JUDGMENT - COUTO G.F., J.:—The petitioners challenge in this writ petition the judgment dated 10th October, 1985, passed by the Joint mamlatdar II of Salcete, as well as the order dated 15th April, 1986, made in appeal by the Collector of Goa and the judgment dated 12th June, 1987, passed by the third respondent Administrative Tribunal. 2. The first petitioners husband and father of the second petitioner and the fifth respondent purchased a property known as "Madeva Morod" alias "Madeva Nomoxi" surveyed under No. 565/1 and registered in the Revenue Office under No. 1278, by a deed dated 20th July, 1977. A house bearing the No. 770 exists in the said property and the same is occupied by the fourth respondent. An application was filed by the said respondent for declaration that he is a mundkar of the said property and that he is in occupation of the aforesaid house, a cowshed and a store-room. By his judgment dated 12th February, 1981, the fourth respondent was declared mundkar of the house as well as of the cowshed and the store-room adjoining it. The matter was taken up in appeal, and by judgment dated 8th February, 1982, the Collector of Goa, allowing partly the said appeal, declared the fourth respondent mundkar in respect of the house only. There was a revision application filed to the Administrative Tribunal which was dismissed by judgment dated 12th June, 1987. 3. Before that, while the matter was in appeal, the fourth respondent filed an application under sections 15 and 16 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Mundkars (Protection from Eviction) Act, 1975, for short, the Act, declaring his intention to purchase the said house. This house is situated in the ward Biumsa of Cuncolim, which was at the relevant time, within the jurisdiction of the Village Panchayat of Cuncolim. By a proclamation dated 17th January, 1984, published in the Government Gazette dated 27th January, 1984, the Government invited objections and suggestions to the proposal to change the said area into a municipal area. Thereafter, a Notification dated 25th May, 1987, was published in the Official Gazette dated 25th May, 1987, declaring the village of Cuncolim as municipal area, in exercise of the powers under section 3(1) of the Municipalities Act. 4. Thereafter, a Notification dated 25th May, 1987, was published in the Official Gazette dated 25th May, 1987, declaring the village of Cuncolim as municipal area, in exercise of the powers under section 3(1) of the Municipalities Act. 4. When the matters were so standing, the Joint Mamlatdar II of salcete by his order dated 10th October, 1985, fixed the purchase price of the land where the house of the fourth respondent stands, at Rs. 7/- per square metre, and further, directed that the said price be paid in terms of section 15(3) of the Act, as the fourth respondent is a village artisan. An appeal was filed, as already mentioned, against the aforesaid judgment of the Mamlatdar and the Collector of Goa by his order dated 15th April, 1986, held that, since the petitioner was admitting that the fourth respondent was a carpenter, there was no doubt that he was a village artisan and no further inquiry was required on the point. However, he held that the area has to be specifically worked out as well as the rate at which the mundkar has to pay the price. Finally, in the judgment dated 12th June, 1987, passed by the third respondent Administrative Tribunal in a revision filed against the aforesaid order of the Collector, it was held that since the petitioners had admitted that the fourth respondent was a village artisan there was no reason for interference. Accordingly, the said revision application was dismissed. 5. Mr. Dessai, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, challenged the aforesaid orders of the first, second and third respondents, mainly, on three grounds. He, first, contended that the fourth respondent has not prayed that he be declared a village artisan, at the time the applied to be declared as a mundkar. Therefore, he was only declared mundkar and the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 could not hold the view that the fourth respondent was a village artisan without a prayer therefor, and further, without holding an inquiry for the purpose. Secondly, he urged that the question as to whether a person is a village artisan is a mixed question of fact and law, and therefore, required for its determination, evidence. Thirdly, he submitted that when the first respondent passed his impugned order, the area where the mundkarial house of the fourth respondent stands, was already part of the Municipal Council of Cuncolim. Thirdly, he submitted that when the first respondent passed his impugned order, the area where the mundkarial house of the fourth respondent stands, was already part of the Municipal Council of Cuncolim. Consequently, the area to which the fourth respondent is entitled to purchase is the area where his house stands plus the area as laid down in the proviso to sub-clause (b) of Clause (i) of section 2 of the Act. 6. As regards the first two contentions I may mention at the outset, that Mr. Thali, the learned Counsel appearing for the fourth respondent, did not dispute that when the said respondent applied for declaration of mundkarship, he has not, at the same time, prayed that he be declared a village artisan. It is not also disputed that the said respondent has been declared as a mundkar in respect of the house only and that the decision in that regard has become final. Finally, it is common ground that on 27th February, 1985, the fourth respondent applied to the Mamlatdar stating that he intended to purchase his dwelling house and prayed that the price to be paid be fixed. This application was resisted by the petitioners herein