JUDGMENT S. Padmanabhan, J. 1. Plaintiff appeals. His suit is for specific performance of Ext. A1 agreement dated 31-7 1978. The property is six cents. It belonged to the first defendant and defendants 2 and 3, her minor children as coowners. Agreement was entered into by the first defendant along with Rajan Menon, her former husband and father of defendants 2 and 3 Rajan Menon was acting as guardian of the minors. Contention of the first defendant is that she was not a consenting party to Ext. A1 and her signature was obtained by the husband under vitiating circumstances. The husband is said to be a drunkard and close friend of the plaintiff. It is also alleged that the guardian is having the added obligation to the plaintiff because of frequent financial assistance in small amounts That contention was accepted by both the courts below on the evidence of the plaintiff himself. It was also found that the agreement is not valid and binding on defendants 2 and 3. The suit was, therefore, dismissed and the decision was confirmed in appeal. 2. The marriage between the first defendant and Rajan Menon was divorced after Ext. A1, by a decree of divorce. There was no necessity for the minors to sell their property. Ext. A1 was not the result of any direct dealing between the plaintiff and the first defendant. First defendant was not even present when the transaction was entered into, she did not receive any amount from the plaintiff. He has not seen the first defendant signing Ext. A1. It was evidently a transaction between the plaintiff and Rajan Menon. Therefore, plaintiff even doubted the genuineness of the signature of the first defendant in Ext. A1. He even went to the extent of verifying the genuineness of the signature of the first defendant in Ext. A1 by comparing it with her admitted signature. Ext. A1 was brought about under abnormal, extra ordinary and suspicious circumstances showing that its execution was not the result of free will or consent given by the first defendant. These are the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court. In second appeal, there is no scope, for interference with those findings. 3. It is true that Rajan Menon was the natural guardian of minor defendants 2 and 3. But Ext. These are the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court. In second appeal, there is no scope, for interference with those findings. 3. It is true that Rajan Menon was the natural guardian of minor defendants 2 and 3. But Ext. A1 was entered into after the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act came into force. S.8 thereof specifically provides that the natural guardian is not entitled to deal with the property of the minor, even in cases where the requisite conditions exist, without the prior permission of the competent court. Permission is not an empty formality which could be given by the court for the mere asking. Such a safeguard is intended to protect the interest of minors against the vagaries of natural guardians. Any dealing, without such permission, could convert the transaction as one without authority and as such, void in the eye of law. A natural guardian, who is dealing with the properties of a minor without such permission from a competent court, could be equated to the position of importer or intermeddler who is having no authority. Even the permission that has to be granted by the court is made conditional on the satisfaction of the existence of certain circumstances. These circumstances are necessity and evident advantage of the minor. The acts of the guardian must be necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for realisation, protection or benefit of the minor's estate. Apart from Ext. A1 wanting prior sanction of court none of the other conditions also exist in this case Ext. A1 indicates that the transaction was entered into solely for the benefit of the plaintiff. No necessity, so far as the minors are concerned, is even mentioned therein. 4. Appellant is having a case that Sections of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act is not applicable to the present transaction, it being an agreement alone. In other words, contention is that prior permission of the court is necessary only when the guardian enters into any mortgage, charge or sale on behalf of the minor. I do not think that the argument is sound. A minor may be bound by the acts of the natural guardian. But, as already stated, that could only be subject to the existence of certain conditions. I do not think that the argument is sound. A minor may be bound by the acts of the natural guardian. But, as already stated, that could only be subject to the existence of certain conditions. Agreement for sale cannot be taken in isolation from the sale that has to be subsequently executed. Agreement for sale has no meaning if the agreed sale is impossible on the basis of it. If an agreement for sale is enforced through a court of law, a decree for specific performance is necessary. In execution of that decree, a compulsory sale also will have to be executed even if the minor or the guardian is not willing to execute it. There is no question of, at first, accepting the agreement and passing a decree for specific performance of the contract and then seeking permission of competent court for the sale deed when time comes for its execution. A guardian cannot enter into an agreement in anticipation of future sanction by a competent court. Even an agreement could be executed only if the sale is necessary or it is in the interest of the minor. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary that even before the execution of the agreement itself, there must be the permission of the court as envisaged by S.8 of the Act. If at all any authority is required, it could be had from a Division Bench decision of this court in Santhosh Kumar v. Varghese ( 1987 (2) KLT 27 ). Any decisions to the contrary, prior to the commencement of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, may not have any force, in view of S.5 thereof to the effect that it is notwithstanding any law, etc to the contrary. It is not possible for the court, in a suit for specific performance to pass a decree conditional on the permission being obtained from a competent court on a future date. Provisions of law and consequently the courts also are always jealous in the matter of safeguarding the interest of persons under incapacity. When a guardian represents a minor, the court will always expect him to keep such a standard as if he was dealing with his own property. Judged by any of these standards, it is pot possible to accept either that Rajan Menon had the authority or that the transaction is acceptable as against the minors. 