JUDGMENT B. P. Singh, J.- The petitioner has been detained under the provisions of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 by respondent no.2, the District Magistrate Ranchi. The order of detention passed under section 12 (2) of the Act (Annexure-1) was served upon the petitioner who was already in Jail in connection with other criminal cases. The order of detention as well as the grounds of detention (Annexure-2) were served upon the petitioner on 10.10.88 while he was in jail. The State Government approved the order of detention and such approval (Vide Annexure-3) was communicated to the petitioner on 15.10.88. The petitioner was produced before the Advisory Board on 17.11.88 and the Advisory Board found sufficient grounds to detain the petitioner. Ultimately the State Government by its order (Annexure 4) dated 6th December, 1988 confirmed the order of detention in exercise of powers under section 21 (1) and section 22 of the Act. 2. The petitioner has challenged the order of detention on several grounds. It was firstly contended that the case of the petitioner was not referred to the Advisory Board within the period prescribed by section 19 of the Act, namely, within three weeks from the date of detention. It was secondly submitted that though the order of detention was served while the petitioner was in jail, there is nothing to show that the detaining authority was conscious of the fact that the petitioner was already in jail custody and that it was necessary to pass an order of detention against him having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to public order. Thirdly it was submitted that the grounds related to cases which were not proximate and the order of detention was, therefore, passed on the basis of stale grounds. It was lastly submitted that ground no. 7 of the grounds was vague as it did not give sufficient particulars to enable the petitioner to make an effective representation. 3. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, the detaining authority. The aforesaid counter-affidavit has been affirmed by one Sri P. B. Lal a Deputy Collector working under respondent no. 2 who claimed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. 3. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, the detaining authority. The aforesaid counter-affidavit has been affirmed by one Sri P. B. Lal a Deputy Collector working under respondent no. 2 who claimed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. It is unfortunate that the detaining authority himself has not filed a counter-affidavit justifying the detention or the petitioner. The counter-affidavit filed on his behalf, is too vague and general and discloses the cavaldir fashion in which such counter-affidavits are drafted and filed. In paragraph 11 of the counter-affidavit, it has been stated that before passing the detention order, all the materials were placed before the detaining authority and after being fully satisfied the same was passed against the petitioner. In paragraph 12 it has been stated that the detention order had been served on the petitioner while he was in jail custody when a report was a report was received from the senior Superintendent of Police that the petitioner was likely to be released from jail custody soon on bail and soon after his release he would indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as experienced on earlier occasions. Therefore, in the interest of public order, it was considered necessary to serve the detention order in the jail itself. 4. In paragraphs 19 and 20 of the writ application the petitioner made a grievance that the order of confirmation contained in Annexure-4 had been passed after a long delay and had not been passed within the period specified in section 21 of the Act. The detention of the petitioner was, therefore, invalid for the reason that the detention was confirmed after a long delay of 51 days. In reply to paragraphs 19 and 20 of the writ application, in paragraph 15 of the counter-affidavit it has been stated that the petitioner had himself admitted that he was produced before the Advisory Board on 17.11.88, and as loch, the meeting of the Advisory Board had been held within the period stipulated by the Act. In reply to paragraphs 19 and 20 of the writ application, in paragraph 15 of the counter-affidavit it has been stated that the petitioner had himself admitted that he was produced before the Advisory Board on 17.11.88, and as loch, the meeting of the Advisory Board had been held within the period stipulated by the Act. The deponent obviously did not care to carefully read paragraphs 19 and 20 of the writ application since in those paragraphs the petitioner had not made a grievance about his not being produced before the Advisory Board within the stipulated period but had made a grievance that the order of detention had been confirmed by the State Government after a lapse of 58 days which was itself a ground for quashing the order of detention. 5. I may observe at this stage that there is no clear averment in the writ application alleging that the State Government had failed to place before the Advisory Board the grounds on which the order had been made and representation, if any, made by the petitioner together with the report of the detaining authority under sub-section (3) of section 12 of the Act. It was only stated in the writ application that the petitioner was produced before the Advisory Board on 17.11.88. When the matter was heard by me on 3.8.89, it was urged before me on behalf of the petitioner that the matter relating to his detention together with all necessary records was not placed before the Advisory Board as required by the Act within the period prescribed by section 19 of the Act. Since there was no clear averment in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 2 as to the date on which the matter had been placed before the Advisory Board as required by the Act, I granted time to the State till the 7th August, 1989 to file a supplementary affidavit stating all relevant facts to satisfy the court that all procedural safeguards under the Act had been complied with. The State was directed, if possible, to keep the record of the case in court for perusal of the court. The State was directed, if possible, to keep the record of the case in court for perusal of the court. It is well settled by several decisions of the Supreme Court that the normal rule that the writ petitions are decided on the basis of affidavits and the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise grounds not taken in the petition at the hearing is not applicable to a petition for grant of a writ of habeas corpus. It is enough for the detenu to state that he is in wrongful detention and the burden lies on the detaining authority to satisfy the court that the detention is not illegal and wrongful and that the petitioner is Dot entitled to the relief claimed. It is incumbent on the State to satisfy the court that detention of the detenu was legal and in conformity not only with the mandatory provisions of the Act but also strictly in accord with the Constitutional safeguards embodied under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India (see Mohinuddin v. The District Magistrate, Beed and others, 1987 (4) S.C.C. 58. Having regard to this principle, I had directed the State to file another affidavit stating all the necessary facts to satisfy me that the detention of the petitioner was legal and in Accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Constitution of India. The matter was thereafter heard on the 9th of August, 1989. A counter-affidavit was filed on that date on behalf of respondent nos. 1 and 3 namely, the State of Bihar and the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Bihar, Patna. Unfortunately even this counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State is blissfully vague. In paragraph 7 it has been stated by reference to paragraphs 19 and 20 of the writ application that the detenu was served with the detention order on 9-10-88 and the case was referred to the Advisory Board on 29-10-88 vide memo no. 9972. Thus the reference was made within the stipulated period of three weeks. The original record relating to the detention of the petitioner was not produced before me when this writ application was heard on the 9th of August, 1989. After the hearing was concluded the learned Government Advocate stated that he will get in touch with the concerned officer and may be able to produce the original file on the next day. The original record relating to the detention of the petitioner was not produced before me when this writ application was heard on the 9th of August, 1989. After the hearing was concluded the learned Government Advocate stated that he will get in touch with the concerned officer and may be able to produce the original file on the next day. However, no such file was produced before me on the next day, though Sri A. S. Dayal counsel for the petitioner was present before me expecting that the file may be produced and he may have an opportunity of making his submission on the basis of the file produced before the court. In these circumstances, I had to proceed on the basis of the facts stated in the writ application and the counter-affidavits. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that section 19 of the Act provides that where a detention order has been made under the Act, the Government shall within three weeks from the date of detention of a person place before the Advisory Board the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order and in case where the order has been made by the District Magistrate mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 12, also the report by such officer under sub-section (3) of that section. Section 19 of the Act, therefore, mandates the State Government to place the matter before the Advisory Board within a period of three weeks from the date of detention, while placing the matter before the Advisory Board, it is required to place before the Board the grounds on which the order of detention has been made, the representation, if any made by the detenu and in case where the order has been passed by a District Magistrate, the report of such District Magistrate submitted under sub-section (3) of section 12 of the Act. From the averments made in paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 3 it appears that the case of the detenu was referred to the Advisory Board on 29-10-88. No other facts have been stated. It has not been stated whether the grounds of detention as also the report of the District Magistrate u/s. 12 (3) had been placed before the Advisory Board. No other facts have been stated. It has not been stated whether the grounds of detention as also the report of the District Magistrate u/s. 12 (3) had been placed before the Advisory Board. In the instant case the petitioner had not made any representation, and, therefore, there was no question of the representation being considered by the Advisory Board. Can it be said that the facts stated in paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit satisfied the requirement of section 19 of the Act? It is not enough that the case of a detenu should be placed before the Advisory Board. It is also mandatory that while placing such a case before the Advisory Board, the grounds of detention, the representation of the petitioner, if any, and the report of the District Magistrate u/s. 12 (3) of the Act must also be placed before the Board. There is nothing in the counter-affidavit to show that such material was also placed before the Advisory Board. Learned counsel, therefore, rightly placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 1987 P.L.J.R. 785 wherein this Court while dealing with a case of detention under the National Security Act, 1980 observed that the liability of the State Government did not end with writing or making a communication to the Board, but it was also required to place before the Advisory Board the grounds on which the petitioner was detained. In that case, the petitioner had stated that his case was not placed before the Advisory Board to which the only reply given was that the State Government had referred it to the Board on 15-2-86. The State Government had not come forward with a case that the grounds on which the order was made and the representation, if any, made by the petitioner, were placed before the Advisory Board within the statutory period of three weeks. In these circumstances, this Court did not uphold the detention of the detenu and quashed the order of detention. 7. In the instant case, there is nothing in the counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents to satisfy me that the requirements of section 19 of the Act were fully complied with. All that has been stated is that the case of the petitioner was referred to the Advisory Board on 29.10.88. 7. In the instant case, there is nothing in the counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents to satisfy me that the requirements of section 19 of the Act were fully complied with. All that has been stated is that the case of the petitioner was referred to the Advisory Board on 29.10.88. There is no averment to the effect that while doing so, the grounds of detention and the report of the detaining authority u/s. 12. (3) of the Act were also placed before the Advisory Board. I am, therefore, constrained to hold that it has not been established to my satisfaction that the provision of section 19 were complied with by the respondents. 8. There is yet another ground on which the order of detention must be quashed. It is not disputed that the petitioner was in jail custody when the order of detention together with grounds of detention were served upon him. The second submission urged before me was that there is nothing on record to disclose that the detaining authority was conscious of the fact that the petitioner was already in jail custody and further that he may be released on hail and that in such event maintenance of public order was likely to be prejudicially affected. The only averment in the counter-affidavit which is relevant is contained in paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 2, the detaining authority. I have already observed that this counter-affidavit has been affirmed not by the detaining authority, namely, the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, but by a Deputy Collector working under him. There is nothing in this counter-affidavit to show why the detaining authority could not himself affirm the counter-affidavit. 