inasmuch as they did not agree with the area claimed by the fourth respondent. They declared their willingness to sell 300 square metres at the market value of the land. The Mamlatdar considering that the prices of and were going up and that the prevailing price in the locality was not more than Rs. 6 per square metre, fixed the purchase price at Rs. 7/- per square metre and without holding any inquiry into the matter or recording any evidence to the effect, directed that the said price be paid in accordance with the provisions of section 15(3) of the Act, since the applicant was a village artisan. The petitioners appealed against this order to the Collector and their main contentions were (a) that the Mamlatdar ought to have fixed the area to be purchased by the fourth respondent and (b) that he ought to have determined after recording evidence, whether or not the fourth respondent was a village artisan within the meaning of the Act. The Collector however, dismissed the said appeal as regards the need of holding an inquiry to determine whether the fourth respondent was a village artisan. The Collector however, dismissed the said appeal as regards the need of holding an inquiry to determine whether the fourth respondent was a village artisan. In his view, once the petitioners admitted that the fourth respondent was a carpenter in the village, although a sophisticated one, it would go without saying that they had admitted the fourth respondent to be a village artisan. He, however, held that the area was to be worked out as well as the rate at which the price was to be paid. The same view was taken by the third respondent while dismissing the revision application. Now, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Dessai, the question as to whether a person is or not a village artisan within the meaning of the Act, is a mixed question of fact and law, and therefore, unless and until some evidence was recorded, it was not possible for the Court below, and it was not correct, to give a decision on the point. 7. Section 2(t) of the Act indeed defines village artisan as meaning a person whose principal means of livelihood is the income he derives from working as artisan in a village. The petitioners had not challenged that the fourth respondent is a carpenter and that he works in a village. However, they came out with a case that though he is a carpenter, he is running a business and supplying furniture to wealthy people. Therefore, according to the petitioners, the fourth respondent does not fall within the purview of the definition of village artisan. The Act does not define artisan. Therefore, we have to give to the said word its common meaning. 'Artisan', the Black's Law Dictionary states, is one skilled in some kind of trade, craft or art requiring manual dexterity. Similarly, the meaning of artisan given in the Webster's Short New International Dictionary is an artist, i.e. one who practises an art; one trained to manual dexterity or skill in a trade such as an handicraftsman undoubtedly, a carpenter is a skilled person who uses manual dexterity in the exercise of his profession. Therefore, undoubtedly, he is an artisan. But, is that sufficient to hold a person, a carpenter, who resides in a village and who works in a village as a village artisan within the meaning of section 2(t) of the Act? Therefore, undoubtedly, he is an artisan. But, is that sufficient to hold a person, a carpenter, who resides in a village and who works in a village as a village artisan within the meaning of section 2(t) of the Act? The answer to this question is, obviously, in the negative, since the aforesaid definition of village artisan requires something more. I already mentioned that village artisan is defined as meaning a person whose principal means of livelihood is the income he derives from working as an artisan in a village. There are, therefore, three ingredients for a person becoming a village artisan within the meaning of the Act, namely (a) such person should be an artisan; (b) such artisan should work in a village; and (c) the principal means of livelihood of such artisan should be the income he derives from his working as an artisan in the village. Now, it is an admitted position that the fourth respondent is an artisan who works in the village of Cuncolim. But what is challenged is that his principal means of livelihood is the income he derives from his working as artisan in the said village. The case of the petitioners, indeed, is that the fourth respondent is running a business. He is an entrepreneur who manufactures furniture for wealthy people, and therefore, it is not possible to hold that the income he gets from the running of the said business constitutes income derived from his working as an artisan. Therefore, according to the petitioners, even if the said income is not only the principal means of his livelihood, but the only means of livelihood, he will never come within the purview of the definition of village artisan in the Act. Thus, there is a controversy as to whether or not the principal means of livelihood of the fourth respondent is or not the income he arrives from his working as a carpenter in the village. The Mamlatdar could not have determined this question without recording some evidence in that connection, and therefore, it was not correct on his part to, while fixing the price straightway direct that the fixed price be paid in accordance with section 15(3) of the Act. The Mamlatdar could not have determined this question without recording some evidence in that connection, and therefore, it was not correct on his part to, while fixing the price straightway direct that the fixed price be paid in accordance with section 15(3) of the Act. Hence, both the Collector and the Administrative Tribunal committed a material error in the exercise of their jurisdiction when they held summarily the view that there was no need of an inquiry to determine the question as to whether or not the fourth respondent was a village artisan. That apart, it is also pertinent to note that the fourth respondent while approaching the Mamlatdar with his application to be declared as a mundkar, did not allege to be a village artisan. Therefore one fails to understand how the Mamlatdar held him to be a village artisan. It is also to be noted that even if such stand had been taken by the fourth respondent, the burden to prove his capacity as village artisan was entirely on him. 8. Hence, the Mamlatdar should have had borne in mind, while deciding the said application of the fourth respondent to purchase his dwelling house, the provisions of section 15 of the Act, and more particularly, the second proviso to sub-section (3) thereof. Sub-section (3) indeed provides that the purchase price payable by the mundkar for his dwelling house shall be the market value of the dwelling house purchased and the improvements thereon, other than the improvement, if any, belonging to the mundkar. The second proviso lays down that (a) when a mundkar has been permitted to occupy the dwelling house by the bhatkar for the purpose of cultivation of or for the purpose of watching and protecting, an agricultural land of the bhatkar and is actually rendering such services and continues to render such services with or without remuneration; or (b) where a mundkar is an agricultural labourer or a village artisan; or (c) where the actual income of a mundkar, being a person belonging to Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and not falling under Clause (a) or Clause (b) from all sources does not exceed Rs. 3,600/-, then, the purchase price payable by such mundkar or a member of his family shall be 20% of the market value payable. 3,600/-, then, the purchase price payable by such mundkar or a member of his family shall be 20% of the market value payable. The above Clause (b) of the second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 15 of the Act indicates that the Legislature had for the purpose of fixing the price to be paid by the mundkar, equated a village artisan to an agricultural labourer. Agricultural labourer is indisputably a person who manually works in agriculture, and therefore, is ordinarily paid for his work on daily wages. As the Legislature put the village artisan in the same bracket of the agricultural labourer, it becomes exceedingly clear that the village artisan as defined in the Act is an artisan who works in the village and maintains himself with the wages he gets working as an artisan. Therefore, considering the definition of village artisan in the context of the Act, and especially in the context of Clause (b) of the second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 15, there is no matter of doubt that the village artisan who runs a business and draws income from the business, although he at the same time works in the same business as an artisan, will not come within the purview of village artisan as defined in section 2(t) of the Act. The Mamlatdar ought to have, therefore, addressed to the question as to whether or not the principal means of livelihood of the fourth respondent was the income he was deriving from his working as an artisan. If the fourth respondent is running a business, by no stretch of imagination, he can be held to be a village artisan, although he also works as a carpenter in his own enterprise. 9. Coming now to the next challenge of the petitioners, it is necessary to advert to the relevant provisions of the Mundkar Act, particularly to the definition of the dwelling house. 9. Coming now to the next challenge of the petitioners, it is necessary to advert to the relevant provisions of the Mundkar Act, particularly to the definition of the dwelling house. Section 2(i) of the Act defines dwelling house as meaning the house in which the mundkar resides with a fixed habitation and includes in addition to the cattleshed a stable, pigsty, workshop or such other structure connected with the business or the profession of Mundkar and the customary easement, if any (a) the land on which the dwelling house is standing and the land around and appurtenant to such dwelling house, subject to the maximum limit of 5 metres, if the land is within the jurisdiction of the Village Panchayat, and 2 meters, if it is within such jurisdiction, from the outer walls of the dwelling house; and (b) 300 square metres of the land including the land on which the dwelling house is standing, provided that where the dwelling house is within the jurisdiction of a Municipal Council, the dwelling house shall include 200 square meters of land including the land on which the dwelling house is standing. It is the submission of the petitioners that the area where the fourth respondent's house stands is, at the present, falling within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Council of Cuncolim, and therefore, the area to which the fourth respondent will be entitled while purchasing his dwelling house, will be as laid down in the aforesaid provision of the Act as regards a dwelling house situated in municipal area. Mr. Dessai indeed contended that the Act merely protects the mundkars against eviction from their dwelling houses and does not in any manner give the mundkar a particular right to a particular area. The area to which he will be entitled will be the area which is available at the time of the passing of the order fixing the price of the purchase by the concerned authority. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel, if at the time of the passing of the said order, the area where the mundkar's house is standing has become a municipal area, it will be the area laid in the Act in case the mundkarial house falls within the jurisdiction of a Municipal Council that will be available to him. Mr. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel, if at the time of the passing of the said order, the area where the mundkar's house is standing has become a municipal area, it will be the area laid in the Act in case the mundkarial house falls within the jurisdiction of a Municipal Council that will be available to him. Mr. Thali, the learned Counsel appearing for the fourth respondent, however, strongly opposed the above view, and according to him, the mundkar will be entitled to the area of his house as it was available to him at the time of the enforcement of the Act, the change of the area from Panchayat to Municipal being entirely irrelevant. The learned Advocate-General advanced a view which is concurring with the view taken by Mr. Thali. In fact, he submitted that the Act was enacted, as its Preamble states, to provide for better protection to mundkars against eviction of their dwelling houses and for granting them the right to purchase the same and to make certain other provisions connected therewith. The declaration of a person as a mundkar is a mere statutory declaration and whatever benefits had accrued to the mundkar at the time of the Act coming into force and be crystallized in the mundkar at that particular point of time. Therefore, according to the learned Advocate General, though it is not mandatory or obligatory to the mundkar to purchase his dwelling house, section 15(b) being merely an enabling provision, the fact remains that whatever rights had accrued to the mundkar at the relevant time of the enforcement of the Act are safeguarded. Among those rights is the right to the dwelling house as defined in the Act and applicable to the Mundkar at that particular point of time. 10. As rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate-General, the Act was enacted to provide for better protection to mundkars against eviction from their dwelling houses as well as for granting them the right to purchase their dwelling houses and to make certain provisions connected therewith. Now, the Act defines who is a mundkar and what is a dwelling house under the Act. Now, the Act defines who is a mundkar and what is a dwelling house under the Act. Therefore, as the Act intended, inter alia to protect the mundkar against the eviction from his dwelling house and to give him the right to purchase it necessarily follows that the right accrued to the mundkar is also in respect of the dwelling house in which he was residing at the point of time of the enforcement of the Act, or at the point of time of the coming into force of the same Act. But, if this position of law appears to be clear and unquestionable, one has to bear in mind, at the same time, the provisions of section 15 of the Act. An examination of the said provision of law leaves no margin for doubts, and as rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate-general what the section provided for is a right to the mundkar to purchase his dwelling house, if he so wishes. Nowhere, in that particular provision of the Act or anywhere else in the Act, it has been laid down that the mundkar is bound to purchase his dwelling house. The provision is, therefore, merely an enabling provision and the mundkar may or may not, according to his wishes, purchase the house. If this is so, it is manifest that if the land around the house and appurtenant to it is freezed from the time of the enforcement of the Act, although that area varies in accordance to it belonging to a panchayat or Municipal area, an absurd and most unjust situation would arise. In fact, the mundkar may choose not to purchase the land for many, many years and to decide to do it only after the lapse of 10, 15 or 20 years. By this time, the conditions which were obtaining at the relevant time of the coming into force of the Act might have, and will definitely have changed. It was, precisely having, inter alia, in mind this kind of consideration that the Legislature established the land available to the mundkar for purchase in consideration of the circumstances whether his dwelling house is within the jurisdiction of a Panchayat or of a Municipal Council. It was, precisely having, inter alia, in mind this kind of consideration that the Legislature established the land available to the mundkar for purchase in consideration of the circumstances whether his dwelling house is within the jurisdiction of a Panchayat or of a Municipal Council. In the light of the above, in my view, the relevant date of fixing the area to which the mundkar will be entitled to purchase as being part of his dwelling house, is the date on which he records his intention to purchase his dwelling house in an application filed to the competent authority to fix the price of the land where the house stands. 11. The Mamlatdar as well as the Collector and the Administrative Tribunal had not considered all the above aspects while passing the impugned judgments and orders. While doing so, they committed a serious error which touches the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in them, and therefore, the interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is entirely justified. The Mamlatdar ought to have considered the evidence led by the petitioners for the purposes of fixing the market value of the land. While doing so, he should roughly follow the principles which are taken recourse of in the fixation of compensation in land acquisition cases. 12. The result, therefore, is that this writ petition succeeds, and consequently, the rule is made absolute in terms of Prayers (a) and (b). Costs by the respondent No. 4. Petition allowed. -----