5. When a guardian represents a minor, the court will always expect him to keep such a standard as if he was dealing with his own property. Judged by any of these standards, it is pot possible to accept either that Rajan Menon had the authority or that the transaction is acceptable as against the minors. 5. In view of the factual and legal positions mentioned above, it is not possible to accept Ext. A1 as a prudent act, as far as the minors are concerned. They were only, aged 7 and 5. They had sufficient funds. No necessity or benefit is either pleaded or proved against them. The conduct subsequent to Ext. A1 also shows that it was unnecessary transaction for the minors. Ext. A1 provided only for a term of three months. Immediately after the expiry of three months, Rajan Menon alone seems to have received Rs. 250/- from the plaintiff. It is not stated to be for any necessities of the minors. It is the further case of the appellant that thereafter the term was extended by three years. The suit was filed only in the year 1981. Normally an extends on for three years is not possible, unless it was for the plaintiff to gain time for making funds or because Rajan Menon wanted to keep things in suspense for the purpose of getting pittance occasionally. The two courts below were, therefore, correct even in coining to the conclusion that the appellant did not establish that he was and continued to be ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 6. On the question of readiness and willingness, as envisaged by S.16 of the Specific Relief Act read with Section (ii) thereof also, the concurrent finding is against the appellant. I have no reason to disagree with the courts below in these respects. Even taking for granted that the agreement could be enforced, as against the one third share of the first defendant, relief of specific performance is not a matter of right. As provided in S.20 of the Specific Relief Act, it is a discretionary relief, though just like all other judicial discretions, the courts should not act arbitrarily or capriciously, but should act on sound and reasonable grounds guided by sound judicial principle and capable of being corrected in appeal. As provided in S.20 of the Specific Relief Act, it is a discretionary relief, though just like all other judicial discretions, the courts should not act arbitrarily or capriciously, but should act on sound and reasonable grounds guided by sound judicial principle and capable of being corrected in appeal. Courts are not bound to grant the relief merely because it is lawful to do so. All the facts and circumstances of the case will have to be meticulously considered. Motive behind the agreement or the litigation and the attendant circumstances also should enter the judicial verdict. It is the duty of the court to take care to see that it is not used as an instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage to the plaintiff Mathew v. Kuruvilla - 1988 (1) KLT 7 ). Comparative hardship and advantage and the conduct of the parties are also some of the considerations. Equity or inequity in granting the relief also should enter the judicial mind. Discretion under S.20 is not absolute. A person who seeks the relief must do equity and come with clean hands. He must have done and must continue to be ready and willing to do all what he has to do. in the light of these principles also appellant plaintiff is not entitled to the reliefs as found by the court below. 7. Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act does not stand isolated, as observed in Abul Aziz Sahib v. H. Abdul Sammad Sahib and another (AIR 1937 Madras 596). In order to understand the full significance of the section, it will have to be understood in conjunction with S.14, 15 and 17 which form a group along with S.16. If the contract is not divisible, the court cannot substitute a new bargain and force a new contract on the parties by decreeing the plaintiff's claim with respect to a portion. What is allowed by S.12, regarding the performance of a part of the contract, is only when a party is unable to perform the whole, but such part unperformed bears only a negligible portion of the whole. What is allowed by S.12, regarding the performance of a part of the contract, is only when a party is unable to perform the whole, but such part unperformed bears only a negligible portion of the whole. That is what Santhosh Kumar's case ( 1987 (2) KLT 27 ) also said, In this connection, learned counsel for the appellant drew my attention to S.12 (4), which says that when a part of the contract which, taken by itself, can and ought to be specifically performed, stands on a separate and independent footing from another part of the same contract which cannot or ought not to be specifically performed, the court may direct specific performance of the former part. I do not think that S.12(4) is also applicable. Even in case that provision is found applicable, for other reasons, specific performance of the one third itself cannot be allowed. The general rule in S.12 is that the discretionary relief of specific performance cannot be granted in respect of the part of a contract. The other provisions are only exceptions to this general rule which will have to be applied in appropriate cases where the court finds the necessity of exercising the discretion in favour of the plaintiff. I am of the view that both the courts below rightly refused to exercise the discretion in favour of the plaintiff to any extent. Second appeal is, therefore, dismissed, but in the circumstances, without any order as to costs.