2, the detaining authority. I have already observed that this counter-affidavit has been affirmed not by the detaining authority, namely, the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, but by a Deputy Collector working under him. There is nothing in this counter-affidavit to show why the detaining authority could not himself affirm the counter-affidavit. In paragraph 12 of this counter-affidavit it has been stated on the basis of information derived from the records of the case that "the detention order had been served on the petitioner while he was in jail custody when a report was received from the Senior Superintendent of Police that the petitioner was likely to be released from jail custody very soon on bail and soon after his release he would indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as experienced on earlier occasions and, therefore, in the interest of public order it was considered necessary to serve the detention order in the jail itself." deponent could not arrogate to himself with the knowledge about the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, it has not been stated in the counter-affidavit that pursuant to the report of the Senior Superintendent of Police the detaining authority after applying his mind to the facts stated therein and after satisfying himself that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it was necessary to pass an order of detention even though the petitioner was in jail, passed the impugned order of detention. All that is stated in the affidavit is that in view of the report of the Senior Superintendent of Police, in the interest of public order it was considered necessary to serve the detention order in the jail itself. In my considered view, the detention of the petitioner must be quashed on the ground that there is nothing to show that there was awareness in the mind of the detaining authority to the fact that the petitioner was in jail at the time of clamping of the order of detention and the detaining authority was satisfied after considering his antecedents and previous criminal acts that there was likelihood of his indulging in criminal activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order if he was enlarged on bail and there was every likelihood that the petitioner will be released on bail within a short time. In the instant case, first of all the detaining authority has not filed an affidavit stating whether he had taken into consideration the fact that the petitioner was already in jail custody and on considering his past activities he was subjectively satisfied that if set free or released from jail custody on bail, there was likelihood of the petitioner indulging in criminal activities endangering public order and it was therefore necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public order. An affidavit filed by one of the Deputy Collectors working under him is not enough since. It is only the detaining authority who can state about the facts which weighed in his mind while reaching the subjective satisfaction. 9. In the case of Gulab Mehra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (1989 (4) SC case 302 the facts were somewhat similar and I am tempted to quote from the judgment of the Supreme Court the relevant passage where in the Court observed as follows:- "In the instant case the detaining authority, respondent No.2 has not come forward to file an affidavit stating whether has taken into consideration the fact that the appellant was already in judicial custody and on considering his past activities he was subjectively satisfied that if set free or released from jail custody on bail, there was likelihood of the appellant indulging in criminal activities endangering public order. On the other hand, the Station Officer of the Police Station, Kydganj, Shri O. P. Ojha has filed a counter stating that the District Magistrate passed the impugned detention order when the appellant was already in jail on the apprehension that the appellant is likely to be released on bail in the near future and if the appellant is bailed out, the public order problem will become worse. This clearly goes to show that the Sub-Inspector has arrogated to himself the knowledge about the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate on whom the power is conferred by the Act. The District Magistrate, the detaining authority in this case has not chosen to file his affidavit. The affidavit-in-opposition filed by the Station Officer of Police implies that he has access to the file of the District Magistrate or he influenced the decision of the District Magistrate for making the detention order. The District Magistrate, the detaining authority in this case has not chosen to file his affidavit. The affidavit-in-opposition filed by the Station Officer of Police implies that he has access to the file of the District Magistrate or he influenced the decision of the District Magistrate for making the detention order. This is also clear from the confidential report submitted by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad to the District Magistrate, Allahabad as well as from the report of the Sub-Inspector of Police annexed with the said report wherein it has been specifically stated that it was apprehended that the appellant, Gulab Mehra who is at present in Naini jail and who has applied for bail, if enlarged on bail, public order will be disturbed. There is nothing to show that there was awareness in the mind of the District Magistrate, the detaining authority of the fact that the appellant was in jail at the time of clamping of the order of detention, and the detaining authority was satisfied in considering his antecedents and previous criminal acts, that there is likelihood of his indulging in criminal activities jeopardizing public order if he is enlarged on bail and that there is every likelihood that the appellant will be released on bail within a short time. On this ground alone, the order of detention is invalid." Following the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Gulab Mehra, I hold that the detention of the petitioner is bad also on the ground that there is no material to satisfy the court that the detaining authority while passing the impugned order of detention was aware of the fact that the appellant was in jail and was satisfied after considering his antecedents and previous criminal acts that it was necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 10. Since the order of detention is bad on two grounds aforesaid, is not necessary for me to consider other grounds of challenge. This application is accordingly allowed. The order of detention dated 9th October, 1988 (Annexure-1) as also the order of confirmation passed by the State Government (Annexure-4) dated 6th December, 1988, are quashed. The respondents are directed to release the petitioner forthwith unless he is required in connection with any other case.