegation, directly or by subordinate legislation as the case may be. In fact, that is evidenced by the reliance placed by the learned Counsel sri R. B. Guttal on Section 195 of the revenue Act itself. But then anyone who looks at Section 195 of the Act has to look at the authority delegated to the Assistant commissioner by Section 47 of the Act to see the nature of the authority delegated to the assistant Commissioner. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the Assistant Commissioner is exercising delegated authority. This question is whether incharge Assistant Commissioner can exercise the delegated authority and not whether the notification dated 31-7-1989 has the effect of delegating the authority to the Tahsildar because the impugned notice was issued much earlier than 31-7-1989, even if one concedes that the notification of 31-7-1989, should be read as a notification under Section 195 of the revenue Act as such. In my opinion it is too far-fetched and cannot be countenanced as proper exercise of judicial interpretation of statutes. When a statute dealing with particular subject provides within itself a full code by the provisions contained in that statute and the various rules made thereunder, it is not proper rule of construction to borrow from another statute authority to sustain the action which otherwise cannot be sustained under the provisions under which the power ought to be exercised by the authority to whom the power is delegated. ( 13 ) FOR the above reasons, I should repell the contentions of the respondents and hold that Annexure-B, the impugned notice is without the authority of law and as such cannot be sustained by this Court. The result is that meeting held pursuant to that notice also is invalid and the resolution passed at that meeting as such must be held to be void and unsustainable against the petitioner. ( 14 ) BY virtue of the invalidation of the impugned notice and the results pursuant thereto the members of the Mandal panchayat are not precluded to bring a fresh 'no Confidence Motion' in accordance with law in the light of the discussion made above, even before the lapse of six months. Section 52 of the Act has no application to a motion of no confidence as it is not part of the transaction of the business of the Mandal. ( 15 ) IN the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .